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When and why do the urban poor in African democracies support opposition 
parties?   Given that Africa has the world‘s highest urbanization rates and is 
experiencing an expansion in urban poverty, the region‘s urban poor increasingly 
represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization.  Yet, opposition parties within 
the region have exhibited differential success at garnering votes from the urban poor.   
Based on the cases of Senegal and Zambia, this study argues that opposition 
parties that employ a populist strategy are more likely to win support from the urban 
poor than parties that employ alternative modes of mobilization.  A populist strategy is 
characterized by the combination of an anti-elitist discourse and a policy message 
firmly focused on social inclusion, a charismatic leader who professes an affinity with 
the under-class, and the targeting of election campaigns in low-income urban areas.  
The advantage of a populist strategy is that it provides greater differentiation than the 
myriad of purely personalistic parties within the region and greater congruence with 
the policy priorities of the urban poor, including service delivery, jobs, and housing.  
The argument is based on a novel set of primary data collected from 400 
informal sector workers in Dakar and Lusaka, in-depth interviews with slum dwellers, 
and semi-structured interviews conducted with political elites.  Using both qualitative 
and quantitative methods, this data illustrates the different modes of mobilization used 
by various parties in these two countries and shows why a populist strategy in 
particular generates the most support from the urban poor.  Furthermore, the data 
allows for the testing of alternative hypotheses for the urban poor‘s voting behavior: 1) 
  
vote-buying, 2) ethnic alignments, 3) retrospective economic voting, and 4) 
associational membership.  
The second part of the study examines when an opposition party will adopt a 
populist strategy with the urban poor.  A populist strategy is alienating to other voters, 
such as rural residents whose support is still necessary to win national elections in 
most African countries. As such, a populist strategy is only feasible if an opposition 
party can mobilize a segment of rural constituents through appeals to a politically 
salient ascriptive identity. In such cases, an opposition party can form a minimum 
winning coalition that consists of the urban poor, to whom populist policies are 
directed, and a segment of rural voters, who provide sufficient votes to win electoral 
majorities.    
Overall, the study emphasizes how demographic and socioeconomic trends 
intersect with party strategizing and voting behavior.  Furthermore, the study holds 
important implications for democratic contestation and consolidation in Africa, 
scholarship on party-citizen linkages, and cross-regional comparisons of the evolution 
and manifestations of populism.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 ―No power, no votes!‖ was the chant hurled at Rupiah Banda, the presidential 
candidate for the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), when he 
toured Kanyama township during Zambia‘s 2008 electoral campaign. Kanyama, one 
of Lusaka‘s poorest and most populous neighborhoods, suffered from frequent 
electricity outages and frustrated residents were determined to withhold their one 
source of currency, their votes, until the problem was rectified (Chilemba 2008).  
Ultimately, the MMD suffered a crushing electoral defeat both in Kanyama 
constituency and the rest of Lusaka, losing to an opposition party known as the 
Patriotic Front (PF).  
 On a micro-scale, this example illustrates how the urban poor in African 
democracies vote for the opposition when those issues most relevant to their own 
lives, such as the delivery of basic goods and services, remain unaddressed by 
incumbents.
1
   The puzzle, however, is why in other African countries, where the 
urban poor face equally difficult living and working conditions, this sector of society 
nevertheless remains loyal to incumbents and less inclined to support the opposition.  
This dissertation aims to address this puzzle by examining the interaction between the 
strategies employed by political parties and the voting behavior of Africa‘s urban 
poor.   
The preferences of the urban poor are increasingly relevant to multi-party 
politics within the region.  In the past, urban centers frequently represented the locus 
of political contention and change in Africa.  Between the 1930s and 1950s, African 
                                                          
1
Throughout this study, ―Africa‖ refers only to those countries in the sub-Saharan region of the 
continent.    
2 
 
cities were the source of anti-colonial strikes throughout the region, ranging from 
railway workers in Senegal to dockworkers in Kenya.  A few decades later, in the 
struggle for political liberalization from authoritarian and one-party regimes, cities 
were once again where citizens and state authorities clashed.  From the villes mortes 
campaign in Cameroon to the bloodier Soweto uprising in South Africa, the inability 
to govern the city placed political regimes in highly vulnerable positions.
2
    
 Today, with some form of multi-party democracy prevailing in many African 
countries, cities on the continent are gaining even greater prominence. African cities 
are growing faster than in any other region of the world, with urban population rates 
averaging five percent per annum over the last twenty years.  Future demographic 
projections indicate no abatement of this process, with an expected tripling of the 
region‘s urban population within the next 30 years, resulting in urbanites becoming the 
majority for the first time in Africa‘s history (Kessides 2006).  Although rural-to-
urban migration is still prominent, urban-to-urban migration and natural population 
growth within cities increasingly are driving Africa‘s urbanization (Freund 2007; 
UNFPA 2007; UN-Habitat 2009). Moreover, Freund (2007) notes that while urban 
Africans still maintain linkages with relatives in the countryside, returning there in a 
pattern of circular migration is becoming an increasingly less attractive option.     
The economic processes accompanying this urbanization have resulted in a 
dual pattern of development.  While urban areas generate approximately 60 percent of 
Africa‘s economic growth, employment opportunities remain scarce and incomes are 
either stagnant or falling (Sisk 2004).  This is largely because capital investment in 
these cities is oriented towards commercial businesses, finance, and tourism instead of 
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 The villes mortes campaign was a general strike in the towns and cities of Cameroon during the early 
1990s as a protest against President Paul Biya‘s opposition to constitutional reform and multi-party 
elections.  The impetus for the Soweto uprising of 1976 was opposition by South African youth to being 
forced by the apartheid regime to learn Afrikaans in school.   
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industrial and manufacturing enterprises where more jobs are usually created (Myers 
and Murray 2007).  High unemployment and underemployment, environmental 
hazards, and sub-standard public service delivery all indicate the strains imposed on 
government management by rapid urbanization.
3
  These challenges are compounded 
by the fact that most African countries retained legal frameworks for urban 
development aimed at containing settlement instead of confronting rapid growth 
(Hansen and Vaa 2004).  One indication of this is that the region‘s slum population 
nearly doubled within the last 15 years, prompting the United Nations to claim that 
urbanization in Africa is ―virtually synonymous with slum growth‖  (UNFPA 2007: 
16).
4
   
Indeed, many analysts have noted that both income indicators and other 
measures of human deprivation, such as health and access to public services, point to 
an increase in urban poverty within the region. For instance, according to household 
survey data for 26 African countries, Ravallion et al. (2007) discovered that while 
overall poverty declined in Africa since the early 1990s due to large-scale out-
migration from rural areas, urban poverty actually increased.
5
 In fact, the share of 
urbanites comprising the region‘s total poor population grew from 24 percent in 1993 
to 30 percent in 2002.  A review of recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers revealed 
that the share of the urban population living below the poverty line is more than 40 
percent in certain African countries, such as Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Malawi, Niger, Senegal, and Zambia (Mitlin 2004). Haddad et al. (1999) found that 
the absolute number of the urban poor and undernourished in a number of developing 
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 In fact, as of 2008, 35 African countries suffered electricity shortages due to growing demand coupled 
with increased prices for oil and coal (Childress 2008). 
4
 Between 2000 and 2010, Africa‘s urban slum population increased from 103 million to 200 million 
people (UN-Habitat 2010).   
5
 This process contributes to the decline in rural poverty not only by reducing the amount of people 
living in rural areas but also by providing the opportunity for remittances to be sent back from family 
members living in the cities.  Ravallion et al. (2007) arrived at these figures based on defining poverty 
as living below $1.08 a day in 1993 purchasing power parity.   
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countries, including those in Africa, has both increased over the last 15-20 years and 
outstripped corresponding changes in rural areas.  Satterthwhaite (2003) likewise 
argues that urban poverty not only is growing but also has been severely 
underestimated in the past.
6
   
Yet, while these trends are generating alarm amongst demographers, 
development practitioners, and urban planners, the political implications of such 
dynamics have thus far received little attention.  This contrasts starkly with 
scholarship in other regions of the world that has examined how contemporary 
demographic and economic changes impact political party strategies and voter 
behavior (e.g. Clark and Lipset 2001; Mair et al. 2004; Roberts and Wibbels 1999).  
As such, this study examines the political implications of rapid urbanization 
and the expansion of urban poverty in Africa by addressing two research questions.  
The central research question asks when and why do the urban poor in African 
democracies support opposition parties?  This study argues that such voting decisions 
depend on the strategies used by political parties to incorporate the urban poor into the 
political arena.  Populist strategies in particular are more likely to attract the urban 
poor than alternative approaches.  As defined in more detail in Chapter Two, a 
populist strategy represents a mode of mobilization that involves an anti-elitist 
discourse, a policy message oriented around social inclusion, and a charismatic leader 
who professes an affinity with the under-class. Its advantage in mobilizing the urban 
poor is twofold. First, a populist strategy offers voters greater differentiation from the 
multitude of parties within the region that are defined solely by a party leader‘s 
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 There are a few reasons for why this may be true.  First, few countries use differentiated poverty lines 
for rural and urban areas.  Therefore, urban poverty is estimated to be lower because the higher cost of 
living in cities is not taken into account (Bapat, 2009; Mitlin, 2004).  Moreover, such poverty lines are 
usually based on food expenditures, ignoring that non-food expenditures, such as rent, transport, and 
fuel, are a large source of expenditure in urban areas.  In addition, while access to certain services is 
greater in urban areas, few indicators measure the quality of the services, which can be lower in urban 
areas due to higher population densities (Satterthwhaite 2003, 2004).  
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personality.  Secondly, it provides greater policy congruence with those issues most 
relevant to the urban poor‘s living and working conditions.  Where an opposition party 
employs a populist strategy, then that particular party is more likely than its 
competitors to gain a plurality of votes from the urban poor during presidential 
elections.   
The second research question asks why and when do opposition parties choose 
a populist strategy to actively mobilize the urban poor?  Two conditions are required.  
First, a country needs to have a sufficient share of its population living in urban areas 
for politicians to have an incentive to employ a populist strategy with the urban poor.  
Even if this condition is met, a second requirement is that an opposition party can 
form a minimum winning electoral coalition that consists of the urban poor and a 
segment of rural dwellers.  The latter are more likely to be mobilized according to a 
politically relevant identity cleavage, such as ethnicity, language, or religion. Where 
such cleavages exist, an opposition party can obtain national electoral majorities by 
relying on a populist strategy to win over the urban poor in the cities and appealing to 
a segment of rural dwellers along identity lines.         
Addressing voting behavior and party strategies in tandem offers an interactive 
approach that accounts for both the participation of the urban poor and the behavior of 
political elites.  A multi-level research strategy that spans two countries, Senegal and 
Zambia, and their respective capitals of Dakar and Lusaka illustrates the argument.  
Qualitative evidence on party strategies, based on interviews with political elites and 
local experts, is complemented by a quantitative analysis of survey data on political 
preferences collected from the urban poor within each city.  This latter data is 
significant because it represents a unique and novel set of information on both the 
voting decisions of the urban poor as well as their perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of their country‘s respective political parties.   
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Who are the urban poor?  
Before addressing this study‘s central research questions, it is first necessary to 
understand the actors at the core of the analysis.  In this particular study, the urban 
poor consist of low-income residents of Africa‘s largest cities.  They are 
predominantly unemployed, underemployed, or laboring in the informal sector and 
often living in illegal or sub-standard housing.  Importantly though, the study does not 
focus on those living in absolute poverty, such as those who survive by begging or 
sleeping in city streets.  For such individuals, the quest for everyday survival takes 
precedence over participation in political life.   
Deriving this conceptualization of the urban poor involved a number of 
considerations. First, by definition, the urban poor reside in their country‘s major 
centers of population and economic activities. This study in particular focuses on those 
living in their country‘s largest city as measured by population. The largest city is not 
necessarily a primate city, which is defined as containing at least twice the national 
population of the country‘s second largest city (Jefferson, 1939).7  Aside from 
Abidjan, Dar es Salaam, Lagos and Johannesburg, most of Africa‘s largest cities are 
also their country‘s capital city.  Similarly, by definition, the urban poor survive on 
less money than other urbanites.  However, there is no specific level of income that 
can be uniformly applied across urban households to classify them categorically as 
poor or not.   In fact, measuring urban poverty by incomes alone obscures important 
differences in the prices faced by urban consumers across different countries and the 
quality of their access to certain goods and services (Satterthwhaite 2003).       
Since it is well-recognized that poverty is multi-dimensional and extends 
beyond income measures (e.g. Atkinson 1987; Sen 1999), other indicators of 
deprivation also need to be taken into account.  Specifically, the urban poor 
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 The reason for making this distinction is that some countries, such as Ghana and South Africa, do not 
have a primate city and therefore, they would be excluded from any cross-country analyses. 
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predominantly reside in substandard housing, made of fragile materials and prone to 
frequent maintenance. Their communities are variously referred to as squatter 
settlements, informal settlements, slums, and shantytowns, and such terms will be 
used interchangeably in the present study.  According to UN-Habitat (2006: 19), all 
terms refer to housing that lacks one or more of the following:  durable structures, 
sufficient living area, access to improved water, access to sanitation, and secure 
tenure.  In such communities, the number of household members in each dwelling far 
exceeds what can be comfortably withstood by these housing structures.  Today, 
approximately 72 percent of Africa‘s urban population lives in such housing 
conditions (UNFPA 2007).   
Besides how they live, where the urban poor live is also a distinguishing factor.  
Hazardous terrains prone to flooding, next to railroad tracks, or under electricity 
pylons represent common areas of settlement for the urban poor (Davis 2004). 
Combined with inadequate access to clean water and unsuitable sanitation facilities, 
such conditions increase the urban poor‘s susceptibility to water-borne diseases, such 
as cholera and malaria. For instance, based on data from the Africa Population and 
Health Research Centre, infant mortality, under-five child mortality, and diarrhea 
prevalence in Kenya is much higher for the slums of Kibera and Embakasi than for 
either Nairobi as a whole or rural Kenya (cited in Kessides 2006).  Analyzing time-
series data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), Brokerhoff & Brennan 
(1998) likewise found that reductions in infant mortality between the 1970s and 1990s 
was lower in urban areas of Africa with over one million people than in rural areas.   
 The employment opportunities available to the urban poor are either scarce or 
low-paid and insecure.  Poor macroeconomic conditions, lack of education and 
training, and bad health are just a few of the factors that prevent the urban poor from 
finding well-paid work (Baharoglu & Kessides 2002). The problem has been 
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exacerbated by the number of youth entering African cities each year looking for jobs 
(World Bank 2009a). As a result, most of the urban poor resort to toiling in the 
informal sector which, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO 2002: 
3), means that they are not recognized or protected under the legal and regulatory 
frameworks within their respective countries.  More specifically, they receive no 
social protection, are subject to highly erratic incomes and unstable employment, 
possess little security of property rights, and rely on informal channels for 
information, training, and credit.  Those in the informal sector are, for example, 
engaged in street vending, marketeering, shoe-shining, domestic work for households, 
or self-employed in micro-enterprises.  While true that not all those who work in the 
informal economy earn low incomes and that not all those who are poor work in the 
informal sector, average incomes in the informal economy are on the whole much 
lower than in the formal economy (ILO 2002: 31).
8
  Moreover, as Myers and Murray 
(2007: 6) note, escaping poverty via the informal sector is very difficult:  ―The 
socioeconomic survival of the poor depends upon a downward spiral of self-
exploitation…where the competitive subdivision of already overcrowded marginal 
niches in the ‗shadow economies‘ of the urban milieu generates only miniscule 
returns, despite the extensive expenditure of time and effort.‖  Overall, the informal 
sector is believed to account for 61 percent of urban employment in Africa (Kessides 
2006: 12) and is estimated to be the source of more than 90 percent of additional jobs 
that will be created in Africa‘s urban areas within the next decade (UN-Habitat 2003: 
103).  
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 There is actually a debate over the proper definition of the informal sector, with some analysts 
preferring a more restrictive conceptualization that simply refers to those who are engaged in untaxed 
activities. However, given that there is no metric by which to judge one definition as superior to 
another, the official one used by the ILO, which is the multi-lateral organization in charge of labor and 
employment issues, is used here.   
9 
 
Admittedly, urban poverty in Africa takes on multiple and diverse 
manifestations across the continent and even within the same city, the poor are not a 
homogenous entity.  Moreover, classifying individuals inevitably results in 
oversimplifications that obscure important differences and potentially misrepresents 
how those individuals actually view themselves.  Nevertheless, the features discussed 
above collectively distinguish the urban poor from their compatriots and help refine 
the focus of this study.   
 
Why focus on the urban poor? 
 Given that they comprise the majority of residents in African cities, and that 
their numbers continue growing, the urban poor can have a potentially significant 
impact on the region‘s political landscape.  Indeed, they represent an example of what 
Kitschelt (2000: 849) terms ―vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies.‖ While they 
may be ignored by politicians during normal times, the urban poor‘s numerical 
advantage means that they are actively courted by political parties during election 
campaigns. Dietz and Shildo‘s (1998: 284) observations from Latin America also 
holds for Africa:  ―Numerous studies over recent decades have shown that the urban 
poor are not a homogeneous mass that behaves or votes in predictable or uniform 
ways, but their sheer numbers inevitably have made them targets for politicians now 
and in future‖ (Dietz and Shildo 1998: 284).  For instance, Kersting and Sperberg 
(2003) note that in the Ivory Coast, political authorities only visit shantytowns during 
an election year.  More generally, Africa‘s urban poor often comprise a large share of 
party cadres, and frequently are transported to political rallies by parties to generate a 
sense of popular momentum around a particular candidate.    
Though Lewis‘ (1959, 1966) analysis of subaltern groups in Mexico and 
Puerto Rico popularized the notion that the urban poor are generally politically 
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quiescent and apathetic, other studies in the developing world reveal more nuanced 
behavior.  Thornton (2000) found that workers in Mexico City‘s small-scale informal 
sector were more likely to vote in elections than formal workers.  In India, Yadav 
(1996: 96) has described a ―second democratic upsurge‖ in which electoral 
participation rates are increasingly higher among low caste, poorer, and less well-
educated citizens.  Based on two rounds of Afrobarometer data, Bratton (2006) noted 
that by 2005, Africa‘s urban poor were turning out to vote more often than they had in 
the late 1990s.
9
  Moreover, survey research in Kenya and the Ivory Coast revealed that 
voter turnout amongst shantytown dwellers exceeded the national average (Kersting 
and Sperberg 2003).  All of this suggests that voter turnout in Africa, and its attendant 
implications for parties‘ electoral fortunes, often depends on mobilizing the urban 
poor.  
Yet, the voting decisions of the urban poor in contemporary Africa are not 
well-understood.  The historically small size of this sector of society is one 
explanation for this omission.  In addition, the urban bias literature of the 1970s and 
1980s, popularized by Bates (1981) and Lipton (1977), emphasized that African 
policymakers kowtowed to the wishes of urban dwellers at the expense of exploiting 
the agricultural sector.  The belief that an urban bias in government practices still 
persists, and that Africa‘s urban dwellers remain privileged over their rural 
counterparts, traditionally has caused urban poverty in Africa to be sidelined as an 
area of study (Maxwell et al. 2000).   
 Literature that has examined the impact of urbanization and urban poverty on 
political dynamics in Africa is insightful but based on analyses that pre-date much of 
the region‘s transitions to multi-party democracy.  For instance, Baker‘s (1974) study 
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 Afrobarometer is a project that conducts public opinion surveys in 20 African countries at regular 
intervals.    
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of the impact of demographic processes on political change in Lagos provides an in-
depth, historical view over fifty years, but the study ends in 1967, only shortly after 
Nigeria received independence from Britain.  Theoretically-rich and broad-sweeping 
analyses of political participation and party responses to the urban poor in developing 
regions, such as Nelson (1970, 1979) and Huntington and Nelson (1976)  were 
conducted at the height of one-party regimes in Africa.  They also preceded much of 
the region‘s adoption of structural adjustment programs, which are believed to have 
exacerbated the extent of urban poverty (White 1996). In Tripp‘s (1997) study of 
Tanzania, the urban poor, represented by Dar es Salaam‘s informal sector, are placed 
at the forefront of analysis.  Yet, the focus is on their role in lobbying for economic 
and political liberalization over the course of the mid-1980s and early 1990s rather 
than their preferences and behavior in the country‘s post-transition period.    
This research gap contrasts starkly both with current empirical trends in Africa 
as well as with the vast theoretical literature on the urban poor and political parties in 
other regions of the developing world.  Particularly in Latin America, which 
experienced the same twin processes of massive urbanization and economic decline 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the political participation of the urban poor and the 
linkages forged with them by political parties comprise a substantial share of the 
literature on that part of the world.  For instance, the ties created with the urban poor 
by the Peronists in Argentina (e.g. Stokes 2005; Auyero 2001), by the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico (e.g. Eckstein 2001; Fox 1994), and by 
Hugo Chávez‘ Movimiento V República (MVR) in Venezuela (e.g. Canache 2004; 
Rincon 2007) are well-documented.  Moreover, social and economic conditions cause 
such ties to evolve so that traditional clientelist links between ruling parties and the 
urban poor in countries such as Mexico and Brazil may be eroding as people recognize 
that access to certain goods and services should be their rights as citizens rather than a 
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reward for their vote (Fox 1994; Gay 2006).  Increasingly, scholars of Latin America 
observe that relationships between the urban poor and political parties there are 
transforming into ―associative networks‖ that involve a diversity of actors, a dynamic 
bargaining over demands and resources, and less inequality amongst participants 
(Chalmers et al. 1997; see also Collier & Handlin 2009).  The comparative dearth of 
knowledge about both the voting alignments of Africa‘s urban poor, as well as how 
political parties interact with this growing sector of society, therefore motivated the 
decision to place the urban poor at the center of analysis.   
 
Outcomes of Interest 
One of the main dependent variables examined in the present study concerns 
the voting behavior of the urban poor during presidential elections.  Voting behavior 
encompasses who an individual supported as well as whether she/he chose to abstain 
from elections.  Both types of choices provide indications of the appeal of the 
available opposition parties as well as the degree of satisfaction with the status quo.   
  Political participation among the urban poor has many manifestations besides 
voting.  On the one extreme lie subversive forms of resistance, such as Tripp‘s (1997) 
study of the non-compliance of urban informal sector workers to economic policies 
implemented by the Tanzanian state during the mid-1980s.  At the other extreme are 
openly violent acts spurred by a growing political consciousness among the urban 
poor who become angry over their relative deprivation (Gutkind 1973).  Indeed, the 
United Kingdom‘s Commission for Africa (2005: 29) warned in its official report that 
―[Africa‘s] slums are filled with an increasingly youthful population, unemployed and 
disaffected.  Africa‘s cities are becoming a powder keg of potential instability and 
discontent.‖  The deadly riots in Nairobi‘s slums in the aftermath of that country‘s 
2007 presidential elections and widespread support of Antananarivo‘s poor for the 
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undemocratic overthrow of Madagascar‘s president in early 2009 lends some 
credibility to this warning.  Active involvement in organized protest movements, such 
as those detailed by Piven and Cloward (1977) with respect to the poor in the United 
States, occupies a space in between such extremes.     
Yet, in most countries, voting is the most common and easiest mode of 
political participation.  This is especially true for the urban poor, who have limited 
resources for activities beyond their daily survival (Dietz 1998), and survey research 
elsewhere suggests that voting is the most frequent form of political participation 
engaged in by this group (see Kersting and Sperberg 2003).  Voting behavior provides 
one outcome indicator of whether the urban poor are taking advantage of the existence 
of multiple parties in the hope of having their demands for jobs, services, and 
infrastructure addressed.  According to Huntington and Nelson (1979: 75), voting 
provides a powerful tool  for eliciting responsiveness by elites: ―By and large, the 
evidence from recent studies reinforces that from earlier ones:  political participation 
via the ballot is a potent weapon of the urban poor in achieving higher levels of certain 
material benefits and thus in helping to reduce economic inequality.‖ Moreover, 
although election data in Africa is not always entirely accurate, it remains more 
complete and comparable than other forms of political participation.  
 The primary motivation for specifically focusing on voting in presidential 
elections is because they usually arouse strong emotions and often attract the most 
participation amongst all classes. The major presidential candidates and their 
respective parties are often better known by the broader populace than those running 
for more local elections. Moreover, voters‘ calculations of who to support in 
legislative or local elections may vary significantly from those for presidential ones, as 
well as depend on whether or not local elections are held concurrently with national 
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ones.
10
  In addition, considering the low degree of fiscal decentralization in many 
African countries and the high dependence of local governments on transfers from the 
central government (Brosio 2000; Olowu 2007), voters may still hold national 
representatives rather than local ones accountable at the ballot box when urban public 
services are insufficient and inefficient.    
Political parties‘ linkage strategies to the urban poor represent both the main 
causal influence with respect to the study‘s primary research question and the main 
outcome under investigation in the secondary research question.  The concept of 
―linkages‖ refers to the manner in which support and influence is exchanged between 
voters and parties (Barr 2009: 34).  Kitschelt (2000) delineates three types of linkages 
according to the mode by which parties mobilize constituents.  Clientelist linkages 
involve the disbursement of selective benefits in exchange for votes and are usually 
forged with lower-income constituents.  This may be in the form of money and gifts 
during campaigns or development projects and legal concessions only in those 
neighborhoods where residents showed loyalty at the ballot box.  Parties that rely on 
programmatic linkages can map their policy programs along an ideological spectrum.  
In contrast to clientelist linkages, programmatic linkages imply that all constituents 
experience the impact, both good and bad, of those policies rather than just those who 
supported the party.  Personalistic linkages constitute a third category and involve 
appeals to constituents almost entirely via a politician‘s charisma.   
This study argues that populist strategies represent an amalgam of Kitschelt‘s 
three linkages.  A populist strategy relies on a constituency base of poorer, subaltern, 
and often unorganized groups (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001).  As with personalistic 
linkages, a populist strategy involves mobilization via the charisma of a party leader 
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 For instance, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) argue that non-concurrent elections tend to increase the 
probability of the executive and legislature being held by different political parties.    
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and fosters unmediated ties between the leader and his/her followers (Barr 2009).  At 
the same time, a populist strategy contains key programmatic components that 
manifest through an anti-elitist discourse and a policy message that promotes social 
inclusion.  In addition, a populist strategy can potentially mobilize voters through ―an 
economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to 
create a material foundation for popular sector support‖ (Roberts 1995: 88).  As 
detailed in Chapter Two, each of these linkage strategies in turn holds implications for 
a party‘s organizational structure.    
 
To Vote or Not to Vote for the Opposition?  
The viability of opposition parties is critical to the consolidation of democracy.  
As Dahl (1971) noted, political competition is one of the two key dimensions of 
democracy because it provides voters with choice. By extension, such competition and 
the availability of choices are impossible without strong, credible opposition parties. 
This is especially true for Africa‘s young democracies, many of which are 
characterized by the entrenchment of incumbent parties (e.g. Bratton 1998;  Bogaards 
2000; Doorenspleet 2003).     
When voting data from presidential elections is examined, divergent support 
for opposition parties by the urban poor appears across African countries experiencing 
similar demographic changes.  Specifically, Table 1.1 examines patterns of party 
support and level of urbanization across 15 African countries.  Level of urbanization is 
used as a proxy for the relative weight of the urban poor in the population.  The 15 
countries presented here were selected based on their conformity to a minimal notion 
of electoral democracy, which is a prerequisite for understanding party competition 
and the participation of the urban poor.  Specifically, following Lindberg (2007), those 
countries included have held at least two elections, not endured an electoral 
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breakdown caused by a coup or other military intervention, and obtained a rating of 4 
or better on ―political rights‖ by Freedom House at the time of their last elections. 11  
The ―political rights‖ category assesses a country‘s electoral process, degree of 
political pluralism and participation, and government functioning, including the 
pervasiveness of corruption.
12
 As such, it captures key elements of an electoral 
democracy.   
As a result of using these criteria, Guinea Bissau and Madagascar were 
excluded due to democratic reversals in 2009.  Moreover, disaggregated election data 
was not available for Cape Verde, Niger, São Tome e Principe, and Seychelles so, 
urban preferences could not be discerned.   In Mauritius, the National Assembly and 
prime minister are elected from multi-member constituencies with each voter having 
three votes and thus, it is not possible to determine the exact percentage of voters who 
supported each party.   
For the remaining countries, the results of the most recent presidential 
elections are provided here where presidential systems exist while parliamentary 
results are provided for those countries, such as Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa, 
which are not purely presidential.  If, at the time of elections, a party belonged to the 
opposition and received a plurality of votes in the largest city, then the respective 
country is classified as ―opposition party dominant.‖ Similarly, if the incumbent party 
at the time of elections received a plurality of votes in the largest city, the country is 
categorized as ―ruling party dominant.‖  Those countries highlighted in bold have an 
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 Notwithstanding some criticisms of this measure (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), it offers a 
comparative measure of political rights that is available for a broad time period across a wide range of 
countries.  The Freedom House scale assigns a 1 to countries that best fulfill the political rights category 
and a 7 to those that are the worst performers in this dimension.  As such, among the other criteria 
mentioned, those countries included obtained a ranking ranging from 1 to 4 in their last elections.  
12
 For more specific details, see Freedom House (2009).   
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opposition party in control of the municipal council of the largest city. More specific 
details about this election data can be found in Appendix One.  
 
Table 1.1:  Patterns of Political Party Support in Africa’s Largest Cities 
Level of 
Urbanization
a
  
Ruling Party Dominance in 
National Elections (year) 
Opposition Party Dominance in 
National Elections (year)  
Low  
(Below 35%)  
Malawi (2009) 
Mali (2007) 
Mozambique (2009)  
Tanzania (2005)  
Lesotho (2007) 
 
High  
(35% and above)  
Botswana  (2009) 
Namibia (2009) 
Senegal (2007) 
South Africa  (2009) 
Benin (2006)
 b
 
Ghana  (2008) 
Kenya  (2007) 
Nigeria (2007)
c
 
Sierra Leone (2007) 
Zambia (2008) 
Sources:  Countries included based on calculations from Freedom House (2010); Urbanization 
classification based on data from the UN‘s World Urbanization Prospects:  The 2007 Revision 
Population Database, available at http://esa.un.org/unup/.  
Notes: 
Countries chosen for inclusion are those which fit the following criteria:  1) have held at least two 
elections, 2) have not had a coup or other military intervention to reverse those elections, and 3) 
received a rating of 4 or better on ―political rights‖ by Freedom House. The bold-faced countries are 
those in which the largest city is actually governed by an opposition party. 
a
  Based on the 2007 UN Population Database, 35 percent of sub-Saharan Africa‘s total population lives 
in urban areas as of 2005.  Thus, those countries with an urbanization rate below this regional average 
are classified as ―low‖ and those above are classified as ―high.‖   
b
In Benin, the candidate supported by the  incumbent party, FARD-ALAFA, was Daniel Tawéma and 
he only obtained 0.6 percent of the vote.  The national vote was won by an independent candidate, Yayi 
Boni but, in Cotonou, the PRD candidate Adrien Houngbédji obtained the majority of votes and 
Nicéphore Soglo of the opposition RB is the mayor.   
c
 Lagos does not have a mayor but rather its affairs are run by the governor of Lagos state. 
Importantly, Table 1.1 illustrates that the level of urbanization plays an 
important role in determining the success of opposition parties.  In fact, those 
countries in which the opposition has obtained a plurality of votes in the largest city 
predominantly are more urbanized, meaning that a higher share of their population 
lives in urban areas.  Another noticeable feature of this Table is that conventional 
institutional explanations about voting outcomes are not supported.  Countries in 
which opposition parties have won a plurality of votes in the largest city span a variety 
of institutional types.  Indeed, they have done just as well in presidential regimes, such 
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as Nigeria and Kenya, as they have in parliamentary ones like Lesotho.  Moreover, the 
opposition has garnered the plurality of votes in countries with first-past the post 
electoral systems, such as Zambia, as well as in countries with two round majority 
run-off systems, like Benin and Sierra Leone. 
 
Table 1.2:  Patterns of Political Party Support across Selected Poor 
Neighborhoods 
(Most recent presidential election) 
 
Country 
(Largest 
City) 
Opposition 
dominance 
in largest 
city? 
Poorest 
Neighbor
-hood(s) 
Constituency Opposition 
vote share in 
constituency 
(party), % 
Ruling vote 
share in 
constituency 
(party), % 
Botswana 
(Gaborone) 
No Old 
Naledi  
Gaborone 
South 
34 
(BNF) 
41 
(BDP) 
Namibia 
(Windhoek) 
No Katutura Katutura East 
& Central 
25 
(RDP) 
48  
(SWAPO) 
South Africa 
(Johannesburg) 
No Orange 
Farm  
Ward 3, 
Region G  
6 
(COPE) 
89 
(ANC) 
Tanzania 
(Dar es 
Salaam) 
No Temeke Temeke 29 
(CUF) 
66 
(CCM) 
Ghana 
(Accra) 
Yes Old 
Fadama 
Odododiodoo 59 
(NDC) 
41 
(NPP) 
Kenya 
(Nairoi) 
Yes Kibera Langata 69 
(ODM) 
24 
(PNU) 
Zambia 
(Lusaka)  
Yes Chaisa  Mandevu  63 
(PF) 
29 
(MMD) 
Sources:
 
 The sources and accompanying notes for the data in the above table can be found in Appendix  
   Two.    
 
Since voting data is not disaggregated by income group, the vote share in the 
largest city accorded to opposition parties acts only as a proxy for estimating the 
degree of support amongst the urban poor.  Admittedly, this is an imperfect indicator 
because cities are not uniformly poor.  Yet, additional details at the municipal level 
increase confidence that voting patterns in the largest city reflect the preferences of the 
urban poor.  Table 1.2 provides the voting shares for the opposition and ruling parties 
for the electoral constituencies in which some of the poorest neighborhoods are 
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located for selected countries.  The poorest neighborhoods were based on secondary 
research, detailed in Appendix Two, that identifies where each city‘s largest slums 
exist or where objective indicators of deprivation, such as income and access to basic 
services, are most extreme. The Table suggests that amongst those countries where the 
main opposition party has obtained the plurality of votes within the largest city during 
the country‘s most recent presidential election, those living within some of the poorest 
neighborhoods of those cities contributed to that outcome.  A similar conclusion can 
be drawn in those countries where the ruling party obtained a large share of support in 
the largest city.    
Afrobarometer data for a sub-sample of the countries presented in Table 1.1 
offers another means for exploring the party preferences of the urban poor.  
Afrobarometer represents a public opinion poll assessing Africans‘ socioeconomic 
conditions and perspectives on the health of their respective country‘s democracy.  
Table 1.3 presents the share of Afrobarometer respondents who admitted two things:  
1) they feel close to a particular party and 2) the party to which they feel closest 
belongs to the opposition.  The classification of respondents as ―poor‖ and ―non-poor‖ 
was based on calculations of a Lived Poverty Index (LPI) for urban residents.  As 
described by Mattes and Bratton (2009), an LPI captures the multi-dimensional 
aspects of poverty by averaging people‘s rankings of their living conditions according 
to five components:  access to cash income, medical care, food, clean water, and 
cooking fuel.  Since the Table does not actually capture whether a respondent voted 
for an opposition party in the last elections, the results here should be considered 
suggestive rather than definitive.  
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Table 1.3:  Share of respondents who feel closest to an opposition party 
Country  Poorest Half in Urban 
Areas, % 
(N)  
Wealthiest Half in 
Urban  Areas, %  
(N) 
All Rural, % 
  
(N) 
Botswana  36.2  
(38)  
30.7 
(27)  
27.9 
(117)  
Ghana  49.3 
(74)  
28.2 
(35)  
35.9 
(147) 
Kenya  80.2 
(69) 
76.1 
(51) 
78.6 
(456) 
Lesotho  39.1 
(27) 
43.3 
(29) 
31.8 
(146) 
Malawi  34.4 
(21)  
37.0 
(20) 
24.2 
(161) 
Mozambique  6.2 
(8) 
 6.0 
(6) 
  5.9 
  (34)  
Namibia  34.3 
(51) 
45.1 
(41) 
23.9 
(119) 
Nigeria  54.9 
(112) 
61.1 
(96) 
52.8 
(322) 
Senegal   27.2 
(31) 
37.5 
(27) 
23.1 
(98) 
South Africa  26.6 
(114) 
40.2 
(138) 
15.3 
(73) 
Tanzania  13.0 
(15) 
9.6 
(9) 
  7.3 
(36) 
Zambia  65.0 
(89) 
88.5 
(69) 
52.2 
(224)  
Sources:  To be comparable with trends presented in Table 1.1, Afrobarometer Round 4 is used for all 
countries that had elections in 2008 and 2009 after Round 4 was conducted or countries where the main 
opposition party was formed subsequent to the Round 3 data collection (e.g. Lesotho, Kenya, and 
Nigeria) Otherwise, Round 3 data was used for countries that had their last election prior to the Round 4 
collection (e.g. Senegal and Tanzania).  
Notes:  The base sample for these calculations was all those respondents who answered that they ―felt 
close‖ to a particular opposition party in their respective country.  The ―poor‖ were determined by first 
calculating the LPI for all respondents, then choosing a cut-off LPI for the population in the urban areas 
within that country.  The cut-off value was simply the median value for that population group.  Since 
the LPI is ranked such that higher values indicate worse welfare, those with an LPI above that median 
threshold were classified as ―poor.‖  The value of this measure is that it respects the location-specific 
nature of poverty, addressing claims that the urban poor are often under-calculated because they are 
measured by the same standards of rural poverty (see Satterthwhaite, 2003).   In other words, the urban 
poor are classified here relative to the overall degree of deprivation within that country‘s urban areas 
rather than in comparison to the living conditions of the rural population.  The 50 percent threshold is 
somewhat arbitrary but also provides a more conservative estimate of the urban poor given that their 
share varies across countries and cities.  
Notwithstanding this caveat, Table 1.3 highlights three main patterns.  First, in 
those countries where the opposition obtained a plurality of votes in major urban 
centers, a large share of the urban poor in particular claimed to have felt closest to one 
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of the parties that belong to the opposition. Secondly, in almost all countries, the urban 
poor favored the opposition more than their rural counterparts, though the variation 
between the urban poor and rural dwellers is larger in some countries than others.  
Thirdly, in some countries, there are distinct differences between the urban poor and 
urban non-poor in terms of their preferences for the opposition while in others, there is 
more cohesiveness. For example, Senegal‘s urban non-poor are more supportive of the 
opposition than the urban poor whereas the reverse is true in urban Ghana.  However, 
in other countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia, a majority of urbanites appear 
to feel closest to the opposition regardless of their socioeconomic standing.  This 
highlights that while broad urban voting patterns generally mirror the preferences of 
the urban poor, particularly since this group comprises the majority in most African 
cities, the views of the urban poor do not always differ from those of other urbanites.   
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Figure 1.1:  Affinity to Opposition among Urban Poor
13
 
                                                          
13 Calculations were based on Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) for all countries that had elections in 
2008 and 2009 or countries where the main opposition party was formed subsequent to the Round 3 
(2005) data collection (e.g. Lesotho, Kenya, and Nigeria) Otherwise, Round 3 data was used for 
countries that had their last election prior to the Round 4 collection (e.g. Senegal and Tanzania).  
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Figure 1.1 also highlights that, according to the Afrobarometer data, there is no 
exact relationship between the level of urban deprivation and support for opposition 
parties amongst the poor.  Indeed, a large share of support exists for the opposition in 
countries with a relatively low average urban LPI, such as in Ghana, as well as in 
countries with very high average LPIs, such as Kenya.  Likewise, minimal support for 
the opposition is clearly visible across countries spanning a wide range of urban LPIs.   
 
The Argument: Populist Strategies and the Urban Poor   
 Such patterns prompt the primary research question at the heart of this study:  
when and why do the urban poor support opposition parties in some countries and in 
some elections but not in others?  As the tables and figure above illustrate, addressing 
this variation requires delving into the internal dynamics between political parties and 
socioeconomic groups within each country.  Yet, few explanations for the voting 
behavior of Africa‘s urban poor exist because, as already noted, the literature on this 
group during the multi-party era is relatively scarce.  Consequently, one is forced to 
either rely on explanations of the urban poor in other areas of the world or evaluate 
whether common claims about general voting behavior in Africa are easily applicable 
to the region‘s urban poor.  
 There are at least four schools of thought in this respect, which are elaborated 
in further detail in Chapter Two.  First, the literature on vote-buying claims that 
political parties encourage loyalty among the urban poor by disbursing money, T-
shirts, soap, food, etc. during electoral campaigns.  Voters see such handouts as an 
indicator of future benefits they may receive if that particular party came into office.  
Thus, by extension, voting disparities across Africa would be attributed to how much 
                                                                                                                                                                       
For information about how the LPI was calculated, please see the notes accompanying Table 1.3.  
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largesse that ruling and opposition parties accordingly provided to poor communities 
before their respective presidential elections.   
A second school of thought posits that ethnicity plays a powerful role in 
shaping electoral preferences in Africa.  In a context where education levels are low 
and party platforms are indistinguishable, ethnicity can serve as an ―information 
shortcut‖ for voters about which candidate is most likely to be sympathetic to their 
needs.  This may be particularly true in urban areas.  Indeed, contrary to the claims of 
modernization theorists, some scholars have argued that urbanization only exacerbates 
the salience of ethnicity in the political, social, and economic domains of African city 
life (e.g. Bates 1983; Melson & Wolpe,1970). As such, this school of thought implies 
that the urban poor are more likely to support a particular opposition party when the 
ethnicity of that party‘s leader corresponds to their own.    
Economic voting represents a third strand of scholarship.  There are at least 
two types of economic voting.  Sociotropic economic voting occurs when constituents 
decide whether or not to support the incumbent based on the performance of the 
overall macro-economy (e.g. Lewis-Beck 1988).  When party support is predicated on 
the vagaries of personal economic circumstances, egotropic economic voting occurs.  
The urban poor are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns because they are 
more dependent than their rural counterparts on monetized goods and services (Fay 
2005; Kessides 2006), but they have fewer resources than the urban elite to withstand 
such downturns.  The retrospective, sociotropic economic voting would therefore 
imply that the urban poor support the opposition in countries where macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate prior to elections.  Likewise, the retrospective, egotropic voting 
hypothesis would postulate that the urban poor vote for the opposition when their 
personal economic conditions worsen in the period preceding elections.      
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Finally, the degree of participation in associational life represents another 
factor that can influence voting behavior.   Among Africa‘s urban poor, associational 
life is increasingly vibrant, whether in the form of self-help groups or organizations 
for slum dwellers and informal sector workers.  From a social capital perspective, 
membership in such associations may increase political activism (e.g. Putnam 1993).  
From a corporatist perspective (e.g. Schmitter 1974), political parties that cater to the 
demands of, or are formally aligned with, such organizations are more likely to garner 
the votes of those organizations‘ members.   
For either empirical or theoretical reasons detailed in Chapter Two, all four of 
these explanations are found incomplete on their own for explaining the disparate 
voting patterns of Africa‘s urban poor.  Instead, this study focuses on the types of 
relationships formed between political parties, the urban poor, and other groups of 
citizens within different countries and over time.   
Specifically, the initial assumption of this study is that both parties and the 
urban poor are rational, utility-maximizers.  The urban poor want improvements to 
their welfare, and parties want to win votes.  Compared with both rural dwellers and 
higher-income urbanites, the urban poor face distinct challenges towards securing 
improved welfare.  Most critically, prices tend to be higher in urban areas and access 
to goods and services is highly monetized whereas in rural areas, basic goods such as 
shelter, fuel, and food, may not be marketed but rather self-provisioned (Bratton 2006; 
Mitlin 2004; Satterthwaite 2004).  Most taxes are paid in cities and used to subsidize 
service provision in rural areas, where taxes on income are extremely rare (UN-
Habitat 2003).  Even when the urban poor do not pay income taxes, they pay value-
added taxes on consumer goods, such as food and beverages.  At the same time, the 
urban poor enjoy fewer informal safety nets in the form of kinship and community 
networks than their rural counterparts, making poor economic circumstances 
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particularly difficult to handle (Maxwell et al. 2000).  Vis-à-vis other urbanites, the 
urban poor are viewed as a threat to state authority by circumventing property laws 
and building homes on land for which they lack an official title (e.g. Centeno and 
Portes 2006).  They also lack the resources of other urbanites to privately secure 
certain services, such as electricity generators and private security guards, when the 
state is under-providing such goods.  Compared to urban professionals, such as 
teachers and nurses, the urban poor lack the leverage to engage in strike activity to 
obtain concessions from the state.  Overall then, the urban poor are uniquely 
dependent on the state for their well-being and therefore, choosing which party to elect 
to national office can hold particularly important implications for them.   
Opposition parties intent on winning votes are most likely to gain the support 
of the urban poor by tapping into the latter‘s disgruntlement and marginalization.  
Populist strategies are especially well-suited to this task.  In a region dominated by 
parties using personalistic linkages that advance vague catch-all messages intended to 
appeal to everyone, parties reliant on populist strategies function in a manner similar 
to a niche product by providing a good for which there is much demand among the 
urban poor but little supply.  As such, populist parties offer greater differentiation 
from the dominant party alternatives in Africa, creating a memorable impression on a 
voter‘s mind.  Moreover, vis-à-vis both the myriad of personalistic parties and the few 
programmatic parties in the region, populist strategies consist of a policy message with 
greater congruence to the issues most relevant to the lives of the urban poor, including 
jobs, taxes, public services, and state harassment.  Congruence is defined as the degree 
of distance between policies advocated by parties and voters‘ own preferences (see 
Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994).  Indeed, as Nelson (1979) notes, populist 
parties are more likely than Marxist or reformist parties to be concerned with the 
urban poor.  In addition, she claims that their appeal to the urban poor is linked to their 
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promise to engage in radical reforms to address the needs of the under-class and their 
rejection of established parties that rarely respond to the urban poor‘s interests.     
This though prompts a secondary research question:  when and why do 
opposition parties employ a populist strategy to target the urban poor?  Populist 
appeals can generate electoral costs as well as benefits.  For instance, opposition 
parties may lose other potential voters, such as rural constituents, by placing the urban 
poor at the forefront of their campaigns.  As Nelson (1979: 323) suggests, so few 
parties systematically exploit the electoral opportunities presented by the urban poor 
because ―Political leaders must also weigh the risks of alienating established 
supporters by overzealous attempts to mobilize the urban poor.‖  
This study argues that two conditions must be met in order for the benefits to 
outweigh the costs.  First, a country must be relatively highly urbanized in order for 
the mobilization of the urban poor to be a worthwhile electoral strategy for any party.  
As demonstrated in Table 1.1, most of the countries in which the opposition has 
proved dominant, in terms of votes gained in the largest city, are highly urbanized.  
Secondly, an opposition party will employ a populist strategy with the urban poor only 
if it has the opportunity to appeal to rural voters along other lines, such as identity.  
Where ethnicity, language, or religion plays a prominent role in society, opposition 
parties can segment their appeal to different constituents, using policy in urban areas 
and identity in rural ones.   
Building on Gibson‘s (1997) concept of ―metropolitan‖ and ―peripheral‖ social 
coalitions, this type of segmented approach allows the opposition to keep its policy 
proposals targeted to the urban poor, who are the core of the coalition, while relying 
on a segment of the rural population for the necessary number of votes to win national 
office.  At the same time, identity appeals help opposition parties conserve scarce 
resources because ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups tend to be geographically 
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concentrated. This allows the opposition to engage in more targeted and less extensive 
campaigning in remote rural areas.  Where such cleavages are more muted or when 
identity appeals are not available to an opposition party, then employing a populist 
strategy with the urban poor is a less practical approach due to the number of other 
constituents, either in the urban elite or in the rural sector, whose vote opposition 
parties may lose as a consequence.   
 
Research Cases and Design  
 This argument is illustrated through a comparative case study approach that 
spans countries, cities, communities, and individuals.  Specifically, the study focuses 
on political parties and the urban poor in Senegal and Zambia. Besides offering a 
comparison across countries, the analysis also examines party linkage strategies over 
time in each country for the purpose of testing the argument‘s internal validity.     
Senegal and Zambia are two of Africa‘s more urbanized democracies with 
relatively old capital cities. Officially established in 1857, Dakar‘s pace of 
urbanization accelerated with the development of the first rail line in West Africa in 
1885 (Scheld 2002). Lusaka was founded in 1905 during the building of a railroad 
from Cape Town to the mining areas of today‘s Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Hansen 2002).  The age of both cities means that contemporary urbanization trends 
are driven more by urban-to-urban migration and natural population growth rather 
than rural-to-urban migration (ANSD 2005: 181; CSO 2003a).  Almost one-quarter of 
Senegal‘s population and 50 percent of its urban population resides in Dakar (ANSD 
2007a; UN 2007).  Thirty-five percent of Zambia‘s population is considered urbanized 
and 32 percent of its urban population lives in Lusaka (UN 2007; World Bank 2009b), 
with other significant portions living in the country‘s urbanized Copperbelt region.   
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Income poverty rates are high but still tend to under-state the level of 
deprivation because they are measured according to national poverty lines rather than 
separate urban and rural ones.  In  Dakar, 42 percent of the population were estimated 
to live below the national poverty line based on 2002 data (Mesple-Somps 2007) while 
43 percent of population in urban Lusaka Province is considered poor (World Bank 
2007a).  The degree of deprivation in Dakar is further emphasized by the fact that 76 
percent of the city‘s population labors in the informal economy, a sector which 
accounted for 97 percent of employment growth between 1994-2005 (ANSD 2007b:  
48; World Bank 2007b).  In Zambia, urban unemployment increased from 13.7 to 26 
percent between 1990 and 2000 (CSO 2003a) and today, 56 percent of the country‘s 
urban population and 69 percent of Lusaka‘s works in the non-agricultural informal 
sector (CSO 2007; World Bank 2007a).  
Beyond working conditions, each city‘s poor live in a sub-standard housing 
environment.  Seventy-six percent of Senegal‘s urban population lives in slums14 with 
most of Dakar‘s poorest residents living in vast irregular settlements in the city‘s 
suburbs of Parcelles Assainies, Pikine, and Guediawaye.  A majority of these 
residents, as well as beggars, lepers, and street-peddlers were viewed by authorities as 
encombrements humains, or ―human clutter,‖ and pushed out of Dakar‘s city center 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Collignon 1984;  Zeleza and Eyoh 2003).  Conditions in 
these neighborhoods are dire:   
 
In Pikine for example, an average of 20 households may share a single water source, 
and many others have no access to a latrine.   The consequences of limited urban 
planning force suburbanites to shift back and forth between the city center and outer 
areas in search of housing, hospitals, schools, employment opportunities, and other 
basic resources necessary for survival (Scheld 2002: 86). 
 Likewise, as a result of British town planning principles, the dearth of government 
housing initiatives, and the lack of private sector housing development, more than 70 
                                                          
14
 See UN-Habitat database:  http://www.unhabitat.org/ (accessed June 10, 2009).  
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percent of Lusaka‘s residents live in squatter settlements on the periphery of the city 
center, which are popularly referred to as ―shanty compounds‖ or ―high-density areas‖ 
(Hansen 2002; Mulenga 2003; UN-Habitat 2007).  Most of these compounds lack 
proper infrastructure and key services such as internal plumbing, which in turn often 
forces communities to share the same latrines and communal water taps (Taylor 2006).  
As Hansen (2002:  85) surmises, ―The health of the public is seriously at risk in 
Lusaka at the outset of the 21
st
 century due to the combined effects of overcrowding, 
declining infrastructure, and insufficient services.‖ The return of cholera in the city 
during every rainy season and the large number of deaths caused by tuberculosis 
highlight the urgency of the situation.    
Despite facing similar living and working conditions, the urban poor in Zambia 
turned to the opposition during recent presidential elections while their counterparts in 
Senegal chose to re-elect the incumbent.  Specifically, Zambia‘s ruling party, the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), first entered office with strong 
support in both the country‘s urban areas and almost all rural provinces. While 
corruption and economic mismanagement during the 1990s under President Frederick 
Chiluba significantly reduced the MMD‘s popularity, economic circumstances 
improved considerably under President Levy Mwanawasa‘s tenure, which began in 
2001.  In fact, under Mwanawasa‘s New Deal government, the country‘s inflation 
dropped to single digits and economic growth averaged approximately five percent, 
buoyed by improved copper prices and substantial external debt forgiveness 
(Economist 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007).   
Yet, high unemployment and economic disparities persisted and in the October 
2006 presidential elections, Mwanawasa and the MMD lost substantially to the 
Patriotic Front (PF) in Zambia‘s major urban areas.  In Lusaka district, the PF 
presidential candidate, Michael Sata, obtained 58 percent of the vote compared with 
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27 percent for Mwanawasa.  In the 2008 presidential by-elections that followed 
Mwanawasa‘s death, Sata gained 60 percent of the votes in Lusaka compared with 30 
percent for the MMD candidate Rupiah Banda.  In both elections, Sata‘s voting shares 
were particularly high in urban Lusaka‘s poorest constituencies, such as Chawama, 
Kanyama, Mandevu, and Matero.  Similar high results in cities within the Copperbelt 
Province lend credibility to Gould‘s (2007: 8&9) observation that ―Michael Sata has 
brought real issues of concern to the urban poor into the political arena.‖  
 In Senegal, the current ruling party, Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) and 
its leader, Abdoulaye Wade, retained support from the urban poor during the 2007 
presidential elections.  This occurred despite the fact that few jobs were created during 
most of President Wade‘s first term, prompting thousands of Senegalese men to risk 
their lives by immigrating to Europe in ramshackle fishing boats (Polgreen 2007).  
Many of President Wade‘s projects, such as the multi-lane Corniche highway along 
the Atlantic coast, were deemed to have favored the city‘s wealthy few rather than the 
poor majority, prompting observations that life in Dakar was operating ―à deux 
vitesses,‖ at two speeds (Meunier 2008: 38).  Yet while Dakar‘s intellectuals 
supported opposition candidates, such as Ousmane Tanor Dieng of the Parti Socialiste 
(PS), Moustapha Niasse of the Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP), or Rewmi’s 
Idrissa Seck, many of Dakar‘s poor surprisingly still supported the incumbent.  Indeed, 
in both the region of Dakar and at the national level, Wade received 55.9 percent of 
the votes in the first round of the 2007 elections, exceeding the majority needed to 
obviate a second round.  As Galvan (2009: 5) observes, ―Tellingly…angry mobs did 
not take to the streets to denounce the government‘s alleged ‗theft‘ of the presidential 
election.‖  Despite Wade‘s failure to deliver for the urban poor, the latter did not shift 
their support to the opposition.    
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The Senegalese opposition's inability to mobilize the urban poor in those 
elections contrasts starkly with Wade's own stint in the opposition only seven years 
previously.  In fact, during the second round of Senegal's historic 2000 presidential 
elections, overwhelming support in Dakar helped Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS 
defeat the then-incumbent PS candidate, Abdou Diouf.  The support of other 
opposition parties for Wade‘s Sopi coalition catapulted Wade to victory during those 
second round of elections.  Critically though, Wade far exceeded the number of votes 
obtained by any of his competitors in Dakar during the first round of the elections, 
indicating that Dakarois at that time did not just want a general of change of political 
regime but a specific change that involved Wade as leader.  In particular, Galvan 
(2001) argues that Wade inspired hope among Dakar‘s economically marginal youth.   
 
Table 1.4:  Schematic of Party Strategies and Outcomes in the Case Study 
Countries 
 
 SENEGAL ZAMBIA 
2000 2007 2001 2006/2008 
Strategy by 
opposition party 
or parties  
Populist strategy 
by PDS 
Personalistic 
and 
programmatic 
linkages  
Personalistic 
linkages  
Populist 
strategy by 
PF 
Outcome in 
largest city  
Opposition PDS 
wins more than 
50 percent of 
vote  
Incumbent PDS 
wins more than 
50 percent of 
vote  
Vote is split 
amongst 
opposition parties 
and incumbent 
MMD 
Opposition 
PF wins 
more than 50 
percent of 
vote  
  Given the comparable situation of the urban poor in both countries, support 
for the opposition in Zambia‘s recent presidential election, but not in Senegal‘s, 
proves puzzling.  As shown in Table 1.4, this disparity though can be attributed to the 
manner in which the opposition parties in each country mobilized the urban poor and 
further substantiated by examining changes in mobilization strategies over time.  
While the PF used a populist strategy with Zambia‘s urban poor in the 2006 and 2008 
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elections, Zambia‘s opposition parties relied on personalistic linkages in the 2001 
elections.  By contrast, Senegal‘s opposition parties used personalistic linkages with 
the urban poor during that country‘s 2007 elections while the PDS employed a 
populist strategy with this sector of society during the 2000 elections.  
Specifically, in Zambia‘s 2001 elections, neither of the two main opposition 
parties, the Forum for Democratic Development (FDD) and the United Party for 
National Development (UPND), obtained an overwhelming plurality of votes in 
Zambia‘s urban centers, including Lusaka, because of their reliance on personalistic 
linkages. After these elections, Mwanawasa increasingly steered the MMD to a more 
programmatic orientation, focused on free-market policies intended to attract foreign 
investment, particularly in the country‘s copper sector.  At the same time though, he 
placed even greater restrictions on the urban poor by amending the ―Street Vending 
and Nuisances Act‖ to include more stringent provisions and launching his ―Keep 
Lusaka Clean Campaign,‖ which blamed informal workers for traffic congestion, 
littering, cholera outbreaks, and deterring business investment in the city.  With the 
help of his Minister of Local Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, those living in 
informal housing settlements were often threatened with, or actually experienced, 
demolitions (see Mushinge 2007;  Mwape 2007).  To fortify the MMD‘s clientelist 
linkages in rural areas, he simultaneously began a massive fertilizer and food subsidy 
program for agricultural smallholders under the Food Reserve Agency.   
As a consummate political entrepreneur who previously was a major player in 
the MMD, Michael Sata took advantage of this disgruntlement and used a populist 
strategy to achieve victory among the urban poor during both the 2006 and 2008 
elections.  With showmanship tactics, such as arriving at the High Court in a 
speedboat to register the Patriotic Front (PF) for the 2008 elections, Sata represents the 
quintessential charismatic politician.  Popularly known as ―King Cobra,‖ he also has a 
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record for getting things done.  For example, when he was Lusaka District Governor 
in the 1980s, he provided affordable housing to many residents and cleaned the 
rubbish off the streets (Gould 2007).  In cities, he appeals to the poor based on their 
main economic priorities, using a campaign slogan of ―lower taxes, more jobs, and 
more money in your pockets.‖  He simultaneously has increased his share of national 
votes in each subsequent election by campaigning heavily in the predominantly rural 
Northern and Luapula Provinces. There, he appeals to voters on the basis of his 
Bemba identity and espousing that no true Bemba politician has ever been president.  
In fact, his campaign symbol of Noah‘s Ark, intended to indicate that all Zambians 
should get aboard the PF to survive economic hardships, was nationally advertised 
only with the Bemba phrase Pabwato, meaning ―get on the boat.‖   
When in the opposition, Wade targeted his appeals in urban areas to the 
unemployed youth and members of the informal sector, relied on simplistic language 
and innovative campaign messages, and invented a novel form of campaigning, known 
as the marches bleues.  Despite his failure to deliver tangible benefits for Dakar‘s 
urban poor during his first term, no one Senegalese opposition party was able to tap 
into the frustrations of this constituency in the 2007 elections and duplicate Wade‘s 
previous populist strategy.  Instead, a majority of the opposition parties in Senegal are 
perceived as the preserve of Dakar‘s citadins, or the traditional urban elite, who 
express discontent with policies via national conferences rather than street protests.  
They espouse virtually indistinguishable party platforms and claim they represent all 
Senegalese rather than one particular constituency base.  Many of their plans to 
improve conditions for the urban poor involve stimulating agricultural growth in the 
countryside and stemming migration to the city, rather than tackling the conditions of 
those already residing in Dakar.   
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  The failure of any one Senegalese opposition party to employ a populist 
strategy with the urban poor was in turn affected by their inability to appeal to rural 
voters along the country's politically salient identity cleavage, which is membership in 
one of the country‘s four Muslim Sufi brotherhoods.  The two largest and most 
influential brotherhoods are the Mourides and Tidianes.
 15
  Sufi brotherhood leaders, 
known as marabouts, play an especially important role in rural areas.  During the 
colonial period, the French formed a close relationship with the marabouts in order for 
the latter to force rural peasants to cultivate peanuts, the country‘s main export crop. 
Peasants who cultivated peanuts on either their own land or that of a marabout thereby 
had a means of paying their dues to their marabout and to Allah. 
16
  In the post-
colonial period, Léopold Senghor and other Senegalese elites continued this alliance 
by providing land, credit, and equipment to marabouts in exchange for their 
compliance with state agricultural and trade policies (Boone 1992; O‘Brien 1975).  As 
Senegal democratized, this patronage relationship filtered over into the political sphere 
such that marabouts would issue their rural disciples a ndigël, or a prescription to vote 
for a particular candidate, during elections.  
During the 2007 elections, Wade courted leaders of the Mouride brotherhood, 
obtaining official endorsement from the Mouride Khalifa Général, Cheikh Saliou 
Mbacké, on the eve of the elections.  At the same time, he also co-opted the leadership 
of one sect of the Tidiane brotherhood.  This in turn prevented opposition parties from 
using religious appeals for significant rural votes. Consequently, opposition parties 
such as the PS, AFP, and Rewmi were forced to rely on personalistic linkages with the 
urban poor so as to avoid losing any potential supporters in the rural areas.   
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 The other two orders are the Qadiriya and the Layène (see Beck 2008).  
16
 In the version of Senegalese Islam, marabouts possess the power to grant salvation to their disciples, 
who are in turn required to obey and pay homage to their spiritual leader (Boone 1992: 41).  
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These cases and the study‘s main arguments are illustrated in greater detail 
with four main types of evidence.  First, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with ruling and opposition political party elites, journalists, civil society members, 
local academics, and development experts.  As recommended by Blee and Taylor 
(2002), respondents were chosen according to the principles of ―completeness‖ and 
―dissimilarity‖ such that they spanned different categories of actors who would also 
possess diverse views on their country‘s respective political environment.  These 
actors were asked about differences in the ideologies of their countries‘ main political 
parties, who comprise the main constituency base of each party, and whether parties 
possess any specific policy proposals aimed at the urban poor.   
No known surveys exist of the voting decisions of Africa‘s urban poor. To fill 
this gap, around 400 total surveys were conducted with informal sector workers in the 
capital cities of Dakar and Lusaka during September to November 2008 and February 
to April 2009, respectively.  In each city, these surveys occurred in ten different 
markets, which is where many informal sector workers spend most of their day 
vending from either stalls or on the side of the street. The ten markets in each city 
spanned different electoral constituencies and included both centrally-located markets 
as well as more peripheral ones.  The rationale for focusing on markets rather than 
households was that during weekdays, most of the urban poor and particularly men are 
not at home unless they have a home-based business.  Moreover, the markets attract 
individuals from across the city, allowing the survey sample to capture a mixture of 
ages as well as those with different linguistic and educational backgrounds.  Also, 
based on national survey data, a high percentage of those laboring in the informal 
sector within each country are concentrated in the retail and trade sectors, which is the 
predominant domain of the markets.   
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Twenty people were selected in each market, and the survey procedure relied 
on a random sampling procedure stratified according to gender.  Research in other 
areas of the world highlights that female and male voters can have different 
preferences for candidates or policy proposals (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2000).  
Moreover, in the markets, there tends to be a form of gender segregation such that 
women dominate vending in the food and fabric sector while men concentrate on 
selling cheap manufactured goods or work as shoe-shiners, carpenters, and tailors.  
Stratifying on gender therefore allowed me to ensure that all such occupations were 
covered.
17
  Unlike other variables, such as ethno-linguistic identity or even age, gender 
is also the easiest marker for stratification without asking respondents questions ex-
ante.  Respondents who were younger than 18 years-old and those who did not have 
Senegalese or Zambian citizenship were purposely excluded since these individuals 
are not eligible to vote in either country‘s elections.   
Thirdly, to confirm that the views of the market workers represented those of 
the broader urban poor, more in-depth surveys were conducted with 30 slum or 
squatter households across three different neighborhoods within each city.  Following 
Dietz (1998), the housing settlements were chosen in each city according to 
Przeworski and Teune‘s (1970) ―most similar‖ and ―most different‖ strategies.  While 
the settlements all contained low-income residents, they varied in that a) they were 
located in different electoral constituencies of their respective city, b) some have a 
contentious relationship with the state authorities while others do not, and c) some 
have been prime targets for non-governmental organization (NGO) and international 
donor service delivery projects while others were not.  More details on the choice of 
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 Research by Macharia (1997) in Nairobi, Kenya revealed that the ruling regime may craft different 
relationships with different sub-sectors of the informal economy.   
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markets and neighborhoods and the administration of the surveys are provided in 
Chapter Four.     
Lastly, in order to determine candidates‘ campaign strategies in rural areas, 
census data and newspaper reports were used.  Drawing on the logic underlying 
Posner‘s (2005) work on which identity cleavages become more salient than others, 
census data from each country reveals the share of the population belonging to various 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious categories, and whether these identities are 
geographically concentrated in rural areas.  This information is then combined with 
newspaper reports of candidates‘ campaign stops during each country‘s most recent 
elections, which reveals whether or not they were concentrating their campaigns in 
rural regions where the population overwhelmingly belongs to one particular ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious group.   
 
Study Outline and Broader Contribution 
 The remainder of the study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter Two 
examines theories about the preferences of the urban poor and derives potential 
hypotheses regarding their voting decisions.  In particular, it examines the role of vote-
buying, ethnicity, economic voting, and associational life in influencing voting 
decisions. It then advances this study‘s central argument, which is that voting 
decisions by the urban poor depend on the linkage strategies used by political parties 
to incorporate them into the political arena.  A populist strategy in particular is more 
likely to attract the urban poor than alternative party-voter relationships because it 
offers greater differentiation and greater congruence.   A typology of linkages is 
introduced that distinguishes clientelistic, personalistic, and programmatic linkages 
according to a party‘s constituency base, mode of mobilization, the role of voter 
participation, and implications for party organization.  The similarities and differences 
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with a populist strategy are then elaborated.  The chapter further discusses how the 
semi-structured interviews and survey materials will be employed to help 
operationalize party linkages and the concepts of differentiation and congruence.   
Chapter Three delves into the contemporary political context of Senegal and 
Zambia and focuses on the linkage strategies parties have used with the urban poor.  
Due to the fact that party linkage strategies can change over time, different electoral 
periods since 2000 are examined in each country.  In Senegal, the populist strategy 
employed by Wade and the PDS in 2000 are compared with those used by other 
political parties during that election.  In turn, the personalistic strategies of the PS, 
AFP, and Rewmi parties are examined within the context of the 2007 elections and 
highlighted as a reason for Wade‘s re-election despite his failure to noticeably 
improve their welfare during his first term.  In Zambia, most of the opposition parties 
relied on personalistic linkages in the 2001 elections and therefore none could garner a 
sizeable share of votes amongst the urban poor despite widespread disillusionment 
with the ruling MMD.  While the MMD became more programmatically-oriented by 
the 2006 elections, Michael Sata and the PF relied on a populist strategy with Lusaka‘s 
underclass to both defeat Mwanawasa and the other opposition parties competing in 
those elections. He was able to sustain that strategy and repeat this performance in 
2008, when the MMD advanced Rupiah Banda as its presidential candidate.   
Chapter Four relies on the survey materials collected from the urban poor in 
the markets and the slums in order to understand how they view the political landscape 
in their respective countries.  By using a series of binomial logit models, the 
alternative hypotheses discussed in Chapter Two are tested with respect to Senegal‘s 
2007 as well as Zambia‘s 2008 elections.  In both countries, associational membership 
among respondents is minimal and retrospective sociotropic and egotropic perceptions 
of the economy do not predict voting behavior at a statistically significant level.  
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Likewise, vote-buying fails to explain support for the opposition candidate, Sata, in 
Zambia and for the incumbent, Wade, in Senegal.  Although ethnicity was a 
statistically significant predictor of support for Sata, with Bemba voters more likely to 
vote for him than for other parties, he received cross-ethnic support and no 
respondents claimed that ethnicity alone was the main factor in their voting decisions. 
Rather, most of Sata‘s supporters claimed they supported him because of the PF‘s 
manifesto and their belief that of all the country‘s political parties, the PF was most 
interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka.  
By contrast, most respondents in Senegal supported Wade in 2007 not because 
they appreciated his policies but because he had promised to change them.  Ironically, 
their disappointment manifested in support for the incumbent rather than any of the 
opposition parties.  A majority of respondents further admitted to seeing no distinction 
among their country‘s parties, few understood the concept of a party platform, and 
most believed that no Senegalese party was particularly interested in improving 
Dakar‘s living conditions.  The comparison of survey results emphasizes that an 
opposition party reliant on a populist strategy with the urban poor offers greater 
differentiation and issue congruence than existing alternatives and therefore is more 
likely to secure the urban poor‘s votes.  
Chapter Five examines the second research question, namely why and when 
parties choose to target the urban poor through a populist strategy.   It is argued that 
the logic of electoral coalition building primarily explains when parties decide to take 
advantage of the electoral opportunities presented by the urban poor by specifically 
targeting them through a populist strategy.  For opposition parties, a populist strategy 
oriented towards the urban poor is most likely to emerge in countries where societal 
cleavages exist that allow the opposition party to segment its message and thereby 
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target the urban poor in cities with a populist strategy while appealing to rural dwellers 
along identity lines.  
The argument is then applied to the two case study countries.  In Zambia, the 
PF has complemented its populist strategy with the urban poor with the use of Bemba 
ethnic appeals to the rural population in order to build a unique social coalition.  
Otherwise, Sata‘s dependence on populist appeals alone to the urban poor would prove 
insufficient for gaining substantial national votes.  Yet, this same strategy was 
unavailable to opposition parties in Senegal during the 2007 presidential elections 
because the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, had already co-opted the religious leaders 
from two Sufi brotherhoods.   As such, Senegalese opposition parties were forced to 
use more personalistic appeals in urban areas to avoid alienating potential rural 
supporters, who could not be mobilized through identity appeals.  
In order to evaluate the argument against data from outside the initial cases 
used to generate the theory, Chapter Six applies the study‘s central arguments to three 
other African democracies, Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa.  These cases confirm 
that a populist strategy not only is a wining approach for mobilizing the urban poor but 
also that it almost always is complemented by appeals to a segment of rural voters 
along identity lines.  In addition, the cases show that a populist strategy is not just 
available to opposition parties but rather can be used by incumbents as well to 
reinvigorate their party‘s support among the urban poor.  Chapter Six also summarizes 
the major findings and broader contributions of the entire study while also suggesting 
areas for further research on political parties and the urban poor.   
Taken as a whole, this study on party strategies and voter preferences provides 
a contribution in at least four domains.  First, the study aims to push Africanist 
scholarship in new directions. While a majority of literature on African politics 
focuses on voting behavior, electoral outcomes, or party systems alone, this study is 
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one of the few that examines how parties actually interact with citizens.  By 
recognizing intra-urban disparities and not just rural-urban cleavages, it further 
emphasizes the value of a sub-national approach for gaining a more nuanced 
understanding of the variety of electoral constituencies in Africa with which parties 
interact.  At the same time, the study does not simply examine "the opposition" as a 
monolithic entity but rather differentiates African opposition parties according to how 
they mobilize the urban poor and other constituents.   
 A second contribution is to embed Africa in cross-regional discussions about 
democratic trajectories.  In other regions of the world, demographic and 
socioeconomic dynamics have long represented the impetus for shifts in voters‘ 
behavior and their relationships with political parties.  For example, rapid urbanization 
and processes of economic informalization that contributed to contemporary 
manifestations of populism in Latin America offer a useful lens for understanding the 
African experience.  
Populist strategies, as defined in this dissertation, represent a fusion of 
personalistic, programmatic, and clientelistic linkages.  As such, the third contribution 
is to highlight how, contrary to Kitschelt's (2000) claims, all three linkages can be 
simultaneously combined to provide an especially potent means of mobilization. 
Moreover, the study illustrates how parties can use disparate linkages with different 
constituents within the same country and over time.  
 Finally, the study speaks to the importance of opposition parties for generating 
the level of contestation and citizen participation that characterizes a genuine electoral 
democracy.  In many African countries, opposition parties consistently fail to defeat 
incumbent parties.  Though incumbent advantages explain part of this trend, the lack 
of credible opposition parties is also an important factor.  As will be shown in the 
following pages, in order to have meaningful multi-party competition, opposition 
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parties must not just participate in elections but use such occasions to articulate 
citizens' preferences. By targeting the priorities of the urban poor, opposition parties 
using populist strategies represent a credible alternative to the status quo for this 
particular constituency, and their presence in elections can therefore facilitate the 
turnover of incumbents.  Thus, how the growing ranks of the urban poor are 
incorporated into the political arena will prove significant not only for their own 
welfare but also for broader party development and democratic consolidation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Drivers of Voting Behavior among Africa‘s Urban Poor: 
The Appeal of Populist Party Strategies 
 
Introduction  
Explanations for the motivations underlying the voting behavior of Africa‘s 
urban poor are scarce, and the broader political preferences of this group remain 
unexplored.  Nonetheless, this chapter draws on four strands of literature to derive 
possible hypotheses for when and why the urban poor support opposition parties.  
First, from findings in other regions of the developing world, the literature on 
clientelism postulates that the urban poor support the political party that offers the 
most selective benefits in exchange for votes, and this often tends to be the incumbent.  
Secondly, scholarship squarely focused on Africa highlights the salience of ethnic 
cleavages in voting decisions, predicting that a poor, urban voter will support a co-
ethnic candidate.  These first two schools of thought imply relative stability in voting 
alignments over time.  The economic voting literature, which constitutes the third 
school of thought, argues that voters will punish or reward incumbents for the 
handling of the macroeconomy or for changes in their own personal economic 
circumstances. Since most of their goods and services are monetized, the urban poor in 
particular are very sensitive to fluctuations in the macroeconomy and will accordingly 
withhold votes from an incumbent when inflation rises and incomes tumble.  Fourthly, 
many micro-level studies explore the associational life of Africa‘s urban poor.  This 
literature portrays either a completely self-sufficient urban underclass, divorced 
entirely from placing demands on the ruling regime, or a highly politicized sector of 
society that may even possess direct ties with a political party.         
 For either empirical or theoretical reasons detailed in the rest of this chapter, 
each hypothesis is an incomplete explanation of voter motivations on its own.  For 
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example, politicians may still engage in clientelist practices or ethnic appeals, but 
these practices on their own are not likely to overwhelmingly win over the urban poor.  
Instead, it is argued here that the urban poor's voting decisions depend on the types of 
relationships established with them by political parties during election periods.  
Building on the work of Kitschelt (2000), the chapter proceeds to delineate three types 
of linkages according to not only their mode of mobilization but also their 
constituency base.  Subsequently, it introduces the idea of populist strategies, which 
represent an amalgam of these three linkages.  The chapter then details the logic 
underlying the central argument of this study: opposition parties that rely on populist 
strategies are more likely to obtain votes from Africa‘s urban poor than parties that 
rely on any of the other party linkages alone.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, 
parties that employ populist strategies provide greater differentiation for voters than 
personalistic linkages, which tend to represent the norm in Africa.  Secondly, the 
appeals inherent within a populist strategy offer greater congruence with the policy 
issues most relevant to the working and living conditions of the urban poor. The 
chapter further describes the conceptualization and operationalization of party linkages 
and populist strategies as well as the causal mechanisms of differentiation and 
congruence.  
 
 
Payments and Promises for Votes?   
Clientelism, or the distribution of resources and promises to a select group of 
constituents in exchange for votes and loyality, does not sufficiently explain the voting 
behavior of Africa's urban poor for two reasons.  First, incumbents tend to possess 
more resources than the opposition, meaning that we would rarely observe the 
opposition winning support in urban centers.  Secondly, the opposition tends to 
concentrate those scarce resources that it does possess in urban rather than rural areas.  
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As such, the urban poor can presumably accept resources from every party but still 
vote for the one that they most prefer.  In other words, clientelism does not ultimately 
explain why the urban poor supports an opposition party over an incumbent, or one 
opposition party over another, if all parties are engaged in the same practice.    
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to first examine why clientelism often is deemed 
the dominant mode of interaction between political parties and the urban poor.  For 
Walton (1998), clientelism presents the least costly means of redressing grievances 
that is simultaneously amenable to both the state and the urban poor.  Similarly, based 
on the Argentine experience, Stokes (2005) argues that clientelism is easiest when 
voters are poor enough to value private goods highly but the party values them very 
little.   According to survey data, she found that the higher an Argentinean‘s income, 
the less likely it was that he/she would accept a gift in the hopes that it would 
influence his/her vote.  Dixit and Londegran (1996) and Calvo and Murillo (2004) 
have also advanced the argument that clientelism appeals most to the poor because 
income has diminishing marginal utility as someone becomes richer.
18
  For Kitschelt 
(2000), in the absence of a welfare state, clientelism mitigates instability caused by 
distributional struggles because it appeases the poor without necessarily hurting the 
affluent and concurrently benefits the established political order.  Burnheim (1985) 
also adheres to such sentiments, noting that people get more out of politics when party 
patrons are looking for clients rather than just followers.   
Two main types of clientelism repeatedly appear in this literature.  One type, 
largely derived from observations in Latin America and South Asia, emphasizes the 
importance of established vertical ties between parties and the urban poor. By 
becoming embedded in the neighborhoods and workplaces of the urban poor and 
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 Kitschelt (2000) classifies such explanations as part of the ―developmentalist school‖ on clientelism, 
which emphasizes that more affluent and educated citizens will both value their votes more as well as 
demand private goods that are too expensive for parties to provide.   
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forming long-term relationships with them, local party patrons attempt to foster among 
constituents a sense of loyalty as well as a fear of losing access to certain goods and 
services. For example, Auyero (1999) focuses on a pro-Peronist shantytown in Buenos 
Aires and notes the installation of offices, known as Unidades Básicas, in such 
neighborhoods that operate as brokers for the party:  ―Peronist brokers function as 
gatekeepers for the flow of goods and services coming from the executive branch of 
the municipal power (the mayor) and the flow of support and votes coming from the 
‗clients‘‖(p.303).  In Mexico, Magaloni et al. (2007) observe that during the 1980s, 
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) tried to create clientelist links with new 
migrants in city slums and informal workers by offering property titles, jobs, 
subsidized food and housing, and licenses for vending in flea markets.  Likewise, 
Eckstein (2001) highlights how in the wake of an earthquake in the 1980s that 
destroyed slum dwellers‘ housing in Mexico City, the PRI entered into a pact with 
residents to provide them with affordable housing and even a free tank of gas in 
exchange for their political support.
19
   From research on clientelism in the slums of 
Karachi, Pakistan, Jan van der Linden (1989) reminds scholars that such relationships 
should not be deemed irrational for the urban poor or a sign of ―false consciousness‖ 
but rather a means for obtaining protection and desired goods.   
  Yet, this mode of clientelism requires intermediaries.  In order to disburse 
benefits for votes or punishments for disloyalty, parties require the ability to monitor 
the actions of constituents, which in turn requires an efficient means of information 
gathering.  Auyero (1999) stresses that in order for clientelism to be effective, strong, 
face-to-face relationships are required on an everyday basis, not just around elections. 
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 Also in Mexico, Holzner (2006) examines the PRI‘s influence in a squatter community and concludes 
that clientelism based on strong, vertical linkages can also stifle information flows and prevent the 
urban poor from learning about alternative party options.  In his view, this explains why despite 
receiving few substantial benefits over the previous twenty years, the members of this community 
continued to support the PRI. 
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Furthermore, mass parties that have deteriorated into patronage machines can benefit 
from more institutionalized structures to engage in such clientelism.
20
  Based on her 
research of Argentina's Peronist party, Stokes   (2005: 322) finds that parties with a 
―tentacle-like organization‖ are most amenable to engaging in clientelist practices. In 
the same vein, Kitschelt (2000: 849) notes that "the complexity of material resource 
flows" inherent to this type of clientelism can thrive "through heavy investments in the 
administrative infrastructure of multilevel political machines that reach from the 
summits of national politics down to the municipal level."  
 While examples of this type of institutionalized clientelism do exist in Africa, 
they primarily exist in rural areas where traditional authorities perform the function of 
brokers.  According to Stokes (2005), the monitoring necessary for this type of 
clientelism is more feasible in smaller communities, such as villages, where it is easier 
to gain knowledge about whether someone is inclined to support one party over 
another.  Informal mechanisms of social control through traditional authorities in rural 
areas can further spread this knowledge.   For example, Senegal‘s Parti Socialiste 
distributed credit, monetary benefits, and agricultural equipment to Mouride 
marabouts, who controlled production of the country‘s peanut sector, in order to 
maintain support from the rural population for agricultural policy decisions and to 
obtain votes during elections (see Villalón 1995).
21
 Baldwin (2008) similarly examines 
how goods and services by the MMD to rural villages in Zambia are channeled 
through traditional chiefs, whose legitimacy can in turn deliver votes for the ruling 
party.  While such situations prove advantageous for both the party and the broker, 
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 Mass parties originally emerged in 19th and 20th century Europe as a result of mobilization by the 
working classes.  Historically, they relied on trade unions and social movements to engage voters, and 
they established nationwide networks to expand membership and to espouse the party's ideology 
(Gunther and Diamond 2001).  
21
 Chapters Three and Five detail how the current president, Abdoulaye Wade, has reverted back to this 
practice with the Mourides for the purpose of electoral gain.  
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how much the rural poor benefit from this clientelism remains unclear.  Drawing on 
insights from Bayart (1993) and Rothschild (1985), van de Walle (2007) indeed notes 
that this first type of clientelism in Africa primarily is oriented to serve the needs of 
elites and to help them build coalitions that span ethnic, regional, or religious 
divides.
22
  He observes that the weakness of African party systems and the 
centralization of power around individuals rather than established parties explain the 
dearth of mass-based patronage machines organized around vertical ties with the poor.  
Table 2.1 draws on public opinion data from Afrobarometer to illustrate that most 
voters in major metropolitan centers in Africa do not believe that their votes are 
monitored by political elites.   
 
Table 2.1: Assessment of Vote Monitoring by Parties in African Democracies  
Country  Region in which 
Largest City is 
Located  
How likely do you think it is that powerful people 
can find out how you voted? 
(% of Respondents in Region) 
Not Likely Likely Don’t Know  
Benin Littoral 86.6 12.5 0.8 
Botswana Gaborone 91 7.7 1.4 
Ghana Greater Accra 81 10.4 8.7 
Kenya Nairobi 90.5 8 1.1 
Lesotho Maseru 51.4 39 9.6 
Malawi South (Blantyre) 82.2 13.1 4.6 
Mali  Bamako 48.5 20.3 31.3 
Mozambique Maputo City 64 12.6 23.4 
Namibia Khomas 58.7 32.2 9 
Nigeria Lagos 64.4 35.2 0.5 
Senegal Dakar 62.9 27 9.8 
South Africa Gauteng 59.8 36.1 4.1 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam 57.9 39 3.1 
Uganda Kampala 66 29.8 4.2 
Zambia  Lusaka  57.4 30.7 11.4 
Source:  Calculated from question 48a in Afrobarometer Round 4 Data, accessed at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/ 
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 Arriola (2009) confirms this, finding that across 40 African countries, patronage via the expansion of 
cabinet appointments facilitates the accommodation of elites who are from different ethno-regional 
groups.   
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As such, a second type of clientelism, which focuses on the distribution of gifts 
and promises as part of election campaigns, rather than on the creation of long-term 
relationships, is the more dominant form of clientelism practiced with Africa‘s poor. 
Its manifestations are readily observable in both rural and urban communities.  Hats, 
T-shirts, and bright sarongs covered with candidates‘ faces and party symbols are 
standard fare during election campaigns in Africa.  In many cases, free bus trips to 
rallies, money, meals, and even beer are provided as inducements.  For Fox (1994: 
157&158), such clientelism can actually be termed ―semi-clientelism‖ because 
individuals cannot be easily punished for disloyalty at the ballot box.  Instead of 
threatening to punish, candidates can only claim that their largesse is a precursor to 
even greater benefits if they are elected into office.  In turn, such claims are 
―unenforceable deals‖ for both sides because the candidate cannot be sure the voter 
will support him/her and the voter cannot be sure of the candidate‘s future actions.  
Stokes (2007:  606) distinguishes this second type of clientelism as a sub-type of the 
first and accordingly labels it ―vote buying.‖ 
A burgeoning area of survey research has not only measured the vote buying 
sub-type of clientelism in broadly similar ways across different African countries but 
also concluded that its presence does not unequivocally determine electoral outcomes.   
Using an experimental design approach, Wantchekon‘s (2003) study in Bénin focused 
on eight electoral districts that were each divided into three sub-groups.  In the first 
sub-group, voters were exposed only to campaign messages that stressed the delivery 
of public goods and government jobs only to the members of that community.  In the 
second sub-group, voters only heard from politicians ―public policy‖ messages, which 
focused on national issues.  The final sub-group, which was the control group, heard 
both types of messages.  While Wantchekon found that first type of message worked 
particularly well for regionally-based candidates as well as incumbents, he also 
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discovers that such clientelist appeals are not uniformly accepted, even amongst the 
poorest of voters.  In Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) likewise classified 
clientelism in terms of vote buying, defining it as promises of personal favors, service, 
patronage, or assistance to a voter or a member of the voter‘s family.  Their 
econometric analyses reveal that such promises play a minor role in influencing 
outcomes in Ghanaian elections.  Drawing on Afrobarometer survey data for Kenya 
and Zambia, Young (2009a) operationalizes clientelism in two ways:  as a party 
representative offering a survey respondent food or a gift in return for his/her vote and 
how often the respondent contacts his/her member of parliament (MP) for help with a 
problem. Measured in this manner, the results show that clientelism does not increase 
the likelihood that a voter in either country will support his/her MP again at the polls.  
Using experimental methods in São Tomé e Principe, Vicente (2008) provides more 
nuance by finding that vote buying is more effective with rural than with urban voters.   
With regards to Africa‘s urban poor, additional theoretical reasons cast doubt 
on the ability of vote buying to shape voting alignments.  As noted above, the poor in 
general are the most likely to be targeted by parties using vote buying because more 
affluent voters can afford the goods that parties disburse. At the same time, opposition 
parties typically possess fewer resources than incumbents and have limited 
geographical coverage during campaigns (see Salih and Nordlund 2007).  In fact, 
opposition parties typically concentrate their campaigns in dense urban areas to ensure 
that these resources go as far as possible.  These two facts combined imply that the 
urban poor will be courted by many different parties, all offering material goods and 
promises.  Since these exchanges are ―unenforceable deals,‖ the urban poor can accept 
the generosity of all the parties while still voting for their favorite candidate, or 
abstaining entirely, on election day.  Indeed, based on research conducted in Bénin in 
1996, Banégas (1998) found that voters took advantage of political competition, 
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accepting gifts from every party and then actually voting according to other criteria 
and interests.  Also based on research in Bénin, Wantchekon (2003) discovers that 
amidst this vote buying, the incumbent candidate is believed to be the most credible 
because he/she is already in office.  Based on their analysis of Nigeria‘s 2007 
elections, Collier and Vicente (2009) likewise find that vote buying practices often 
favor the incumbent rather than opposition challengers.  By extension then, if this type 
of clientelism is the driving factor for the urban poor‘s voting behavior, then the 
opposition would rarely ever win substantial majorities amongst this group, 
contradicting current voting patterns across the continent.  Thirdly, as Magaloni et al. 
(2007) observe, parties cannot rely exclusively on vote buying as a campaign strategy 
precisely because it can be very expensive and offers few guarantees about the 
ultimate electoral outcome.   
 Thus, neither type of clientelism provides a convincing explanation for the 
voting behavior of Africa‘s urban poor.  Both types are believed to appeal particularly 
to the poor.  Yet, clientelism characterized by institutionalized, long-term relationships 
with the urban poor is more infrequent in the African context than in other developing 
regions.  The vote buying sub-type of clientelism, which is oriented around campaign 
gifts and promises, creates uncertainty about the actions of voters and the credibility of 
candidates‘ pledges.  Since vote buying practiced by incumbent parties is believed to 
be the most credible, and presumably the most generous, we would rarely observe a 
majority of the urban poor in some African countries offering their support to 
relatively young opposition parties if such clientelism represented the primary driving 
force behind voting decisions.  In addition, precisely because vote-buying by both 
incumbents and the opposition is widespread throughout Africa, this variable fails to 
provide a useful explanation on its own for when and why the urban poor support the 
opposition.   
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Ethnic Voting Alignments  
Similarly, recent empirical research on ethnicity in Africa as well as theoretical 
insights about the diminished salience of ethnic identity in cities cast doubt that 
ethnicity represents the sole feature driving the voting decisions of the urban poor.  
The motivation for thinking otherwise derives from Rokkan and Lipset's (1967) 
seminal work on party systems, which emphasized that societies contain a hierarchy of 
cleavage structures that in turn influence voter alignments. Indeed, a large portion of 
the literature on Africa stresses the prominence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
cleavages within the political sphere.   
Ethnicity in particular frequently is portrayed as a tool strategically used by 
skilled political entrepreneurs to capture a share of the electorate.  During the era of 
one-party rule, Zolberg (1966) highlighted how political leaders used a mantra of unity 
and the fear of ethnic tensions as a means of justifying the banning of opposition 
parties.  Yet, even if political leaders publicly denounced the role of ethnicity in 
political affairs, many nonetheless manipulated ethnicity as a means to stay in power 
(Ottaway 1999).   For instance, Posner (2004a) demonstrates that Malawi‘s Hastings 
Banda assessed the country‘s electoral geography and in turn decided to exploit 
cleavages between the Chewa and Tumbuka groups as a means of holding on to 
political power.  With respect to the multi-party era, Ottaway (1999) claims that 
ethnicity remains a salient feature in electoral politics because the swiftness of 
democratic transitions gave parties little time to develop their policy programs while 
the concurrent discrediting of socialism increased the difficulty for parties to define 
themselves in ideological terms.   
 Why, however, would ethnic appeals attract voters?  According to van de 
Walle (2007), in the absence of programmatic parties, individuals may resort to ethnic 
voting in the expectation that they are more likely to receive certain goods and 
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services from a co-ethnic than from a politician with a different background.  Such 
―cognitive shortcuts‖ are particularly useful for those with minimal education and few 
other means to distinguish political parties (Norris and Mattes 2003).  Indeed, 
Kimenyi (2006)  claims that ethnic groups are akin to interest groups with high exit 
and entry barriers, and ethnic diversity precludes a socially-optimal distribution of 
public goods by increasing the transaction costs of cross-ethnic collective action.  By 
contrast, because collective action problems can be addressed more efficiently within 
an ethnic group and because ethnic groups tend to be geographically concentrated, 
intra-ethnic cooperation facilitates the acquisition of local public goods, which can 
materialize when a co-ethnic is in power.  
Empirical research based on survey data provides ambiguous evidence about 
the impact of ethnicity on voting behavior. For instance, using data from 
Afrobarometer, Norris and Mattes (2003) examine whether a link exists between 
ethno-linguistic identification and party identification. While they find that there is a 
significant relationship between the two variables, they concede that other structural 
factors as well as government performance also influence party support in most 
countries. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) administered their own survey to explicitly 
examine voting behavior, and they find that ethnicity was not an overriding 
determinant of voting decisions over the course of the 1996 and 2000 national 
elections in Ghana.  Rather, ethnicity is only a factor in supporting certain parties for 
about 10 percent of respondents.  Otherwise, the vast majority of survey respondents 
chose parties based on their past performance, their future potential, or their policy 
proposals. Wantchekon‘s (2003) field experiment in Benin also revealed that voting 
decisions are far from determined by a candidate‘s ethnic affiliation.   
These studies, however, do not distinguish between rural and urban voters but 
rather aggregate all voters together.  In the specific context of urban Africa, the 
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salience of ethnicity and its implications for the political arena have been contested by 
anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists.  On the one hand, urbanization 
can foster inter-ethnic competition over scarce resources and opportunities within the 
city.  For Bates (1983: 164-165), the benefits of modernization are limited but also 
highly visible and desired by many in an urban setting, and ethnic groups therefore 
rationally compete with each other to obtain them.  For him, competition occurs along 
ethnic lines because ethnic groups constitute a ―minimum winning coalition,‖ meaning 
they are large enough to gain benefits from the inter-ethnic competition for resources 
but small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits since they are only 
distributed to members of the group.  Based on an analysis of Nigeria, Melson and 
Wolpe (1970:  1115) likewise argue that urban areas create conditions for zero-sum 
conflict amongst different ethnic groups:   
 
Nowhere is the reality of ‗modern scarcity‘ experienced more intensely than in the 
cities, wherein the rate of population growth invariably exceeds the rate of economic 
development and the availability of new jobs.  It is here that the various elements of 
the mobilized population are thrown into direct, and very personal, competition with 
one another---for positions within governmental agencies and commercial concerns, 
for the control of local markets, for admission to crowded schools, for induction into 
the army, and for control of political parties.    
In his study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Young (1965) concurred that urban 
ethnic tensions could be linked to a strong demand for resources that outstrip supply as 
well as the tendency for social status to overlap ethnic divisions (pp.256 &263).  He 
further observed that the co-existence of ethnic groups in urban areas contributed to a 
heightened sense of cultural identity.   
Such observations have been echoed by Cohen (1969), who noted the growth 
of ethnic associations in urban Nigeria intended to assist newly arrived migrants in the 
search for housing and income, as well as Chege (1981), whose analysis of local 
politics in Nairobi‘s slums illustrated that urban settlement was highly ethnically 
segmented.  Huntington and Nelson (1979) also note that African cities contain a large 
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number of urban migrants who ultimately intend to retire to the countryside and 
thereby retain an attachment to rural ethnic ties and village of origin.  For the urban 
poor in particular, Nelson (1979) argues that ethnic ties are the main source of 
information, employment opportunities, and political participation in Africa.  In 
addition, she believes that the inability of the urban poor to forge cross-ethnic linkages 
inhibits their ability to act as a unified political class and therefore she concludes that 
voting, along with other forms of participation, would occur along ethnic rather than 
socio-economic lines.  
On the other hand, theorists argued that urbanization reduces the salience of 
ethnicity via a variety of mechanisms, including through socioeconomic development, 
the exacerbation of inequality within ethnic groups, or exposure to greater diversity.   
Scholars of the modernization school proposed a teleological viewpoint and claimed 
that urbanization constituted a key element of modernization, accompanying an 
expansion in literacy, industrialization, and growth and contributing to more 
progressive and cosmopolitan world views that erode parochial forms of identification 
(e.g. Lerner 1968; Lipset 1959;  Parsons 1975). A few case studies support this 
perspective in the African context.  In Bamako, Meillassoux (1968) found that the 
Muslim religion and the availability of Bambara as a lingua franca contributed to the 
creation of a new urban identity that transcended rural, ethnic affinities.  Crowder 
(1962: 83) likewise claimed that ―tribal‖ identities were difficult to maintain in Dakar 
where he noted that a ―new community of Dakarois‖ were emerging.  For others, the 
expansion of education and media that accompanies such socioeconomic and 
demographic processes tends to increase inequalities within ethnic groups while also 
creating a basis for shared interests and experiences that foster new solidarities across 
ethnic groups (e.g. Beteille 1970; Hargrave 1970).  Proponents of the ―contact 
hypothesis,‖ such as Allport (1954), also argued that prolonged interaction with others 
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reduces barriers to communication and thereby increases mutual awareness of shared 
characteristics, whereas infrequent contact can reinforce hostile stereotyping.  Cities in 
particular provide more of a forum for such interaction than dispersed rural areas.   
Excluding this present study, there are no known contemporary empirical 
studies of whether ethnicity specifically affects the voting behavior of urbanites and 
the urban poor in African elections. Without such data, there are additional theoretical 
reasons for questioning whether ethnicity trumps all other considerations for the urban 
poor when they go to the polls.  First, a constructivist view of ethnicity emphasizes 
that the urban milieu may cause identities to be constantly re-defined and that ethnic 
groups are not necessarily cohesive or monolithic.  Indeed, rather than ethnicity 
becoming transplanted to the city or modernization eroding such affinities, Ferguson 
(1999) found during his study of mineworkers in Zambia‘s Copperbelt an overlapping 
duality in urban identities that were both ―localist‖ and ―cosmopolitan.‖ Eyoh (2007) 
echoes this sentiment, noting that cities contribute to the creation of distinct urban 
identities that are highly heterogeneous and shaped by transnational cultural 
influences, youth, religion, class, locality, gender, and ethnicity.  The mutability of 
ethnicity may be even further enhanced by changing demographic patterns since fewer 
urbanites today are retiring to their rural villages and since most urbanization is fueled 
by natural population growth in cities or urban-to-urban, rather than rural-to-urban, 
migration (Freund 2007; Tacoli 2001).
23
  Indeed, one would expect that the salience of 
ethnicity would be most muted in older cities, which are the ones where natural 
population growth predominantly fuels urbanization and where communal enclaves 
would have had more time to diversify. 
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 Tacoli (2001) notes that while rural-to-urban migration accounted for over 40 percent of urban 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s, it only accounted for about 25 percent during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Secondly, it is not clear that ethnicity serves the same political function in 
urban areas as it does in rural ones.  For rural dwellers with less access to media and 
divergent views, a candidate‘s ethnicity may be interpreted as a sign of a credible 
commitment to deliver goods and services.  However, given the higher population 
density of urban areas, opposition parties in particular are likely to concentrate a 
majority of campaign efforts in cities so as to ensure that their limited resources go as 
far as possible.  As a result, urban residents are more likely than their rural 
counterparts to learn about the various party options available and to make their voting 
decisions accordingly.   
Thirdly, even if ethnic attachments remain strong for urbanites and the urban 
poor, political parties cannot feasibly take advantage of such affinities in their election 
campaigns.  Indeed, according to Barkan (1995),  rural populations tend to lack an 
occupational or class identity and therefore define their interests based on where they 
live instead of what they do, thereby explaining the geographic concentration of votes 
in rural areas during African elections.  For political parties, this implies that ethnic 
appeals are more feasible in a rural setting.  In cities however, political parties cannot 
target their campaign messages as easily along ethnic lines because this would require 
knowing ex-ante whether the urban poor are neatly segregated into ethnically distinct 
housing townships, who is actually attending political rallies to hear the party 
message, and who within these townships is actually registered to vote.  This degree of 
knowledge is rarely available to African political parties and even if it were, the 
possibility of alienating other groups with an ethnic message is quite high in an urban 
setting.  Moreover, according to Eyoh (2007), ethnic residential segregation is less of a 
reality today than in the past precisely because of the rapid growth of African cities 
and the attendant expansion of both poor and mixed-income neighborhoods.   
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Given the prominence of ethnicity in studies on Africa, one cannot outright 
dismiss the impact of this variable on voting behavior. Yet, its influence may vary 
across urban and rural areas. Since rural areas have less access to the media, encounter 
fewer opposition candidates because of the latter's resource constraints, and tend to 
possess more homogeneous and geographically-concentrated identities, ethnicity may 
hold greater symbolic power of a candidate's commitments. By contrast, urbanites 
encounter greater ethnic diversity on a daily basis and more information about 
alternative political options. While the urban poor in particular may not necessarily 
possess a clear class consciousness, the urban setting offers more axes for unity, 
including the need for quality public services and job opportunities, than division.
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Furthermore, both the inconclusive nature of the literature and the lack of voting data 
on this particular issue cast doubt that ethnicity is the dominant means by which the 
urban poor select a political party.  
 
Economic Voting  
While the ethnic voting literature tends to portray voters as intransigently loyal 
to co-ethnics, the traditional economic voting literature implies more fickle citizens 
who will switch allegiances if government performance proves unsatisfactory.   
Increasingly, however, this literature recognizes the importance of intervening factors, 
such as political institutions, for determining whether and how economic factors 
influence voting decisions. As will be shown, even when such intervening factors are 
considered, an analysis of macro-economic data reveals that this school of thought 
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 The failure to disaggregate explicitly urban and rural voters in many recent empirical studies of 
ethnicity and voting behavior may account for why these studies often result in contradictory or 
ambiguous findings.    
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does not offer a robust explanation for when Africa‘s urban poor support the 
opposition.  
By definition, economic voting occurs when economic concerns represent the 
primary motivation for choosing a candidate or party to support.  These concerns may 
be either sociotropic, meaning that voters react to their country‘s overall 
macroeconomic circumstances, or egotropic, meaning that one‘s personal financial 
situation affects his/her voting decisions.  Most of the early research in this field 
originated from studies of the United States and Western Europe, which had ample 
longitudinal data on both elections and economic conditions for statistical analyses. 
Moreover, this literature espoused a common pattern, namely that voters act 
retrospectively and therefore punish incumbents at the ballot box if macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate in the period immediately preceding an election (e.g. Lewis-
Beck 1988;  Tufte 1978).  While individuals can also be prospective and vote based on 
assumptions of a ruling government‘s future behavior, Hibbs (2006) noted that this 
outlook creates a moral hazard problem because voters have no guarantee that the 
government will perform better.  Yet, they have witnessed the ruling government‘s 
past behavior and believe this is a predictable indicator of future trends.  
 More recently, however, scholars have questioned whether voters can draw a 
clear chain of accountability between economic performance and incumbent actions.  
Rather, as Anderson (2007) argues, there are a number of contingencies that can 
inhibit economic performance from directly influencing voting decisions.  Key among 
these is the nature of party systems and political institutions. Coalition governments or 
executives with weak mandates increase the difficulty of attributing responsibility to 
the incumbent.  For example, Samuels (2004) finds that presidential systems increase 
the clarity of partisan responsibility for economic performance compared with 
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parliamentary ones, and this is particularly true if executive and legislative elections 
are held concurrently.  
The importance of party system and institutional variables has been confirmed 
through research focused solely on developing countries. Based on an analysis of the 
1990s in Latin America, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) uncovered that shifts in GDP 
exerted a greater influence in causing electoral volatility in the region‘s legislative 
elections than in presidential ones.  Yet, voters appear to hold presidents more 
accountable if economic performance is measured by inflation rather than GDP, 
indicating that they feel an executive has more control over monetary policy than 
broader economic growth. Focusing on the same region during the 1980s, Remmer 
(1991) found that the larger the shift in GDP, inflation, and exchange rates in the 
period preceding elections, the greater the electoral volatility. However, this volatility 
was more extreme in politically fragmented party systems than in two-party 
democracies. Aguilar and Pacek (2000) examine a more diverse group of developing 
countries and find that deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are associated with a 
higher voter turnout amongst lower socioeconomic groups, in turn leading to greater 
electoral support for not just any opposition party but specifically those parties with a 
leftist or lower class orientation.
25
    
At its core, the theoretical tenets of the economic voting literature are highly 
relevant to the urban poor because this group is considered to be especially susceptible 
to the effects of the macroeconomy.  Shocks to macroeconomic conditions hurt the 
urban poor more severely than the rural poor because of the former‘s dependence on 
cash income to purchase necessary goods and services, including food (Fay 2005; 
Kessides 2006).  In fact, Dietz‘s (1998) analysis of Peru revealed that due to their 
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 Their research directly builds on findings by Pacek and Radcliff (1995), who claim that the stakes of 
economic adversity are even greater in developing countries than industrialized ones because it can 
exacerbate existing sociopolitical tensions. 
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dependence on monetary incomes, Lima‘s lower classes were much more intimately 
tied to, and therefore more affected by, inflation, devaluation, and rising costs of living 
in the 1980s and 1990s than Peruvian peasants, who could rely on self-provision of 
food.  Moreover, in the specific African context, the dominance of strong executives 
and weak legislatures, as well as the small number of parliamentary systems with 
coalition governments, would imply that the potential for accountability might be 
relatively greater.    
Nevertheless, evidence of this relationship in Africa is also scarce. For 
instance, Posner and Simon (2002) offer one of the only known detailed analyses of 
economic voting in Africa. Focusing on Zambia and relying on sociotropic, egotropic, 
retrospective, and prospective perceptions of satisfaction with the economy, they find 
that economic conditions only have a small impact on election outcomes.  At the same 
time though, they find that voters who were dissatisfied with the economy abstained 
from voting in the country‘s 1996 presidential elections instead of supporting an 
opposition party.  
 Figure 2.1 below further highlights that macroeconomic conditions do not 
explain the disparities across African democracies regarding support for the opposition 
by the urban poor.  This Figure examines the election year percentage change in real 
GDP per capita for the 15 electoral democracies in Table 1.1 of Chapter One.  This 
measure not only examines shifts in individual incomes but also is adjusted for 
inflation changes.
26
  As shown, the incumbent retained control in countries with a 
negative or comparatively small percentage change in real GDP per capita, such as 
Senegal.  At the same time, the opposition was dominant in the urban areas of 
countries where the percentage change in real GDP per capita was quite high, 
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 Pacek and Radcliff (1995:  750, footnote 2) further note that this measure is most appropriate for 
intertemporal comparisons.   
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including Zambia.  If economic voting were at play, then we would expect those 
countries classified as ―opposition party dominant‖ to have small or negative changes 
in real GDP per capita previous to their last presidential elections. Instead, the 
overriding impression is that no clear pattern exists between changes in 
macroeconomic conditions directly preceding elections and whether the incumbent 
won a majority of votes in the country‘s largest city. 
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Figure 2.1:  Real GDP per capita (%) in Year of Country’s Most Recent 
Presidential Election
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 Moreover, the economic voting thesis fails to elucidate the causal mechanisms 
linking perceptions of economic performance to voting behavior.  As Anderson (2007) 
discusses, for economic circumstances to influence voting decisions, voters must 
directly attribute blame to the government for declining standards.  In addition to 
institutional constraints, this chain of causality may be disrupted by a host of other 
factors that voters consider responsible for both national and personal economic 
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 The data in Figure 2.1 are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database (2010).  The data are based 
on real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars.  Following Pacek and Radcliff (1995), if an 
election occurred in the first quarter of a year, then the rate change was based on the prior year.   
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circumstances, including global economic turmoil, lack of personal initiative, or 
family sickness (Stokes 2001).  Pacek and Radcliff (1995) further suggest that it is not 
aggregate growth per se but inclusion in the growth process that determines whether 
constituents vote against the incumbent.  Indeed, the urban poor in particular may 
judge a government more on its failure to abide by promises regarding service 
delivery, job creation, affordable education, and better healthcare than about only the 
state of GDP and inflation, which are the most common indicators used in this 
literature.  Finally, the economic voting literature does not recognize the ability of 
parties to shift the locus of accountability for the macroeconomy:  ruling parties may 
possess the marketing skills to convincingly justify poor performance just as 
opposition parties‘ may be able to persuade voters of an incumbent‘s neglect more 
than is genuinely warranted.   
 
Associational Life  
In comparison with the economic voting literature, scholarship on the political 
ramifications of the urban poor‘s associational behavior poses contradictory claims.  
From the perspective of some observers, associational life amongst the urban poor 
provides an outlet for self-help activities and thereby reduces this sector of society‘s 
dependence on the state.  Associational life does have a rich history in Africa, and the 
withdrawal of the state during the period of economic liberalization in the 1980s and 
1990s was expected to provide the necessary political space to further foster its growth 
(see Bratton 1989).  The strains placed on deteriorating municipal infrastructure, 
coupled with growing urban populations, certainly has provided fertile ground for 
―heterogeneous institutions involved in a range of activities including community 
management, provision of social services and infrastructure, finance and credit, and 
religious and social affairs‖ (Tostensen et al. 2001: 20).   
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Examples of such associations are numerous.  Tripp (1991) focuses on rotating 
savings associations and neighborhood watch teams in Dar es Salaam during 
Tanzania‘s economically tumultuous period of the 1980s.  She finds that these types of 
informal, voluntary associations filled critical gaps when the state was too 
incompetent to provide trustworthy financial institutions or adequate police security to 
the urban poor.  Robson (2001) observes a similar dynamic in Luanda, Angola where 
water committees in low-income neighborhoods are responsible for maintaining 
community water taps and obtaining money from residents for their upkeep. For those 
facing a family emergency or interested in starting an entrepreneurial venture, credit 
associations organized along ethnic or religious lines may provide a poor urbanite with 
a crucial lifeline.  For instance, the rotating credit associations, or tontines, among the 
Bamiléké in Douala and Yaoundé are well-known for helping newly arrived rural 
migrants adjust to urban Cameroon (e.g. Bouman 1995; Burnham 1996; Soen and de 
Comarmond 1972).  In Dakar, Senegal, adherents to the Mouride sect of that country‘s 
brand of Sufi Islam can find financial assistance from dairas, which play the same role 
as credit associations (see Guèye 2001).  
Instead of self-help organizations reducing claims-making on the state and 
relying on informal or local support networks for basic goods and services, an 
alternative view of associational life espouses that members of such organizations may 
be much more politicized.  Participation in civic associations can foster trust and 
cooperation and encourage citizens to become more engaged in their political 
communities (e.g. Putnam 1993).  A corporatist perspective goes even further to 
suggest that members of some associations can actually possess explicit ties to specific 
political parties.  Reflecting on developments in countries of Western Europe and 
Latin America, Schmitter (1974: 93-94) defined the concept of corporatism as ―a 
system of interest representation,‖ dominated by a small number of interest group 
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organizations that are ―recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted 
a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and support.‖  In other words, such organizations are notable for their degree of 
―encompassment,‖ containing not only a large, concentrated membership base but also 
a high degree of authority over their members‘ actions (Olson 1971).  In turn, this 
provides them with the leverage to engage in a process of concertation with the state in 
order to design relevant economic and social policies and help with their 
implementation.  By extension, members of such organizations are most likely to 
support the ruling party in charge of the state apparatus when their interests are taken 
into account and filtered into the policy process.
28
  
As in other regions of the world, labor and trade unions in Africa have in the 
past played a relatively politicized role. Unions and their strike activities in the 1940s 
and 1950s were pivotal to ending colonial rule.  Indeed, one of Africa‘s most vocal 
anti-colonial leaders, Guinea‘s Sékou Touré, was the leader of the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT), and he gained notoriety by leading a series of strikes 
against French colonial rule in the early 1950s (Cooper 2002).  During the 1990s, 
labor unions also were key actors in the region‘s pro-democratization movements, 
ranging from Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia (see Bratton 1994; Cooper 2002; 
Decalo 1997; Ihonvbere 1997).  In Zambia, the leader of the Zambian Confederation 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Frederick Chiluba, became the country‘s first 
democratically elected leader in 1991.  Yet, outside of South Africa, unions rarely 
have retained a corporatist relationship with political parties after democratic 
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 Based on her observations of Niger, Robinson (1991) noted a sub-type of corporatism, which she 
labeled ―neotraditional‖ corporatism.  This refers to a state in which technocrats, military officers, and 
aid donor bureaucrats obtain broad legitimacy for policy reforms by cultivating ties with traditional 
forms of authority, such as customary chiefs and Islamic officials.   
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transitions occurred.  For instance, internal divisions over economic reforms caused 
the ZCTU to splinter, and it was rarely consulted by the government on issues of 
economic policy (Rakner 2003).  The growth of the informal sector and loss of formal 
jobs also has weakened union membership throughout Africa (Olukoshi 1998), further 
reducing the power of unions to exert influence over political parties. 
Admittedly, some traditional labor unions are broadening their mandate to 
incorporate informal sector workers.  In Ghana, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) has 
established an informal economy desk that has been assisting informal sector workers 
for over a decade (Croucher 2007).  The example of Senegal‘s Union Nationale des 
Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal (UNACOIS), which is an organization of 
informal sector workers that originally emerged in 1989 to protest the role of state 
monopolies in the country‘s economy (Thioub et al. 1998), also hints at the potential 
for informal sector workers to unionize in their own right.  In fact, in Southern Africa, 
there exists the Malawi Union for the Informal Sector (MUFIS) as well as 
Mozambique‘s Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal 
(ASSOTSI) (War on Want  n.d.).  Likewise, Zambia contains a multitude of such 
organizations, ranging from the Zambian National Marketeers‘ Association 
(ZANAMA), the Zambian Traders and Marketeers Association (ZATMA), and the 
Lusaka Informal Traders Association (LITA) (War on Want 2007). 
Similar organizations exist with regards to improving the urban poor‘s living 
conditions.  One of South Africa‘s most active organizations is Durban‘s Abahlali 
baseMjondolo (shackdwellers) movement, which was founded in 2005 during a 
protest over the dearth of toilets, land, and suitable housing within the city.  Abahlali 
baseMjondolo was particularly vocal about not wanting its members to support the 
ruling ANC in elections until such services materialized (Pithouse 2006).  Along with 
the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Landless People‘s Movement in 
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Gauteng, Abahlali baseMjondolo remains quite active in contesting that country‘s 
anti-slum and squatter legislation (see Tolsi, 2008, 2009).  Other comparable 
organizations include Ghana‘s Homeless People‘s Federation and the Shack Dwellers 
Federation of Namibia.
29
  
Nevertheless, such organizations may not represent the interests of a broad 
segment of the urban poor.  For Nelson (1979), large-scale organization of the urban 
poor is hampered by both the heterogeneous nature of their interests and their lack of 
resources.  Amis (2004) offers some confirmation of such sentiments by observing 
that informal traders in Johannesburg and Kumasi were too poorly organized and not 
sufficiently well-connected to prevent their forcible relocation from markets in their 
respective cities.  Dietz (1998) concurs that the urban poor rarely possess enough 
money and time to engage in associational activities that may compete with other 
responsibilities. A study of street vendors in South Africa found that informal sector 
workers also were loath to join organizations claiming to represent their interests due 
to a belief that the required membership fees fueled corrupt practices (Lund and 
Skinner 1999).  For precisely all of these reasons, Tostenten et al. (2001) question 
whether associational life includes the poorest elements of Africa‘s urban population.   
Without a sizeable membership base amongst the urban poor, it is therefore 
doubtful that such organizations possess the qualities of encompassment needed to 
function in a corporatist mode.  In addition to their small size, Widner (1997) adds that 
such types of associations may be too transient or too numerous to represent a 
dependable source of votes for a party.  According to a report by the International 
Labor Organization (2002), most informal sector organizations are in fact very short-
lived and disband after their objectives are achieved, rarely becoming more 
                                                          
29
 See the Shack/Slum Dwellers International website:  http://www.sdinet.co.za/ (accessed June 22, 
2009).    
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institutionalized structures able to pursue long-term development objectives.  At least 
in the case of Zambia, Rakner (2003) further confirms that a large number of 
economic interest associations precludes any single one from gaining adequate 
attention by the broader public and weak membership bases reduce the government‘s 
incentives to consult with, or consider the concerns of, any single one.  In addition, 
many of these organizations, especially those supported by NGOs, may be loath to 
form close relationships with parties for fear of co-optation into coalitions that 
ultimately implement policies antagonistic to the urban poor.  Such fears are not 
without precedent:  both the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the 
South African Confederation of Trade Unions (COSATU) became handmaidens to 
neoliberal policies directly antithetical to their own interests through their close 
relationships with the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the African 
National Congress (ANC), respectively.  In other words, organizations representing 
the urban poor may be unable or unwilling to perform the delicate act of balancing 
autonomy from party forces with influence over party policies.   
Associational life in Africa is therefore eclectic and vibrant, at least among a 
small segment of the urban poor. How membership in such associations affects voting 
behavior remains nebulous though.  In the scholarship on self-help associations, 
politics appears completely divorced from urban service delivery.   Yet, as Hagopian 
(2007) notes, there is little evidence to suggest that a dense associational life reduces 
the salience of political parties as citizens‘ main source of interest representation.  
Harriss (2005) likewise finds that despite the plethora of organizations for the urban 
poor in Delhi, India, they most commonly seek to have their demands answered 
through political parties rather than NGOs or other representatives of civil society. 
Other scholarship emphasizes the political activism of such associations, and a 
corporatist perspective would presume that associational involvement would hold 
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implications for members‘ party preferences.  However, details on existing informal 
sector or slum dwellers‘ organizations provide little indication that such interest 
groups possess the requisite characteristics of size and authority needed both to 
influence government policies towards the urban poor and to shape their members‘ 
voting decisions.   
 
Party Linkages and Populist Strategies  
Given the incomplete nature of existing explanations for the voting behavior of 
Africa‘s urban poor, this study advances an interactive approach that focuses on the 
relationships between parties and constituents. In particular, the study examines the 
linkage strategies, or mode of connection, used by parties with voters.  As Barr (2009: 
34) specifies, the term ―linkages‖ refers to the manner in which support and influence 
is exchanged by parties and voters.  Differentiating amongst various forms of linkage 
requires understanding who are the voters targeted by a party, how are they mobilized, 
and what is the ultimate aim of their participation.  In turn, the type of linkages 
established with voters holds implications for party organization. 
Kitschelt (2000) delineates three types of linkages:  personalistic, clientelist, 
and programmatic.  Drawing on Max Weber‘s (Roth and Wittich 1968) notion of 
charismatic authority, personalistic linkages depend on appealing to constituents 
almost entirely by showcasing a politician‘s individual qualities.  A party reliant on 
such linkages is virtually reduced to its leader‘s agenda rather than representative of a 
particular ideology or broader mandate.  Clientelist linkages revolve around the 
disbursement of selective benefits, both before and after elections, in exchange for 
votes.  As noted earlier, clientelist linkages with Africa‘s poor tend to manifest 
through the distribution of money, gifts, and promises during campaigns.  Kitschelt 
(2000) further classifies appeals made to citizens based on ethnic or other identity 
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factors as a type of clientelist linkage because such appeals delimit who should receive 
future benefits in exchange for their votes.  When parties offer a set of policies that 
they would implement if elected into office, they establish programmatic linkages with 
citizens.  In contrast to clientelist linkages, programmatic linkages imply that all 
constituents experience the impact, both good and bad, of those policies rather than 
just those who supported the party.  From Kitschelt‘s (2000: 850) perspective, 
―Political parties offer packages (programs) of policies that they promise to pursue if 
elected into office.  They compensate voters only indirectly, without selective 
incentives.‖  
Yet, Kitschelt‘s categorization actually does not define different linkage 
strategies but rather focuses predominantly on how voters are mobilized, i.e. through 
charisma, selective benefits, or policy proposals.  Table 2.2 provides a more 
comprehensive analysis of various linkage strategies.  As already discussed, poorer 
voters typically represent the main constituents for clientelist linkages because they 
are more likely to value the benefits received from parties than better-off voters (e.g. 
Stokes 2005). The main intention of the linkage is to garner votes rather than for the 
poor to exercise any influence over policy orientation, contributing to a vertical and 
asymmetrical relationship between the party and voters.  A hierarchical, party 
structure facilitates this relationship (Gunther and Diamond 2001) and encourages 
direct ties between a leader and voters.   
For personalistic linkages, obtaining votes is also the primary aim of a party. 
However, any particular sector of society may comprise the constituent base.  Since 
the party leader‘s charisma is the main mode of mobilization, vertical ties likewise 
exist between the leader and his/her followers.  Party organization is therefore shallow 
and dependent on the leader (Gunther and Diamond 2001).   
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Programmatic linkages can also be formed with any socioeconomic group but, 
crucially, they have participatory aims.  Relationships are forged with voters in order 
for them to help shape the policy agenda and to become incorporated into the political 
process (Lawson 1980).
30
 Horizontal ties may be formed with civil society 
organizations to expand influence.  This in turn causes accountability to be more 
indirect and dispersed amongst different actors and institutions rather than solely 
attributable to the party leader.          
 
Table 2.2:  Typology of Party Linkages 
Dimension  Clientelist Personalistic Programmatic 
Who is the constituent 
base?  
The poor  Any societal 
group 
Any societal group 
How are they 
mobilized?  
Particularistic 
benefits 
Charisma Policies and 
ideological program  
What is the aim of 
targeting the 
constituent base?  
Votes Votes  Participation in 
shaping policy agenda  
Mode of interaction 
with constituents? 
Direct, vertical 
ties between 
leader and 
voters 
 
Direct, 
vertical ties 
between 
leader and 
voters 
 
Indirect, horizontal 
ties between leader 
and voters, 
 
Party management? Top-down Top-down  Dispersed authority  
 
Parties that employ populist strategies tend to combine aspects of all three of 
these linkages in order to obtain votes.  The concept of populism has proved 
contentious, and often the term is used so frequently to describe parties, promises, and 
leaders that it can become substantially vacuous.  Changing economic, social, and 
political structures can also cause populism to adopt different manifestations over 
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 Roberts (forthcoming) further distinguishes between participatory and programmatic linkages, 
usefully noting that they while programmatic linkages tend to encourage participation, participation can 
also exist in tandem with more eclectic ideologies, as exhibited with Argentina‘s Peronists.  For the 
sake of parsimony, the current study does not engage in a more disaggregated analysis of party 
linkages, even if such an undertaking would add greater conceptual accuracy. 
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time.  As such, Latin American scholars often distinguish between the "classic" 
populism that dominated in that region during the 1930s and 1940s and contemporary 
variants as represented by the parties led by figures such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, 
Bolivia's Evo Morales, or Ecuador's Rafael Correa.  A key distinguishing feature 
between the two types was that classical populism occurred during the early stages of 
industrialization in Latin America, when mass participation in politics emerged, and 
often involved ties to grass-roots organizations, such as labor unions.  Neo-populism, 
however, is less tied to formal organizations and institutions but rather emerges in 
societies that are fragmented and grappling with economic and political 
transformations (see Roberts 2006; Roberts 2007). Given the present study's concern 
with recent political developments in Africa, core aspects of the contemporary 
conceptualization of populism are more relevant, particularly since the degree of 
social organization in Africa never has been sufficiently high to lend itself to the 
classical incarnation of populism and since mass participation in Africa has occurred 
before, rather than in concert with, large-scale industrialization.   
One of the key aspects of this type of "populism" is not just an appeal to "the 
people" but rather to a certain group of people.  Specifically, poorer, subaltern, 
diverse, and often unorganized groups represent the primary constituency base of 
parties that use populist strategies (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001).  As such, there is a 
similarity in constituency base to those parties that rely more exclusively on clientelist 
linkages. Another aspect is that much like programmatic linkages, mobilization of 
these constituents relies on a policy discourse.  While these policies may not 
necessarily fall along a traditional left-right ideological continuum, they are focused 
on a program of social inclusion.  Much of the literature stresses that populism is anti-
elitist and criticizes established institutions (e.g.Canovan 1999;  Ionescu and Gellner 
1969).  Parties that employ populist strategies offer a package of policies oriented 
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around providing goods, services, and recognition to those who have been excluded 
from the economic and political status quo supported by the existing establishment.  In 
the case of the urban poor, these policies do not focus on the provision of valence 
goods, about which everyone agrees.  Rather, they may involve policy decisions about 
practices deemed legal and illegal, formal and informal.  For instance, are shanty 
homes upgraded or demolished?  Are street hawkers harassed or viewed as an asset? 
Are basic services provided to settlements deemed illegal by the state?   To achieve 
these policies and gain support, populist strategies can also involve some selective 
benefits to supporters in the form of economic redistribution or material incentives 
(Roberts 1995), much like the mode of mobilization central to clientelist linkages.   
In addition to an anti-elitist policy discourse to rectify exclusion, a charismatic 
leader is usually a sine qua non of a populist strategy (e.g. Canovan 1999;  Conniff 
1982; Mouzelis 1985).  This leader often professes an affinity with the under-class, or 
a "closeness with the common people" (Weyland 2001:14), which is reinforced by the 
leader's self-portrayal as an outsider to the political establishment against which s/he 
protests (e.g.Barr 2009: 38). By relying on "nonmediated rapport between the leader 
and 'his people'" (Mouzelis 1985, 334), populism is essentially plebiscitarian, ―vesting 
a single individual with the task of representing ‗the people‘‖ (Barr 2009:  36).  As 
with clientelistic linkages, populism tends to involve vertical forms of incorporation of 
the lower classes in developing countries (Mouzelis 1985).  
Populist strategies therefore hold implications for a party's internal structure. 
Specifically, the party will be organized in a top-down manner, with local cadres 
having little autonomy (Mouzelis 1985). Indeed, the party becomes relegated behind 
the leader's prerogatives, sometimes leading to authoritarian tendencies (Norris 1999).  
Both Barr (2009) and Nelson (1979) further emphasize that citizens are not seen as 
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agents of social reform by populist parties but rather as objects for providing votes and 
a popular legitimacy for the leader and/or party.  
Table 2.3 summarizes these characteristics and stresses that populist strategies 
fuse together key aspects of the three voter-citizen linkages.  They share the same 
constituency base as clientelist linkages.  Moreover, they share the same internal party 
organization, direct ties with voters, and aims of personalistic and clientelist linkages.  
However, they also incorporate the modes of mobilization of all three linkages, with 
policy discourse playing a major role.  As such, in contrast to some Latin American 
scholars such as Weyland (2001), who believe that the essence of populism is its 
plebiscitarian organization, this study instead emphasizes that in the African case, the 
programmatic content is critical to populist strategies.   
Table 2.3: Characteristics of a Populist Strategy 
Dimension  Populist  
Who is the constituent base?  The poor  
How are they mobilized?  Policies, 
Charisma, 
Particularistic benefits 
What is the aim of targeting 
the constituent base?  
Votes 
Mode of interaction with 
constituent base?  
Direct, vertical ties between 
leader and voters  
Party organization?  Top-down 
 
The Advantage of Populist Strategies with Africa’s Urban Poor 
Populist strategies exhibit greater appeal to the urban poor than the individual 
party linkages presented in Table 2.2 on their own.  Specifically, as noted earlier, 
clientelist linkages in the form of vote-buying are a common practice in urban areas by 
both incumbent and opposition parties alike.  As such, there is nothing to prevent 
urban citizens from accepting material incentives from all parties and then voting 
according to other preferences.  
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Moreover, Africanist scholars have oft-noted the dearth of parties with 
programmatic linkages that advance distinct policy agendas or a clear ideology (e.g. 
Manning 2005; Ottaway 1999; Randall and Svasand 2002; van de Walle and Butler 
1999).  Instead of a vehicle for class grievances, many established African political 
parties emerged as a result of anti-colonial protest and relied on a nationalist discourse 
that emphasized unity over division.  Africa is also similar to many other developing 
regions in that industrialization occurred after independence, therefore weakening the 
autonomy of trade unions vis-à-vis the state (Mouzelis 1985) and dampening the 
impact of class-based interest groups in political debates.  Moreover, foreign aid can 
constitute one-quarter to two-thirds of central government expenditures in many 
African countries, resulting in a heavy dependence on international donors whose 
conditionalities limit the degree of freedom for parties to define their own political 
programs (Manning 2005).
31
   
Notwithstanding these observations, Africa is not completely devoid of 
programmatic parties.  The long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is well-
recognized as a conservative, free-market-oriented party whose policies have favored 
the creation of an enabling institutional environment targeted at attracting investment 
(Molomo 2000). According to Good and Taylor (2008), the fact that the BDP ruling 
elite emerged from wealthy cattlemen and was never particularly anti-colonialist or 
African nationalist contributed to its orientation.  Under Thabo Mbeki, South Africa‘s 
African National Congress (ANC) became decidedly more neo-liberal, particularly 
through the implementation of the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) 
plan.  GEAR increasingly alienated the ANC‘s leftist alliance partners because it 
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 For example, aid as a share of central government expenditures is 24 percent in Kenya, 26 percent in 
Ghana, 40 percent in Zambia , 58 percent in Benin,  and 59 percent in Senegal.  These figures are for 
the most recent years available in the World Development Indicators 2009.  
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emphasized privatization, tariff reductions, and productivity-linked wage rates (Lodge 
2002).   
Yet, Africa‘s few programmatic parties tend not only to represent the ruling 
party but also to adhere to the right-side of the economic ideological spectrum. 
Traditional leftist parties adhering to socialist beliefs are uncompetitive in 
contemporary Africa due to either the discrediting of socialism in other regions of the 
world (Randall and Svasand 2002) or the absence of a viable constituency base.  
Indeed, the decline of formal labor union participation that has been observed in 
Europe (e.g. Rueda 2005) and Latin America (e.g Roberts 2007) is also reflected in the 
African experience due to economic liberalization programs implemented during the 
1990s.  Without adapting their electoral strategies to incorporate Africa‘s vast non-
unionized, informal sector, such leftist parties as Senegal‘s Parti de l’Indépendance et 
du Travail (PIT), Côte d‘Ivoire‘s Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), or Ghana‘s 
Convention People‘s Party (CPP) cannot gain much support in urban areas beyond 
working-class professionals. In turn, attempting to appeal to the heterogeneous and 
unorganized informal sector requires a more amorphous message and a shift in party 
organization that may reduce the programmatic nature of a traditionally leftist 
opposition party.   
By contrast, personalistic linkages are the norm in most of Africa, and parties 
that forge such linkages tend to advance vague platforms and valence goods, offering 
to improve everything for everyone.  Voters in turn cannot clearly articulate what 
distinguishes the party‘s agenda from the leader‘s personality.   There are a number of 
reasons for this.  First, many new parties in Africa either emerge as, or transition into, 
a vehicle for one individual‘s personal ambitions.  Secondly, the financing of most 
political parties in Africa depends on the personal resources of the party leader rather 
than contributions from citizens or public funding (Bryan and Baer 2005; Salih and 
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Nordlund 2007).  This reinforces both the control of the party leader over the internal 
workings of the party, as well as increases the tendency for political leaders and 
parties to become synonymous in the eyes of the voters.  Thirdly, traditional leaders 
and chiefs retain a prominent role in African societies, ranging from Ghana‘s Ashanti 
chiefdom, Uganda‘s Buganda kingdom, South Africa‘s Zulu kingdom, or the Lozi 
kingdom in Zambia‘s Western province.  Even if such monarchies are largely 
symbolic today, they may contribute to a public tendency, especially among older 
generations, to equate political office with a person rather than party.  Moreover, 
political institutions in many African countries foster a high degree of centralization 
around the office of the presidency, resulting in vast powers awarded to the executive 
(van de Walle 2003).  The fusion of the executive office with a person filters over into 
the electoral sphere, causing campaigns to revolve around a presidential contender‘s 
personal qualities rather than his/her policy beliefs.  In addition, widespread illiteracy 
and minimal education hinders many Africans from reading party platforms or 
comprehending potentially complex policies.  Instead, they may use alternative 
information shortcuts, such as how gregarious or colorful a candidate is on the 
campaign trail, as an indicator for how well s/he will perform in office.   
Given this political landscape, an opposition party that relies on a populist 
strategy with the urban poor is more likely to achieve the latter‘s support at the ballot 
box.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, since most opposition parties campaign in 
urban areas to conserve scarce resources, the urban poor are inundated by political 
contenders.  A party that engages in a populist strategy functions in a manner similar 
to a niche product, in effect choosing an area of specialization for which there is a 
demand that no other party is addressing.  Consequently, populist strategies offer a 
degree of differentiation for a party operating in a political milieu crowded by purely 
personalistic linkages.     
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Greater issue congruence with poor, urban voters represents the second 
advantage of populist strategies. In much of the literature on party-voter linkage 
mechanisms in industrialized countries, congruence is defined as the degree of 
distance between policies advocated by parties and voters‘ own preferences (see 
Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994).  By definition, populist strategies rely on 
mobilization through an anti-elitist or anti-establishment discourse, which 
automatically appeals to poorer and more marginalized groups.  Yet, beyond this, a 
policy discourse by populist parties that addresses the distinct challenges faced by the 
urban poor, vis-à-vis their rural counterparts and more affluent urbanites, further 
enhances congruence. 
What are some of the distinct challenges faced by the urban poor from which 
populist parties can derive a policy message?  Most critically, prices tend to be higher 
in urban areas, particularly in large cities where costs are affected by those with higher 
incomes. In African cities, access to goods and services is highly monetized whereas 
in rural areas, basic goods such as shelter, fuel, and food, may not be marketed but 
rather self-provisioned (Bratton 2006; Mitlin 2004; Satterthwaite 2004).  Compared 
with their rural counterparts, the urban poor are more likely to be tenants rather than 
owners of their homes, increasing their vulnerability to rent increases and evictions by 
landlords (see Mitlin 2007). Unlike rural areas, the urban poor face daily expenditures 
on public transport to reach labor markets (Mitlin 2004).  At the same time, the urban 
poor enjoy fewer informal safety nets in the form of kinship and community networks 
than their rural counterparts, making poor economic circumstances particularly 
difficult to handle (Maxwell et al. 2000).  Formal safety nets are also lacking.  In fact, 
while agricultural input subsidy programs are now popular in a number of African 
countries, such as Malawi and Zambia, equivalent initiatives in the form of urban 
public works programs or food stamps for the poor are virtually non-existent.  
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Moreover, research in other regions indicates that the urban poor are more exposed to 
stimuli from radios, TV, and newspapers as well as the actions of political parties, 
civil society organizations, and neighbors (e.g. Dietz 1998).  This means that they are 
more likely to be aware of the nature of their economic circumstances and the 
potential political alternatives to address their situation.  All of this suggests that while 
absolute poverty remains higher in Africa‘s rural areas, relative poverty may be more 
acutely felt in urban areas where gleaming shopping malls compete with street 
vendors for space and where residents tend to be more politically mobilized.   
Yet, in addition to their difference with rural dwellers, the urban poor may 
experience a dissimilar relationship with the state than more affluent urbanites.  The 
urban poor threaten the authority of the state by circumventing property laws and 
building homes on land for which they lack an official title (e.g. Centeno and Portes 
2006).  In addition, African states have tended to view the informal activities in which 
the urban poor engage as a blight on their cities‘ images (e.g. Potts 2007). As Cooper 
(1983: 42) observes,  
 
In African cities, people are more likely to be buffered from the harshness of poverty 
and unemployment by social ties rooted in illegal space and the nonregulated 
economy, which only emphasize the impotence of the state.  This in turn may draw 
the state into gestures of control that, whether effective or not, show the state‘s 
hostility to the poor‘s efforts at survival.   
Despite such attitudes, the urban poor must depend on the state for service 
delivery much more than other urbanites.  For instance, more affluent urbanites can 
buy generators when electricity provision is erratic or hire private security guards if 
the police are not adequately tackling crime.  Urban professionals, such as doctors, 
nurses, and teachers, also have more leverage for obtaining concessions to their 
demands through strike activity than those in the informal sector.  Indeed, the degree 
of competition in the saturated informal sector and the inability to forfeit even a day‘s 
wages contributes to the urban poor‘s incapacity to use such tactics to place pressure 
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on the state.  Simultaneously though, the degree of desperation amongst this group 
may contribute to shorter time-horizons as their impatience grows for some means to 
ameliorate their plight.  
Thus, the urban poor lack the money or leverage of other urbanites to procure 
private services or elicit government responsiveness. At the same time, they possess 
fewer options to engage in self-provision of goods and services in the same manner as 
rural dwellers.  When they do try to build makeshift homes or sell goods in the street 
as a survival strategy, they often face harassment by the ruling regime during non-
electoral periods.  Their combination of deprivation, dependence, and neglect by the 
government makes them particularly ripe for populist opposition parties that espouse 
radical reforms over a short period of time that are intended to address the existing 
establishment‘s non-responsiveness to their demands.  As such, through both the 
content of their messages and their claim to deliver fast rewards, parties engaged in 
populist strategies provide a close degree of congruence with this group‘s needs.        
Overall then, as highlighted in Figure 2.2, this study argues that populist 
strategies are more likely to generate support from the urban poor because they offer 
greater congruence with the issues relevant to the urban under-class and provide 
differentiation from parties reliant on purely personalistic linkages, which tend to 
mobilize all types of voters with the same catch-all messages.  Yet, they are also 
superior to parties with programmatic linkages oriented around a left-right ideological 
spectrum which are, as discussed above, relatively rare.  Those that do exist are either 
oriented towards salaried workers by dwindling leftist opposition parties or towards 
neo-liberal policies that have not demonstrated much benefit to Africa‘s urban poor.  
In other words, traditional programmatic linkages may offer greater differentiation 
than those of personalistic parties but less congruence than populist strategies that 
focus on policies relevant to the everyday realities of the urban poor.   
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Figure 2.2:  Outline of Argument’s Key Variables 
 
Contributions and Qualifications of the Argument 
In order to fully understand the argument, three important qualifications are 
required.  First, as described thus far in this chapter, populist strategies have a 
specifically urban orientation.  The reason for this is that scholarship in other 
developing regions of the world has noted that populism is predominantly, though not 
exclusively, an urban phenomenon. For instance, in Latin America, urbanization in the 
1930s and 1940s led to classical populism in some countries by contributing to the rise 
of the working classes who lacked representation (Conniff 1981; Conniff 1982; Drake 
1982). In the 1980s and 1990s, the debt crisis and other failed economic policies led to 
a rise in the urban informal sector, whose members were pivotal supporters to the 
populist parties that emerged during that period (e.g. Demmers, Fernández and 
Hogenboom 2001; Weyland 1999).    
Admittedly, previous episodes of populism in Africa have sometimes focused 
on rural areas. The most obvious example occurred in the early 1980s in the wake of a 
military coup when Burkina Faso's charismatic prime minister, Thomas Sankara, 
advocated a radical social revolution.  He privileged the needs of peasants by reducing 
rural taxes, establishing farm collectives, and attempting to provide rural social 
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services (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989).  At the same time though, he alienated 
urban labor unions (Nugent 2004) and razed slum dwellings in the center of the 
capital, Ouagadougou (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989).  Yet, his efforts appeared 
to be a "top-down affair" (Sandbrook 1993: 130), prompted by his own grand vision 
rather than as a response to popular demands on the ground.32 
Today, however, the combination of rapid urbanization, democratization, and 
economic stagnation in Africa can create the foundations for popular discontent in 
cities that can in turn be seized on by savvy politicians.   As Coppedge 1997 notes, 
when a particular cleavage is absent from the political sphere, political entrepreneurs 
face a window of opportunity to form new parties to reflect new social conflicts.  
Huntington and Nelson (1979: 29) observe that this is particularly true when such 
entrepreneurs belong to the opposition:  ―Political elites out of power are more likely 
to be interested in expanding political participation, changing its bases, and, at times 
developing new forms of participation. Bringing new actors into the political arena is a 
classic way of altering the balance of power in that arena.‖  A populist strategy aimed 
at the urban poor is therefore one means for an opposition party to gain votes.  
The second issue concerns the role of class in this analysis.  As defined here, 
populist strategies involve a programmatic element.  Programmatic linkages on their 
own, particularly when forged by mass-based parties, traditionally have depended on 
socioeconomic cleavages (e.g.Gunther & Diamond 2001).  However, the urban poor 
may not necessarily experience a sense of class consciousness that binds them together 
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 Jerry Rawlings is also sometimes portrayed as a populist leader.  However, the populism he expressed 
in the period immediately after his coup in Ghana in 1979 was based on vague notions of rectifying 
immorality and corruption (Oelbaum 2001), which seemed to provide a convenient justification for the 
military takeover rather than a response to popular economic and political demands.  Though the regime 
was sympathetic to keeping transport costs and the prices of consumer goods low for urban residents, 
this often resulted in the destruction of market stalls and the confiscation of traders' merchandise, which 
was then re-sold to the general public by the government at lower prices (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 
1989).      
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and motivates their choice of party. Rather, the point is that the urban poor collectively 
face certain challenges as a result of their living and working conditions, and these 
may constitute the basis for common grievances that are instrumental for parties‘ 
electoral fortunes.  For instance, Cameron‘s (1991) study of Peru‘s expanding 
informal sector revealed that while this group was neither cohesive nor a unified social 
force, its collective emergence profoundly influenced that country‘s party dynamics. 
Moreover, because the programmatic element of populist strategies revolves 
around social inclusion, the implications for other classes will vary according to 
country context.  In certain instances, such a strategy can polarize the electorate along 
class lines and particularly alienate elites. However, in other cases, the non-poor may 
identify with certain goals of a populist strategy, even if they personally are not 
targeted to benefit.  Improving conditions for the poor does not always diminish the 
welfare of the rich, and sometimes may even enhance it by decreasing crime, begging, 
and other social ills. In addition, while the urban poor may support an opposition party 
that relies on a populist strategy because of the particular challenges they encounter on 
a daily basis, the non-poor may vote for the same party primarily for different reasons, 
such as disappointment with the incumbent‘s attempts to alter the constitution or curb 
civil liberties. Indeed, even though populist parties depend heavily on a constituency 
base among subaltern groups, there are cases in other regions of the world where they 
have fostered cross-class support (see Cameron 1991; Gibson 1997; Roberts and Arce 
1998).  Likewise, Table 1.3 in Chapter One illustrated that support for the opposition 
in some African countries was found amongst both the urban poor and urban non-
poor.  
Thirdly, parties are dynamic entities, shifting their interaction with voters as a 
result of both structural factors that change voter preferences and as a means of 
responding to modifications of other parties‘ electoral strategies.  As Hagopian (2007) 
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observes, political parties in developing country democracies may mix their electoral 
strategies with different types of constituents.  Consequently, opposition parties may 
rely on a populist strategy with the urban poor but purely personalistic linkages with 
rural dwellers.  At the same time, ruling parties may craft programmatic linkages with 
elites that espouse a free-market ideology while resorting to clientelist linkages to 
maintain the support of the rural poor. Parties can also alter their electoral strategies 
over time. For instance, in India, Chhibber (1999) observed the erosion of clientelist 
networks and the increased use of caste, religion, and ethnicity for attracting voters.  In 
Brazil, Hagopian et al. (2009) found that politicians are becoming less dependent on 
clientelism and more supportive of programmatic linkages with voters as a result of 
economic and administrative reforms in the 1990s, which created new cleavages 
amongst voters and reduced resources available for patronage.
33
    
Likewise, opposition parties in Africa that rely on populist strategies with the 
urban poor may experience transitions over time.  Indeed, populism is a particularly 
transitory mode of mobilization (Weyland 2001) and cannot be sustained for indefinite 
periods if the urban poor fail to see any tangible improvements in their lives or 
experience policies that are directly antithetical to their own interests.  Therefore, if 
opposition parties turn into ruling parties, faced with national concerns, tasked with 
managing the macroeconomy, and responding to investors, a populist strategy may be 
abandoned.  As a result, a party that was voted into national office through majority 
support from the urban poor may potentially lose this constituency base in the long-
run. 
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 This supports Shefter‘s (1994) claim that parties may resort to programmatic modes of mobilization 
when they lack adequate resources for clientelism, a view that van de Walle (2007) believes ultimately 
may hold some relevance in Africa as well.   
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Operationalizing Key Concepts  
To test this study‘s main argument, the key concepts discussed in this chapter 
require operationalization. This study provides a dual approach to operationalization 
by examining these concepts from the standpoints of both parties and voters.  In 
addition to drawing on secondary materials about political parties in Senegal and 
Zambia, interviews with political party members and local governance experts are 
complemented by the views of the urban poor regarding the political scene in their 
respective countries.  
From the view of political parties, a comparison of party manifestoes, 
responses from semi-structured interviews, and party activities documented in local 
newspapers help characterize the linkages they forge with both the urban poor and 
other constituencies.  Based on these resources, personalistic linkages dominate if 
opposition parties cannot define the ideological differences that distinguish them from 
their competitors and instead each espouses a commitment to the same values and 
goals.  Other indicators include a party‘s claim that it broadly represents all citizens 
and cannot define a clear constituency base and if the party markets the qualities of its 
leader during campaigns rather than a set of policy programs. Likewise, if voters 
define their motivation for supporting a presidential candidate in terms of his/her 
personal characteristics rather than policies, then personalistic linkages prevail.  
 As already noted, clientelist linkages can sometimes prove difficult to identify.  
Yet, for the purposes of this study, clientelist linkages as conceptualized in Table 2.2 
involve systematized handouts to a certain constituency base, namely the poor.  While 
such handouts may persist during normal times as part of an effort towards fostering 
more long-term relationships between a party and the poor, it was argued earlier that 
vote-buying around elections is the most common manifestation of clientelist linkages 
in Africa.  In such cases, handouts usually involve the disbursement of money, 
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clothing, food, and/or drinks during election campaigns.  They may also involve 
localized infrastructure and/or development initiatives that are timed right before 
elections.  The nature, degree, and timing of such handouts will be uncovered through 
the use of interviews with observers of election campaigns, newspaper reports, and the 
claims of survey respondents.  
 Of all potential linkages, programmatic ones potentially have attracted the 
most attention in terms of operationalization.  The World Bank‘s Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) classifies a party‘s programmatic nature according to either its 
description in two party almanacs, Political Parties of the World and Political 
Handbook of the World, or whether a party‘s name indicates its ideological leaning 
(Keefer 2005).  As part of its secondary materials, this study also relies on the use of 
the same almanacs as the DPI.  However, it does not characterize a party as having a 
specific ideological orientation simply due to its name because self-proclaimed 
―socialist‖ parties in Africa often have engaged in economic liberalization.  In other 
words, party actions do not always correspond to party monikers.  This study further 
draws on some of the suggestions offered by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 323) and 
classifies a party as purely programmatic (or confirms that it is not) if the following 
conditions are (not) met, as evidenced through primary data materials:  1) parties‘ 
positions on relevant issues systematically diverge, 2) politicians within the same 
party demonstrate less variance on key issues than those belonging to different parties, 
and 3) if politicians can map their party positions on a left-right scale ranging from 
more to less government intervention, respectively.  
 A populist strategy can be discerned according to the dimensions presented in 
Table 2.3.  In order to be populist, the party needs to be firmly oriented around a 
constituency comprising lower-class groups.  While electoral support amongst this 
group is an indicator of a party‘s popularity, it does not necessarily mean that a party 
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is populist.  Rather, the party needs to center most of its electoral campaigns in the 
neighborhoods and working areas of the urban poor, potentially even establishing 
party offices in such areas.  At the same time, a charismatic leader is a sine qua non of 
a populist party, and such charisma may manifest through publicity stunts and 
controversial claims that stir up attention.  Unmediated ties between a charismatic 
leader and the under-class can emerge when the leader attempts to identify himself as 
a ―common man,‖ using a form of language, a repertoire of campaign tactics, or a 
selection of personal experiences that resonate with the masses.  Most significantly, 
given that a populist strategy involves a programmatic component focused on social 
inclusion, parties using this strategy should offer policy promises targeted to the 
distinct challenges faced by the urban poor and aimed at rectifying their exclusion 
from the economy.  Simultaneously, given that the populist strategy described here is 
especially focused on the urban poor, a party using this strategy should have a much 
weaker policy message, based on manifestoes and interviews with party members, 
towards other constituencies, including rural dwellers and the urban elite.         
 The two intervening variables central to this study, differentiation and 
congruence, can be uncovered by focusing more on a voter‘s perspective in the 
manner delineated in Table 2.4.  Indeed, survey data collected from market workers 
and residents of low-income neighborhoods in Dakar and Lusaka provide such 
viewpoints.  Voters were asked if they viewed any distinction among their country‘s 
political parties and, if so, they were asked to identify how that party was different.  If 
they acknowledged distinctions and could articulate what they were, this provided an 
indicator that parties did not simply merge together in a voter‘s mind.  A secondary 
indicator of differentiation relied on how much support opposition parties received as 
measured by who survey respondents voted for and according to official election 
results in low-income urban areas.  If two or more opposition parties received 
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equivalent support, this implies that voters did not discern a major difference among 
them.  However, if one opposition party received overwhelming support, then it 
clearly stood out among its competitors.
34
 While it is theoretically plausible for more 
than one party to employ a populist strategy towards the urban poor in the same 
election cycle, there are no known practical examples of this in either the African 
context or other regions of the developing world.    
 
Table 2.4:  Indicators of Differentiation and Congruence from 
Surveys of the Urban Poor 
Dimension  Degree  
More Less 
Differentiation - Respondents report observing a 
difference among parties along 
key dimension (e.g. policies)  
  
- One particular opposition party 
received significantly more 
support than any other 
- Respondents report they cannot 
see a difference among country‘s 
parties 
 
- No opposition party received 
significantly more support than 
any other 
Congruence  - Majority of respondents 
articulated that a specific policy 
was the main motivation for 
supporting a particular opposition 
candidate  and that candidate also 
expressed that particular policy 
message in his/her campaign 
 
- One opposition party repeatedly 
identified as interested in 
improving urban living conditions  
- Majority of respondents voted 
for incumbent despite registering 
disappointment with the status 
quo 
 
 
 
 
- No opposition party identified as 
interested in improving urban 
living conditions  
 
Traditional measures of congruence require mapping a median voter‘s 
positions on key issues along a left-right scale, estimating the positions of politicians 
on the same issues, and then measuring the distance between the median citizen and 
the median legislator according to the width of scale positions (see Huber and Powell 
1994; Powell and Vanberg 2000).  The smaller the distance is, the greater the 
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 The focus on comparing opposition parties is more meaningful because voters would be expected to 
be more likely to see a difference between the incumbent and the opposition than among opposition 
parties alone. 
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congruence.  Yet, such techniques are usually applied in studying industrialized 
countries where the assumption that parties and voters possess views along a left-right 
scale rarely proves problematic.  As noted earlier though, such an assumption is not 
always valid in the African context.   
Nevertheless, certain parties can still offer policy prescriptions that are more 
aligned with a particular constituency base than others.  The policy priorities of the 
urban poor were uncovered through both the surveys as well as through secondary 
resources on low-income populations in Dakar and Lusaka.  If survey respondents 
voted for a presidential candidate who promised to address these priorities, which 
often included the provision of jobs and basic services, and the respondent reported 
that the policies of the candidate rather than his/her personality or campaign handouts 
were the primary motivation for support, then this is an indication that such a party 
offered more congruence to the demands of the urban poor than the existing 
alternatives.  In turn, those who voted for another candidate should not have identified 
party policies as the main motivation for support because this would then imply that 
different segments of the urban poor support various parties due to their respective 
policies, thereby meaning that no one party provides more congruence with this 
constituency base than any other.  In the same manner, if a majority of respondents 
repeatedly identified the same party as being most likely to improve living conditions 
in either Dakar or Lusaka, then that party was deemed to have greater congruence with 
the urban poor‘s demands.  Lastly, if a respondent reported disappointment with the 
status quo but nevertheless voted for the incumbent, this highlights that none of the 
existing opposition parties offered greater congruence to the needs of the urban poor 
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than the incumbent.
35
  Table 2.4 delineates how respondents‘ behavior can reflect a 
party‘s degree of differentiation and congruence.     
 
Summary  
 Even though Africa‘s urban poor have received little attention by scholars 
during the multi-party era, this chapter examined four possible explanations for their 
voting behavior and found each incomplete.  The institutional requirements and party 
discipline for monitoring voter actions renders clientelist, party machines that exist in 
other developing regions quite rare in Africa‘s urban context.  Moreover, empirical 
findings in a set of African cases show that a sub-type of clientelism, vote buying, 
does not entirely influence voters‘ decisions.  From a theoretical standpoint, it is 
conceivable that the urban poor may accept handouts from all parties but ultimately 
vote in accordance with their own conscience.  The influence of ethno-linguistic 
identity on political behavior has long occupied a large body of the literature on 
Africa.  However, the evidence is far from conclusive that ethno-linguistic cleavages 
overwhelmingly determine who a voter supports, and no known contemporary 
research has examined whether such cleavages apply to those lower-class Africans 
living in a heterogeneous, metropolitan setting.   Economic decline consistently has 
proved a key motivation for voters to reject an incumbent but, whether this manifests 
as a vote for the opposition or through abstention remains less clear.  Cases where 
Africa‘s urban poor support an opposition party even when macroeconomic conditions 
are improving implies that such factors cannot entirely account for voting behavior.  
Associations for the urban poor, whether in the form of slum dwellers movements or 
                                                          
35
 It would not be surprising if a respondent was not disappointed with the incumbent and therefore 
voted for the incumbent.  Indeed, as described, a populist strategy relies on incorporating those who feel 
alienated by the status quo.  By extension then, a member of the urban poor who does not feel that way 
would be less likely to support an opposition party espousing such a message.   
91 
 
informal sector work organizations, are growing fast throughout Africa.  Yet, how 
many Africans actually belong to these associations and what influence they actually 
exert on members‘ voting preferences or on political parties‘ policies remain vague.  
 Due to the limitations of these alternative explanations, this study focuses on 
the role of political parties and their interactions with constituents.  This chapter 
presented the study‘s main argument, which is that opposition parties that rely on a 
populist strategy are more likely to obtain support from this group than parties reliant 
on personalistic, clientelist, or programmatic linkages alone.  A populist strategy fuses 
key elements of these distinct linkages, including their modes of mobilization.  Like 
programmatic linkages, a populist strategy relies on a policy discourse but one which 
is focused on social inclusion rather than a left-right ideology.  Similar to personalistic 
linkages, a populist strategy depends on a charismatic leader.  In the same manner as 
clientelist linkages, a populist strategy may also involve the selective disbursement of 
material incentives and its constituency base is firmly focused on the poor.  
The advantage of a populist strategy is twofold.  First, its policy message 
exhibits greater congruence with those issues relevant to the urban poor. Such issues 
include job creation, reductions in the prices of basic goods, provision of public 
services, and freedom from state harassment.  By contrast, those few parties in the 
region reliant on purely programmatic linkages often either advance neo-liberal 
policies that thus far have brought few benefits to Africa‘s urban poor or promote a 
leftist ideology that is outdated and/or more relevant to salaried workers than to the 
urban poor‘s quest for daily survival.  Secondly, a populist strategy increases a party‘s 
differentiation from the multitude of competitors in the region that are dependent on 
purely personalistic linkages with the urban poor.  Instead, a populist strategy enables 
a party to fuse the charisma of its party leader with a specific policy agenda oriented 
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towards the excluded, thereby creating a memorable impression on the mind of an 
impoverished urbanite when s/he goes to the polls.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
From Gorgui to King Cobra: 
Party Strategies in Comparative Perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter delineated criteria for identifying the disparate linkages 
used by political parties with their country‘s citizens and introduced the concept of 
populist strategies.  This chapter aims to draw on these criteria to classify the 
strategies employed by Senegalese and Zambian opposition parties with the urban 
poor during each country‘s most recent presidential elections.  In comparing the two 
countries, the chapter highlights that a populist strategy is most effective for 
opposition parties to gain votes from this specific constituency.   
 For the Patriotic Front‘s (PF) Michael Sata, nicknamed ―King Cobra‖ because 
he can prove ―venomous‖ to his political enemies (Mwiinga 1994), a populist strategy 
helped his party obtain the majority of votes in Zambia‘s major urban centers in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt during both the 2006 and 2008 elections.  Sata targeted his 
campaigns in shanty compounds and mobilized the urban poor not only with his 
charismatic style but also with a bundle of policy promises that collectively aimed to 
rectify this constituency‘s economic exclusion and lack of political voice. His 
campaign messages were reinforced by the use of tactics intended to portray himself 
as a ―common man‖ who understood the plight of the marginalized.  Such a strategy 
helped him defeat both the increasingly aloof and rural-oriented ruling Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) as well as the United Party for National Development 
(UPND) and the Heritage Party (HP), both of which articulated broad-sweeping 
messages intended to hold national appeal.  
  By contrast, no single opposition party obtained significant support from the 
urban poor during Senegal‘s 2007 elections.  Abdoulaye Wade, an octogenarian oft-
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referred to as Gorgui, meaning the ―old one‖ in Wolof, retained the presidency despite 
having accomplished very little for the urban poor during his first term.  His victory 
was assisted by Senegal‘s so-called ―living room opposition,‖ which consists of a 
broad range of opposition parties who all share the tendency to discuss the country‘s 
problems in exclusive fora rather than join disgruntled Dakarois in street protests 
against government policies.  Amongst these opposition parties are those reliant on 
purely personalistic linkages, claiming that they represent ―all Senegalese‖ and 
espousing vague, indistinguishable platforms.  A smaller set of programmatic 
opposition parties with strong ties to the country‘s dwindling labor unions offer more 
distinct appeals around socialism, workers‘ rights, and economic nationalism.  
However, the comprehension of such messages remains limited to only a small 
segment of unionized urbanites and salaried professionals rather than the mass of the 
urban poor.   
For purposes of highlighting the argument‘s internal consistency and to 
demonstrate the dynamic nature of party linkage strategies, each country‘s preceding 
electoral period is first examined in brief detail.  For example, in Zambia‘s 2001 
elections, when all the opposition parties relied on personalistic linkages, the urban 
poor divided their support amongst four political parties rather than overwhelmingly 
supporting just one.  By contrast, in the run-up to Senegal‘s historic 2000 elections, 
Wade relied on a populist strategy to mobilize Dakar‘s excluded and disgruntled 
masses, particularly the youth.  He defeated not only the ruling PS but also his other 
opposition competitors in the first and second rounds of voting.  By providing this 
historical context, the chapter therefore can compare different party strategies both 
across countries and over time.   
 Semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 respondents constitute the 
main source of primary evidence used in this chapter.  Those selected for interviews 
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included party leaders and representatives, past and present government officials, local 
journalists, civil society organizations, academics, and development experts.  
Collectively, these interviewees constituted a purposeful sample because they 
possessed an authoritative level of knowledge about the country‘s political 
environment and urban policy challenges.  Appendix Three provides a full list of the 
individuals interviewed in both countries. Party manifestos and newspaper articles 
collected from each country‘s national archives further help construct a picture of the 
various party strategies employed. Overall then, the chapter aims to illustrate how 
incumbents and the opposition have interacted with the urban poor in Senegal and 
Zambia over time and emphasizes the success of the populist strategy.  The task of 
uncovering why parties choose a populist strategy over possible alternative approaches 
is left to Chapter Five.     
 
Zambia 
Political Party Landscape  
 Zambia‘s peaceful transition to multiparty democracy in 1991 heralded the 
beginning of greater political liberalization in a number of countries throughout the 
continent.
36
  With the slogan ―The Hour Has Come,‖ the MMD and its then leader, 
Frederick Chiluba, ended at the ballot box 27 years of rule by Kenneth Kaunda and his 
United National Independence Party (UNIP).
37
  Formed from an eclectic mix of labor 
union officials, civil society members, and career politicians, the MMD originally 
                                                          
36
 Benin, which abolished an 18 year military-authoritarian regime through a national conference in 
1990, is often seen as representing an equivalent symbol of democratization, especially for francophone 
Africa.  
37
 Previous to the 1991 elections, Zambia had experienced a brief period of multiparty democracy from 
1964 to 1972. 
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emerged in urban areas.  However, its victory in 1991 was due to support in both the 
country‘s urban and rural provinces.38   
Yet, corruption, mismanagement, and electoral maneuvering by the MMD 
ultimately generated friction within the party, leading to many defections and the 
creation of new parties, such as the National Party (NP) in 1993 and the Zambia 
Democratic Congress (ZDC) in 1996.  Two years later, a Pentecostal pastor, Nevers 
Mumba founded the National Christian Coalition (NCC).  Around the same time,  
Zambia‘s managing director at Anglo-American, Anderson Mazoka, resigned as 
treasurer from one of the MMD‘s branch offices and formed the UPND.  A second 
round of parties mushroomed in 2001 after Chiluba‘s failed bid to alter the 
constitution to secure a third-term as president.  Notable amongst these were the 
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), the HP, and the PF.   
While Christon Tembo and Godfrey Miyanda, leaders of the FDD and HP, 
respectively, left the MMD because they disagreed with Chiluba‘s third-term bid 
(Banks et al. 2008), Michael Sata‘s motivations were quite different.39  Originally a 
loyal UNIP member, Sata served as the Lusaka District Governor, a Member of 
Parliament (MP) for Lusaka‘s Kabwata constituency, and Minister of State for 
Decentralization.  When he foresaw UNIP‘s waning popularity, he joined the MMD 
around the time of its founding.  Under the latter party, he obtained prominent 
positions as the Minister of Local Government and Housing, Minister of Labor and 
Social Security, Minister of Health, Minister without Portfolio, and MMD National 
Secretary.  Believing he would be selected as Chiluba‘s successor after the third-term 
                                                          
38
 The only province the MMD did not win in the 1991 elections was Eastern Province, the stronghold 
of UNIP (Bratton 1994). 
39
 Sata had supported the attempt to change the constitution.  In fact, during the May 2001 conventions 
during which MMD party members voted on Chiluba‘s proposition, Sata pressured fellow party 
members to wear third-term T-shirts (Malupenga 2001) and claimed that those who opposed Chiluba 
would not succeed (Mapulenga and Phiri 2001).   
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bid failed, Sata left the party and formed the PF when Levy Mwanawasa was chosen 
instead.  
   Today, there are approximately 28 officially registered political parties in the 
country (Matlosa 2007), with the most competitive ones presented in Table 3.1. In the 
2006 presidential elections, the Electoral Commission of Zambia tried to ensure the 
participation of only the most serious contenders by stipulating that each party needed 
to pay 20 million kwacha to participate (Chakwe 2006).
40
  The same fee was also 
required for the 2008 elections.  In general though, Zambia provides no public 
subsidies for parties, forcing most to rely on their leader‘s own finances as their 
primary source of funding (Bryan and Baer 2005).   
Table 3.1:  Overview of Zambia’s Main Political Parties  
Party Name  Current Leader Year 
Founded 
Coalitions joined 
(year formed) 
Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy 
(MMD) 
Rupiah Banda 
 
1990 --- 
Patriotic Front (PF) Michael Sata 2001 --- 
United Party for 
National 
Development (UPND) 
Hakainde Hichilema 
 
1998 ■ United Democratic 
Alliance (UDA, 2006) 
Heritage Party (HP) Godfrey Miyanda  2001 --- 
United Liberal Party 
(ULP) 
Sakwiba Sikota  2006 ■ Supported PF (2006) 
■ Supported MMD 
(2008)  
United National 
Independence Party 
(UNIP)  
Tilyenji Kaunda  
1958 
■ United Democratic 
Alliance (UDA, 2006) 
■ Supported MMD 
(2008) 
 
Urbanization Challenges 
Zambia‘s proliferation of parties occurred in tandem with an economic 
liberalization program that impoverished the urban population while simultaneously 
increasing its ranks.  The MMD adopted a free market ideology, and Chiluba‘s tenure 
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 The average exchange rate in the fourth quarter of 2006 was 3985 kwacha = 1 US dollar (EIU 2007a).  
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was characterized by the adoption of vast reforms under the auspices of a structural 
adjustment program.  As has been documented elsewhere (e.g. Tacoli 2001;  Myers 
and Murray 2007), structural adjustment often hurt urban consumers by ending 
currency controls and price subsidies on staple foods.  Simultaneously, greater 
economic austerity reduced available public spending for urban infrastructure, health, 
and education while privatization and trade liberalization forced uncompetitive 
domestic industries to either shed workers or impose wage freezes.  As a result of 
these latter measures, between 30,000 and 50,000 formal sector workers in Zambia 
lost their jobs between 1992 and 1996 (Rakner 2003).  Moreover, poverty in Lusaka 
increased from 25 to 39 percent in only two years between 1991 and 1993 (UNDP 
1998:  59).  Consequently, so many Zambians resorted to laboring in the urban 
informal sector that by the mid-1990s, middle-class Lusakans were complaining about 
the lack of walking space on city sidewalks due to the predominance of street vendors 
and the growth of tuntembas, which are makeshift market stalls crafted out of wood 
and plastic (see Chilaizya 1993; Mwiinga 1993).
41
  As Hansen (2004: 62) notes, street 
vending in the capital had reached ―anarchic proportions‖ by Christmas 1998:  ―Main 
streets, alleyways, and shop corridors in the city centre, and many other spots besides, 
had turned into one huge outdoor shopping mall where thousands of street vendors 
were selling all manner of goods.‖  
At the same time, Lusaka experienced an increase in population.  The city‘s 
population growth rate over the 1990s was 3.3 percent, more than twice the rate for 
Zambia overall (CSO 2003a).  The impetus for this demographic shift was twofold.  
First, migrants arrived from Zambia‘s other main urban area, the Copperbelt province, 
which is the source of the country‘s main export commodity.  A prolonged decline in 
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 Translated from Bemba, tuntemba literally means ―area of operation‖ and in Hansen‘s (2004) view, is 
a term that captures how vendors and marketers claim public space for their survival activities.  
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copper prices and production, along with privatization of the mines, caused more than 
25,000 workers in the mining sector to lose their jobs over the 1990s (McCulloch et al. 
2000).  Most migrated to Lusaka in the hopes that the city‘s more diversified industrial 
base would provide alternative employment opportunities.  In fact, the capital city 
received approximately 133,000 residents from the Copperbelt during the 1990-2000 
period (CSO 2003a).  Secondly, Lusaka contains a higher concentration of young 
people than the rest of the country, meaning that the city experienced higher natural 
population growth than other areas of Zambia (Mulenga 2003).   
Such demographic and economic pressures not only placed constraints on 
formal employment opportunities within Lusaka but also on housing availability. Due 
to British town planning principles, many African residents of Lusaka lived in housing 
on the outskirts of the city during colonial times and since permanent settlement was 
discouraged, housing options for Africans generally were limited (Taylor 2006). With 
successive waves of migration to the city in the 1990s, coupled with the dearth of 
government housing initiatives or private sector development, this housing became 
characterized by vast, unorganized shanty compounds (Hansen 2002; Mulenga 2003).    
The construction of such housing consists of concrete block walls and corrugated iron 
or asbestos sheet roofs, and roads in such communities are gravel with no drainage, 
making many impassable during the rainy season (World Bank 2002a).  According to 
the director and deputy directors of housing and social services for the Lusaka City 
Council, approximately 35 such compounds exist in Lusaka, seven of which are 
considered illegal and therefore not eligible to receive more substantial infrastructure 
investments from the government.
42
  In all, such settlements contain the highest 
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 Personal interviews with Rose Phiri and Bornwell Matawe, LCC, Lusaka, April 8, 2009.  According 
to Matawe, in legal settlements, people possess title to their land and therefore can access loans and put 
up homes of their choice.  Hickey (2005) echoes that the government is not responsible for investing in 
basic services within those settlements deemed ―illegal.‖  
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density of the city‘s population and are home to 70 percent of Lusaka‘s residents (UN-
Habitat 2007). Tellingly, while the government refuses to recognize illegal shanty 
compounds because this implies an onus of service provision, it nonetheless has 
designated some of them as official political wards for the purpose of elections.
43
  
 Throughout the 1990s, the MMD not only implemented liberalization policies 
that worsened living and working conditions, but also actively alienated the urban 
poor through housing demolitions and crackdowns on vendors.  In his role as the 
MMD‘s Minister of Local Government and Housing, Michael Sata razed in 1991 the 
homes of 500 families living in Kanyama‘s shanty compounds (Weekly Post 1992).44 
Illegal homes in the compounds of John Laing and Misisi were also threatened with 
demolition in 1992 because these areas had been earmarked for industrial development 
(Chibuye 1992).  One year later, approximately 40 shacks in Kamwala Township were 
targeted by bulldozers to make way for more modern houses (Chitenje 1993).  By the 
end of the decade, John Laing and Misisi were threatened yet again with demolition 
(Mumbati 2000; Kabuswe 2000). Also in 2000, the deputy minister of Lusaka 
Province requested the eviction of squatters in Lusaka‘s Ibex Hill neighborhood, 
prompting one affected resident to exclaim, ―My husband is a policeman and he gets 
very little money so where do you want us to go?  It seems the ruling MMD is for the 
rich‖ (cited in Hampande 2000: 3).  Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four illustrates the location 
of these neighborhoods.  
With respect to street vendors, a particularly violent crackdown in 1993 by the 
Lusaka City Council (LCC) led to riots and prompted Chiluba to intervene on the 
vendor‘s behalf (Hansen 2004: 65).  Consequently, vending was sarcastically referred 
to as the ―Office of the president‖ because vendors appeared to be under Chiluba‘s 
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 Personal interview with Rose Phiri, LCC, Lusaka, April 8, 2009. 
44
 Apparently, just a few years later, residents whose homes were destroyed had already re-built on the 
same site (Nampito and Gina 1995).   
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protection (Chifuwe 1993).  This relationship was formalized in 1996 with the 
establishment of a Vendors‘ Desk at State House where Chiluba appointed a deputy 
minister to be in charge of street and market vendors‘ affairs (War on Want n.d.).  By 
1999, however, traders recognized the limits of their protection when the LCC 
engaged in a massive sweep across Lusaka that resulted in the destruction of hundreds 
of tuntembas in the city center and within the residential townships on the periphery 
(Hansen 2004: 66). Apparently, Chiluba did not intervene on this occasion because the 
MMD realized that the vendors were not actually registered voters and therefore did 
not need to be co-opted in exchange for electoral support (Hansen 2007b: 10).   
 
 
The 2001 Elections:  Personalistic Linkages Fail the Urban Poor   
 Although this harassment, dire living circumstances, and Chiluba‘s attempts to 
change the constitution should have proved a major boon for the opposition‘s 
prospects in the 2001 elections, the use of personalistic linkages to mobilize the urban 
poor failed to deliver electoral majorities in urban areas to any major party.  In fact, 
only 2.5 million of a potential 4.6 million eligible Zambians even registered to vote in 
2001 (Venter 2003), implying a significant lack of enthusiasm with the possible 
candidates.  Though the MMD‘s candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, obtained the 
presidency through a very slim mandate, with only 29 percent of the national vote, the 
opposition did not perform much better.  In fact, the second-place finisher at the 
national level, the UPND‘s Mazoka, only received a quarter of the votes.  As seen by 
the boldfaced numbers in Table 3.2, the UPND and FDD split votes in Lusaka‘s 
poorest constituencies, with the UPND more popular in Kanyama and Munali and the 
FDD prevailing in Chawama and Mandevu.  Within the Copperbelt, the Heritage Party 
received the most votes in the country‘s second largest city, Kitwe, while the MMD 
proved victorious in the third largest city of Ndola.  Thus, despite a decline in urban 
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living standards, no one party was able to overwhelmingly capture the imaginations of 
the urban poor.    
 
Table 3.2:  Results from the 2001 Zambian Presidential Elections in  
Selected Urban Areas (%) 
Urban 
Constituencies 
Poverty 
Rates 
Main Candidates (Party) 
Levy 
Mwanawasa 
(MMD) 
Andrew 
Mazoka 
(UPND)  
Christon 
Tembo   
(FDD) 
Godfrey 
Miyanda  
(HP)  
Lusaka Province  
Chawama 0.61 21.4 27.3 29.2 3.8 
Kabwata 0.25 15.0 34.5 21.8 9.8 
Kanyama 0.57 14.5 41.4 19.9 4.5 
Lusaka Central 0.26 12.4 34.7 21.9 13.5 
Mandevu 0.52 16.5 18.7 30.5 7.4 
Matero 0.42 19.4 20.1 25.1 9.2 
Munali  0.58 12.5 31.7 24.6 12.9 
Copperbelt Province 
Kitwe  0.45 30.0 15.9 4.9 30.1 
Ndola  Central 0.56 26.1 15.6 12.2 22.1 
Sources:  Election data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia;  Poverty data from Simler (2007) 
and based on the 2000 Census and the 2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey.  
 
Based on some of the criteria discussed in Chapter Two, the fact that the urban 
vote was split among four parties indicates that the opposition parties exhibited very 
little differentiation.  Indeed, analysts of these elections are in agreement that while the 
MMD certainly engaged in some techniques to hinder the opposition, the opposition 
parties themselves were largely to blame for failing to mobilize greater support.
45
  For 
instance, Rakner (2003: 124) notes that all the parties contesting those elections shared 
the following traits:  emerged from the MMD, were formed behind a strong leader 
who contributed the majority of the party‘s finances, lacked any programmatic or 
ideological leanings, and were mainly based in Lusaka.  Momba (2005: 33) observed 
that "the lack of significant differences in terms of policies due to similar ideologies 
                                                          
45
 Some of the MMD‘s tactics involved harassment of the media, physical violence against opposition 
party members, and scheduling the elections immediately after Christmas, when most people would be 
away from the constituency in which they registered to vote (Simon 2005).    
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and general outlooks raises questions about the meaningfulness of alternative choices 
presented to voters at election time." Burnell (2001) noted that the opposition had 
failed not only to craft a policy agenda targeted at key issues but also to mobilize 
grassroots support.  He further claimed that the state of the opposition helped qualify 
Zambia as an example of Mkandawire‘s (1999) ―choiceless democracies.‖  
A closer examination of the opposition parties‘ promises indicates that no 
single one advanced a message with a large degree of congruence with the priorities of 
the urban poor.  The FDD focused on the need for institutional reforms, such as 
curbing executive powers, but economic concerns and food security were more urgent 
issues for the electorate (Burnell 2002). While the Heritage Party campaigned on a 
vague message of ―national renewal,‖ both UNIP and the UPND offered to introduce 
free healthcare and education (Burnell 2002).   At the same time, however, the UPND 
also announced that agriculture would receive priority if Mazoka was voted into 
presidential office, arguing that this sector was ―Zambia‘s number one competitive 
advantage in Africa‖ (cited in Chifuwe 2000:  4).   All three parties did not offer 
different economic policies than the MMD but promised to implement them with 
greater oversight and transparency (Rakner 2003).  
The PF only obtained between two to four percent of the vote across Lusaka‘s 
urban constituencies.  The party certainly was disadvantaged by time constraints, 
having decided to compete in the elections only 59 days after it had been established.  
Yet, Sata‘s poor showing was also due to his close association with Chiluba, and 
therefore with the rampant corruption and liberal economic policies that typified the 
MMD‘s first decade in power (Larmer and Fraser 2007).  At the time of the 2001 
elections, Sata‘s populist strategy had yet to take shape. 
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The “New Deal" Administration Gets Old  
 Mwanawasa entered office proclaiming a ―New Deal‖ administration, which 
resulted in greater commitment to economic liberalization and increased harassment of 
the urban poor.  Specifically, by furthering many of the privatizations initiated by 
Chiluba and courting foreign investors, the MMD retained a pro-capitalist, free-market 
stance, emphasizing the importance of entrepreneurship.
46
  According to the party‘s 
manifesto, prepared for the 2006 elections, Mwanawasa‘s government had pursued 
during his first term ―macroeconomic policies aimed at arresting economic decline, 
stabilizing the economy and further entrenching a liberal economic environment‖ 
(MMD 2006:  6).  During his second term, the MMD‘s priorities were to ―provide 
incentives that facilitate and enhance greater private sector participation in the mining, 
agriculture, tourism and manufacturing sectors as well as create a risk free investment 
destination‖ (MMD 2006:  6).  In addition, the party aimed to promote partnerships 
with local and foreign investors, create incentives to invest in rural areas and for labor-
intensive businesses, promote export-oriented industries, and encourage Zambians‘ 
involvement in high-earning investments (MMD 2006: 7).             
  Guided by these objectives, Mwanawasa considerably improved Zambia‘s 
economic circumstances and governance environment during his tenure.  The 
country‘s inflation dropped to single digits and economic growth averaged 
approximately five percent, buoyed by improved copper prices and substantial 
external debt forgiveness (Economist 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007).  Progress also 
occurred with financial sector reform during this period,
47
 and Mwanawasa engaged in 
a concerted effort to combat corruption, including establishing a corruption taskforce 
                                                          
46
 Personal interview with Dr. Katele Kalumba, MMD,  Lusaka, March 5, 2009.  Members of other 
parties, such as the ULP‘s Sakwiba Sikota (interviewed March 31, 2009 in Lusaka) and journalists, 
such as the BBC‘s Musonda Chibamba (interviewed January 28, 2009) agreed with this 
characterization.   
47
 Personal interview with anonymous DfID governance advisor, Lusaka, March 11, 2009.  
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and controversially removing Chiluba‘s immunity from prosecution on corruption 
charges (Mthembu-Salter 2007).  Furthermore, Mwanawasa officially launched the 
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) in 2007, which is a multi-stakeholder 
initiative aimed at reviewing weaknesses in the country‘s constitution, including the 
rule that a presidential candidate can win with only a simple plurality of votes.
48
  
Compared with Chiluba‘s presidency, Mwanawasa‘s tenure also coincided with 
greater tolerance of the independent press, such as The Post newspaper, which tends to 
offer more favorable coverage to the opposition.
49
  
 
Mwanawasa’s Policies Towards the Urban Poor  
Yet, as highlighted in Figure 2.1 in Chapter Two, macroeconomic growth did 
not necessarily help the MMD very much in the 2006 elections because life for the 
urban poor did not necessarily improve under Mwanawasa.  Indeed, as noted by Lewis 
(2008: 97), economic growth in a number of African democracies over the last decade 
has not been accompanied by improvements in incomes or public welfare.  In Zambia, 
improved copper prices benefitted foreign investors more than local residents, 
especially since foreign-owned mining companies were only taxed 0.6 percent of their 
profits (Larmer and Fraser 2007).  Other growth came from the country‘s tourism and 
construction industries (EIU 2008), neither of which had significant spillover effects.  
Figure 3.1 shows that despite relatively stable growth during Mwanawasa‘s first term, 
there was only a marginal decline in the number of poor people living in Lusaka.  
Moreover, this figure highlights that there was positive and stable economic growth 
throughout Mwanawasa‘s tenure from 2001-2008, even though the opposition 
prevailed during the 2006 and 2008 elections among Lusaka‘s urban poor.  
                                                          
48
 See ―About the NCC‖ at http://www.ncczambia.org/aboutthencc.php (accessed October 13, 2009).  
49
 Personal interview with Sheikh Chifuwe, 17-year journalist with The Post and General Secretary of 
the Press Freedom Committee, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.   
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Figure 3.1:  Trends in Urban Poverty and Macroeconomic Growth, Zambia
50
 
 
  
Other data also attests to the persistence of urban poverty despite economic 
growth during this period. By 2004, formal sector employment had declined by 24 
percent from its 1992 level (Larmer and Fraser 2007). Approximately 56 percent of 
Zambia‘s urban population and 69 percent of Lusaka‘s worked in the non-agricultural 
informal sector (CSO 2007; World Bank 2007a).  Figure 3.2 also highlights that the 
monthly cost of basic food staples and essential non-food items for a family of six 
living in Lusaka continued increasing during Mwanawasa's first term.  Just two 
months previous to the October 2006 elections, the cost increased again to 1,421,650 
Kwacha, or $387 at 2006 exchange rates. This exceeded by more than double the 
                                                          
50
 The number of poor was calculated from poverty data in Simler (2007), who in turn based  his data 
from the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys for 1993, 1998, and 2004, and from  population data 
from CSO (1995), CSO (2003a), and Republic of Zambia (2006). GDP growth data is from the World 
Development Indicators, 2009.  
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average monthly income of 645,326 Kwacha found in most of Lusaka‘s low-income 
neighborhoods.
51
 
Figure 3.2:  Trend in the Cost of Monthly Basic Needs in Lusaka
52
 
 
Moreover, service delivery remained sub-standard and expensive in urban 
areas.  Figure 3.3 illustrates how the average cost of electricity and water for a family 
of four living in Lusaka steadily increased during Mwanawasa‘s tenure.  The quality 
of such services was also low. Despite paying very high electricity bills relative to 
their incomes, residents in Lusaka‘s townships were also burdened by frequent power 
outages that could last up to eight hours (Bupe 2006).  According to a World Bank 
(2007a) study on urban settlements in Zambia, pit latrines are a common form of 
waste disposal in informal settlements. Space constraints in Lusaka mean that there is 
limited room available to construct new latrines. This problem is exacerbated by the 
                                                          
51
 See the basic needs baskets calculated by the Lusaka-based Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection 
(JCTR) since 1996 and which can be found at http://www.jctr.org.zm/bnbasket.html (accessed July 20, 
2009).  
52
 The source for Figure 3.2 is data from the JCTR (2006).  The basic needs surveys are conducted on a 
monthly basis. Only the data from the month of January is shown here. 
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fact that residents in such settlements often rely on self-made shallow wells for water 
supply and can rarely afford to chlorinate or boil their drinking water. While it is not 
uncommon for middle- and upper-class Lusakans to pay for private garbage 
collection, street lights, and roads,
 53
 poor households could only rely on the 
government or an NGO to provide equivalent services. Organizations involved in 
housing policy claim that the government-run National Housing Authority built 
houses that only Lusakans with affluent jobs could afford while the Low-Cost 
Housing Development Foundation linked to the Ministry of Local Government 
concentrated most of its projects on the poor in rural areas.
 54
  
 
Figure 3.3:  Trend in Average Cost of Utilities in Lusaka
55
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 Personal interviews with Michael Soko of the United Nations Development Program, Lusaka, March 
10, 2009 and Nelson Ncube of the People‘s Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia, Lusaka, 
February 17, 2009.  
54
 Personal interview with Nelson Ncube, People‘s Process on Housing and Poverty, Lusaka, February 
17, 2009.  
55
 The source of the data presented in Figure 3.3 is the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) CityData 
database.  
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In addition, the harassment of the urban poor prevalent during the Chiluba era 
grew even more pronounced under Mwanawasa.  Unlike his predecessor, Mwanawasa 
considered the Vendor‘s Desk an unnecessary government office and abolished it 
(War on Want 2007).  When a cholera outbreak occurred in February 2004 under the 
electricity pylons next to Soweto market, Mwanawasa‘s Minister of Local 
Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, ordered the razing of part of the market and 
told the displaced vendors they would receive no alternative land to trade on because 
they had originally opted to trade on illegal land (cited in Hansen 2007a).  In June 
2008, 400 makeshift stalls in Lusaka‘s Town Centre Market were razed without 
warning and without offering traders alternative space (Times of Zambia 2008a).  The 
impetus for many of these demolitions was to force marketeers into more modern 
markets, which offer better working conditions but require the payment of tenants‘ 
fees for stalls that few vendors can afford.  Indeed, some of the city‘s newest and most 
modern markets have wound up in the hands of Asians and Lebanese, who can more 
easily afford the higher stall charges that the government levied on these markets, 
effectively preventing many African Zambians from moving into them (Hansen 
2004).
56
  Such actions lead Victor Phiri, a representative of an informal sector 
workers‘ organization known as Workers Education Alliance of Zambia (WEAZ), to 
conclude that the government is in effect ―stealing from the poor.‖57  Extortion 
practiced by MMD cadres presents another problem for marketeers.  MMD cadres 
frequently force marketeers to pay extra fees in exchange for their stalls under the 
promise of receiving better garbage collection and drainage within the markets, which 
ultimately never materializes.
58
   
                                                          
56
 Hansen (2004: 76) provides some details on this issue, particularly with respect to Kamwala Market. 
57
 Personal interview with Victor Phiri, WEAZ Director, Lusaka, February 25, 2009.   
58
 Personal interview with BBC correspondent Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.  See also 
Hansen (2007a) and War on Want (2007) on MMD cadres‘ control of the markets. 
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President Mwanawasa also invested 200 million kwacha into the ―Keep 
Zambia Clean‖ campaign (Times of Zambia 2007a). Designed to improve cleanliness 
and hygiene around the city, the campaign involved adding more stringent provisions 
to Zambia‘s Street Vending and Nuisances Act, which levies fees on those who are 
engaged in street vending or who purchase from vendors (Times of Zambia 2007a).
59
  
Crackdowns on street vendors and illegal marketeers ensued because they supposedly 
worsened traffic congestion and street littering and contributed to cholera outbreaks.  
For example, in mid-2007, the four-lane Freedom Way in downtown Lusaka was 
cleared of street vendors whose activities had made the road virtually impassable.
60
 
The Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which has initiated a number of 
programs to assist informal workers, decried this ―continued harassment of the 
informal sector by the state police, the local authorities, the ZRA [Zambian Revenue 
Authority] and even the ruling party cadres.  These look at the informal sector as a 
nuisance merely tolerated for cheap political propaganda, electioneering and even 
financial extortion‖ (ZCTU 2006:  17).  For Hansen (2007a: 2) though, such 
harassment is consistent with the government‘s perception of the ―free market,‖ which 
means attracting foreign investors to a clean city free of vendors and selling market 
stalls to the highest bidder.   
 In addition, those living in illegal squatter settlements consistently were 
threatened with demolitions.  In late 2002, a campaign of squatter compound 
demolitions occurred throughout the city at the height of the rainy season, causing 
more than 700 families to become homeless and placed in refugee tents where 
                                                          
59
 The amended Street Vending and Public Nuisances Act can be found on the website of the Lusaka 
City Council at 
http://www.lcc.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=82&Itemid=112 (accessed 
March 20, 2009). 
60
 Personal interview with Father Henriot, Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection, Lusaka, January 30, 
2009.  
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dysentery and cholera ensued (Myers 2005).  In March 2007, the Mwanawasa 
government announced full backing from the President‘s cabinet to proceed with plans 
to demolish illegal shanty compounds in Lusaka, some which were in existence for 
decades.  Human rights groups warned that such actions would create a humanitarian 
emergency since alternative accommodation had not been provided for the displaced 
(Jere 2007).  Nevertheless, under the protection of anti-riot police, the government 
proceeded to destroy 100 homes in the Kalikiliki compound alone (Mwanangombe 
2007).   
 Such treatment of the urban poor reflected both characteristics of 
Mwanawasa‘s personality and the government‘s general attitude towards urban 
development.  For Mwanawasa, adherence to the rule of law was more important than 
his popularity.
61
 At the same time, the MMD government has not created an urban 
development program around a coherent policy framework.
62
  Even one of the MMD‘s 
founding members and campaign manager, Dr. Mbita Chitala, admits that his party 
lacks clear programs on housing and job creation.
63
 His colleague and MMD National 
Secretary, Dr. Katele Kalumba, further adds that he is unaware of any urban 
development strategy and notes that instead, the goal of the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing tends to be aimed at ridding the cities of excess populations 
in the markets and residential areas.
64
  Regardless of the motivation for such actions, 
Dr. Kalumba recognizes that they were detrimental to his party‘s image among 
Lusaka‘s poor:   
 
And I realized that we were really hurting a lot of our people by the approach that we 
were taking in enforcing the public hygiene measures.  It touches upon whether the 
street or the town is the privilege of a certain group of people.  Whose town is it? It 
appears that if you live in Woodlands, Kabulonga, and so on, you are the town 
                                                          
61
 Personal interview with BBC Zambia correspondent, Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.  
62
 Personal interview with anonymous DfID governance advisor, Lusaka, March 11, 2009.  
63
 Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, MMD, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.  
64
 Personal interview with Dr. Katele Kalumba, MMD, Lusaka, March 5, 2009.  
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owners, and if you live in Kaunda Square or Kalingalinga or places like this, you are 
simply strangers in the city who can be moved and resettled somewhere.  Now that‘s a 
very significant ideological problem regarding our understanding of the city and its 
dynamic as a population-space relation.  Before, in the colonial times, it was a white 
man‘s city, a white man‘s town.  The natives were brought in from outside, they were 
kept away and at night, after 17 hours, you are not expected to be seen anywhere near 
the neighborhoods.  So, this time, it‘s just a different configuration, from race to class.  
The new sort of nouveaux riches, the new economic leaders and players think that 
they have the power to define who occupies what space.
65
  
 
Frustration with these policies was apparent during the 2006 campaign when the 
Minister of Local Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, was almost beaten up 
when she canvassed for votes at Lusaka‘s City Market.  One vendor shouted, ―This 
station is not for MMD, it is for Sata and we do not want Masebo and her MMD‖ 
(cited in Kachali and Kalilele 2006: 6). Mwanawasa faced similar outrage during the 
same campaign when his presidential motorcade was blocked by PF supporters 
shouting anti-MMD slogans along Lumumba Road (Chellah and Chilemba 2006), a 
thoroughfare normally crowded by informal sector workers.   
 
 
Vote-Buying in the Countryside  
In contrast to the MMD‘s treatment of the urban poor, the party adopted a 
much more accommodating approach in the rural areas through the use of vote-
buying, thereby illustrating how parties employ disparate strategies with different 
constituents.  The party‘s manifesto for 2007-2011, which was released for the 2006 
elections, highlights that the MMD ranked agriculture as its number one priority for 
the country‘s economic development agenda (MMD 2006). The party mainly accorded 
attention to this sector via the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP). Launched in the 
2002-2003 farming season, the FSP provides partially subsidized fertilizer to 
                                                          
65
 Ibid.  Woodlands and Kabulonga are affluent neighborhoods in Lusaka while Kaunda Square and 
Kalingalinga are shanty townships.   
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households in rural areas. While there is no doubt that rural poverty remains a major 
concern in Zambia that should be addressed by the government, the FSP did not  
represent solely a programmatic tool to improve rural livelihoods but rather an 
instrument for vote-buying.
66
 
This becomes obvious by observing that the FSP has been sustained by the 
government despite the many problems with its economic effectiveness and 
administration.  For instance, if the government was truly interested in improving 
agricultural development, the FSP would be accompanied with a broad range of 
investments in the agricultural sector.  Instead, the FSP constitutes the single largest 
expenditure item in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) budget 
(Jayne et al. 2006), and comprised almost 40 percent of the government‘s budget 
during 2006 (Ariga et al. 2006).   By contrast, more long-term investments in 
infrastructure and irrigation constituted only two and three percent of the budget, 
respectively (Jayne et al. 2006), and the dominance of the FSP in the budget has 
deprived agricultural extension and research services of a large part of their operating 
budgets, in turn decreasing their effectiveness (Ariga et al. 2006).   Moreover, richer 
farmers have benefitted more from the program than poorer small-scale farmers 
(Morris et al. 2007). Similarly, poorer regions, such as Western and Northwestern 
Province, receive the lowest agricultural public expenditures and benefit the least from 
the FSP (Govereh et al. 2009).
67
  In essence, the FSP was not available to all 
agricultural producers and as seen in Table 3.3, fertilizer was distributed more heavily 
in provinces that were becoming PF strongholds, presumably in the belief that votes in 
other provinces were already secure.   
                                                          
66
 Just because the MMD distributes FSP for political reasons does not mean that this necessarily wins 
over voters.  In fact, Taylor (2008) suggests that the poor administration for the FSP may have actually 
hurt the MMD politically 
67
 The spatial distribution of fertilizer subsidies is returned to briefly in Chapter 5. 
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A 2005 study based on extensive fieldwork in rural areas by the Zambia-based 
NGO Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) concluded that there was ―very 
little impact of the FSP in terms of reducing food shortages, increasing household 
income and reducing poverty‖ (CSPR 2005: 23). In addition, the impact of the FSP 
has been negligible on yield production (Govereh et al. 2009). According to Taylor's 
(2008) research on the political economy of agricultural subsidies in Zambia, 
distribution around elections in 2006 occurred way before the actual planting season.  
Moreover, his research uncovered that rural MPs often pressured the Ministry of 
Finance to continue financing the program in the belief that it would provide support 
among voters.  This was confirmed by the MMD's national campaign manager, Mbita 
Chitala, who admits that his party retains control in rural areas via fertilizer 
distribution.
 68
   Likewise, a World Bank specialist on Zambia‘s public management 
notes that given the number of inefficiencies surrounding the FSP, the program should 
be primarily viewed as a political tool for the MMD.
 69
 
Table 3.3:  Distribution of FSP and Poverty Rates by Province 
Province  Poverty Rate, 2004 Kilograms of FSP fertilizer per hectare of 
maize planted, 2006 
Central 76 51 
Copperbelt 56 122 
Eastern 70 54 
Luapula 79 115 
Lusaka 48 122 
Northern 74 110 
Northwestern 76 54 
Southern 69 47 
Western  83 13 
    Sources:  Poverty data is from Simler (2007) and FSP data is from Govereh et al. (2009).  
When the vice-president, Rupiah Banda, became the MMD‘s election 
candidate in the wake of Mwanawasa‘s death in August 2008, he campaigned on a 
motto of ―continuity‖ and vowed to proceed with his predecessor‘s policies (Africa 
                                                          
68
 Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, Lusaka, January 29, 2009. 
69
 Personal interview with Patricia Palale, Lusaka, February 25, 2009. 
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Confidential 2008).
70
 The continuation of agricultural handouts represented one of the 
key ways in which this promise was fulfilled. Banda promised in a campaign rally that 
he was expanding the FSP from 120,000 to 220,000 families and that the government 
would increase the share it subsidizes from 60 to 75 percent (Miti 2008). Around the 
same time, it was announced that the budget for the FSP 2008-2009 year would be 485 
billion kwacha (Times of Zambia 2008b). The PF‘s Dr. Guy Scott complained that the 
MMD again timed its annual fertilizer deliveries just before the 2008 elections.
71
  
Banda also aroused much controversy when he was photographed distributing bags of 
sugar and mealie-meal, a maize-based gruel that is a Zambian staple food, to village 
women in rural areas during his campaign (See Figure A4.1 in Appendix Four). 
 
Election Results in 2006 and 2008  
While the MMD concentrated on vote-buying in the rural areas during both the 
2006 and 2008 elections, its treatment of the urban poor proved detrimental to its 
electoral fortunes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.  Overall, the 2006 elections were 
characterized by much higher voter registration than in the 2001 elections.  Four 
million Zambians registered (Wines 2006a) while the Electoral Commission of 
Zambia reported that 70 percent of these registered voters actually turned out to vote, 
indicating less voter apathy at the choice of candidates or outcome.
72
   
At the national level, Mwanawasa received a larger mandate than in 2001, 
gaining 43 percent of the vote compared with Sata‘s 29 percent.  Not surprisingly, the 
MMD obtained most of its votes in majority rural areas, such as Eastern, Western, 
                                                          
70
 The Zambian constitution stipulates that in the case where a president dies in office, a new president 
needs to be elected within 90 days.  The vice-president, Rupiah Banda, became the interim president 
and endorsed as the MMD‘s candidate.  Ironically, Banda was until only a few years earlier an official 
member of UNIP.   
71
 Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.  
72
 See ―2008 Elections‖ at http://www.elections.org.zm/. 
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Northwestern, and Central provinces.  However, Michael Sata obtained about 58 
percent of the vote in Lusaka District compared with 22 percent for Mwanawasa.  In 
the wake of Andrew Mazoka‘s death, Hakainde Hichilema took over leadership of the 
UPND and entered into a coalition with UNIP and the FDD, which was called the 
United Democratic Alliance (UDA), for the 2006 elections.  Despite hoping to reverse 
the 2001 results when these parties split each other‘s votes by running separately, 
Hichilema only received 20 percent of the votes in Lusaka. As seen by the boldfaced 
numbers in Table 3.4, Sata obtained the majority of votes in all of Zambia‘s major 
urban constituencies.  Such an outcome indicated that urbanites did not simply want a 
change from the MMD but rather chose a specific opposition party that was believed 
to be most likely to implement the exact change they wanted. 
 
Table 3.4:  Results from the 2006 Zambian Presidential Elections in  
Major Urban Areas (%) 
Main Urban 
Constituencies 
Poverty 
Rates  
Presidential Candidates (Party) 
Levy 
Mwanawasa 
(MMD) 
Michael 
Sata  
(PF) 
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UDA) 
Godfrey 
Miyanda  
(HP)  
Ken  
Ngondo 
(APC)  
Lusaka Province  
Chawama 0.61 20.7 55.9 22.2 1.0 0.3 
Kabwata 0.25 17.2 61.4 19.6 1.6 0.1 
Kanyama 0.57 22.9 45.7 29.8 1.2 0.3 
Lusaka Central 0.26 20.9 56.4 20.8 1.6 0.1 
Mandevu  0.52 23.0 61.4 13.9 1.3 0.3 
Matero  0.42 21.7 63.4 13.5 1.2 0.2 
Munali  0.58 19.9 58.3 19.9 1.6 0.3 
Copperbelt Province 
Kitwe 0.45 19.6 69.5 9.2 1.5 0.2 
Ndola Central 0.56 20.4 64.5 12.2 2.5 0.4 
Sources: Election data calculated from the Electoral Commission of Zambia 
(http://www.elections.org.zm/).  Poverty data from Simler (2007) and based on the 2000 Census and the 
2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 
   
The importance of Sata‘s victory across both Lusaka and cities in the 
Copperbelt is even more remarkable considering the ethnic composition of the two 
regions of the country.  While the Copperbelt is primarily Bemba-speaking, Lusaka‘s 
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population is highly heterogeneous.  Though migrants from the Copperbelt and 
Northern provinces have arrived more recently, most migrants are from Eastern and 
Southern provinces (Hansen 2002).  Nyanja-speakers are in the majority, representing 
almost 53 percent of the population as of 2000 (CSO 2004). This is important because, 
as discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, ethno-linguistic identity has at times 
played an important role in Zambian politics (see Posner 2005).  Nevertheless, Sata, 
who is a Bemba-speaker, was still highly popular in a city dominated by Nyanja-
speakers.  
 
Table 3.5:  Results from the 2008 Zambian Presidential Elections in 
   Major Urban Areas (%) 
Main Urban 
Constituencies 
Poverty 
Rates 
Presidential Candidates (Party) 
Rupiah 
Banda 
(MMD) 
Michael 
Sata (PF) 
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UPND) 
Godfrey 
Miyanda  
(HP)  
Lusaka Province      
Chawama 0.61 25.5 60.3 13.9 0.3 
Kabwata 0.25 20.2 63.3 15.8 0.7 
Kanyama 0.57 26.1 52.2 21.3 0.4 
Lusaka Central 0.26 24.7 58.6 15.9 0.8 
Mandevu 0.52 28.8 63.2 7.5 0.5 
Matero 0.42 25.0 66.5 8.1 0.4 
Munali  0.58 27.1 58.5 13.7 0.6 
Copperbelt Province       
Kitwe  0.45 18.5 75.2 5.6 0.6 
Ndola Central  0.56 30.4 60.8 7.6 1.3 
Sources: Election data calculated from the Electoral Commission of 
Zambia(http://www.elections.org.zm/).  Poverty data from Simler (2007) and based on the 2000 Census 
and the 2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 
 
A similar pattern occurred in the October 2008 by-elections that followed 
Mwanawasa‘s death.  Rupiah Banda beat Sata by only two percentage points at the 
national level, obtaining 40 percent of the vote compared with his competitor‘s 38 
percent. Simultaneously, Sata‘s vote shares actually increased in all of Lusaka‘s 
constituencies, as well as in key cities on the Copperbelt.  By contrast, Hichilema and 
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his UPND actually lost some ground (see Table 3.5).
73
  While the exact level of 
turnout by the urban poor in particular is not possible to determine with the existing 
election data, the turnout rates in urban Lusaka were higher than the national turnout 
rates during both elections. Specifically, the national turnout rate was 69 and 45 
percent in the 2006 and 2008 elections, respectively.  The comparative rates for urban 
Lusaka were 71 and 58 percent.  
 
 
The Populist Strategy of “King Cobra”  
By employing a populist strategy, rather than the personalistic linkages of his 
opposition competitors, Sata was able to tap into the frustrations of the urban poor 
more effectively in the 2006 and 2008 elections than the opposition had done during 
the 2001 elections.  His strategy was three-fold.  First, he relied on a careful targeting 
of his campaign rallies within key areas of Lusaka.  Secondly, he mobilized 
constituents via a combination of charisma and a programmatic message around issues 
of social inclusion and anti-elitism, with some distribution of selective benefits to 
potential supporters.  Thirdly, he relied on simplistic language and an open-door 
policy, as well as magnified his own lack of education, in order to foster the image of 
a paternalistic benefactor who understands the plight of the ―common man.‖ This, in 
turn, fosters vertical ties between Sata and his constituents and translates into an 
autocratic and hierarchical management of the PF by him.  
 
                                                          
73
 Both the 2008 and 2006 elections were deemed ―free and fair‖ by local and international observers 
(see Africa Confidential 2008; Larmer and Fraser 2007). However, the UPND believes that the MMD 
steals some of its votes in rural areas as a way of remaining competitive with the PF, whose urban votes 
are more difficult to steal (Personal interview with Dr. Choowle Beyani, UPND, Lusaka, February 24, 
2009).  
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Geographically-Targeted Campaigns  
Sata spent a majority of his time campaigning amongst street vendors, 
marketeers, bus and taxi drivers, and the youth, the latter of whom comprise 66 
percent of the population in Lusaka Province (CSO 2004).
74
  In the 2008 elections, he 
launched his campaign from the Matero market, where the PF contains an office 
(Kalaluka and Noyoo 2008).  By contrast, Banda launched his campaign from 
Lusaka‘s plush Inter-Continental Hotel (Times of Zambia 2008c) and Hichilema began 
at the Mulungushi Conference Center, a site traditionally reserved for meetings 
amongst politicians.
75
  In the run-up to the 2006 elections, Sata believed that Mandevu 
constituency, which is among the poorest in Lusaka, was one of his strongest bases of 
support
76
 and he therefore held the final rally of his presidential campaign in Mandevu 
compound (Larmer and Fraser 2007).   
Shanty compounds are specifically targeted by the PF during election 
campaigns because, as mentioned earlier, these neighborhoods have the highest 
density of residents where potentially many votes can be obtained.
77
  In the aftermath 
of the 2006 elections, when many urbanites were surprised that Sata did not win the 
presidency, riots broke out in not only Mandevu and Matero but also in the Garden 
and Chipata compounds and ultimately spread to the Copperbelt.  Residents in these 
compounds threw stones and burned market stalls and merchandise, overwhelming the 
police and forcing the Zambian army to intervene (Paipi et al. 2006).  Only when Sata 
publicly appealed for calm did the rioting cease (Wines 2006b).  As a precautionary 
measure, riot police were dispatched to some Lusaka shanty compounds in 2008 to 
deter violence after those elections (Africa Confidential 2008). 
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Mixed Modes of Mobilization  
 As a consummate political entrepreneur, Sata grabbed the attention of this 
constituency by crafting a charismatic and controversial image that has helped 
distance himself from his previous image as Chiluba‘s right-hand man.  For instance, 
he engages in very theatrical antics during his campaigning to grab attention.  In 2006, 
his campaigns featured broken clocks because the clock is the MMD‘s symbol (Wines 
2006a). The implication was that the MMD‘s time had expired.  The PF‘s own symbol 
is Noah‘s Ark and its rallying cry of Pabwato translates as ―get on the boat,‖ implying 
that Zambians should join the party to escape the country‘s deluge of economic 
hardships.
 78
  Playing on the theme, Sata arrived at the Zambian High Court to register 
his party for the 2008 elections standing in a speedboat towed by a truck (see Figure 
A4.2 in Appendix Four).  
 Importantly, he sustains this image outside of election periods.  In 2005, more 
than a year before the 2006 elections, he addressed a huge rally in Matero township to 
denounce the MMD‘s performance and argued that Zambians needed a respite from 
power outages, high taxes, and the lack of clean water (The Post 2005).  In January 
2007, he organized a mass procession in the streets of Lusaka to protest the 
privatization of Zambian National Commercial Bank (ZNCB) and the International 
Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) suggestion that the government place higher valued-added 
taxes on food and agricultural products (Larmer and Fraser 2007).  Moreover, he takes 
great effort to remain in the eye of the media and is featured on the front cover of The 
Post newspaper practically every day.  The PF‘s vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, noted 
that Sata purposely used to hold press conferences on Sunday, when there is relatively 
little happening for journalists to report, so that he would be guaranteed to appear in 
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 The MMD joked that if too many people got on the boat though, it was bound to sink like the Titanic 
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the Monday paper.
79
  He often intentionally creates large crowds by hiring buses to 
bring people to his rallies, which in turn is intended to convince others that he has 
legitimacy as the people‘s representative.  In fact, when he went to the High Court in 
January 2009 to demand a recount of the 2008 election results, 15 busloads of 
supposed supporters were brought in to cheer in his favor.
80
    
Coupled with this charisma is a package of policy promises that resonate with 
the priorities of the urban poor and aim to rectify their relegation, both figuratively and 
literally, to a marginal place in Zambian society.  Collectively, Sata‘s promises 
challenge the MMD‘s rigid definitions of legality and illegality as well as highlight 
that support for a free market economy need not require the state to abrogate its 
responsibilities to provide basic goods and services.  In the words of the PF‘s vice-
president, Dr. Guy Scott, ―The growth of the elite and elite-led kind of policy-making, 
or elites serving-their-own policymaking, coupled with dreadful poverty, both urban 
and rural, it‘s a serious apartheid kind of problem. I think Michael [Sata] grasps that, 
verbalized that better than anybody, the inequality.‖81  A respected Zambian political 
analyst, Dr. Neo Simutanyi, concurs:  
 
He [Sata] has been able to package his message in a way that resonates well with the 
majority of the poor, especially in urban areas.  He seems to understand the problems 
of the poor, the problems of the working people, especially you know those who have 
lost jobs and so forth.  And having worked as Minister of Local Government, he 
seems to understand the local issues, the issues of water, the issues of services, and 
these are some of things that he is able to talk about in a language that the local people 
actually understand.
82
   
He has articulated this message most vocally through the PF‘s slogan of ―lower 
taxes, more jobs, more money in your pockets.‖   Though vague, it offers more 
substantive policy commitments than the slogans of the other parties.  The MMD 
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exhorts Zambians to support it ―For Growth and Empowerment‖ (MMD 2006) and the 
UPND encourages voters to ―Realize the dream of a better Zambia through real 
change‖ (UPND 2008). Growth, empowerment, and a better Zambia essentially 
represent valence goods against which no one would argue. By contrast, low wages, 
high prices, and few job opportunities were cited among residents in Zambia‘s 
informal urban settlements as the top causes of poverty (see World Bank 2007a).  
Indeed, when asked why informal sector workers belonging to his organization 
support the PF, Victor Phiri of WEAZ responded that ―He [Sata] focuses on 
unemployment, he can articulate our will.‖83 Given Lubinda, the PF‘s spokesman and 
MP for Lusaka‘s Kabwata constituency recognizes that the message is particularly 
effective in urban areas rather than rural ones:  ―We talk about lower taxes, we talk 
about jobs for people.  Now, that appeals to the people in the urban areas because 
they‘re the ones who are looking for jobs, they‘re the ones whose incomes are 
overtaxed.  So, we appeal to them more than to rural dwellers.  We haven‘t articulated 
issues of agriculture that strongly.‖84  Others echoed the same claim, noting that 
people living in rural areas are less likely to understand the concept of tax while being 
more inclined to want to hear campaign promises about farming inputs than jobs.
85
   
On the surface, promising more jobs and lower taxes may also appear devoid 
of any programmatic content.  However, tax rates are particularly contentious in 
Zambia, where the MMD government privatized the mines and only requires foreign 
investors to pay 0.6 percent of royalties on their profits (Lungu 2008).  Many low-
income Zambians in formal jobs believe that they should not have to pay taxes on their 
meager incomes when wealthy investors could do so more easily.  Informal workers 
who do not pay income tax are still forced to pay monthly or daily fees for using a 
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market stall or for setting up a tuntemba.
86
  The urban poor also are more likely to 
have a higher share of their incomes going to pay VAT taxes on consumer goods.
 87
 
Arguably, reducing the VAT and other taxes would provide less revenue for the 
government.  However, the PF‘s Director of Research, Dr. Mulenga, claims that 
reducing taxes could actually provide more money for public services because fewer 
people would try to evade taxes, leading to higher compliance, and Zambians would 
spend more of their money on consumption, thereby expanding industries and 
ultimately economic growth.
88
 With respect to jobs, the PF argued that creating more 
employment required diversifying the economy away from copper
89
 and requiring 
foreign investors, particularly the Chinese, to use local labor rather than importing 
workers from overseas.
90
 For those who remain unemployed, Sata also advocated the 
provision of unemployment benefits until a job was found.
91
  
In addition, improved water, sanitation, electricity, and housing are amongst 
the top promises offered by the PF during its campaigns.  Dr. Mulenga claims that the 
PF‘s advantage is the adoption of a ―human rights approach‖ to these issues.  When a 
clean water supply, for example, is portrayed as a basic need, then it becomes 
inexcusable for a government not to provide it.
92
  This emphasis on a human rights 
approach is not necessarily uncontroversial when one considers that the MMD will not 
provide such services to compounds considered ―illegal.‖ 
A comprehensive housing development program is the main pillar of the PF‘s 
party manifesto, which stresses the need to provide low-cost, decent housing to those 
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individuals currently residing in squatter settlements.
93
  Upgrading shanty housing by 
providing the proper infrastructure, rather than demolishing these settlements as the 
MMD has tended to, was stressed throughout the PF‘s last two electoral campaigns.94 
PF MPs, such as Dr. Scott and Lubinda, have been vocal in Parliament about ensuring 
that shanty compounds receive adequate government assistance during the rainy 
season when roads become impassable (Zambian Parliament Tenth Assembly 2008).  
In addition, after the March 2007 housing demolitions, Sata proclaimed that he would 
sue the state on behalf of the people who lost their homes (Mwape 2007).  When asked 
about the housing situation, Sata personally replied that illegal housing should be 
upgraded and added, ―But, you don‘t demolish for the sake of demolishing.  The 
people must come first.  People must come first.  The laws are made for people, laws 
are made to protect the people.  We‘re going to do that.‖95  
Part of the PF‘s message is also to deride the MMD‘s harassment of street 
vendors as both counterproductive and inhumane and instead advocate that more 
adequate places be found for them to sell.  In fact, Sata noted that 
  
The MMD, they don‘t know anything about how to deal with anything 
because…when it comes to the vote, they [MMD members] don‘t run in the streets 
where they [vendors] vote and they don‘t provide them [vendors] with employment.  
They [MMD members] don‘t provide them with more space.  You can‘t force them 
[vendors] out of the streets…If you crack down on them [vendors], where are you 
going to take them? What I‘m saying is, if you fail to provide for them, don‘t bring 
punitive measures against them.
96
   
 
Such a claim is surprising from someone who, as Minister of Local Government and 
Housing under Chiluba, engaged in wide-ranging crackdowns on informal sector 
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workers and was even the architect of the Street Vending and Public Nuisances Act.  
Yet, for Edward Chisenga of the Street Vendors‘ Association, Sata‘s past behavior is 
forgotten and ―King Cobra‘s‖ more recent interventions on their behalf are 
appreciated.  In choosing a presidential candidate, Chisenga adds that treatment of 
street vendors is more important to him than other issues, such as health or 
education.
97
  PF Vice-President, Guy Scott, further adds that his party, which controls 
the Lusaka City Council but receives orders from the MMD-controlled Ministry of 
Local Government, tries to sabotage the crackdowns on street vendors and market 
workers as much as possible.
98
  
Importantly, this package of messages around social inclusion remained 
constant across the two elections.  Yet, some of Sata‘s more controversial claims 
disappeared in 2008 without hurting his support among the urban poor.  Most notably, 
Sata had been extremely critical of the predominance of foreign investors or, in his 
words ―infestors,‖ in the Zambian economy.  In the Copperbelt, Sata criticized the 
presence of Chinese and Indian companies, who own many of the region‘s copper 
mines in the wake of the MMD‘s privatization policies.  He likewise decried that most 
of Lusaka‘s shops were owned by Chinese and South Asians (Wines 2006a) and 
vowed to deport foreign business owners if elected into office.  At his final rally in 
Mandevu in 2006, he stated, ―The markets are for Zambians…if you want to remain 
poor and if you want all good things to go to foreigners, vote for Mwanawasa‖ (cited 
in Chellah and Mwilu 2006).  
Yet, in the run-up to the 2008 elections, he noticeably toned down his 
xenophobic rhetoric.
99
 In fact, in the September 30, 2008 edition of The Post 
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newspaper, the PF sponsored a full-page campaign advertisement with the following 
message, which was personally signed by Sata:   
 
We started our journey in 2001, we have come a long way.  I would like on behalf of 
the Central Committee, Provincial Committees, District Committees, Constituencies, 
Wards, Branches, Sections, the General Membership of our Party and indeed on my 
own behalf pay tribute and sincerely thank our Asian community for the tremendous 
support and contribution rendered to the Patriotic Front.  Without it, we would not 
have reached this far (emphasis added). 
 
He also reversed direction and pledged that if elected into office, he would actually 
protect all investment deals signed under the MMD administration (EIU 2008).  The 
fact that his vote shares actually were slightly higher in urban areas despite a reduction 
in xenophobic claims suggests that his message on social inclusion had been the 
constant factor in attracting the urban poor.
100
  
  While Sata‘s charisma and programmatic message around social inclusion are 
his primary mobilizing tactics, he may have relied on selective benefits to a small 
extent as well. Specifically, there was some speculation that the PF distributed money 
to bus and taxi drivers before both elections in order to encourage them to generate 
support for the party among their customers.
101
 However, few knew whether those 
who had received such payments actually voted for Sata, or even showed up at the 
polls at all.
102
  
More generally, many believe that vote-buying does not necessarily influence 
urban voting behavior to the same extent as it might in rural areas. For instance, 
Cheikh Chifuwe of The Post newspaper claims that urban voters who receive handouts 
still tend to vote according to their consciences:  ―Urban voters get those things 
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[handouts] but, at the end of the day, they make an independent decision, choice.  I 
think over time, there has been greater awareness in the urban areas so it doesn‘t 
matter what you really give them.‖103 As noted in Chapter Two, one reason for this is 
that due to resource constraints, opposition parties will concentrate campaigns in 
urban areas and so, they can all offer hand-outs and urbanites can vote in turn as they 
choose. This contrasts with rural areas, where the incumbent traditionally is dominant 
and sometimes the only party campaigning.   
 
Vertical Ties and Hierarchical Party Management  
 The third key element of Sata‘s populist strategy is the use of language, 
symbols, and party management tactics that bring him closer to the people.  In turn, 
these actions reinforce his vertical ties and plebiscitarian relationship with the urban 
poor while emphasizing the lack of autonomous civil society organizations mediating 
the PF‘s interaction with this constituency.  For instance, Sata speaks in the vernacular 
during his campaign speeches while Mwanawasa used to given his speeches in 
English and then have a staff member translate them into local languages (Wines 
2006a). Moreover, Sata portrays himself as a common man who understands the 
travails of low-income urbanites:  ―He [Sata] talks about people eating a meal in the 
compound.  He talks about what affects a person in the compound and they understand 
that this man knows what he‘s talking about.‖ 104  According to the PF‘s vice-
president, Sata purposely highlights his own lack of education and refinement because 
it elicits claims from the opposition that one needs to be educated to run a country:  
―He [Sata] likes the image that he‘s uneducated.  It brings out the worst in the 
educated elite.  They say, ‗Honestly, a man with grade 4 [education], how can he run a 
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country?‘  I mean, 99 percent of the voters are grade 4 [educated].  What‘s their 
problem? What a stupid thing to say.‖105 Likewise, the PF tries to discredit the leader 
of the UPND by calling him ―calculator boy‖ as a reference to Hichilema‘s former 
background working in the accounting multi-national Grant Thornton. Hichilema, 
though somewhat insultingly, admits that the PF‘s style of leadership is effective given 
the nature of the urban poor: 
 
It is the circumstances that they [the urban poor] have found themselves in that they 
are looking for someone who can---well, their perception is that the one who shouts a 
lot, the one who threatens to beat up everyone else is the one who is macho enough 
and maybe is the one who should rule the country.  And you can‘t blame them 
because they have been denied education.  They‘ve been denied jobs.  So, they tend 
to be on the riotous side and obviously somebody who is closer to the riotous 
behavior is someone who they will think is their savior.
106
  
In the same manner, Dr. Chitala of the MMD candidly acknowledges that his party has 
less success with the urban poor because his party is perceived as aloof and 
intellectualistic.
107
   
Another tactic used by Sata is to show that unlike other politicians, he is 
directly accessible to the people.  In the mid-1990s, when he was Minister of Local 
Government and Housing, dozens of people regularly queued up to speak with him 
directly about their problems (Mwiinga 1994).  Anyone who has visited the PF 
headquarters in Farmer‘s House off Cairo Road soon realizes that this ―open door‖ 
policy still continues today, with constituents constantly lined up to meet with him.  
Furthermore, the PF‘s vice-president, Dr. Scott, acknowledges that Sata publicly 
lambasts the performance of PF councilors and MPs to purposely bring himself closer 
to the voters.
108
  By criticizing his own party members for not effectively responding 
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to the peoples‘ demands, Sata creates a paternal image that only he cares for the 
people and can accordingly provide. 
On the other hand, the PF does not forge horizontal relationships with civic 
organizations representing the urban poor, debunking the possibility that a corporatist 
arrangement between associations of the urban poor and this opposition party have 
been responsible for the PF‘s success.  According to Dr. Scott, while there are 
representatives of certain organizations who are members of the PF, the party does not 
have formal associations with any particular organizations.  In his view, it would be 
unwise for an organization to associate with the PF since this would in turn cause it to 
be targeted for harassment by the MMD.
109
  The largest umbrella organization for 
informal workers, known as the Alliance for Zambia Informal Economy Associations 
(AZIEA), has been angry about the targeting of its members by all political parties 
during election times.   In fact, its general secretary, Lameck Kashiwa, complained in 
the 2008 electoral campaign that ―They [politicians] should stop looking at us as 
campaign tools, we are human beings and want to be respected just like they want to 
be respected‖ (cited in Katasefa 2008: 7).  One of AZIEA‘s largest alliance members 
is the Zambia National Marketeers Association (ZANAMA), which was established in 
cities on the Copperbelt during the 1990s but has its Lusaka office in the capital‘s 
main Soweto market. Its original goal was specifically to protect market workers from 
pressures by political party cadres, who often try to extort money from them (War on 
Want n.d.).  According to the MMD‘s Dr. Kalumba, ZANAMA splits its support 
between the MMD and PF rather than favoring one over the other.
110
  
As noted earlier, the country‘s main alliance of labor unions, the ZCTU, has 
become increasingly involved in advocating rights for informal sector workers, 
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especially since its membership of formal sector workers has declined substantially 
since 1991.
111
 While the ZCTU formerly possessed a corporatist relationship with the 
MMD during the party‘s early years under Chiluba, the party‘s privatization practices 
alienated much of the labor movement.  By the 1996 elections, the ZCTU openly 
announced that it no longer supported the MMD (Rakner 2003) and since then, the 
union movement has abstained from endorsing any parties, including the PF (Larmer 
and Fraser 2007).  This lack of horizontal ties resonates with contemporary populist 
movements in Latin America where leaders have sought to mobilize atomized, 
unorganized urban masses who are not represented by any organizational 
intermediaries, such as unions (e.g. Roberts 1995; Roberts and Arce 1998). 
 Not surprisingly, Sata‘s reliance on strong, vertical ties with the voters has 
manifested in a party organization firmly oriented around him.  Thus far, Sata has 
demonstrated little tolerance for internal dissent and tellingly, the PF is the only major 
Zambian political party not to hold internal party elections to determine who its leader 
will be (EIU 2008).  Consequently, experts on the local political scene and even 
members of the PF do not believe that the party truly is institutionalized beyond Sata 
and would therefore lose momentum if he was not at the helm.
112
 The authoritarian 
nature of the party was clear when Sata forbade PF MPs from participating in 
Zambia‘s National Constitutional Conference (NCC), an initiative aimed at revising 
the constitution, because he believed that the other invited stakeholders were too 
partisan.
113
  When 27 PF MPs contravened his order and nonetheless participated, he 
attempted to expel them from the party (Times of Zambia 2007b).  In turn, they 
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threatened to throw their support behind Rupiah Banda in the 2008 elections (EIU 
2008).  
Cross-Class Support?  
While the various components of Sata‘s populist strategy have endeared him to 
the urban poor, his appeal to other urbanites appears mixed.  Certainly, some of Sata‘s 
xenophobic claims in the 2006 elections and his outspoken admiration for Zimbabwe‘s 
dictatorial leader, Robert Mugabe, frightened away intellectuals and the middle-
classes (Schatz 2007).  Larmer and Fraser (2007: 631) claim that civil society leaders 
are largely distrustful of Sata‘s ―street politics.‖ Big business elites also tend to shy 
away from the PF and favor the MMD, through votes and/or campaign contributions, 
specifically because they prefer the certainty that comes from supporting the status 
quo.
114
    
Nevertheless, the election results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that Sata obtained 
high vote shares in two constituencies, Lusaka Central and Kabwata, that have 
relatively low poverty rates.  Lusaka Central contains the neighborhood of Kabulonga, 
which is Lusaka‘s most expensive area where some of Zambia‘s wealthiest citizens 
reside.  Kabwata is less lavish but contains significant neighborhoods dominated by 
Zambians of Indian descent (Taylor 2006), who arguably would have been most 
offended by Sata‘s anti-South Asian rhetoric.  Though difficult to determine the 
economic standing of those who are voting for Sata within these constituencies, there 
are at least two reasons why he may not have completely alienated more affluent 
Lusakans.  First, his previous service in government proved that he is serious about 
policy implementation.  In fact, in addition to his ―King Cobra‖ nickname, he is also 
widely known as a ―man of action.‖  For instance, when he was Lusaka District 
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Governor in the late 1980s, he famously cleaned up piles of accumulated trash on the 
capital‘s streets (Gould 2006).  As one local journalist noted, ―Things work under him.  
He has been Minister of Local Government, Minister of Health, Minister without 
Portfolio.  He has produced results.  So, from that angle, people in the urban areas see 
him as a person who works.‖115  Secondly, while the PF has been erratic on the proper 
role of foreign investors, the PF‘s director of research, Dr. Mulenga, notes that the 
party does not eschew a free market orientation.
 116
  Instead of lobbying for 
nationalization or protectionism, the PF advocates for lower taxes and less 
bureaucracy in order to provide an enabling environment for private investment by 
local investors.
117
  This eclectic stance of wanting more government support for local 
investors with less government intervention may then prove palatable to some 
medium- and small-scale business owners.     
Nonetheless, Sata‘s populist strategy towards the urban poor holds greater pay-
offs because it is the latter, rather than better-off urbanites, who are most likely to 
appear at the polls.  Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the UPND, offered the 
following observation:  ―First, you must understand who votes in the city.  It is the 
people living in squalor, mainly.  The people in these big offices that you see hardly 
go into the queue to vote, they don‘t even register.‖118 Cheikh Chifuwe of The Post 
made the same claim, noting that in urban areas, those with formal jobs will not be 
able to spare adequate time to stand in long voting queues.
119
   The Director of Policy 
and Research for the UPND, Dr. Choolwe Beyani, despaired at these circumstances:   
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Unfortunately, the unemployed are the majority of the voters.  The so-called middle-
class is insignificant.  Even the working classes, who have certain levels of education, 
has become insignificant in voting patterns.  So, the half-literate or illiterate urban 
poor and the rural peasantry have become, especially in this economic crisis, the 
backbone of the voting patterns.
120
 
 
He proceeded to explain how this in turn reduces the ability of his own party to 
communicate a sophisticated campaign message.
121
   
 
Other Opposition Party Alternatives in Zambia 
 The importance of a populist strategy in contributing to Sata‘s success among 
the urban poor during the 2006 and 2008 elections contrasts markedly with the purely 
personalistic linkages employed by three other main opposition parties.  The UPND is 
the most viable of the three, given its third-place finish in the 2008 elections.  Unlike 
the PF, whose rallying cry of Pabwato conjures an image of radical departure from the 
status quo under the MMD, the UNDP‘s motto of Pa Kuboko Chabe, meaning ―let‘s 
shake hands,‖ implies a conciliatory stance and accomplishment through unity.  A 
former UPND vice-president, Sakwiba Sikota, now leads the United Liberal Party 
(ULP).  Though Sikota has never run as a presidential candidate, his party always 
enters into electoral pacts with other parties.  The third main opposition party, the 
Heritage Party, probably achieved its greatest popularity in the 2001 elections and, as 
seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, has since then failed to gain more than one to two percent 
of the vote in Zambia‘s urban constituencies.  Its leader, Godfrey Miyanda, struggled 
to even obtain the necessary 200 signatures to legally register as a presidential 
candidate in 2008 (Mwanangombe 2008).   
 The ideologies of each party remain relatively similar, offering a wide-ranging 
agenda that intends to appeal to all Zambians.  The Heritage Party campaigns against 
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the corruption of the MMD while failing to articulate why voters should support it.
122
 
Formed in 2006 after Sikota lost the battle to lead the UPND to Hichilema, ULP 
theoretically is guided by a liberal democratic philosophy.  However, its own leader 
does not appear exactly sure of what that means in practical terms:   
 
Especially in a country like ours, where you have so many disparities between the 
haves and the have nots, you need to have intervention from the state.  But at the same 
time you can‘t have a totally leftist leaning [government], otherwise the economy gets 
bogged down.  So, hence that‘s why we are liberal democrats, which is sort of like a 
halfway house between the two.
123
  
The ULP‘s lack of strong ideological orientation is demonstrated by the fact that the 
party opposed the MMD in the 2006 elections and then entered into an electoral pact 
with the ruling regime during the 2008 elections.  
In 2006, the UPND‘s leader, Hichilema, led the UDA, which also included 
UNIP and FDD (Mapulenga 2006).  This coalition emerged as a response to 
Zambians‘ fatigue with proliferating opposition parties.124  As seen in Table 3.4, the 
UDA failed though to not only defeat the MMD but also to outperform the PF.  
Larmer and Fraser (2007:  623) observe that the UDA ultimately proved unappealing 
to the electorate because it failed to offer any substantive policy differences with the 
MMD.  Likewise, in 2008, the UPND proposed running a ―mixed economy‖ that 
aimed to increase and properly structure ―private/public local and foreign investments 
in sectors such as agriculture, mining, construction, energy, tourism, manufacturing, 
infrastructure, telecommunications, pensions, insurance, financial and other services, 
many of which have in the past decades been neglected‖ (UPND 2008:  1).  However, 
these objectives are not a radical departure from those articulated in the MMD 
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manifesto but rather convey a commitment to improve and intensify investments in a 
broad range of sectors.     
 In terms of substantive policy areas, education, health, and agriculture 
represented the UPND‘s three main foci.  According to the party‘s research director, 
Dr. Beyani, the party advocates the introduction of free education, reform of the 
healthcare system, irrigation, agro-processing, effective agricultural marketing 
arrangements, and improved road infrastructure.
125
 Yet, as the governance advisor 
with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) observes, the party is not 
specific about how they will achieve these improvements, particularly with respect to 
how they will pay for them.
126
 Moreover, since no Zambian political party opposes 
more education, better healthcare, and a revived agricultural sector, it is unclear how 
these goals differentiate the UPND from its competitors.   
Both the UPND and the Heritage Party also tend to emphasize rural 
development as the key to improving urban challenges. For Hichilema, stopping the 
tide of rural-to-urban migration would help ―decongest‖ the cities:  ―So, if we made 
the conditions better for them out there [in rural areas], by making agriculture viable 
through subsidies and other programs, you will reduce the pressure of influx of street 
vendors coming in and looking for a better life.‖127 Yet, as noted earlier, the MMD is 
already engaged in a vast input subsidy program.   Likewise, the ―Village Concept‖ 
lies at the heart of the Heritage Party‘s manifesto, advocating that Zambia return to the 
way of life before the country was colonized.  Such a life involves ownership of a 
wealth-generating investment (e.g. land or business), food security, incorruptible 
leadership, productivity, and a social safety net to protect the destitute (Heritage Party 
n.d.).   According to Wazziah Phiri, the party‘s spokesman, the ―Village Concept‖ 
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emphasizes that improving productivity in rural areas will decrease rural-urban drift 
because Zambians would no longer only find opportunities in the cities.
128
  
While certainly not ignorant of the challenges of urban poverty, both UPND 
members, such as Dr. Beyani, and MMD representatives, including Dr. Kalumba, 
claim that the UPND‘s constituency base predominantly spans middle-class, urban 
intellectuals as well as rural dwellers in Hichilema‘s stronghold of Southern 
Province.
129
 This is partly due to the way in which the young, charismatic Hichilema 
markets himself.  He alternately claims ―I‘m a villager,‖ ―I‘m a rancher‖ and ―I come 
from a business background.‖130  His rhetoric though does not seem to be relevant for 
the urban poor.  For instance, he advocated in his 2008 campaign that Zambians 
should more actively read the Auditor General‘s reports, which shows how poorly 
citizens‘ money has been spent under the MMD (Noyoo 2008).  He also widely 
advertises that his party has written acerbic critiques of the MMD‘s budget 
proposals.
131
 Yet, given the low education levels of most of the urban poor, delving 
into such esoteric reading cannot hold the same appeal as attending Michael Sata‘s 
raucous rallies.   
Zambia‘s other main opposition parties do though share with the PF a party 
organization that centers on their leaders.  This problem is especially acute for the 
Heritage Party, which has no members in parliament (Mwanangombe 2008) and 
therefore fails to convey that the party is more widely representative beyond Miyanda. 
Not surprisingly then, Heritage‘s spokesman, Phiri, admits that his party is not 
institutionalized beyond its leader and would most likely crumble in Miyanda‘s 
absence: ―If you look at the political system in our country, it is basically centered 
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around individuals, unfortunately or fortunately… So, I wouldn‘t cheat you and tell 
you that we‘re institutionalized enough to reach a point whereby maybe if this man 
[Miyanda] moves out, we [the Heritage Party] could still stand.‖132  
In the same manner, the UPND revolves around Hichilema, as it previously did 
around his predecessor, Mazoka.  Transition of leadership from Mazoka to Hichilema 
did occur on the basis of intra-party elections but, Hichilema was widely perceived as 
Mazoka‘s protégé (Banks et al. 2008).  The main controversy during those elections 
was the perceived impression that Mazoka‘s successor needed to be from the Tonga 
ethnic group, just as Mazoka had been. When Sakota lost the party elections to 
Hichilema, allegedly because the former is Lozi while the latter is Tonga, Hichilema 
hastily created a broader party leadership structure.  This though was intended not 
necessarily to improve party governance but primarily to prevent defections to the 
ULP and to mitigate the impression that the UPND is for Tongas alone (Chellah and 
Chipenzi 2006).  Since then, it is unclear whether future elections for the UPND 
leadership will occur during Hichilema‘s tenure, and they seem unlikely given that he 
has already intimated that he will be his party‘s candidate in the 2011 elections.133  
Thus, while Zambia‘s other opposition parties share a party organization 
largely centered on their party leaders, they deviate from the PF in a number of other 
key respects.  First, they advance messages that are oriented around goods that all 
Zambians would prefer, such as improved health and education, rather than specific 
issues that are priorities for the urban poor.  Secondly, their tactics for addressing 
urban poverty often focus on nebulous promises to invest in rural areas so as to 
prevent overcrowding in the cities rather than new solutions for helping those already 
settled in the cities.  Thirdly, for the UPND in particular, the tactic of emphasizing 
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agricultural production while advocating a thorough analysis of auditor‘s reports may 
appeal to a vast constituency of rural dwellers and well-educated urbanites but creates 
little resonance with the urban under-classes. Such characteristics explain why in both 
the 2006 and 2008 elections, the PF defeated not only the MMD amongst 
constituencies largely comprised of the urban poor but also other opposition parties.  
The urban poor‘s support for the PF therefore should be viewed as a consequence of 
the party‘s ability to craft a populist strategy to address exclusion and harassment by 
the MMD and thereby become more distinguishable than the rest of the opposition, 
which predominantly relied on personalistic linkages with this constituency.   
 
 
Senegal  
Political Party Landscape  
By comparing the PF with not only other Zambian opposition parties but also 
those in Senegal, the importance of a populist strategy in attracting the urban poor 
over personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone becomes even clearer. 
Like Zambia, Senegal did not experience substantive political liberalization until the 
early 1990s.  From 1966 to 1976, the country was a single-party system under Léopold 
Sédar Senghor‘s Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), which espoused a form of 
democratic African socialism (Nohlen et al. 1999).  In 1976, Senghor amended the 
constitution and introduced the ―law of three trends,‖ which legalized three political 
parties as long as they adhered to an acceptable ideological position:  liberal 
democracy, social democracy, and communism/Marxism. At the same time, the UPS 
changed its name to the Parti Socialiste (PS) and staked claims on the centrist, social 
democratic position (Diaw and Diouf 1998).  The liberal democratic orientation was 
foisted upon the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS).  Founded in 1974, the PDS 
was led by Abdoulaye Wade, who was trained as an economist, mathematician, and 
139 
 
lawyer. The Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (PAI) accepted the Marxist 
designation.
134
   
After Senghor resigned from the PS in 1980, he was replaced by his prime 
minister, Abdou Diouf.  In 1991, the PDS joined the PS government during a period of 
co-habitation which ended with the 1993 elections. In 1995, Diouf  provided Wade a 
cabinet post.  These periods of co-habitation helped create the foundation for a more 
competitive political environment. The PS began consulting with the opposition about 
the creation of a new electoral code, a guaranteed secret ballot, lowering the voting 
age from 21 to 18, allowing expanded voter registration, and permitting foreign 
election monitors (Creevey et al. 2005; Kanté 1994).  During the following 
presidential elections in 2000, an opposition coalition was formed known as 
Alternance 2000.  Along with the PDS, this coalition included a number of leftist 
parties, such as the Ligue-Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD-
MPT), And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (AJ/PADS), and 
the Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail (PIT) (Banks et al. 2008).   
Between 2000 and 2007, the number of officially registered political parties in 
Senegal increased from 57 to 77 (Camara 2000; Adejumobi 2007).  Table 3.6 presents 
only the country‘s most competitive parties.  Just as in Zambia, in order to ensure that 
only the most serious parties participate, the Ministry of the Interior and Local 
Collectivities imposed a fee of 6 million CFA on parties competing in the 2000 
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presidential elections.
135
  Despite relatively low inflation, the fee rose to 25 million 
CFA for the 2007 presidential elections (Dione 2006).
136
   
 
Table 3.6:  Overview of Main Senegalese Political Parties 
 
Party Name  Leader  Year 
Founded  
Coalitions joined (year formed)  
Parti Démocratique du 
Sénégal 
(Democratic Party of 
Senegal, PDS) 
Abdoulaye 
Wade 
1974 ■  Front pour l’Alternance  
(FAL, 2000) 
■  Sopi Coalition (2001)  
■  Convergence des Actions autour 
du Président en Perspective du 21
ème
 
Siècle (CAP21, 2002)  
■ Sopi 2007 Coalition (2007)  
Parti Socialiste  
(Socialist Party, PS) 
Ousmane 
Tanor 
Dieng 
1959 ■ Cadre Permanent de Concertation  
(CPC,  2001)  
■ Coalition populaire pour 
l’alternance (CPA, 2006) 
Alliance des Forces de 
Progrès  
(Alliance of Forces for 
Progress, AFP) 
Moustapha 
Niasse 
1999 ■ FAL (2000) 
■ CPC (2001)  
■ CPA (2006) 
Rewmi  
(The Nation)  
Idrissa 
Seck  
2006 ---- 
Ligue Démocratique-
Mouvement pour le 
Parti du Travail 
(Democratic League-
Labor Party Movement) 
Abdoulaye 
Bathily  
1981 ■ FAL (2000) 
■ Sopi coalition (2001) 
■ CAP 21 (2002)  
■ CPA (2006) 
Parti de l’Indépendance 
et du Travail  
(Party of Independence 
and Work, PIT) 
Amath 
Dansokho  
1981 ■ FAL (2000) 
■ CPC (2001)  
■ CPA (2006) 
And-Jëf-Parti Africaine 
pour la Démocratie et la 
Socialisme  
(Act Together –African 
Party for Democracy 
and Socialism, AJ-
PADS) 
Landing 
Savané  
1991 ■ FAL (2000) 
■  And Defaar Sénégal (2007)  
Démocratie-Solidarité 
(Democracy-Solidarity)  
Robert 
Sagna  
2006 ■ Takku Defaraat Sénégal(2007)  
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Resource constraints remain a major issue for most opposition parties.  Since 
there is no public funding for parties, approximately 53 percent of funding must come 
from a candidate‘s personal resources (Bryan and Baer 2005).  Although the Ministry 
of the Interior will provide every registered candidate with the same number of posters 
and media attention, a party with more funding can print additional campaign 
materials and buy more radio and television time.
137
  Campaign travel in particular 
constitutes the greatest expense for Senegalese parties (Bryan and Baer 2005).  
 
Urbanization Challenges 
Due to this lack of resources, urban areas and particularly Dakar represent 
especially contested areas during elections.  At independence in 1960, Dakar was 
already becoming West Africa‘s most urbanized city with 14 percent of Senegal‘s 
population living in the capital (DPS 1993). This increased to 18.8 percent in 1976 and 
reached 21.6 percent by 1988 (DPS 1993). By 2002, almost one-quarter of the 
population lived in the city of Dakar and its main suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye 
(ANSD 2006), meaning that this agglomeration contains a potentially large source of 
votes.  At the same time, Dakar‘s massive population presents major challenges, 
prompting it to be described as a place ―invaded by poverty, offering today the face of 
a city knocked to pieces, anarchic and polluted.  An urban monster‖ (Ghorbal 2001).  
At least three factors have contributed to the city‘s growth and impoverishment 
during the post-independence period. First, the agricultural sector collapsed in the 
early 1980s.  Drought in the peanut basin and the adoption of a structural adjustment 
agreement that involved reducing fertilizer subsidies stimulated a massive rural 
exodus to Dakar (Mbow 1993; Pison et al. 1995).
138
  The increase in rural-to-urban 
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migration to Dakar was especially high during this period, averaging 5 percent during 
1983-1988 (DPS 1993), compared with 2.1 percent between 1988 and 2002 (ANSD 
2006).  Secondly, structural adjustment also required implementing austerity measures 
that led to extensive job retrenchments and to fewer civil service positions for 
university students upon graduation (Graham 1994). Both trends resulted in a city 
increasingly crowded with job seekers at a time when the state could not afford to 
create more employment opportunities.  At the start of the 1990s, open unemployment 
in Dakar was estimated at 24 percent with underemployment much higher (Graham 
1994).  During the preceding decade, purchasing power in the city had also declined 
by 35 percent (Faye and Thioub 2003), an indicator that would be even further 
exacerbated with the devaluation of the CFA in 1994.
139
   
More recently, however, the city has grappled with a third trend, which is that 
the country‘s birth rate peaked in the 1980s, meaning that a surfeit of young people is 
now on the job market (Oxford Analytica 2007).  For the youth, the rule of the day has 
become débrouille, meaning to cope or manage to get by, which usually involves 
accepting a low-paid apprenticeship, attempting to emigrate overseas, or most likely 
entering the already saturated informal sector (Diop 2002).  In fact, 76 percent of 
Dakar‘s population labors in the informal economy, a sector which accounted for 97 
percent of employment growth between 1994 and 2005 (ANSD 2007b:  48; World 
Bank 2007b).  The median monthly salary in the informal sector is approximately the 
equivalent of 45 dollars in current prices (ANSD 2007b: 51).   
As in Lusaka, Dakar‘s most densely populated areas also tend to be its poorest 
and, as seen in Figure 4.2 of Chapter Four, predominantly are located outside of the 
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city center.   These include the Médina neighborhood, which emerged during the 
colonial era when African inhabitants were expelled from the central Plateau quarter, 
which is the center of government administration and expensive homes (Mehretu and 
Mutambirwa 2003; Scheld 2002).  Likewise, the vast, irregular settlements of 
Parcelles-Assainies, Pikine, and Guédiawaye originated from déguerpissements, or 
forced removals, of slum dwellers from the city center between the 1970s and 1980s 
because they were perceived as encombrements humains (human clutter) who 
tarnished the city‘s image (Collignon 1984; Vernière 1977;  Zeleza and Eyoh 2003).140   
A majority of the bidonvilles, or shantytowns, in these neighborhoods on the city 
periphery were built on marshlands during an extended period of drought.  Yet, ever 
since the rainy seasons re-commenced, these neighborhoods become flood zones 
during part of the year, causing stagnant water to accumulate in homes (Fall et al. 
2005) and thereby creating breeding grounds for malarial mosquitoes and cholera.
141
   
 
 
The Triumph of a Populist Strategy in 2000  
Although Dakar‘s poor were ignored and even physically marginalized in the 
past during the country‘s period of more circumscribed political competition, their 
growth and density now means they are actively courted by politicians during 
elections, particularly by opposition parties trying to economize on scarce resources.  
As such, a journalist with the independent newspaper Sud Quotidien claims that ―If a 
party wins Parcelles, Pikine, and Guédiawaye, then it wins Dakar.‖142  During his time 
in opposition, Wade recognized the importance of this electoral rule better than any of 
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his other political competitors.  Wade relied on a populist strategy specifically targeted 
at Dakar‘s youth and consisted of a mixture of unrivalled charisma and programmatic 
appeals aimed at giving hope to the excluded.  The manner in which he delivered his 
messages signified an important deviation from the traditionally elitist nature of 
Senegalese politics and conveyed a sense of the direct, vertical ties between him and 
the broader populace.  Describing Wade‘s use of a populist strategy in the 2000 
elections further highlights the contrast with the opposition parties competing in the 
2007 elections.  
 
Vertical Ties, Youth, and Informality 
Wade‘s campaign for the 2000 elections was influenced by the growth of a 
new urban identity that privileged individual initiative in the face of an unresponsive 
state.  Two trends contributed to this identity.  First, the disappointed urban youth 
became more vocal about their living and working conditions.  In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, unemployed youth and students engaged in a series of riots, strikes, and 
demonstrations targeted against symbols of power in the affluent Plateau area of 
Dakar (Diouf 1996).  Shortly thereafter, the Set Setal movement was launched.  
Inspired by a song written by the Senegalese musician Youssou Ndour,  Set Setal is a 
Wolof phrase for ―clean up‖ and referred both to improving poor sanitation on the 
city‘s rubbish-strewn streets and to reducing the country‘s corruption and bad 
governance under the PS (Scheld 2002;  Diaw and Diouf 1998).  Participating youth 
responded to the state‘s incompetence by organizing volunteer neighborhood groups 
to clean streets, dispose of litter, and paint wall murals.  For Diouf (1996), the 
movement was an assault on the non-responsive ruling class and an attempt to reclaim 
public space for the entrepreneurial activities associated with la débrouille. 
McLaughlin (2001) further argues that Set Setal essentially signified the emergence of 
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an eclectic new urban identity, exemplified by not just wall murals, music, and 
neighborhood solidarity but also the spread of urban Wolof, which is a Creole 
language of French and Wolof.    
Secondly, this period coincided with the emergence of a class of individuals 
called moodu-moodu.  This term refers to predominantly uneducated and male, Wolof 
rural migrants to the city who depend on the informal sector and transnational 
opportunities to accumulate wealth.  Assisted through their contacts via Sufi religious 
affiliations, the existence of the moodu-moodu contradicted the belief of middle-class 
families that Western education was the route to success (Scheld 2002).  In the view of 
Senegalese sociologist Malick Ndiaye (1996), the moodu-moodu further popularized 
the notion amongst the urban masses that the informal sector, not white collar jobs, 
represented the easiest means to acquire social mobility and affluence.   
In the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections, Wade‘s method of 
campaigning accorded priority to this new urban identity around youth and 
informality, thereby generating a sense of direct responsiveness between Gorgui and 
the alienated masses.
143
  Specifically, he invented an entirely new formula of political 
campaigning in Senegal known as the marches bleues, or blue marches.  Traditionally, 
parties relied on elaborate, stationary performances set up around tents and chairs and 
complete with dancers and praise-singers, who would espouse the virtues of local or 
national party candidates.  The gathered audience would receive a meal as well as T-
shirts and hats with party slogans and pictures of candidates‘ faces.  Critically, these 
traditional meetings would involve the leader speaking in French to his audience, with 
a translator interpreting the meaning into local languages. Moreover, candidates often 
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 Such an advantage became even greater precisely because Diouf had lowered the voting age from 21 
to 18 in 1993.  Moreover, popular radio stations in the city, such as Oxy-Jeunes in Pikine, were 
encouraging their young listeners to register to vote for the 2000 elections (Gellar 2005). 
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devoted their time to talking with small groups of older attendees while the youth were 
often sent away to separate mass rallies (Foucher 2007).   
While the PS continued in this vein for the 2000 elections, the PDS could not 
afford this mode of campaigning.  Rather, Wade chose a cheaper but more dynamic 
mode of campaigning.  Specifically, PDS representatives toured city streets in their 
own cars, waving flags and banners colored blue, which is the color of the PDS.  
Instead of the suits favored by Diouf, Wade donned the typical Senegalese boubou.  
His security guards wore blue denim, a symbol of American values that favor the 
personal initiative of the débrouillard or the migrant returning from overseas rather 
than the ideals of a French civil servant (Foucher 2007).  Large amplifiers would blast 
the Senegalese pop music and Ivorian reggae favored by the young.  When the music 
was interrupted for Wade‘s speeches, he used urban Wolof rather than French to 
directly communicate to voters.  By effectively marching through Dakar, Wade was 
using a form of mobilization familiar to the youth, who always used marches as a 
means of protesting against the state (Foucher 2007).  At the same time, this mode of 
campaigning resonated with the notion of informality.  As Ibrahima Thioub, a 
Senegalese history professor at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop, observed,  
 
The PS has static meetings while the PDS marches, like the street peddlers and 
hawkers.  The PDS carries an indigenous discourse that is very understandable for the 
rural migrants who arrive in the city. I believe that the group that has the most 
difficulty with the PDS is the descendants of the citadins of the 19
th
 century.  For 
them, the texts of laws and rules are very important but such things aren‘t for those in 
the informal sector.  So, for them, laws don‘t make much sense and the PDS wants to 
push this logic.
144
   
As a sign of where he saw his constituency base was located, Wade launched 
the start of his 2000 campaign and his marches bleues in the main thoroughfares of 
Dakar where informal workers typically peddle their goods.  He moved from the 
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 Personal interview with Ibrahima Thioub, UCAD, Dakar, Sept.10, 2008. Citadins is a term for city 
dwellers.   
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Médina to the markets of Guele Tapée and Soumbédioune and down the main 
thoroughfares of Cheikh Anta Diop and Avenue Blaise Diagne (Ba 2000, cited in 
Foucher 2007).  By contrast, the PS launched its campaign in the rural Tambacounda 
region in the south-east of the country while Moustapha Niasse of the AFP began in 
the troubled region of Casamance (Panafrican News Agency 2000).  Such an approach 
helped Wade convey that he was a leader who differed from his two predecessors:  
―This populism gave the appearance that he remained an ordinary man.  A leader who 
listened to his people.  A leader who consulted them and was devoted to them‖ 
(Coulibaly 2003: 128).  Indeed, despite his high level of education, he proved capable 
of portraying himself as a man of the people.  
 
A “Political Animal” with a Popular Message 
Beyond his marches bleues, Wade‘s populist strategy involved a combination 
of charisma with a relevant policy message. Léopold Senghor had long ago 
characterized Wade as an ndiombor¸or hare, which symbolized a remarkable and 
shrewd political animal in a poem written by the first president (Breuillac 2000).  For 
Diop et al. (2002: 176), one of Wade‘s major advantages was a talented oratory and 
deep knowledge of the Senegalese people.  His facility with words tapped into the 
disillusionment of the times.  Most critically, he brought the term Sopi, meaning 
―change‖ in Wolof, into the political sphere during the 1980s long before this now 
commonplace rallying cry became a feature of political campaigns in Africa (Breuillac 
2000).  He would also draw on well-known fables to make parallels between literary 
villains and the incompetence of the PS (Breuillac 2000).  Like Michael Sata, Wade 
also ensured that, he always remained in the public eye through deft use of the 
burgeoning private media. In fact, he would often hold several press conferences a day 
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while Diouf would only agree to interviews during the week preceding the 2000 
elections (McKenzie 2000).   
Even Wade‘s own party cadres admit that Gorgui’s charisma was the main 
allure of the PDS.  When asked what attracted him to the PDS over all of Senegal‘s 
other political parties, Babacar Gaye, the PDS spokesman and Director of the Cabinet 
of Political Affairs, responded:   
 
I was fascinated by the man [Wade].  It wasn‘t his party [that attracted me] at the time 
because I wasn‘t looking for his doctrine, philosophy, method, organization.  No, that 
didn‘t interest me.  What interested me was that I was convinced that Abdoulaye 
Wade could change this country, that‘s all… So, I joined the PDS more for Wade than 
for the philosophy or ideology of the party.  Maybe if he was a fascist, I would 
support him.  If he was a communist, I would support him.  Even if he was someone 
who believed in savage liberalism, I would support him.
145
  
Beyond charisma, Wade mobilized the urban poor with promises on those 
issues most relevant to their everyday lives.  Notably, these promises were focused on 
social inclusion but combined aspects of both liberal and leftist appeals, consistent 
with Sata‘s promises and with observations that contemporary variants of populism 
adhere to an eclectic ideology (see Roberts 1995).  Jobs were at the forefront of 
Wade‘s agenda, with a critique of Diouf‘s poor performance in this respect topping off 
his campaign on February 8, 2000:  ―Seven years ago he [Diouf] had promised 20,000 
jobs.  Actually he lost 100,000‖ (cited in Panafrican News Agency 2000).  He made a 
ritual of asking at campaign rallies who had a job, anticipating only a few individuals 
to respond. A sea of hands always rose up into the air when he would subsequently 
question who was unemployed (Breuillac 2000).  The technique was effective in 
reinforcing the PS‘ lackluster record on employment.  Drawing on his party‘s 
characterization as a liberal party, Wade promised to provide jobs via the 
diversification of the economy away from peanut production and attracting foreign 
investment (Sixtine 2003). Beyond jobs, he also focused on the need to improve the 
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water supply in urban areas and provide relief for victims of flooding in the country 
(EIU 2000), which would include those in the poor suburbs of Dakar.  In addition, he 
vowed to end the déguerpissements practiced under the PS regime.
146
 Instead of 
demolishing unsuitable or illegal housing, the new logic was either to relocate people 
into better housing or compensate them if the state required them to move 
elsewhere.
147
  
Given the primary emphasis on unemployment, it was the economically, 
marginal youth concentrated in urban slums who had staked the most hope on Wade‘s 
promises (Galvan 2001).  More generally though, Diaw and Diouf (1998: 134) 
characterize the PDS as a ―populist party which the population could believe in.‖  
Above all, Graham (1994:  126) claims that Wade‘s optimism was an important 
antidote to growing complacency with the status quo:  ―Usually the only way this 
‗culture of poverty‘ can be reversed is by severe economic shock or by some kind of 
external influence.  The Sopi movement, which broke with years of uninterrupted 
political stability, may have temporarily provided such an influence.‖ 
The 2000 Elections  
The 2000 election results highlighted the success of Wade‘s populist strategy.  
In the first round of the February 27, 2000 elections, Wade competed against six other 
opposition candidates as well as the PS.  Election results from the first round of voting 
revealed that his populist strategy paid off.  Based on data provided by the Ministry of 
the Interior, Wade obtained 48 and 50 percent of the vote in the departments of Dakar 
and Pikine, respectively.
148
  At the national level, Wade secured a total of 
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 Personal interviews with Cheikh Guèye, ENDA-Tiers Monde, Dakar, Nov.19, 2008 and 
Mohammadou Abdoul, ENDA-Tiers Monde, Dakar, Oct. 3, 2008.  
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 At the time, Pikine and Guédiawaye were part of the same department.  Since 2000, they became 
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provided by Macoumba Coumé at the Ministry of the Interior on Oct. 2, 2008. 
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approximately 31 percent of the vote compared with Diouf‘s 41 percent.  Moustapha 
Niasse of the Alliance des Forces du Progrès (AFP) came in third with 17 percent of 
the votes, illustrating that it was not just a contest between the PS and the opposition 
but rather between the PS and the PDS.   Having received enough votes to advance to 
a second round of elections, Wade needed to convince the unsuccessful opposition 
candidates to rally around him. Promising that he would install a coalition government 
if he won, Wade was able to convince the AFP, along with other smaller parties, to 
join his original Alternance coalition, which was in turn re-named the Front pour 
l’Alternance (FAL) (Banks et al. 2008). 
Recognizing that winning over Dakar was critical to a national victory in the 
second round of the 2000 elections, the PS hurriedly launched a ―charm offensive‖ in 
the city and its suburbs (Diop et al. 2002:  173).  Yet, this tactic failed to have the 
desired outcome for the PS, which ultimately lost the second round to the PDS.  In 
Dakar especially, the PDS garnered 76 percent of the votes compared with 23 for the 
PS.
149
  According to one of the spokespeople for the PS, its major failure was ignoring 
both the plight and the electoral potential of Senegal‘s urban poor:  ―This is why the 
PS lost in 2000, because it lost its electorate, which had shifted and became poorer and 
more urban and conditions of life very difficult.  And these people sanctioned us in 
2000.‖150  
 
Sopi becomes Nopi
151
   
After Wade‘s electoral victory, his populist strategy dissipated and more 
purely personalistic linkages began to characterize his relationship with the urban 
poor, illustrating how party strategies shift over time.  Yet, the change was a gradual 
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 Nopi means ―to fall silent‖ in Wolof.  I borrowed this phrase from Havard (2004).    
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one.  Hoping to consolidate his rule by gaining a parliamentary majority, he continued 
to rely on his marches bleues for the campaign leading up to the 2001 legislative 
elections (Thomas 2001).  While inaugurating a commercial center in 2002 in Dakar‘s 
largest downtown market, known as Sandaga, Wade praised the ingenuity and 
entrepreneurial efforts of informal sector workers.  Famously, he declared at this 
gathering that he was the country‘s first ―informal‖ president (Coulibaly 2003:  123), 
referring to his own initiative and innovation in the political sphere.   
In general though, the PDS retreated from a populist strategy with the urban 
poor and relied more on a vague platform around valence issues as well as large-scale 
projects that proved most beneficial for Dakar‘s more affluent citizens.  The seven 
years preceding the 2007 elections were characterized by a series of high-profile 
construction projects, which Wade labeled as his Très Grands Projets (Very large 
projects, TGP) and administered by the Agence pour la promotion de l’investissement 
et les grands travaux (Agency for the promotion of investment and large works, 
APIX).  These projects included luxury ocean-front hotels and shopping centers, such 
as ―Dakar City‖ in the posh Les Almadies neighborhood and which contained a high-
end American retailer and a store selling imported European perfumes.  He further 
promised to build a new 400 million dollar international airport and a new capital 
(Oxford Analytica 2007).  One of the more controversial projects was a new, gleaming 
highway along Dakar‘s Corniche, hugging the road parallel to the Atlantic Ocean.  For 
the hundreds of thousands of poor Dakarois who cannot afford a car and who instead 
depend on dangerous, communal vehicles known as Ndiaga Ndiayes for transport, 
according priority to building the highway seemed misplaced.  Serigne Mansour Tall, 
the program director for UN-Habitat in Senegal, observed the following about the 
highway:  ―The relationship between the amount of money that was invested and the 
impact on the population is relatively weak because the Corniche only benefits a few 
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of the privileged in Dakar and encompasses the rich neighborhoods and those who 
have their own cars, which is a very small percentage of the population.‖152 According 
to a former minister of urbanization, Seydou Sy Sall, this general emphasis on large-
scale infrastructure has occurred to the detriment of basic infrastructure in Dakar‘s 
peri-urban zones.
153
 Many began agreeing with the claim of PS spokesman Abdoulaye 
Vilane that the acronym of TGP stood for nothing else than a Très Grand Piège, or a 
very large trap, rather than the grand projects originally promised (Thiobane 2008).  
The cartoon illustrated in Figure A4.3 of Appendix Four satirizes the degree of 
disappointment with these projects.   
 In the meantime, life for the urban poor became increasingly intolerable.  As 
seen in Figure 3.4, growth was somewhat erratic during Wade‘s first term, and the 
number of poor living in Dakar increased by almost 90,000 between 1994 and 2002.      
Moreover, Wade‘s 2000 campaign promises to tackle youth unemployment remained 
largely unfulfilled.
154
  In fact, approximately 50 percent of Dakar‘s population is 20 
years-old or younger (ANSD 2007b) and 22 percent of this age group are unemployed, 
compared with 11 percent in rural areas (ANSD 2007a).  A survey conducted by the 
national statistical agency in 2006 found that most Dakarois, like their counterparts in 
Lusaka, viewed youth unemployment as their community‘s greatest development 
challenge, followed by the lack of potable water and suitable sanitation facilities 
(ANSD 2007a).  
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Figure 3.4:  Trends in Urban Poverty and Macroeconomic Growth, Senegal
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In addition, only 32 percent of Dakarois own their homes compared with 62 
percent for the country overall (COHRE 2004).  The urban poor‘s role as tenants only 
increases their vulnerability since they are susceptible to increases in rent payments 
and evictions by landlords.  Early on in his first term, Wade rescinded on his earlier 
promised not to demolish slum housing and instead his government engaged in forced 
evictions in, among other places, Dakar‘s Baraka and Capatage slums, claiming that 
residents were illegally occupying State-controlled land (COHRE 2004).        
Furthermore, while the PDS regime began improving rural electrification, 
urban electrification did not receive the same degree of investment.
156
  Due to the 
government‘s failure to finance sufficient fuel to run its electricity generators, 
unrelenting black-outs began to plague Dakar in March 2006 (Oxford Analytica 2007).  
Electricity cuts lasting up to twelve hours a day could be particularly aggravating for 
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poor households that had allocated scarce resources to pay their monthly bills and 
could not afford the private generators on which affluent Dakarois began to depend.  
Similar to Zambia, Figure 3.5 highlights that the average monthly cost of both 
electricity and water in Dakar for a family of four people increased during Wade‘s 
first term as president.  
Figure 3.5:  Trends in the Average Cost of Utilities in Dakar
157
 
     
The desperation of the urban poor was most clearly manifested by the large-
scale emigration of Senegalese men to Europe during Wade‘s first term.  In fact, 
Senegalese nationals comprised a majority of the 30,000 illegal migrants who arrived 
in Spain‘s Canary Islands during 2006 alone. The trip in fragile, open wooden canoes 
results in usually one in six migrants perishing in the high seas (Ba 2007).  Yet, 
desperation made many Senegalese fatalistic, leading to the popular slogan of “Barça 
ou Barsakh,” meaning that one either makes it to Barcelona or goes on to the next life.  
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Given the risks involved and the fact that overseas remittances can contribute 30 to 80 
percent of household budgets in Senegal (Faubert 2008), many poor migrants blamed 
Wade directly for a massive deportation campaign led by Spain and France in late 
2006.  Wade‘s main response to this outpouring of anger only a few months before the 
2007 elections was to launch a new program to address urban unemployment, which 
was called Retour vers l’Agriculture (Return to Agriculture, REVA) and intended to 
grant would-be migrants plots for farming.  Playing on the title of this program, many 
concluded that REVA was invented by rêveurs, or dreamers, who unrealistically 
believe that city dwellers will be enticed to move back to the countryside.
158
   
 REVA represented just one example of the PDS‘ growing focus on 
agricultural programs.  Another effort was the Loi d’Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale 
(LOASP), which Wade announced soon after entering office, arguing that Senegal 
needed a grand vision for its agricultural sector.  In all, the PDS spokesman Babacar 
Gaye claims that between 2006-2008, 1000 tractors were delivered to rural areas to 
help with the modernization of agriculture and that both seeds and fertilizer were 
heavily subsidized.
159
 By contrast, a number of development experts and former 
bureaucrats claim that the regime lacks any type of coherent government strategy for 
urban development.
160
  Notwithstanding the urgent need to spur agricultural growth, 
these developments during Wade‘s first term illustrate that he shifted his focus away 
from the urban poor and that his strategy for addressing their concerns relied on 
stemming the wave of urban migration rather than improving housing, services, and 
employment opportunities in Dakar.   
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156 
 
Creating Clienteles?  
Some opposition parties have argued that though Wade failed to deliver jobs 
and prioritized construction projects for affluent Dakarois, he won over the urban poor 
through clientelistic linkages.
161
 They point to the one main project targeted at the 
urban poor that has received a great deal of media attention: Plan Jaxaay.   This 
project was intended to assist the victims of yearly flooding in Pikine and Guédiawaye 
by moving affected households to higher land nearby.
162
  In 2005, Wade proposed to 
allocate approximately 84 million dollars (50 billion CFA) towards building modern 
housing for those living in water-logged shantytowns.  The PDS-dominated National 
Assembly further adopted Wade‘s proposition that a portion of the money for such a 
program would come from postponing the 2005 legislative elections so that they 
would coincide with the 2007 presidential ones (Agence France Presse 2005b).   
Yet, the mismanagement and poor planning of Plan Jaxaay was not likely to 
create a loyal clientele for Wade.  Only a few months before the 2007 elections, most 
of the affected families were still homeless and living in tents on the outskirts of 
Dakar, having endured yet another rainy season in even more crowded and unsanitary 
conditions.  Furthermore, flood victims were still being required to pay 35 percent of 
the cost of the new housing once they were finally re-settled (UN-IRIN 2006).  In the 
view of Serigne Mansour Tall from UN-Habitat, ―The Plan Jaxaay is not a very bad 
thing but it was a plan that was chosen without much consideration of its feasibility… 
it‘s dominated by disorder.‖163  
By contrast, the PDS did embark on more organized efforts to establish 
clientelistic linkages with religious leaders.  Indeed, although ethnic identity is not a 
salient feature of Senegalese politics (see Diouf 1994), religion has played an 
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 Personal interview, Hélène Tine, AFP, Dakar, September 16, 2008. 
162
 ―Jaxaay‖ means ―eagle‖ in Wolof.  
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 Personal interview, Serigne Mansour Tall, UN-Habitat, Dakar, Oct. 28, 2008.  
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important political role in the country‘s history.  In particular, Senegal has four main 
Islamic Sufi brotherhoods.  While the Tijaniyya brotherhood remains larger in 
membership, the Mouridiyya is more centralized because it is not split into 
independent branches (Ross 2008).   As a Mouride himself, Wade engaged in frequent 
visits during his first term to Touba, which is the holy town of this brotherhood.  In 
fact, his trips became so regular that he became mocked for only engaging in 3Ts:  
tukki, télé, Touba, meaning ―traveling overseas, going on television, and visiting 
Touba‖ (Dahou and Foucher 2004). Among other patronage promises, Wade oversaw 
the construction of a new road from Touba to Mbacké, which is where the leader of 
the Mouridiyya, Cheikh Saliou Mbacké, resides (Le Vine 2004).  Furthermore, 
prominent Mourides received special favors, such as being issued diplomatic passports 
that are usually only reserved for public officials (Mbow 2008).  Tellingly, unlike in 
the 2000 elections when Wade focused his campaign in Dakar, he launched his 2007 
one in Touba (Schwartz 2007). On the eve of elections, Cheikh Saliou appeared on 
television to lobby for Wade‘s re-election, arguing that the President would then be 
able to complete the modernization of Touba‘s infrastructure (Mbow 2008).   
Yet, such tactics could not explain Wade‘s popularity with Dakar‘s poor for 
two reasons.  First, a majority of Dakarois belong to the Tidiane sect, not the Mourides 
(DPS 1993).  Secondly, while Chapter Five discusses how Wade co-opted leaders of 
some Tidiane sects in rural areas in the same way he did with Mouride leaders, there is 
increasing evidence that urban voters, much more than rural ones, follow Sufi leaders 
only in matters of religion rather than politics (Beck 2008; Gellar 2005).  
 
Le PDS, c’est Wade  
Wade‘s overt displays of religious devotion to the Mourides in an officially 
secular state were symptomatic of a broader tendency to engage in excessive displays 
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of executive power and a highly hierarchical management of the PDS.  As a result, he 
created a rift between urban intellectuals and the PDS, contributing to the impression 
that the many intellectuals who rallied around Wade‘s cause in 2000 no longer support 
him.
164
   
Specifically, Wade further sullied his reputation early on in his first term when 
he began purging representatives from other opposition parties who had backed him in 
the FAL coalition in 2000.  In December 2000, he dismissed his Minister of 
Urbanization, Amath Dansokho, who is the leader of PIT.  Moustapha Niasse of the 
AFP lost his job as prime minister in March 2001, and two cabinet members from the 
LD-MPT were fired in March 2005.  For Ismael Fall, a political analyst at the 
University of Cheikh Anta Diop, such tactics reflected Wade‘s attempt ―to forge a new 
political identity, based first on himself and secondly on his party, ahead of the [2007] 
elections‖ (Agence France Presse 2005a). Furthermore, after an initial referendum in 
2001 which eliminated the upper-legislative chamber, the Sénat, for financial reasons, 
the National Assembly approved the re-establishment of this body in January 2007 
and stipulated that 65 of its 100 members would be appointed by the President 
(Englebert 2008).
165
   
Within the PDS, Wade ultimately controls the career track of his party 
members.  The clearest evidence of this occurred when Idrissa Seck, the prime 
minister from 2002 until 2004, was fired from this post under allegations of 
corruption.  A long-time protégé of Wade and the director of the PDS‘ presidential 
campaign in the historic 2000 elections, Seck was widely perceived to harbor 
presidential ambitions.  He was expelled from the party and spent seven months in 
                                                          
164
 Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, Sud Quotidien, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008. 
165
Moreover, in January 2001, the National Assembly voted to reduce the presidential term in office 
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prison under the charge that, as mayor of the town of Thiès, he had misappropriated 
funds intended for road construction projects (see Diop 2006).
166
   Many mayors who 
were PDS members but considered close to Seck were also removed from their posts 
and replaced with Wade loyalists.
167
 Once freed from jail, Seck formed his own 
political party, called Rewmi, which means ―the nation‖ in Wolof.   
The hierarchical nature of the PDS‘ management was only reinforced by the 
party‘s lack of horizontal relationships with civic organizations, including those 
representing members of the urban poor.  One such organization is the Union 
Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal (UNACOIS), which was   
established in 1990 to fight against government monopolies. UNACOIS consists of a 
variety of informal sector workers, ranging from small-scale traders and service 
providers to large-scale importer-exporters.  Defending the interests of informal sector 
workers and protecting them from tax levies constitute the main goals of the 
organization (Thioub et al. 1998). According to UNACOIS‘ Secretary General, Mame 
Bou Diop, the organization contains about 50,000 members in Dakar and 150,000 
nation-wide.
168
 Headquartered in Dakar‘s Sandaga market, the members are linked to 
UNACOIS‘ leaders through a series of hierarchical business, credit, family, and 
religious relations (Thioub et al. 1998), giving UNACOIS a degree of encompassment 
that theoretically would be conducive to a corporatist arrangement with the PDS.  Yet, 
in reality, it retains an independent political base.  Mame Bou Diop claims that while a 
UNACOIS member can be a member of any political party, the organization does not 
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subscribe to any formal political affiliations,
169
 and its political autonomy was 
confirmed by a number of other outside observers.
170
 In fact, though many presidential 
candidates came to discuss their programs with the UNACOIS leadership before the 
2007 elections, the PDS was notably absent.  Despite Wade claiming an affinity with 
the informal sector, Bou Diop notes that Wade lacks a policy for improving conditions 
for informal workers and that the government‘s interest in taxing such workers 
necessarily creates antagonistic relations with UNACOIS.
171
 
 
The 2007 Election  
Despite the lack of ties to organizations representing the urban poor, the focus 
on large-scale construction projects that benefitted the affluent rather than the lower-
classes, and the exhibition of excessive executive powers, Wade nonetheless proved 
victorious in the 2007 presidential elections.  Wade campaigned on a message of “Le 
meilleur reste à venir,” or ―The best is yet to come,‖ which implied that his large-
scale construction projects were just a small sample of the larger plans he intended 
(see campaign photo in Figure A4.4 in Appendix Four).  At the national level, Wade 
secured 55 percent of the vote, meaning that a second round of elections proved 
unnecessary.
172
 As seen in Table 3.7, he also obtained more than 50 percent of the 
vote in the four départements of the Dakar region, including the poorer suburbs of 
Pikine and Guédiawaye.  Moreover, his closest competitor, Seck, was between 30 to 
40 percentage points behind.  Thus, even if these opposition parties had entered into a 
coalition, as Wade himself did in 2000, they would not have defeated him in Dakar.  
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As in Zambia, the turnout rates in Dakar, which was 72 percent, slightly exceeded the 
rate for the country as whole, which was 70 percent. 
 
Table 3.7:  Vote Shares in the Region of Dakar in 2007 Presidential Elections (%) 
(First Round) 
Main candidates (Party)  Départements in the Region of Dakar 
    Dakar    Pikine Guédiawaye Rufisque  
Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)  52.5 60.4 
 
61.0 
 
52.0 
 
Idrissa Seck (Rewmi)  17.7 
 
20.0 
 
17.8 
 
23.0 
 
Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS) 16.3 
 
10.4 
 
11.6 
 
17.3 
 
Moustapha Niasse (AFP) 5.3 
 
3.2 
 
3.7 
 
2.4 
 
Abdoulaye Bathily  
(LD-MPT)  
1.7 
 
1.0 
 
1.5 
 
1.0 
 
Robert Sagna  
(Démocratie-Solidarité)  
1.9 
 
1.1 
 
0.9 
 
0.4 
 
Landing Savané (AJ-PADS)  1.2 
 
1.3 
 
1.0 1.4 
 
  Sources:  Sud Quotidien  (2007) ; Also, www.Senelections.org (accessed November 2007)  
  Notes:  This table includes only the top seven performing candidates of the total 15 who competed in    
 this election.  Unlike the other three départements, Rufisque is predominantly rural.  The  
results are for the first round of elections.  A second round was unnecessary because of Wade‘s 
ability to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes.  
Most opposition parties largely decried such a victory as fraudulent and 
therefore boycotted the June 2007 legislative elections, which only served to exclude 
them even further from having any influence in the political arena.  However, 60 
independent observers from the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) declared that the election had been ―sufficiently free and transparent‖ and 
noted that while some discrepancies had occurred, they were not enough to cast doubt 
on the results (EIU 2007c).  Moreover, the popular classes appeared to accept the 
vote‘s legitimacy since no mobs of angry, unemployed youth emptied onto the streets 
to denounce the results in the same manner that they did during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Galvan 2009). RADDHO, which is a Dakar-based NGO dedicated to promoting 
human rights in Africa and which helped monitor the 2007 elections, declared that 
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they occurred in a general atmosphere of peace and tranquility (RADDHO 2007). In 
addition to obtaining the highest share of votes in the poorest areas, the anti-PDS 
leader of UNACOIS confirmed that he knew of many informal sector workers who did 
indeed vote for the PDS.
173
  
 
  
“The Living Room Opposition”  
 Instead of massive fraud on behalf of the PDS, the lackluster performance of 
Senegal‘s main opposition parties predominantly explains Wade‘s ability to win a 
majority of votes in Dakar during the 2007 elections.  As Galvan (2009: 5) observes, 
"Divided and demoralized, the opposition has no real platform from which to criticize 
President Wade and his party.‖  In fact, since March 2000, no opposition candidate has 
demonstrated the same ability to mobilize the electorate to the same degree as Wade 
did (Diop 2006).   Although Wade achieved very little for the urban poor and invested 
more in large-scale infrastructure and rural development, no one opposition party was 
able to generate the necessary level of momentum required to transform widespread 
urban disgruntlement with the status quo into an electoral advantage.  Instead of the 
populist strategy employed by Wade in 2000, personalistic linkages characterized the 
PS, AFP, and Rewmi and thereby caused a split in votes amongst these parties, which 
except for their leaders, all appeared relatively similar to the electorate.  The 
programmatic linkages used by the traditional leftist parties, such as LD-MPT, PIT, 
and AJ-PADS, relied on an outdated socialist message that never has been really 
understood by the urban poor and exhibits a low level of congruence with their 
everyday priorities.   
Three main qualities characterize all of the opposition parties and reduce their 
appeal to the urban poor.  First and foremost, they remain virtually indistinguishable 
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from one another.  Coming from the same elite social class as Wade, they possess the 
same fundamental interests and fears.
174
 While they may consistently criticize Wade‘s 
performance, they offer no indication of what distinct policy alternatives they would 
offer if voted into office.  In the view of Ebrima Sall at the research institute 
CODESRIA, ―Personalities of the leaders have come to crystallize the whole identities 
of these parties…It‘s been a serious indictment of the political class to say that the 
politicians are all the same.‖175   
A second trait, which only serves to reinforce the first, is that Senegal‘s 
opposition parties rely on civilized discourse as the main means of attacking the 
failings of the PDS.  Mamador Thior, editor-in-chief at Radio-Télévision Sénégalaise 
(RTS), therefore labels this as the tendency to be an opposition de salon, or a ―living 
room opposition.‖176  Instead of descending into the streets with other angry Dakarois 
when the cost of living increases or blackouts become intolerable, the opposition 
frequently chooses to meet, discuss, and issue joint statements decrying Wade‘s 
policies.  For example, in 2002 the opposition formed the Assises politiques de 
l’Alternance to critique the direction Wade was taking the country after only two years 
in office (Sow 2002).  Three years later, political parties joined civil society groups, 
journalists, and concerned academics in the Pacte Républicain, intended to mitigate 
political tensions around the conduct of the forthcoming elections and to demonstrate 
commitment to the democratic principles of the Republic and social peace.
177
  In the 
wake of the 2007 elections, about 100 organizations, including the opposition parties 
and civil society organizations, came together again into a massive, long-term 
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initiative known as the Assises Nationales.
178
 This initiative highlights that Senegal is 
facing a crisis period, and it revolves around a series of committees that issue reports 
on the economic and social challenges in the country.  Notably, the PDS refused to 
participate,
179
 raising questions about the ultimate impact of the Assises Nationales on 
the policy sphere.   
While worthwhile, the overall impression of such activities is that the 
opposition rarely makes genuine sacrifices when poor Senegalese are marching in the 
streets.  An editorial published in the traditionally pro-opposition newspaper, Le 
Quotidien, decried the opposition‘s lack of imagination: ―The opposition is content 
with issuing incendiary communiqués to the police office, noisily intervening on the 
radio, and diplomatic visits‖ (Aziz Tall 2008: 9).  By remaining the reserve of 
educated elites, such undertakings fail to incorporate the broader urban population, 
who may be too illiterate or too busy laboring in the informal sector to even know that 
the opposition is involved in such efforts.
180
  At the same time, precisely because so 
many opposition parties are involved in the same initiatives, it becomes difficult to 
uncover which one is the most vocal in denouncing the PDS‘ performance.   
  Thirdly, despite the fact that three opposition leaders formerly were ministers of 
urbanization, most of the opposition parties accord very little priority to addressing 
urban poverty.
181
  During another opposition discussion roundtable in March 2003, a 
number of opposition parties, including the PS, AFP, and PIT, published a declaration 
on their perspective of the national situation.  Among a long list of grievances, the 
declaration concluded that the poor performance of agriculture constituted the PDS‘ 
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greatest failure (Le Soleil 2003).  In the run-up to the 2007 elections, a number of 
opposition parties joined in a coalition known as the Coalition populaire pour 
l’alternance (CPA). Along with civil society organizations, members of the CPA 
primarily were lobbying for greater attention to rural poverty.
182
 According to Serigne 
Mansour Tall of UN-Habitat, no opposition party addressed urban poverty and urban 
development during the 2007 campaigns:   
 
During the [2007] electoral campaign, some journalists asked the different parties what 
were their policies for addressing urban poverty. They [the opposition parties] spoke a lot 
about rural poverty but not about urban poverty.  But, urban poverty is much more 
pernicious because it‘s a poverty that can lead to violence, which is not the case with rural 
poverty...I have never seen an [opposition] candidate that has elaborated in a clear manner 
the need to address urban poverty.  They talk more about national issues, especially for 
presidential elections.
183
  
 
The following two sub-sections further illustrate these three characteristics by 
first focusing on the three opposition parties that obtained the highest results in Dakar 
during the 2007 elections, the PS, AFP, and Rewmi.  In order to emphasize that these 
opposition parties rely on personalistic linkages, they are compared with respect to 
their espoused ideology, how they distinguish their ideologies vis-à-vis their 
competitors, who represents their main constituency base, and their views on urban 
poverty and the poor. Then, the specific challenges for programmatic parties of 
appealing to the contemporary urban poor are examined with respect to three of 
Senegal‘s most established leftist parties, AJ-PADS, LD-MPT, and PIT.  Both types of 
opposition parties largely confirm Antoine Tine‘s (2005:  129) observation that 
Senegalese political parties ―are within the hands of political elites who are most often 
accused of being incapable of thinking about the social realities of the most deprived 
classes and of proposing adequate social projects.‖  
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The Heavyweight Contenders:  PS, AFP, and Rewmi  
Internal party rivalries led to the emergence of many of Senegal‘s current 
opposition parties.  For instance, in 1996, during a period of intense intra-party 
violence, Abdou Diouf appointed Ousmane Tanor Dieng as the PS secretary general.  
Moustapha Niasse, who was a long-time PS stalwart and served as foreign minister 
under both the Diouf and Senghor regimes, opposed this decision and defected in 1999 
(Banks et al. 2008).
184
  During the same year, he formed the AFP.  As noted above, 
Idrissa Seck followed a similar trajectory, having staunchly supported the PDS for his 
entire career and then establishing Rewmi in 2006 after he was released from jail.  
Consequently, both AFP and Rewmi represent vehicles for the personal ambitions of 
their leaders rather than institutions established to address genuine societal grievances.   
The personal nature of these political parties is reflected in their lack of a 
programmatic orientation.  Hélène Tine, the official representative for the AFP, notes 
that social democracy characterizes her party, which campaigned on a nebulous motto 
of ―faith, patriotism, and solidarity.‖185 Accordingly, she explained this means that one 
requires a spiritual basis on which to build a political program, be a patriot to engage 
in politics, and express solidarity with the least-favored individuals in society.
186
 In 
declaring his candidacy in 2007 for the presidency, Moustapha Niasse made ten, all-
encompassing promises to Senegalese citizens: 1) restoring the credibility of the state, 
2) employment creation, 3) lowering the price of staple goods, 4) reinvigorating 
agricultural production, 5) improving the country‘s road system, 6) a more judicious 
allocation of resources to health, education, research, culture, and sport, 7) creating 
integrated management and development zones to improve service delivery in every 
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region of the country, 8) restoring peace in Casamance, 9) re-establishing security on 
both Senegal‘s borders and within its urban areas, and 10) employing diplomacy to 
improve development, security, peace, and good relations with its neighbors (Niasse 
2007). These goals are not particularly different from those of Rewmi, which 
according to the party‘s representative, Omar Sarr, promotes education, training, 
health, and agriculture.
187
  His colleague Waly Fall, who is one of the few Rewmi 
mayors in Dakar not purged by Wade, adds that a party ideology is not particularly 
necessary: 
   
Thus, Rewmi is not a leftist party, it‘s not a liberal party.  The only ideology that is 
viable here and in all countries in the world is how to improve the lives of the 
population.  What are the efforts that the state should engage in? What are the sacrifices 
that the population should engage in?  And a system of management that is fair and 
equitable and which allows a majority of the population to get out of their current living 
conditions.
188
  
 
Although the PS possessed much stronger historical and ideological foundations, 
its party platform became even further muddled in the aftermath of the 2000 elections. 
In fact, when the PDS originally entered office in 2000, a number of PS cadres 
defected to it, in a process known as transhumance, which refers to the predictable 
movement of goats to better grazing lands (Galvan 2009). If ideological affinities were 
more pronounced, such a shifting of party affiliations presumably would be less 
feasible. 
According to Abdoulaye Vilane, the PS spokesman, the party follows the AFP in 
professing a social democratic nature.  Yet, what this means in terms of practicalities 
remains vague.  For him, the PS platform is ―socialist in the terms of humanity, 
justice, democracy, and progress and liberty in the fullest sense.‖189 When asked the 
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policy goals of the PS, Vilane explained, ―We want law and order to prevail, for 
democracy to prevail, the separation of powers to prevail, justice to prevail, legality to 
prevail, solidarity to prevail, transparency to prevail, and good governance to 
prevail.‖190 For Ibrahima Sall, a former Minister of Planning under Diouf and a 
counselor for the PS, the party is distinguished by being the most organized and 
committed to fighting against Wade.  However, what exactly the PS is fighting for 
remains unclear:  ―It [the PS] fights for justice, equality, things like that.  But, it 
doesn‘t have a precise, specific program.‖191  
Given these generalities, differentiating among the parties‘ philosophies clearly 
proves difficult, which is a fact openly acknowledged by all of the parties‘ 
representatives.  Aissata Tall Sall, who is the chargé of communication for the PS, 
admits that since they are all committed to social democracy, there is no true 
philosophical difference between her party and the rest of the opposition.
192
  Rather 
the leadership of Dieng and the party‘s past experience in office represent the major 
advantages possessed by the PS over its competitors.  Yet, she also recognizes that the 
party‘s challenge remains distinguishing its policy projects from those of the PDS and 
communicating this difference more clearly to the Senegalese people.
193
  The AFP‘s 
Tine concurs that there is no substantial ideological difference among the opposition 
parties since they all more or less are ―social democratic.‖194 Abdou Latif Coulibaly, a 
well-known journalist, political analyst, and fierce critic of Wade, clarifies that ―It‘s 
necessary for you to know that the AFP is made up of people who left the PS.  At their 
base, they have the same ideology and approach, theory and doctrine.  The area of 
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difference that distinguishes one from the other is the experience of the people who 
lead the parties.‖195 
Moreover, each party professes its desire to broaden its constituency base to 
include all Senegalese but has achieved this with varying success.  The AFP‘s 
performance in this regard is most disappointing.  Having come in third place in the 
2000 elections, Niasse only garnered five percent of the vote in the department of 
Dakar during the 2007 elections and even less in Pikine and Guédiawaye (see Table 
3.7).  Formed by elites who previously worked in civil society organizations, the 
party‘s main constituency base consisted of intellectuals and university professors.196 
According to Coulibaly, ―Moustapha Niasse is the best of all of them but the people 
said ‗no.‘ But, he‘s also responsible for that.  He is a great man but he‘s detached from 
the reality of the true Senegalese. He spent a lot of his time overseas.‖197  In fact, in 
the year preceding the 2007 elections, Niasse was a member of the United Nations 
team negotiating peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes 
region, spending much of his time outside of the country (Diongue et al. 2007). This 
certainly did not help his party become better known to the Senegalese in general and 
the urban poor in particular.  
At its founding, the PS was targeted at the rural population, particularly 
peasants, pastoralists, and fishermen.
198
 However, since its defeat in 2000, the PS 
recognizes that a majority of the population is no longer rural.
199
 As such, the PS‘ 
spokesman, Abdoulaye Vilane, claims that the PS‘ discourse now ―addresses all the 
Senegalese,‖ including the youth, women, and the middle-classes because ―if you 
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want to advance a country, you can‘t just address the poorest.‖200 As for the poor in 
Dakar‘s suburbs, Vilane adopts a more disparaging tone, noting that ―there are a lot of 
people there but people live as though they are in a village. Their mentality, their 
treatment of the environment, etc., it‘s always anarchic.‖201 Similarly, the former PS 
Minister of Planning, Ibrahima Sall, claims that Dakar‘s urban poor are simply rural 
migrants with an ―anti-citizen‖ and ―anti-democratic‖ mentality.202  Both sentiments 
hint at the old PS elitism that Wade steered to his advantage in 2000 when he rallied 
the urban poor with a populist strategy.  Even though the PS previously failed to 
adequately target urban areas, the party launched its 2007 campaign in the province of 
Louga rather than in Dakar.
203
  
Only a few years old, Rewmi has yet to establish a clear constituency base.  
Idrissa Seck is particularly popular in Thiès, where he is the mayor and where Rewmi 
launched its 2007 campaign. In fact, Thiès was the one region won by his party in 
2007, achieving 55 percent of the votes.
204
  In general though, Sarr states that ―Senegal 
as a whole‖ represents Rewmi’s constituency base.‖205 His colleague, Waly Fall, 
concurs:  ―Rewmi has a panoramic ambition. We traverse issues that appeal to all.  
Today, the Senegalese don‘t fit into categories such as the middle-class, the working 
class, peasants.  We are all Senegalese.‖206  
 In addition to expressing a collective desire to appeal to ―all Senegalese,‖ these 
three parties also share a similar outlook as Zambia‘s personalistic parties regarding 
the best way to help the urban poor:  improve rural areas. For instance, the PS 
emphasizes that to prevent people from coming to the cities, the conditions for success 
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need to be established in the countryside.
207
  Sarr is even blunter about Rewmi’s 
approach:  
 
You know, urban poverty is due to extreme poverty in the rural areas so I think we 
should attack the problem at its roots, going to the rural areas and finding solutions for 
the rural populations so that they can have local solutions to their development 
problems.  If you proceed that way, you may prevent them from coming in large 
numbers to join the urban population, which is the reason for the growing urban 
poverty.
208
  
The AFP‘s Tine likewise claims that greater investment is needed in individuals‘ 
home localities so that they are not convinced to migrate to the city.
209
  
All three parties‘ perspectives tend to contradict the contemporary realities 
about Senegal‘s urbanization process.  While the country‘s rate of urbanization has 
increased, this is no longer primarily due to rural-to-urban migration but more to 
natural population growth.  In fact, migrants to Dakar from other regions of the 
country accounted for only 25 percent of those living in the city as of 2002 (ANSD 
2005). Furthermore, augmenting the attractiveness of rural areas in the hopes of 
discouraging urban migration is no different than many of Wade‘s own policies in this 
domain, including REVA.  As such, these opposition parties not only fail to provide 
concrete details for combating existing urban poverty but also advocate the same 
emphasis on rural development as the incumbent they all oppose. 
 Finally, the personalistic nature of all these parties manifests through a party 
organization centered on its leaders.  In the view of Mbow (2008:  167), ―Parties never 
turn out their own leaderships, and that needs to change.  Most of those who currently 
run Senegal‘s parties are incapable of practicing democracy.‖ Indeed, the inability of 
cadres to advance within their own party structure contributes to the country‘s 
proliferation of parties.  For instance, Robert Sagna, who is the mayor of the southern 
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city of Zinguinchor, left the PS and formed the party Démocratie et solidarité in order 
to compete as a presidential candidate in 2007 because it was not possible to challenge 
Dieng within the party for this opportunity.  In general Diop (2006) notes that Dieng is 
deft at resisting attacks by adversaries trying to reduce his power, and he firmly 
controls which candidates run on the PS ticket.  A similar pattern hampers the AFP in 
which individuals such as Massokhna Kane, Cheikh Mouhamadou, and Mamoune 
Niasse all quit to create their own parties or to join the PDS.
210
  The old rivalry 
between Dieng and Niasse, which drove Niasse to form the AFP in the first place, also 
means that they will not support each other in any coalition agreement.
211
  
 Thus, the three main opposition parties in Senegal possess relatively vague 
platforms and ideologies, with few ideas for addressing urban poverty.  Moreover, 
they tend to target relatively similar constituency bases, though with varying degrees 
of success.  The urban poor in particular were not specified as a constituency base and 
all three parties launched their 2007 campaigns outside of Dakar.  Consequently, the 
main distinction among these parties is the personalities of their leaders, who in turn 
exercise a firm grip on their parties‘ internal power structures.   
 
 
Le Pôle de Gauche 
 The parties of the pôle de gauche, or the traditional left, include AJ-PADS, 
LD-MPT, and PIT, and none have ever gained much support outside of Dakar.  Led by 
Landing Savané, the AJ/PADS emerged in 1991 from a merger of socialist and Maoist 
groups. PIT was formed by dissidents of PAI in 1981 and recognized by the Soviet 
Union as Senegal‘s official Communist party.  Recognized in the same year but 
actually established in 1974, the LD-MPT originally was a self-proclaimed Marxist-
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Leninist group whose leader, Abdoulaye Bathily, vehemently opposed Senegal‘s 
interaction with the World Bank and IMF during the height of structural adjustment in 
the 1980s (Banks et al. 2008).      
As more programmatic parties, leaders play a more muted role than they do in 
the PS, AFP, or Rewmi.  For example, when Savané accepted a series of ministerial 
roles in Wade‘s government after the 2000 elections, the party began splintering 
because many party stalwarts argued that he was betraying the party‘s ideology by 
allying with an avowedly liberal party.
212
 Importantly, defectors left not because they 
could not obtain adequate power within the party but because of their commitment to 
its ideology.   PIT did not present its leader, Amath Dansokho, as a candidate in the 
last presidential elections but rather participated in the CPA coalition. Ibrahima Sène, 
a long-time PIT member and the representative in charge of PIT‘s social and economic 
affairs, emphasizes that this was done to emphasize that the party does not exist to 
serve its leader but rather a larger purpose, which is to enhance ―the consciousness of 
salaried workers.‖213 
In addition, the leftist parties historically possessed strong ties to the country‘s 
unions, and this in turn holds implications for their contemporary constituency base.  
The LD-MPT, for instance, retains links with Senegal‘s main teachers‘ union and, 
according to the party‘s spokeswoman, originated as an elitist party vested in 
organizing teachers and students.
214
  AJ/PADS largely consists of the same social 
base, including left-of-center academics, students, and professionals (Galvan 2009).  
Sène claims that 80 percent of PIT‘s members are ―salaried workers,‖ who labor in the 
formal sector and predominantly belong to unions. From his perspective, salaried 
workers are more involved in a ―modern‖ system of production and communication, 
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 Interview with Alioune Badara Diop, University of Gaston-Berger, St. Louis, Dec. 1, 2008.  
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 Interview on Sept. 25, 2008. 
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 Interview with Aiwa Wade, spokeswoman for the LD-MPT, on Sept.21, 2008. 
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understand and fight for their rights and obligations in the workplace, and experience a 
sense of solidarity that manifests through organization in unions.  In turn, union 
participation helps raise their social and political consciousness.
215
 Such views largely 
confirm Graham‘s (1994: 127) observation that ―Most of the [Senegalese] Marxist 
parties, which in theory should represent the interests of the poor… are not 
particularly attuned to needs of the poor, whom they consider the lumpenproletariat.‖ 
At a general level, most of the poor have not attended school and therefore do 
not understand what ―socialism‖ means and how it differs from ―liberalism.‖216  Thus, 
the abstract nature of the messages espoused by these leftist parties precludes their 
comprehension by the urban poor.  For example, during its previous incarnation as 
PAI, PIT‘s goals included achieving political independence from France and 
transforming Senegal into a Communist society.
 217
  Today, PIT lobbies for regional 
integration and economic nationalism within West Africa as a means of achieving 
Senegal‘s economic independence.218  Furthermore, the party aims for a fair legal 
system that protects the rights of workers since, according to Sène, the conditions for 
achieving socialism can only be attained if the rights of workers are respected.
219
  
However, such sentiments can hold little relevance to informal workers who vend in 
makeshift stalls, near open sewage ditches and with little protection from heavy rains 
or the scorching sun but who would not seek to redress their situation via the legal 
system.    
 The PDS largely discounts these parties as real challengers, highlighted by the 
PDS deputy proclaiming that while Rewmi‘s Idrissa Seck is a threat, ―the ideology of 
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 Personal interview with Ibrahima Sène, PIT, Dakar, Sept.25, 2008. 
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 Personal interview with Mamadou Thior, Radio Télévision Sénégalaise, Dakar, Nov.6, 2008.  
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  Personal interview with Ibrahima Sène, PIT, Dakar, Sept.25, 2008. 
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Bathily doesn‘t work.‖220 Successive presidential election results support this 
observation.  In Dakar, which is the core base of these parties, neither Bathily nor 
Savané obtained more than two percent of the vote in the 2007 presidential elections 
(see Table 3.7). According to Galvan‘s (2009: 3) analysis of those elections,  ―Neither 
[Bathily nor Savané] represented serious challengers to Wade; both hoped to be the 
‗dark horse‘ whose meticulously articulated and largely irrelevant ideological 
message would finally, somehow, catch fire with the voters‖ (emphasis added).  
  The future of these leftist parties remains unclear.  On the one hand, Aiwa 
Wade of the LD-MPT admits that ―the population does not really understand the 
message of the left and its meaning for them‖ and therefore hopes her party can ―find 
a message to convince the masses.‖221  She further recognizes that while the LD-MPT 
formerly was well-situated in Dakar because that was where the intelligentsia 
concentrated, the changing ―physiognomy‖ of the city, including the growth of the 
informal sector, means that the party can no longer simply focus on intellectuals and 
hope to win votes.
222
 On the other hand, if these traditional leftist parties, with 
shrinking union membership bases and an outdated message, try to amend their 
approach, it remains unclear how they would remain distinct from their better 
performing but less ideologically-oriented counterparts.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter examined whether and how various political parties in Senegal 
and Zambia have mobilized the urban poor for votes.  Since the commencement of 
genuine multiparty democracy, the two countries have shared a proliferation in 
opposition parties, which are deprived of public funding and traditionally financed by 
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party leaders.  Most of these leaders in turn established their parties in the wake of 
intra-party disputes and as a means of advancing their own ambitions.  They all face 
the challenge of reaching out to large numbers of urban dwellers who have been 
economically marginalized and often crowded into substandard housing on the 
peripheries of Dakar and Lusaka.   
Given these similar circumstances, two key points emerged by comparing 
parties across countries and over time.  First, even when an incumbent fails to provide 
jobs, decent housing, and basic public services, the opposition may still prove unable 
to capture the imagination of the urban poor if it does not employ a populist strategy 
with this constituency.  Indeed, both Zambia‘s 2001 and Senegal‘s 2007 elections 
illustrated that even when the incumbent regime theoretically should be at a 
disadvantage, no opposition party may definitively win over the urban poor.   
Secondly, a populist strategy prevails with the urban poor not only due to the 
failed promises of the incumbent but also because other opposition parties are relying 
on personalistic or programmatic linkages that reduce their degree of differentiation 
and level of congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor.  Well-educated 
and potentially technocratic leaders, such as the UPND‘s Hichilema and the AFP‘s 
Niasse, remain disadvantaged by an intellectualism that creates distance with the 
urban poor as well as by advancing broad messages intended to capture the votes of 
both urbanites and rural dwellers.  By contrast, the success of Gorgui over the AFP 
and the pôle de gauche in the first round of Senegal‘s 2000 elections parallels that of 
―King Cobra‖ vis-à-vis the UPND and the Heritage Party in Zambia‘s 2006 and 2008 
elections.  These trends are summarized in Table 3.8.    
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Table 3.8:  Summarizing Interactions of Opposition Parties with the Urban Poor 
ZAMBIA  Incumbent 
Party 
(Leader)  
Opposition Party  
(Leader)  
Interaction by 
Opposition 
Party 
Outcome  
2001  MMD 
(Mwanawasa) 
UPND (Mazoka), 
FDD (Tembo), 
Heritage (Miyanda)  
Personalistic 
linkages 
Vote is split 
among UPND, 
FDD, Heritage, 
and MMD in 
Lusaka, Kitwe, 
and Ndola  
PF (Sata)  Personalistic 
linkages 
2006 &  
2008  
MMD 
(Mwanawasa) 
UPND (Hichilema),  
Heritage (Miyanda) 
Personalistic 
linkages 
The PF obtains 
an 
overwhelming 
majority of 
support in 
Lusaka, Kitwe, 
and Ndola 
PF (Sata) Populist 
strategy  
SENEGAL Incumbent 
Party 
(Leader) 
Opposition Party  
(Leader)  
Interaction Outcome  
2000  PS 
(Diouf) 
PDS (Wade) Populist 
strategy 
The PDS wins 
overwhelmingly 
in Dakar in both 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 
rounds of 
elections  
AFP (Niasse) Personalistic 
linkages 
LD-MPT (Bathily),  
PIT (Dansokho),  
And-Jëf (Savané) 
Programmatic 
linkages 
2007  PDS 
(Wade) 
AFP (Niasse),  
PS (Dieng),  
Rewmi (Seck)  
Personalistic 
linkages  
The PDS wins 
over 50 percent 
of the vote in 
the Dakar 
metropolitan 
areas; no 2
nd
 
round of 
elections is 
needed   
LD-MPT (Bathily),  
PIT (Dansokho),  
And-Jëf (Savané)  
 
 
Programmatic 
linkages  
 Importantly, this chapter has illustrated that the length of a party‘s tenure in 
office is not a driving feature of support for Sata in Zambia and for Wade in Senegal.  
Admittedly, the incumbent MMD in Zambia has been in office for 19 years, while the 
PDS was only in office for seven years at the time of the 2007 elections.  However, 
Zambia‘s 2006 elections were as much a referendum on Mwanawasa‘s first term in 
office as Senegal‘s 2007 elections were for Wade.  Indeed, if disgruntlement for the 
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MMD‘s lengthy tenure was the main reason for the urban poor‘s support for Sata, then 
support for Mwanawasa should have continued to decrease between the 2001 and 
2006 elections.  However, Mwanawasa‘s support rose from 29 to 43 percent of the 
national vote between those two elections.  Moreover, Sata was not an unknown 
politician whose performance in office was untested.  Rather, he held numerous high-
profile positions within the government for the last thirty years, including in both the 
MMD and UNIP regimes.  
 Instead of length of party tenure or party loyalty, the means by which each 
country‘s opposition parties interacted with the urban poor over time explains why this 
constituency supported the PF in Zambia and the PDS in Senegal during each 
country‘s most recent presidential elections.  Despite the fact that Wade was trained as 
a lawyer and economist while Sata‘s schooling only extended to grade four, both 
individuals relied on a similar populist strategy aimed at incorporating low-income 
urbanites, especially youth, into the political arena. This was done through the use of 
campaigns targeted in deprived regions of Dakar and Lusaka, which revealed that poor 
residents represented the PDS and PF‘s constituency base.   Moreover, Wade in 2000 
and Sata in 2006 and 2008 relied on a policy message of social inclusion that 
manifested through promises to provide jobs, end harassment of informal workers, and 
improve housing and service delivery.  Their policies often involved an eclectic 
mixture of liberal and leftist norms that privileged both individual prerogative and 
government intervention.  Similar to contemporary Latin America‘s neo-populists, 
they relied on direct, vertical ties with the urban poor rather than mobilizing them 
through a corporatist relationship with institutions such as AZIEA or ZCTU in Zambia 
and UNACOIS in Senegal.  Through the use of indigenous languages and theatrical 
antics during campaign rallies, they signaled a disconnect with what they portrayed as 
largely elitist existing political establishments. Even though Sata was a long-time 
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MMD loyalist and Wade had served in co-habitation governments with the PS, these 
charismatic leaders both re-invented themselves as outsiders and ―men of the people.‖ 
This gamble paid off with those individuals who historically were treated as a blight 
on their cities‘ landscapes instead of citizens who posed a genuine electoral advantage.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The View from Below: 
How the Urban Poor Respond to Party Linkage Strategies 
 
Introduction  
 The previous chapter relied on interviews with political elites and other key 
informants to illustrate the relationships between political parties and the urban poor in 
Senegal and Zambia.  However, the perspective of the urban poor was largely missing 
from this narrative.  As such, this chapter utilizes a novel set of primary data collected 
from a total of 400 market workers in the cities of Dakar and Lusaka to illustrate how 
the urban poor view their respective country‘s political parties and to understand why 
they voted for a particular candidate in the last elections.  The surveys are 
supplemented with more in-depth interviews with a total of 60 individuals in slum and 
squatter settlements whose responses are used to provide some qualitative details on 
each country‘s party landscape.  These two forms of primary data were collected in 
Dakar from August to December 2008 and in Lusaka between January and April 2009.  
In Dakar, surveys were conducted in French, Wolof, and Pulaar and in Lusaka, they 
occurred in English, Bemba, and Nyanja.   
The benefits of the survey findings from the market workers are twofold.  First, 
the four models of voting behavior presented in Chapter Two, which were vote-
buying, ethnic alignments, retrospective economic voting, and associational 
membership, are tested on the available survey data.  If  vote-buying drives the voting 
decisions of the urban poor, then those parties which offer handouts in the form of 
money and/or gifts around elections should obtain more votes than those parties that 
did not, and whether a respondent received handouts should represent a statistically 
significant influence on his/her choice of candidate.  If ethnic alignments are 
important, then a voter who has a co-ethnic running for president should be 
181 
 
significantly more likely to support that candidate over those who are from other 
ethnic groups. Similarly, if a candidate is not a co-ethnic, then a voter should be less 
likely to vote for him/her. If retrospective, sociotropic economic voting plays a role, 
and the accountability of the government is clear, then voters should support the 
opposition when they believe that their country‘s economy is doing poorly and the 
incumbent when it is doing well.  Likewise, they will support the opposition if their 
personal economic circumstances deteriorate.  Finally, if membership in a particular 
association influences support for a particular candidate, then there should be a 
statistically significant difference in the candidates who are supported by those who 
are members compared with those who are not members of any association.   
Instead of these four different models of voting behavior, this study has argued 
thus far that the type of relationships forged between parties and citizens influences 
when and why the urban poor support the opposition.  Specifically, the study has 
claimed that populist strategies are more likely to attract the votes of the urban poor 
than clientelistic, personalistic, or programmatic linkages alone.  This is because 
populist strategies offer greater differentiation from the multitude of parties reliant 
solely on personalistic linkages and provide greater congruence with the priorities of 
the urban poor than either personalistic or programmatic linkages.   
As such, there is a second advantage of the survey findings:  they can provide 
evidence of these two causal mechanisms which are believed to facilitate the appeal of 
populist strategies.  As specified in Chapter Two, congruence refers to the distance 
between a party‘s campaign messages and the issues most important to voters.  Since 
typical means of measuring congruence (see Powell 2009) are not available in the 
African context, this study measures congruence in a number of ways.  Greater 
congruence occurs when a particular party repeatedly is identified by voters as being 
concerned with improving living conditions for the urban poor, and lower congruence 
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exists when that party is not believed to be particularly concerned with this issue. 
Moreover, congruence exists when a majority of respondents claim they supported a 
specific candidate first and foremost because of his/her policy proposals.  If, however, 
a respondent voted for a candidate due to influences by family members and friends, 
or because of the candidate‘s personality and/or region of origin, this implies that less 
congruence existed between that party and the voter.  Chapter Three also described the 
campaign messages that various political parties in both Senegal and Zambia espoused 
to the urban poor.  If those variables that most influenced a voter's choice of candidate 
correspond at a statistically significant level with the campaign promises offered by a 
particular party, then this represents another indication of congruence.  
Differentiation refers to substantive policy distinctions among political parties.  
Again, there are two ways to measure differentiation.  If one opposition party receives 
considerably more votes than any other, then that indicates that one party significantly 
stands out in the minds of the urban poor.  However, if the parties split votes among 
respondents, then that reveals that no particular party stood out for the urban poor. In 
addition, if survey respondents directly report observing variation across parties with 
respect to policy, rather than simply with respect to the personal backgrounds of party 
leaders, then greater differentiation exists.  Importantly, both conditions must be 
present for a populist strategy to work.  Indeed, a party reliant solely on programmatic 
linkages may exhibit differentiation but not necessarily congruence.   
If the argument central to this study is correct, then survey respondents in 
Zambia would not overwhelmingly just support the opposition but specifically support 
the PF, which has relied on a populist strategy, in large majorities.   In other words, the 
urban poor would not simply be attracted to any opposition party but to the opposition 
party which espoused a message focused on their priorities.   The PF would be 
identified as a party interested in improving living conditions for the urban poor as 
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well as one which is distinguished by its social and economic policies.  Those 
variables that are significantly correlated with support for Sata will encapsulate issues, 
such as service delivery and employment, which the urban poor themselves have 
identified as areas of concern and which Sata in turn focused on during his campaign. 
At the same time, in Senegal, where a populist opposition party did not exist in the 
2007 elections, no opposition party should receive a substantial share of votes.  Even 
though services and jobs are equally as important for the urban poor in Dakar, they 
will not be issues that significantly influence support for the opposition because these 
are not issues on which the Senegalese opposition parties exclusively focused during 
their electoral campaigns.  Little differentiation will exist among the opposition parties 
and no one party will be viewed as extensively interested in improving living 
conditions for the poor.  The incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, will not be chosen because 
of his policy achievements on behalf of the urban poor but because of the lack of 
alternative options.    
The results confirm that Lusaka‘s urban poor overwhelmingly voted for Sata, 
and a majority did so because of the PF‘s policy manifesto.  At the same time, Dakar‘s 
urban poor acknowledge that Senegal‘s opposition parties, which relied on either 
personalistic or programmatic linkages, were relatively indistinguishable.  Few voted 
for the opposition and those who did spread their votes across a number of different 
candidates. Of the four models on voting behavior, only ethnic alignments appear to 
exercise a significant influence on voting behavior, and this was only true for Zambia. 
Yet, even in Zambia, ethno-linguistic background alone is not responsible for a 
respondent‘s decision to support a particular candidate.  Indeed, age, household access 
to water and electricity, and perspectives on job creation are also found to exhibit an 
impact on voting decisions. Importantly, the evidence on the effects of differentiation 
and congruence remain significant even when accounting for these alternative models 
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of voting behavior.  The rest of the chapter describes how the surveys were conducted 
and then delves into the specific findings in each city.  
 
Survey Methodology  
The surveys used for this chapter relied on an emic-etic approach whereby a 
common set of questions were asked in both countries and supplemented by country-
specific questions (Harkness et al. 2003).  In general, the surveys asked about 
respondents‘ demographic and educational backgrounds, working and living 
conditions, perspectives on the ruling party‘s performance, whether they voted in the 
most recent presidential elections, who they supported and why, whether and how 
candidates campaigned in their neighborhoods, and how they perceived their country‘s 
opposition parties.  A full copy of the questionnaire used in each city can be found in 
Appendix Five.     
Traditionally, cross-national surveys can pose certain difficulties.  Cultural 
norms can dictate that questions which are appropriate in some countries are not in 
others (Johnson and van de Vijver 2003).  Interpretation of the features which 
constitute abstract concepts, such as ―democracy‖ or ―freedom‖ may vary significantly 
across countries (King et al. 2004). Ordinal response categories, such as those 
common with Likert scales, can be biased across countries when some groups have 
higher standards about what constitutes, for example, the definition of ―strongly 
agree‖ or ―strongly disagree‖ (King and Wand 2007).   
While some of these challenges emerged in the present study, they were either 
confronted directly or do not prove to significantly hinder the overall findings.  For 
instance, direct inquiries about voting decisions can sometimes engender suspicions by 
survey respondents.  However, the relatively democratic environment in both 
countries, and the fact that such questions were posed after rather than before the 
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elections, meant that there were very few refusals to answer questions about this topic.  
The only abstract concept used in the surveys was ―party manifesto‖ in Zambia and 
―party platform‖ in Senegal.223  In both cases, respondents were asked to describe their 
understanding of these concepts in an open-ended fashion so that differences in 
interpretation could be readily uncovered.  While Likert scales were employed, the 
responses to such questions are applied to understand voting behavior in separate 
statistical analyses for each country rather than in a cross-country statistical analysis.  
In other words, the analyses capture the behavior of Dakarois according to their own 
culturally-specific understandings, and likewise for Lusakans.  
 
Why Market Workers?  
 While this study is generalizing to the urban poor, Chapter One noted some of 
the difficulties in determining who actually constitute this category.  Many African 
countries do not use urban-specific poverty lines.  Consequently, when measured by a 
nationally-determined poverty line, the extent of urban poverty is overshadowed by 
the fact that rural dwellers are often worse off in absolute terms.  Moreover, household 
level poverty data disaggregated by neighborhoods is not available for many African 
cities, thereby making it difficult to identify ex-ante a sampling frame of poor 
households to survey.  Practical challenges compound these methodological ones since 
a majority of those who constitute the urban poor spend most of their days, including 
weekends, away from home in order to earn a living.  Focusing on households can 
therefore lead to an oversampling of those who are too old or too sick to work, women  
 taking care of children and housework, and those who are unemployed but not 
seeking jobs.      
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 ―Manifesto‖ is more a common term in Zambia while ―platform‖ is more often found in the political 
discourse in Senegal.   
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 Therefore, the sampling frame for this study included individuals who were 
eligible to vote based on age and citizenship and who labored as informal sector 
workers in the markets of Lusaka and Dakar.  As already noted, these two capital 
cities are the largest agglomerations in their respective countries, meaning that a 
sample selected within them, rather than in secondary towns and cities, should be 
broadly representative of the general urban poor.  Moreover, the informal sector 
comprises a large share of employment in these two cities.  In Lusaka province, 69 
percent of the population depends on the non-agricultural informal sector, which is 
higher than any other province in the country (CSO 2007: 46).  According to the 
Senegalese statistical agency, the informal sector is by far the largest employer in 
Dakar, with 76 percent of the city‘s population dependent upon it (ANSD 2007b: 
48).
224
  As already noted, incomes in this sector are meager.  In Dakar, the median 
monthly income in the informal sector is approximately 20,000 CFA, or about 45 
dollars in current prices (ANSD 2007b: 51).  While equivalent figures for Lusaka are 
unavailable, at the national level, the average monthly income is 107,124 Kwacha, or 
23 dollars in current prices (CSO 2007: p.53).  
Markets represent an appropriate location for sampling informal workers 
because they are almost entirely comprised of such individuals.  The prime occupation 
of those in the markets is vending, including retail goods such as clothing and house 
wares, agricultural products, and self-made foods and beverages.  In Zambia in 
particular, a huge proportion of retail trade occurs in salauala, which means to ―pick 
from a pile‖ (Taylor 2006:  90) and refers to secondhand clothing.   However, one can 
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 Both countries share a similar definition of this sector.  In Zambia, it refers to employed persons who 
―were not entitled to paid leave, pension, gratuity and social security, and worked in an establishment 
employing 5 persons or less‖ (CSO 2006: 18). In Senegal, the basic definition refers to those who lack 
written accounts and are not registered as a business.  Additional characteristics include precarious 
working conditions that lack water, electricity, or a telephone, lack of social security, and businesses 
that employ on average 1.5 people (DPS 2003: 1, 3, 8-10).   
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also find within the markets tailors, carpenters, butchers, hairdressers, shoe shiners, 
and those providing non-traditional services, such as charging mobile phones.  In 
addition, within this diverse setting are sometimes students assisting a family 
member‘s business, unregistered taxi drivers visiting friends or eating a meal, and a 
few unemployed idling away the day.   
Working conditions in these markets can vary according to occupation.  
Vendors can be particularly disadvantaged because a majority labor in either 
makeshift stalls, constructed out of wood and plastic, simply sit on the ground, or 
engage in perambulatory vending on the edge of the markets. Not only do such 
conditions provide vendors with little protection from inclement weather but also 
expose merchandise to rain, mud, and heat, all of which may deter customers.  
Moreover, vendors can be especially vulnerable to petty theft of money and 
merchandise.   
 
Survey Sampling Technique   
This working population was surveyed according to a two-stage clustered 
sampling procedure.  In the first stage, ten markets were selected throughout each city 
and therefore markets constituted the primary sampling unit.  Cluster sampling is an 
appropriate technique when the working population is so large that it would be 
prohibitively costly and time-intensive to randomly survey all of it (Rea and Parker 
2005), and sub-sampling through multiple stages is a common approach under 
circumstances where a list of the population is completely lacking (Groves et al. 
2004).  Due to the limited size of the survey samples, clusters (i.e. markets) were 
deliberately rather than randomly chosen in each setting.  Lindberg and Morrison 
(2008) also adopt this approach, arguing that when working with relatively small 
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sample sizes, deliberately selecting clusters can ensure a representative level of 
coverage that cannot be guaranteed through random selection.         
In order to make generalizations about the working population, the chosen 
clusters traditionally should be ―probability proportional to size,‖ meaning that the 
probability they are selected into the sample should be proportional to some known 
variable (Groves et al. 2004).  For instance, if the population of certain geographic 
locations is larger than others, then those clusters should have a greater chance of 
being selected into the sample than more sparsely populated ones.  However, the 
market setting in the African context is very different from traditional survey 
environments in that their total populations are both unknown and vary on a daily 
basis.  During rainy days, those laboring in more makeshift structures may decide to 
stay at home.  Likewise, near special holidays, such as Korité and Tabaski in Senegal 
or Christmas in Zambia the number of marketeers may increase as they try to earn 
some extra money.
225
  As such, the objective in both countries was to ensure that the 
chosen clusters reflected diversity not in terms of population size but rather in terms of 
geographical coverage and market type.   
For Zambia, a report by the European Development Fund (1996) categorized 
markets in Lusaka according to territorial size.  In particular, ―urban‖ markets are 
equivalent to central city markets in that they span a huge catchment area and attract 
vendors from all corners of the city.  ―Inter-area‖ markets cover the district in which 
they are located as well as one or more neighboring areas.  ―District‖ markets may 
actually have a greater number of vendors than the previous category but they are just 
limited to their specific district.  Finally, ―sub-district‖ markets are essentially those 
located in residential areas, meaning that they are both smaller in size and attract only 
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 Korité marks the end of Ramadan and Tabaski is the biggest feast day of the year for Senegal‘s 
Muslims. 
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local residents.  According to the EDF (1996) report, a majority of these markets fall 
into the latter two categories and thus, for the purposes of this study, most of the 
selected markets fell into this classification as well. However, it was also important 
that the final ten markets spanned different electoral constituencies.  In the past, 
Rupiah Banda was an MP for Munali constituency while Michael Sata served 
Kabwata constituency.  Depending on their perceived records in office, such factors 
may influence how vendors viewed these candidates in the 2008 elections.  By 
ensuring that markets were sampled across different electoral constituencies, this study 
aimed to control for that potential bias. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the markets selected 
were located in all four corners of the city. The concentration of survey sites on the 
periphery of the city is due  to the fact that most of Lusaka‘s markets are located in 
unplanned, high-density, and low-income areas rather than in the more affluent 
neighborhoods of Kabulonga, Woodlands, Roma, or Rhodes Park (Nchito 2006).  
Figure 4.1:  Map of Survey Locations in Lusaka  
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 Although an equivalent study of the markets was unavailable in Senegal, a 
similar logic motivated the selection of markets in Dakar.  Specifically, those in the 
sample included more remote markets in the poorer suburb of Pikine, more residential 
markets in key neighborhoods, and a few major markets in the center of the city.  
Moreover, Dakar contains a number of specialized markets in which a majority of 
vendors focus on selling a certain type of merchandise.  For instance, Kermel is an 
artisan‘s market in Dakar‘s Plateau neighborhood, HLM predominantly focuses on 
fabric, and Tilène is known as a food market.  These were purposely included since 
studies elsewhere in Africa (e.g. Macharia 1997) have demonstrated that different sub-
sectors of the informal economy can both attract particular ethno-linguistic groups and 
engender disparate responses by the state.  The remaining markets were more typical 
in terms of selling all manner of goods and services.  Figure 4.2 highlights which 
markets were chosen in the city center and Pikine.  
Figure 4.2:  Map of Survey Locations in Dakar  
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Table 4.1:  Summary of Selected Markets in Each City  
Dakar, Senegal 
Market Arrondissement Market Specialty  Share of market’s workers 
who live in the same 
arrondissement (%)
b
 
Grand Yoff Parcelles Assainies Multiple products 50 
Gueule Tapée  Parcelles Assainies Multiple products 90 
HLM Grand Dakar Fabric 35 
Kermel Plateau Artwork 30 
Marche Zinc Pikine Dagoudane Multiple products 85 
Ouakam  Almadies Multiple products 90 
Sandaga Plateau Multiple products 10 
Syndicat Pikine Dagoudane Fruits and nuts 70 
Thiaroye Thiaroye Multiple products 35 
Tilène Plateau Food products 45 
Lusaka, Zambia  
Market Constituency Market Type
a
 Share of market’s workers 
who live in the same 
constituency (%)
b
 
Chawama Chawama District 90 
Chelstone Munali Sub-district 100 
Chilenje Kabwata District 90 
Chipata Mandevu Sub-district 95 
Kabwata Kabwata Inter-area 60 
Kanyama Kanyama District 95 
Kaunda Square Munali District 90 
Mandevu Mandevu District 85 
Matero  Matero District 100 
Soweto  Kanyama Urban 35 
Notes: 
a
These market types are derived from the European Development Fund (1996)  
                b
 These shares are derived from the author‘s survey results.  
Table 4.1 lists the ten markets sampled in each city and highlights the 
proportion of those sampled in the survey who lived in the same administrative region 
where the market is located.  Not surprisingly, very central markets, such as Sandaga 
in Dakar and Soweto in Lusaka tend to have most of their occupants migrating into the 
city center each day from other neighborhoods.  By contrast, neighborhood markets, 
such as Ouakam and Chelstone, are almost entirely dominated by local residents.  
Thus, these markets exhibit other characteristics that can be leveraged to ensure that 
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the sample is probability proportional to size.  Appendix Six provides a more detailed 
overview of each selected market. 
Cluster sampling can be problematic in that those within a cluster may be more 
homogeneous, and therefore less statistically independent, than those across clusters.  
This ―design effect‖ can decrease the size of the standard errors for regression 
coefficients, thereby leading to a greater tendency to reject the null hypothesis.  Unlike 
traditional household surveys, however, there are reasons to believe that such 
problems are less severe in the case of market workers precisely because they do not 
live in the market.  In other words, such respondents are exposed to influences both in 
their workplace and in their own neighborhoods, which might be in a very different 
part of town than where the market is located, and therefore the degree of 
homogeneity in political views or demographic characteristics should be less 
problematic.  Nevertheless, one way to mitigate any possible ―design effect‖ variance 
between clusters is to only sample a small but fixed number of respondents over a 
wider number of clusters (Groves et al. 2004). As such, 20 respondents were surveyed 
across the ten markets.  
During the second stage of sampling, the 20 respondents in each market were 
chosen according to a random sampling technique stratified by gender.
226
    Early 
studies on voting behavior in the United States and Western Europe suggested a 
―gender gap‖ whereby women tended to support more conservative parties than men 
and typically voted less often (e.g. Inglehart 1977;  Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell 
et al. 1960).  More recent studies (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2000) have shown that in 
post-industrial societies, this gap has been narrowing due to women‘s greater 
participation in the labor force, better access to higher education, less emphasis on 
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 According to Levy and Lemeshow (1999), stratified sampling both incorporates the simplicity of 
random sampling and greater precision by reducing standard errors in estimation. 
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child-bearing, and declines in religiosity.  However, most African societies are not 
considered post-industrial, and traditional expectations of women still prevail.  
Stratifying on gender allows the surveys to probe whether a voting gap exists in 
Senegal and Zambia with respect to both political participation and candidate support.  
More specific details on the surveying procedures can be found in Appendix Six.  
 
Caveats of Sampling Market Workers 
 The sampling strategy discussed above presented some caveats and challenges.  
Most significantly, surveying market workers leads to ―coverage error‖ by excluding 
other groups who also should be considered the urban poor but do not work in the 
markets.  This can potentially create a major bias if those excluded are significantly 
different from market workers in a way that affects their voting behavior (Braun 
2003).  As mentioned earlier, surveying households would have led to a potential 
oversampling of women with children, the elderly, the unemployed, as well as low-
income formal workers, such as security guards, police officers, teachers, and nurses. 
However, these views are now potentially under-sampled by focusing on markets.   
 Consequently, three slums or squatter settlements were selected for in-depth 
interviews in each city to help detect and adjust for potential bias.  The responses from 
individuals in these settlements are not included in this chapter‘s statistical analyses 
but, they provide illuminating qualitative evidence of residents‘ political beliefs and 
voting behavior. Table 4.2 below provides a brief description of the selected 
settlements.   
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Table 4.2:  Summary of Selected Informal Settlements in Each City 
Dakar, Senegal 
Cité 
Bissap 
Located in the Biscuiterie commune, most of Cité Bissap‘s residents are 
illegally squatting on land. In March of 2008, 24 homes in Cité Bissap were 
destroyed by a fire, leaving 325 people homeless.  The mayor of Biscuiterie 
claims that he does not have the resources to improve the housing and attempts 
to solicit resources from the mayor of Dakar have not amounted to anything 
(Faye 2008). 
HLM 
Montagne 
Located in the HLM commune, HLM Montagne‘s housing consists of cinder 
block walls with roofs of cardboard and corrugated steel. The housing is very 
irregular with public walkways and private backyards ceaselessly blurring 
together.  Montagne has received some support from the NGO ENDA-Tiers 
Monde.   
Baraka  Baraka is situated just behind rather affluent housing in Liberté 6 extension of 
the Liberté commune d'arrondissement.  The residents were evicted from their 
former location, which is not far from their current one, in February 2001 
(COHRE 2004). The community has benefitted from assistance from the 
NGO, ENDA-Tiers Monde, which is apparent from the community‘s well-built 
mosque and community center, as well as the availability of a communal water 
tap.  Many of the residents are from the Casamance region of Senegal 
(COHRE 2004).  
Lusaka, Zambia 
Chaisa Chaisa compound is located in the Northwestern part of the city in the 
constituency of Mandevu. In 1987, the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing declared Chaisa as an Improvement Area, which allowed occupancy 
licenses to be given as security of tenure to some of the households (Nordin 
2004).  The quality of housing varies immensely, with some having doors with 
padlocks and others just having curtains to indicate an entrance.  In recent 
years, the Japanese donor agency (JICA) has helped install communal water 
taps in the compound.  
Misisi Misisi is an illegal, informal settlement located in Chawama constituency and 
has been consistently threatened with demolition by the Government.  Misisi 
has been identified as one of the five worst slums in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
field surrounding the compound is littered with trash and stagnant, dirty water, 
which accounts for the compound‘s high levels of cholera.  Most residents‘ 
homes are under ZESCO‘s high tension electricity wires, which have in the 
past caused some residents to be electrocuted during storms. 
Kalikiliki Kalilikliki is an informal settlement located in Munali constituency, in the 
Eastern part of the city and next to the Kalikiliki Dam.  Kalikiliki means 
―rush‖ or ―hustle and bustle‖ in the local language of Nyanja, referring to the 
original land owner‘s insistence that the Dam be constructed as quickly as 
possible (Nchito 2007).  In 2002, the Lusaka City Council tried demolishing a 
number of illegal homes within this compound. Residents torched the 
bulldozer intended to raze the settlements and in the ensuing clash with police, 
two teenagers were shot dead (Myers 2005).  
Following Dietz‘s (1998) study of the urban poor in Lima, Peru, the housing 
settlements were chosen in each city according to Przeworski and Teune‘s (1970) 
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―most similar‖ and ―most different‖ strategies.  While the settlements all contained 
low-income residents, they varied in that a) they were located in different electoral 
constituencies of their respective city, b) some have a contentious relationship with the 
state authorities and while others do not, and c) some have been prime targets for non-
governmental organization (NGO) and international donor service delivery projects 
while others have not.  The latter two criteria could potentially influence residents‘ 
perceptions of the ruling party‘s performance.   
Ten respondents in each settlement were asked similar questions to those of the 
market workers, for a total of 30 respondents in each city and 60 for the overall study.  
Such a small sample precludes reliable statistical analyses. Yet, a majority of residents 
in these neighborhoods also engage in small-scale commerce as their major form of 
livelihood, increasing confidence that the market workers surveyed are not especially 
different from these residents.  Where available, descriptions of their responses are 
included to provide at least illustrative evidence that coverage error did not pose a 
major problem in the survey with market workers.  Furthermore, these interviews were 
more in-depth and open-ended than those with market workers, offering a qualitative 
understanding of decision-making processes with respect to political decisions.   
Slum dwellers in each country typically were dismissive of government 
attention to their plight, although this varied slightly according to the nature of the 
settlement.  For instance, in Dakar, ―rien du tout,‖ or ―nothing at all,‖ was the most 
common response from residents about what improvements the PDS government had 
made in their neighborhoods in recent years.   However, in Baraka, residents offered a 
slightly more sanguine perspective because of the presence of the urban service-
delivery NGO called ENDA-Tiers Monde.  In Cité Bissap, a few respondents noted 
that the government provided residents mattresses, rice, and clothes in the aftermath of 
that settlement‘s March 2008 fire but has offered nothing more significant outside of 
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that particular incident.   In Lusaka, residents of Chaisa compound, where the 
Japanese donor JICA has been active, remained the most positive.  In fact, seven out 
of ten Chaisa respondents were able to cite improvements there, such as the arrival of 
communal water taps, paved roads, and health clinics.  Yet, in both Misisi and 
Kalikiliki, ―nothing‖ remained the most frequent response to questions about the 
MMD‘s improvements within the neighborhood.  This illustrates that outside of areas 
of heavy donor or NGO involvement, there was little sense that the ruling regime in 
either country had done much for the urban poor, generating even greater puzzlement 
over why the PDS was victorious amongst this group in Senegal‘s most recent 
presidential elections while the MMD was not in Zambia‘s.   
 
Lusaka:  The Power of Pabwato  
With the above context and methodological details in mind, this section 
examines the data from the Lusaka survey to confirm that the PF appealed more to 
Lusaka‘s urban poor than either the MMD or alternative opposition parties and to 
uncover why this was so.  The left column of Table 4.3 presents an overview of the 
key characteristics captured in the survey sample while the right column presents the 
distribution of these characteristics in the broader population of self-employed vendors 
within Lusaka according to data calculated from the 2000 Census.  Vendors certainly 
are not representative of all the types of workers found within the markets.  However, 
since 61 percent of those in Lusaka‘s informal sector concentrate on trade (CSO 
2006), vendors do tend to represent the dominant occupation of those within this 
sector.  Thus, the Census was disaggregated into self-employed vendors and sales 
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assistants who live in the district of Lusaka and who are both Zambian citizens and 18 
years of age or older.
227
  
 
Table 4.3:  Summary of Survey Respondents in Lusaka Markets 
Descriptive Variable Sample Percentage Population Percentage 
from 2000 Census 
Gender 
       Female                                                      48 45.5 
       Male                                                         52 54.5 
Age 
       18-24 years 17.5  22.9 
       25-30 years 23.5  33.2 
       31-35 years 20    14.7 
       36-40 years 17    12.5 
       More than 40 years 22    16.8 
Language Group  
       Barotse 4  1.4  
       Bemba 37.5  24.3 
       English 0.5  3.3 
       Mambwe 6.5  1.5 
       Northwestern  5  1.1 
       Nyanja 32  63.3 
       Tonga 8.5  3.8 
       Tumbuka 5  1.0 
       Other  1 0.2 
Education  
      No schooling  2   13 
      Primary uncompleted 8   15.3 
      Primary completed 16 24 
      Secondary uncompleted 41 33 
      Secondary completed 26  11.1 
      Post-secondary vocational  7  3.7 
Born in Lusaka?  
      Yes 40.5  35.4 
       No  59.5  64.6 
Belong to a Work Association?  
     Yes                                                           5.5 --- 
     No 94.5 --- 
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 More specifically, the base data for the calculations are the 2000 Census data for Lusaka Province 
(Province 5).  Observations for eligible voters in Lusaka District were isolated and the proportions 
calculated correspond to individuals who are self-employed in occupations classified as ―Salesmen, 
shop assistants and demonstrators,‖ ―Street vendors, canvassers, and newsvendors,‖ and ―Sales workers 
not elsewhere classified.‖  These are occupation codes 451, 452, and 490, respectively, in the Census.   
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Given that the respondents were stratified according to gender, it is not 
surprising that the survey sample captured approximately the same proportion of 
males and females that would be found in the broader populace of Lusaka‘s informal 
sector.  On the other hand, the language groups, which are those determined by 
Zambia‘s Central Statistical Office (CSO), are less representative.  While Bemba and 
Nyanja are the two most prevalent language groups in the capital (CSO 2004), the 
survey over-sampled those whose first language falls into the Bemba group and under-
sampled those in the Nyanja group.  Similarly, with respect to education, it appears 
that those who completed primary schooling, meaning that they left school after Grade 
7, along with those who failed to complete primary schooling or never attended at all, 
were also under-sampled.  In order to correct for these two design errors, proportional 
weights are applied in the regressions presented later in this section.  
A key observation about Table 4.3 concerns the extremely small share of 
respondents who belong to any type of work associations, such as ZANAMA, LITA, 
or the Street Vendor‘s Association.  The primary reason offered for lack of 
membership was that the respondent was unaware that any organizations existed for 
market workers, even though Lusaka contains numerous marketeers and vendors 
associations.  Additional reasons were that the benefits of membership remained 
unclear, respondents were too busy to join, and a perception that such organizations 
were corrupt and riddled with in-fighting.  A few additional respondents, however, 
were involved in micro-credit associations, such as FINCA, which provides small 
loans to female entrepreneurs.  These findings mirrored the responses of those in the 
shanty compounds.  Though a very few claimed that they belonged to religious 
community groups or microfinance organizations, an overwhelming majority claimed 
they were uninvolved in work associations.  All of this suggests that associational 
affiliation cannot be a major driving force behind respondents‘ voting decisions and 
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confirms the observation of Nelson (1979) that the majority of the urban poor tend to 
be unorganized in any formal manner.     
 
Table 4.4: Number of Migrants to Lusaka by Province and Years of 
Residence  
Province 
where born  
Number of Years Ago Respondent Moved to Lusaka 
One year 
or less  
Between 
 1 & 5 years   
Between  
5 & 10 years  
More than 10 
years   
Total from 
Province  
Central  1 2 3 8 14 
Copperbelt 0 8 4 23 35 
Eastern 0 2 3 16 21 
Luapula 0 0 1 4 5 
Northern 0 3 5 13 21 
Northwest 0 1 1 3 5 
Southern 0 5 1 3 9 
Western 0 0 0 6 6 
Other
a
 0 0 0 3 3 
Total  1 21 18 79 119 
Notes: 
a ―Other‖ refers to those who were born outside of Zambia but have since become citizens.  
The sample also indicates that a majority of respondents migrated to Lusaka 
from other areas of the country, and this does not markedly differ from the estimates 
for the broader population.  Indeed, Table 4.4 above highlights that most of the 
respondents moved from the Copperbelt Province, followed by the Eastern, Northern, 
and Central Provinces, and this largely coincides with the findings from CSO (2003a) 
regarding migration flows to the capital.  Importantly, most of these migrants arrived 
in Lusaka more than ten years ago, meaning that they are increasingly likely to view 
themselves as Lusakans.  Joining a family member and lack of employment in one‘s 
home province constituted the two main reasons why respondents decided to move to 
Lusaka.   
Despite objective indicators showing that Zambia‘s GDP growth and real GDP 
per capita growth were relatively strong and stable in the 12 months previous to the 
survey, approximating 6 percent and 3 percent respectively (WDI 2009), most 
respondents possessed negative views on the prevailing economic conditions for the 
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country as a whole.
228
  As seen in Table 4.5 above, more than fifty percent stated that 
they believed economic conditions within the country had worsened within the year 
prior to the survey.  Of those who expressed that opinion, 52 percent blamed the 
policies of the Zambian government for worsening circumstances while a quarter felt 
that the global economic downturn was responsible.  The Cramér‘s V indicates a 
strong relationship between the perspectives on the economy and the factor attributed 
with responsibility for changes in economic circumstances. The Pearson chi-square 
(χ2) reveals that there is a significant association between these two variables.229  This 
is particularly important given that based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, 
retrospective economic voting is more likely to occur when voters can actually 
attribute accountability to the government for economic performance.  As shown here, 
the voters did believe the government was responsible.   
 
Table 4.5:  Assessment of Economic Conditions over the Previous 
12 Months 
(% of All Respondents) 
Factor 
responsible for 
this change in 
economic 
conditions  
How would you compare economic conditions in Zambia 
today to those of the same time last year? 
Better No change Worse Total 
Policies of the 
Zambian 
government  
4 0 51.5 55.5 
Global 
economy  
0 0 25 25 
Weather 0 0 3 3 
Don‘t know 0 0 2.5 2.5 
Not applicable  0 14 0 14 
Total  4 14 82 100 
  Cramér's V = 0.717   ; χ2= 205.362; p = 0.000; N=200 
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 Since the surveys were conducted in the first quarter of 2009, these macroeconomic indicators are 
based on the World Development Indicators data for 2008.  
229
 The Cramér‘s V measures the strength of the relationship between two or more categorical variables 
on a scale of 0 (no relationship) to 1 (perfect relationship).  
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According to Table 4.6, voting appears to be this group‘s main form of 
political participation, and a majority of respondents voted in the last two presidential 
elections.  In fact, the turnout rates reported by these respondents for both elections 
exceeded the rates reported by the Electoral Commission of Zambia for Lusaka 
District as a whole.
230
  Of those who did not vote, procedural issues rather than the 
dearth of appealing candidates represented the self-reported reason for abstention.  
The main procedural problem was that respondents lacked the requisite identification 
documents to vote, including a National Registration Card (NRC) and a voter‘s card. 
A Zambian is supposed to receive a National Registration Card at the age of 16, which 
is in turn necessary to obtain a voter‘s card at the age of 18. This was particularly 
problematic in the 2008 elections because the Electoral Commission of Zambia 
claimed that it was logistically impossible to re-open the electoral register, and 
therefore those who were not registered in the 2006 elections effectively were 
disenfranchised in the 2008 ones (Chibamba 2009).  Moreover, those who had lost 
their voting cards in the interim were given only five days to replace them (ECZ 
2008).  The second reason cited by respondents for not voting was lack of time due to 
either the fact that they were working or that they were out of town and could not 
return in time to cast their vote in Lusaka, where they were registered.  
Of those who did vote, Sata was overwhelmingly the favorite in both elections 
amongst this sample, reflecting the general results for Lusaka as a whole.  While 
Sata‘s share of votes increased between elections, those of the MMD declined.  
Nevertheless, in 2008, the MMD still outperformed the UPND by more than threefold.  
This, along with electoral data presented in Chapter Three, suggests that support for 
the PF is not simply motivated by an anti-incumbent bias amongst the urban poor.  
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 As noted in Chapter Three, the turnout rates for Lusaka District in the 2006 and 2008 elections were 
71 and 58 percent, respectively.  
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Rather, it is spurred by this constituency‘s particular attraction to Sata and his party‘s 
message.
231
  
 
Table 4.6:  Summary of Voting Behavior in 2006 and 2008 Presidential Elections 
Did you vote in the presidential elections?  
Percentage of all 
respondents (2006) 
Percentage of all 
respondents (2008) 
Yes 74 62.5 
No  26 37.5 
Primary reason for not voting  
 
Percentage of non-
voters (2006) 
Percentage of non-
voters (2008) 
No appealing candidates  0.0 1.3 
Lack of time 13.5 22.7 
Elections wouldn't be fair 3.8 6.7 
Favorite candidate wouldn't win 0.0 2.7 
No matter who wins, nothing will change  7.7 6.7 
Lacked NRC, voter‘s card, or both  44.2 48.0 
Too young  13.5 0.0 
Jehovah's Witness
a
  7.7 5.3 
Other
b
  9.6 6.7 
Party supported
c 
 Percentage who 
voted (2006) 
Percentage who 
voted (2008) 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD)  40.3 30.9 
Patriotic Front (PF)  54.9 61.8 
United Party for National Development 
(UPND)  4.9 7.3 
Heritage Party (HP)  0 0 
 Notes:  
a  Jehovah‘s Witnesses in Zambia are forbidden to vote.   
             
b ―Other‖ usually referred to those who were sick, pregnant, or hospitalized at the time of the  
                 elections.   
                      c
 The same candidates ran for the PF, UPND, and HP in both elections.  However, Rupiah  
   Banda was  running to replace the deceased Levy Mwanawasa on the MMD ticket in the  
   2008 elections.  
 Respondents were further asked why they believed the MMD ultimately won 
the 2008 elections at the national level.  Since the 2008 elections are more recent, 
respondents‘ recall abilities are therefore likely to be more reliable than they are 
regarding the 2006 elections. Figure 4.3 illustrates that overwhelmingly, respondents 
believed that the MMD‘s victory was due to electoral malpractice. By contrast, only 
about nine percent of respondents claimed that the ruling party‘s good policies 
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 Unfortunately, the small number of respondents who voted for the UPND, which was nine in total, 
precludes a rigorous statistical analysis of who supported this particular opposition party and why.  
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explained the final outcome.  When pressed, these respondents cited the MMD‘s 
removal of primary school fees, which occurred in 2002, the distribution of fertilizers 
to rural areas, and the fact that the kwacha had been relatively strong under 
Mwanawasa‘s tenure.  Very few marketeers believed that campaign handouts in the 
form of gifts and money by the MMD explained that party‘s national success.  Only 
ten percent of respondents saw the lack of a competitive opposition as a determining 
factor in the election results.   
 
Figure 4.3:  Primary Reason for MMD Victory in 2008  
 
Regression Results and Interpretation  
 In order to analyze voter motivations, a series of binomial logit regressions 
were conducted.  The purpose of these regressions is twofold.  First, they can test the 
various schools of thought on voting behavior presented in Chapter Two. From the 
descriptive statistics above, it is clear that associational membership is not an 
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important determinant of voting behavior for Zambia‘s urban poor.  However, the 
regressions can test whether ethnicity, vote-buying, and perspectives on the 
macroeconomy influenced a respondent‘s voting decisions.  Secondly, the regressions 
emphasize the importance of a populist strategy for a political party attempting to 
mobilize the urban poor by highlighting the degree of congruence between party 
messages on the one hand and variables that influence the urban poor‘s voting 
decisions on the other hand.  
The regressions were conducted on voting decisions in the October 2008 
elections.  The dependent variable is the probability of voting for Sata in those 
elections since the primary research question is to understand why King Cobra 
attracted so much support among the urban poor.  However, Table A7.1 in Appendix 
Seven presents the findings for the same models when the dependent variable is the 
probability of voting for the MMD‘s Rupiah Banda.232 All of these regressions were 
only conducted on those who voted rather than the entire sample, which reduced the 
sample size from 200 to 123 respondents.  
To determine the best predictors of support for the PF‘s Michael Sata, a series 
of independent variables are sequentially introduced to reflect three types of influences 
that both reflect the schools of thought on voting behavior introduced in Chapter Two 
and control for confounding variables.  The first model examines demographic and 
educational factors.  Specifically, it focuses on the importance of ethnic identity while 
also controlling for other variables specific to a respondent‘s background and 
upbringing that might influence his/her choice of presidential candidate. If the ethnic 
voting literature is correct, then a respondent who shares Sata‘s ethno-linguistic 
background, which is Bemba, should be more likely to vote for Sata at a statistically 
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 The two sets of regressions that alternatively use Sata and Banda as dependent variables are not 
exactly mirror images of each other because some respondents voted for Hichilema.   
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significant level even when additional confounding variables are taken into account.  
At the same time, other ethno-linguistic groups would be significantly less likely to 
support Sata when they also have co-ethnics in the elections.   
This demographic and educational model can be summarized as examining the 
probability that respondent i supported Sata in the 2008 elections according to the 
following specification:  
 
(1) Pr (Sata =1| x) = 
      F(β0 +βfemi + βyoungi + βmediumi + βlowschooli + βmedschooli  + βbembai + βnyanjai) 
 
where fem =1 if respondent i is a woman, young captures respondents in the 18-30 age 
category while medium represents those i respondents in the 31-40 age group.
233
 
Therefore, those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded dummy 
variable category.  Lowschool =1 if respondent i did not attend school or did not 
complete schooling at the primary level while medschool =1 for a respondent who 
completed primary schooling or obtained some secondary schooling.   Those who had 
completed secondary school or had some post-secondary education represented the 
excluded category.
234
  Finally, bemba = 1 if a respondent‘s first language is within the 
Bemba language group, and nyanja =1 if a respondent‘s first language is within the 
Nyanja language group.
235
  Including whether someone whose first language is Bemba 
chose to support a Bemba candidate, Sata, helps evaluate the strength of the ethnic 
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 Originally, 18-24 and 25-30 year-olds were in two different groups.  However, due to the Electoral 
Commission‘s restrictions on allowing new voters to register for the 2008 elections, the former category 
consisted of very few voters and was therefore collapsed with the next higher age group. This is a 
recommended procedure for binomial and multinomial models since categories with few respondents 
can increase the potential for unstable coefficients.    
234
 In other words, low schooling represents those with 0 to 6 years of school, medium schooling 
includes those from 7 to 11 years of school, and high schooling includes those with 12 or more years of 
school.  
235
 The languages within the Bemba language group are Bemba, Lunda, Lala, Bisa, Ushi, Chishinga, 
Ngumbo, Lamba, Kabende, Tabwa, Swaka, Mukulu, Ambo, Lima, Shila, Unga, Bwile, and Luano. 
Languages within the Nyanja language group include Nyanja, Chewa, Nsenga, Ngoni, Kunda, and 
Chikunda(CSO 2000).  
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voting argument amongst the urban poor.  A similar rationale motivated the inclusion 
of the Nyanja variable since Banda was formerly a member of UNIP, which was 
highly popular in the Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province.   
As seen in Table 4.7, column 1, two variables are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  A respondent who was between 18 to 30 years of age was more 
likely to support Sata than someone in an older age category. Moreover, if someone‘s 
first language belongs to the Bemba language family, s/he was more likely to vote for 
Sata.  Education level does not significantly impact a respondent‘s decision to support 
Sata.  Likewise, gender and being a Nyanja-speaker do not appear to have had an 
impact on the decision to support Sata.  As such, this first regression suggests some 
support for the ethnic voting argument because Bemba-speakers were significantly 
more likely to support Sata.  However, Nyanja-speakers were not necessarily less 
likely to support the PF leader, suggesting that he did not deter the support of 
members from this ethno-linguistic group in Lusaka.
236
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 Importantly, column 1 of Table A7.1 in Appendix Seven also reveals that Nyanja-speakers were not 
significantly more likely to support the Nyanja candidate, Banda.   
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    Table 4.7:  Binomial Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for Michael Sata 
Notes:  Significance levels:   ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   
a
Those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the age 
dummy dummy variables.  
b
 The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was 
those who had 12 or more years of education.  
Independent 
Variables 
Demographic 
& Education 
 
(1) 
 
(1)  
Campaign 
Conduct 
 
(2) 
    
 
Economy &  
Service 
Delivery 
(3) 
(3) 
Full Model 
 
 
(4) 
Weighted 
Full Model  
 
(5) 
Female  -0.550 
 (0.429) 
--- --- --- --- 
Age:  18-30 years
a
  1.221** 
(0.564) 
--- ---   2.180*** 
 (0.702) 
  1.672** 
 (0.786) 
Age: 31-40 years  0.641 
(0.495) 
--- --- --- ---- 
Low education
b
  -0.381 
 (0.673) 
--- --- --- ---- 
Medium education   0.454 
 (0.495) 
    
Bemba language   
group 
  1.501*** 
 (0.509) 
--- ---   1.735*** 
 (0.571) 
  1.316* 
 (0.698) 
Nyanja language  
group  
  0.580 
 (0.504) 
  --- --- 
MMD handouts  ---   0.198 
 (0.663) 
--- --- --- 
Opposition handouts ---   0.539 
 (0.516) 
--- --- ---- 
Household access to 
water 
--- ---  -1.903*** 
 (0.596) 
  -2.216*** 
  (0.720) 
 -2.980*** 
 (0.590) 
Household access to 
electricity 
--- ---   1.423** 
 (0.596) 
   1.350** 
  (0.672) 
  1.946*** 
 (0.629) 
Poor performance by 
MMD in creating 
jobs 
--- ---   1.579 
 (1.046) 
   2.789** 
  (1.169) 
  3.436** 
 (1.626) 
Poor performance by 
MMD in improving 
conditions for the 
poor 
--- ---   1.495*** 
 (0.560) 
  1.679*** 
 (0.644) 
  2.453*** 
 (0.875) 
Poor performance by 
MMD in improving 
transport 
--- ---   0.631 
(0.485) 
  1.169** 
 (0.563) 
  1.156  
 (0.839) 
Worsened economic 
conditions over 
previous 12 months  
--- ---   1.031* 
 (0.605) 
  0.939 
 (0.674) 
 -0.039  
 (1.033) 
Worsened personal 
economic conditions 
over previous 12 
months  
--- ---   0.010 
 (0.462) 
  0.681 
 (0.557) 
  0.964 
 (0.619) 
Constant  -0.818 -0.114 
(0.548)  
 -3.375*** 
(1.213) 
 -6.349*** 
 (1.649)  
-6.304*** 
 (2.094) 
Number of obs.  123 123 123 123 123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.012 0.215 0.337 0.459 
Prob >chi2 0.009  0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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The second model, labeled the ―campaign conduct‖ model, draws on the vote-
buying literature and tests whether a respondent‘s voting behavior is influenced by 
whether a party offered gifts and/or money in his/her neighborhood during the 2008 
campaign. Gifts usually occur in the form of T-shirts or chitenges, which are brightly-
colored fabric women wrap around their waists into long skirts. All opposition parties 
are grouped together, but this does not necessarily prevent examining the specific 
effect of the PF‘s handouts.  No one mentioned that the Heritage Party offered money 
or gifts, if it even campaigned at all in a respondent‘s neighborhood, and this is 
consistent with popular views that the HP presidential candidate, Godfrey Miyanda, 
eschews giving the perception that he‘s buying peoples‘ votes.237 By contrast, the PF 
was the most frequently mentioned opposition party involved in handouts. If the 
UPND was also cited, then this party was also deemed to have offered handouts in 
addition to, not instead of, the PF.  The model can be specified as follows:  
 
(2) Pr (Sata =1| x) = F(β0 +βmmdhandoutsi + βopphandoutsi )  
 
where mmdhandouts is coded as 1 if respondent i claims that the MMD offered money 
and/or gifts in his/her neighborhood, and 0 otherwise.  The same coding procedure is 
used for opphandouts, which refers to whether any opposition parties provided gifts 
and money.   
If vote-buying played an important role, then we would expect a positive and 
significant correlation between the presence of opposition handouts and support for 
Sata.  While column 2 of Table 4.7 demonstrates a positive relationship between these 
two variables after controlling for the MMD‘s campaign handouts, this relationship is 
not significant.  As such, whether a party offered gifts and money do not appear to 
have had an influence on respondents‘ decision to support Sata. This is potentially 
                                                          
237
 Interviews with HP spokesman, Wazziah Phiri on February 28, 2009 and UNDP governance advisor 
on March 10, 2009.   
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because, as seen in Table 4.8, both the MMD and the opposition offered these 
handouts in relatively high proportions, meaning that ultimately they did not provide 
any one party with a particular electoral advantage.   
 
Table 4.8:  Handouts (Gifts and/or Money) by Zambian Political Parties before 
2008 Elections, as Reported by Respondents  
 
Party  Yes No/Don’t Know 
Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency 
MMD handouts? 88% 110 15% 12 
Opposition (PF & UPND) 
handouts? 
78.4% 98 21.6% 27 
Notes:  These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2008 elections rather than for the 
entire sample.  For the entire sample, 87% claimed the MMD offered handouts and 77% claimed the 
opposition parties did so.  
 
 The third model tests two hypotheses.  The first is the economic voting 
argument and therefore includes independent variables that capture retrospective 
sociotropic and retrospective egotropic perspectives on economic conditions. The 
second hypothesis refers to the importance of the PF‘s message and its degree of 
congruence with voters.  In particular, since the PF focused on service delivery, 
employment, and improving conditions for the poor in its campaign messages, the 
model tests whether those who lacked key services or disapproved of the MMD‘s 
performance in these areas were significantly more likely to vote for Sata.   
This third model, labeled ―economic conditions and service delivery,‖ is 
specified as follows: 
 
(3) Pr (Sata =1| x) = 
 F(β0 +βwateri + βeleci + βjobsi + βpoori  + βtransi  + βworsei+βworseperi ) 
If a respondent possessed tap water and electricity within his/her household, water and 
elec were coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  If a respondent claimed that the MMD 
performed poorly in terms of creating employment, improving conditions for the poor, 
and improving transport, such as the availability of affordable minibuses and taxis, 
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then jobs, poor, and trans were all coded 1.  Likewise, if the respondent claimed that 
Zambia‘s economic conditions worsened over the previous twelve months, worse was 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  A similar coding procedure occurred for those who had 
observed a deterioration in their own personal economic conditions.  These last two 
variables are specifically aimed at testing the economic voting thesis.  
As seen in the results, the most substantively significant variable in this model 
is whether a respondent possessed access to tap water within his/her household.  Those 
who did have such access were less likely to vote for Sata.  Indeed, the World Bank 
(2007a) notes that within Lusaka‘s informal settlements, residents rely on self-made 
shallow wells for water supply and on pit latrines, posing serious health challenges. 
Out of 314 communal pipes installed in the city, 142 have been vandalized and are 
unusable and many more suffer from leaks (World Bank 2007a: 86-87).  Potable water 
within households is a scarce commodity for Lusaka‘s urban poor and as seen in Table 
4.9 below, only 46 percent of survey respondents in the markets claimed they 
possessed a water tap within their homes.  
 
Table 4.9:  Distribution and Perceived Affordability of Utilities among Survey 
Respondents, Zambia 
 
Utility  Possess utility within 
household 
Utility has become more 
affordable 
Yes No  Agree Disagree 
Water  45.6% 54.4% 26.6% 73.4% 
Electricity  65% 35% 33% 67% 
Notes:  These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2008 elections rather than for the 
entire sample.  However, they are almost exactly the same for the entire sample. 
Moreover, only two of the thirty shanty compound residents interviewed 
possessed a household tap.  In Misisi, one woman complained that she would like 
more water in the compound ―because most of the personal taps in the yards are closed 
because people were not paying. For the communal taps, it‘s 200 kwacha per 20 
liters.‖ Another woman in Chaisa explained that ―the communal taps are timed and 
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open in sessions, from 7-10 in the morning and 4 to 6 in the afternoon.‖ She would 
prefer to have the taps open throughout the day.  Others complained about the poor 
quality of water from these taps.   
As seen above, electricity is more widely available within households.  Yet, 
power cuts are frequent and electricity bills are high, causing many to default on bill 
payments and have their service suspended.  As shown in Table 4.9, only 33 percent 
of respondents believe that electricity has become more affordable.  Moreover, unlike 
water, which requires substantial investments in infrastructure within homes, 
electricity can be obtained illegally.  Respondents were only asked whether they could 
obtain electricity within their households, not about how they obtained it or how 
consistently it was provided.  These confounding circumstances may explain why 
even those who do have electricity were also more likely to vote for Sata.   
In addition, if the MMD was deemed to have done little or nothing to improve 
conditions for the poor, then respondents were significantly more likely to support 
Sata.
238
 Retrospective sociotropic perspectives of the macroeconomy also seem to 
exert a significant impact on support for Sata in this model.      
 To preserve degrees of freedom, a full model is then constructed by 
introducing those independent variables that were statistically significant in previous 
models into the service delivery model.  Even those variables within the service 
delivery model that were not statistically significant are nonetheless retained for both 
theoretical and statistical reasons.
239
  Theoretically, variables not significant in the 
service delivery model may nonetheless prove significant when omitted demographic 
                                                          
238
In order to determine whether respondents considered themselves poor, they were asked which 
neighborhood they resided in and then which ones they believed to be the poorest in Lusaka.  Most 
respondents lived in one of the neighborhoods that they personally considered to be among the city‘s 
poorest.  
239
 This full model proved relatively robust given that the Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test was p= 0.122, 
meaning that the number of those who actually voted for Sata are not statistically different from those 
predicted by the model.    
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variables are included whose absence may have been suppressing the influence of 
some variables in the service delivery model.  Statistically, a likelihood ratio test 
revealed that those variables which were insignificant in the service delivery model 
had a non-zero impact on a respondent‘s decision to vote for Sata and therefore should 
be included in the full model.
240
 Furthermore, Table A7.2 in Appendix Seven reveals 
that there was not any multi-collinearity among these independent variables that may 
bias the results.  Similarly, even though a number of subjective indicators are included 
in this full model, Table A7.3 in Appendix Seven demonstrates that based on a test 
using Chronbach‘s Alpha, these indicators are not capturing the same underlying 
variable dimension.
241
  
This full model, presented in column 4 of Table 4.7, once again emphasizes 
that younger voters and those whose first language is Bemba were significantly more 
likely to vote for Sata. In addition, the service delivery variables retain the same 
relationship and degree of significance.  The fact that the MMD‘s poor performance 
on job delivery becomes statistically significant in this model suggests that age not 
only affects who supported Sata but also perspectives on service delivery.  This is 
logical given that younger individuals may be more inclined to be mobilized by a 
charismatic leader who promises rewards over a short period of time.  Given that the 
Central Statistical Office (2004) found that the majority of urban Lusaka‘s 
unemployed are in the 15-29 age category, younger voters may be particularly 
disillusioned by the lack of available jobs and more attracted to a leader who 
prioritized this issue.  
                                                          
240
 In particular, the likelihood ratio test which excluded from the full model perspectives on the 
MMD‘s performance on employment and transport as well as retrospective egotropic perceptions of the 
economy resulted in a probability > chi2 =0.0068.    
241
 Chronbach‘s Alpha is a statistical indicator which determines whether separate variables are 
essentially measuring the same underlying concept.  
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Importantly however, neither retrospective sociotropic nor retrospective 
egotropic perceptions of the macro-economy proved to be a significant predictor of 
support for Sata in this full model.  However, the MMD‘s lackluster performance in 
improving conditions for the poor was a very significant factor.  Three reasons may 
explain this outcome.  First, the MMD‘s performance with improving conditions for 
the poor is a level variable rather than a change one.  Residents may be more inclined 
to blame the government for more long-term suffering than short-term fluctuations, 
especially since the MMD has been in office for 19 years.
242
  Secondly, many 
respondents did not perceive a change in their personal economic conditions and if 
they did, often saw their own initiative or family circumstances as contributing to this 
change, not necessarily the government.  Third, if voters were simply disappointed 
with their economic conditions, they could have abstained entirely or supported 
alternative opposition parties, including not just the PF but also the UPND and HP.  
Instead, Lusaka‘s urban poor needed to be mobilized by a candidate who not only 
pointed out what the MMD did poorly but also convinced them he would offer 
improvements in specific domains most relevant to their livelihoods, including water, 
electricity, and jobs.  
  As a further test of the model‘s robustness, weights are introduced into the 
model to account for the over-sampling of Bemba and the under-sampling of poorly-
educated respondents within the survey.  This was done by determining from the 2000 
Census what share of the informal sector population in Lusaka jointly belong to each 
of the three education categories used (i.e. low schooling, medium schooling, and high 
schooling) and each ethno-linguistic category.  These population shares were then 
                                                          
242
 This claim contradicts the findings of Posner and Simon (2002), who argue that change variables are 
more likely to influence voting behavior than level ones.  However, their measures were based on 
objective poverty data, while this study‘s relies on more subjective perceptions, and they focused on 
opinions of the MMD with respect to the elections in 1996, when the party had yet to establish a 
substantial record in office.        
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divided by the sample shares of respondents who fell into each of these schooling-
linguistic categories (i.e. Bemba speakers with low schooling, Bemba speakers with 
medium schooling, etc.).
243
   In this way, the views of those individuals who were 
under-sampled, such as less-educated Nyanja-speakers, are given more weight than 
those who were over-sampled. However, as seen in column 5 of Table 4.7, this 
alteration does not significantly change any of the results from the full model.
244
   
Coefficients in logit analyses are well-known for being difficult to interpret, 
particularly when the independent variables are all dummy variables.  As such, Table 
4.10 draws on the statistically significant variables in the weighted full model and 
presents predicted probabilities of voting for Sata for key selected variables, holding 
the remaining statistically significant variables at their modal values.  This not only 
facilitates interpretation but also highlights that while a Bemba-speaker was 
significantly more likely to vote for Sata than someone of another ethno-linguistic 
group, service delivery and performance variables exert a more substantive impact on 
the urban poor‘s choice of Sata.  For instance, a young, Bemba-speaker who has 
access to water within his/her household and believes that the MMD performed well 
regarding job creation was only 36 percent likely to vote for Sata in the 2008 
elections.  By contrast, a young, non-Bemba speaker who lacks access to water within 
his/her household and believes the MMD performed poorly regarding job creation is 
99 percent likely to vote for Sata.  In other words, while demographic variables are 
                                                          
243
 Though one might doubt the accuracy of these weights given that they are based on the 2000 Census 
rather than a more recent year, reports on language in CSO (2004) show that the shares of these 
language groups in Lusaka hardly changed between 1990 and 2000, which was a major period of 
internal migration.  This increases confidence that using language weights calculated from the 2000 
Census are not especially problematic.    
244
 The weighted model also provides a slightly better fit based on the pseudo-R square. Long and 
Freese (2006) note how essentially, a pseudo-R square alone cannot reveal much information about the 
fit of a model unless it is compared with other specifications of the same model.  In other words, a small 
pseudo-R square is not necessarily an indicator of poor fit alone unless it is lower than the equivalent 
for a different specification of the same model.   
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important, issues which Sata emphasized in his campaign appear to have a greater 
impact on a respondent‘s decision to support him for president.  
 
Table 4.10:  Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Sata in 2008 
Selected Variables MMD performed well 
regarding job creation  
MMD performed 
poorly regarding job 
creation   
Non-
Bemba 
speaker 
Bemba 
speaker 
Non-
Bemba 
speaker 
Bemba 
speaker 
Does not have 
access to water 
within household 
Older (above 30 years) 0.35 0.67 0.94 0.98 
Young (18-30 years) 0.74 0.92 0.99 0.99 
Has access to 
water within 
household 
Older (above 30 years)  0.03 0.09 0.46 0.76 
Young  (18-30 years) 0.13 0.36 0.82 0.94 
All of this suggests that while ethno-linguistic identity cannot be dismissed as 
a factor shaping the voting preferences of the urban poor, it operates in conjunction 
with other considerations.  Indeed, Bemba speakers were more likely to support a 
Bemba co-ethnic at the ballot box.  This is also highlighted in Table 4.11.  Among 
Bemba-speakers, almost 77 percent of them were supporters of Sata.  This was 
significantly higher than the percentage of Bembas attracted to the two other main 
candidates.  Yet, a higher percentage of Nyanja speakers also tended to support Sata as 
opposed to either Banda or Hichilema, with almost 58 percent of Nyanja-speakers 
casting their ballot for King Cobra.  
Moreover, when respondents were asked directly why they supported a 
particular candidate in both elections, no one identified a candidate‘s ethnicity or 
region of origin as a primary reason for his/her voting behavior.  This was likewise the 
case within all three shanty compounds, where respondents spanned a wide range of 
ethno-linguistic groups.  For instance, in Misisi compound, a 70-year-old Tumbuka 
woman who supported Sata asks rhetorically, ―Why pick a fellow tribemate if he can‘t 
deliver?‖ Even if one accepts that respondents may edit their survey answers to 
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present the most socially desirable responses (e.g. Johnson and van de Vijver 2003), 
the logit results demonstrate the importance of service delivery issues even after 
ethno-linguistic identity is taken into account.  
 
Table 4.11:  Support for Candidate in 2008 Elections by  
Primary Language Group 
Primary 
Language 
Group   
Candidate Supported by % of Language 
Group (Frequency)  
Total % of 
Language Group 
(Frequency)  
 
Rupiah 
Banda 
(MMD) 
Michael 
Sata (PF) 
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UPND) 
Barotse 50 
(3) 
16.7 
(1) 
33.3 
(2) 
100 
(6) 
Bemba 21.6 
(11) 
76.5 
(39) 
2 
(2) 
100 
(51) 
English 0 
(0) 
100 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
100 
(1) 
Mambwe 14.3 
(1) 
85.7 
(6) 
0 
(0) 
100 
(7) 
Northwestern 28.6 
(2) 
57.1 
(4) 
14.3 
(1) 
100 
 (7) 
Nyanja 36.8 
(14) 
57.9 
(22) 
5.3 
(2) 
100 
 (38) 
Tonga 37.5 
(3) 
25 
(2) 
37.5 
(3) 
100 
 (8) 
Tumbuka 75 
(3) 
25 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
100 
 (4) 
Other 100 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
100 
 (1) 
Total candidate 
share 
30.9 
(38) 
61.8 
(76) 
7.3 
(9) 
100 
(123) 
      Cramér‘s V:   0.376;  χ2= 34.854, p=0.004; N= 123 voters   
 
Table 4.12 further reveals that Sata was the favored candidate among those 
who labeled a candidate‘s party manifesto, not ethnicity, as the primary factor driving 
voting decisions, followed by whether the candidate promised a change.  This 
highlights that the policy proposals offered by the PF tended to mobilize market 
workers.  By contrast, of the total voters in the survey, those who cited ―Other‖ as the 
main reason driving their voting decisions overwhelmingly supported Banda.  When 
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this category is examined more closely, it predominantly includes those who felt that 
the MMD should be allowed to complete its term given that Mwanawasa was re-
elected in 2006 and would have served until 2011 if not for his untimely death.   
Table 4.12:  Primary Reason for Supporting Candidate in 2008 Elections 
Primary Reason for 
Supporting a Candidate 
Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)  Total  
(% of All 
Voters)   
Rupiah Banda 
(MMD) 
Michael Sata 
(PF)  
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UPND) 
Candidate's manifesto 1.6 27.6 4.9 34.1 
Personal change in living 
conditions  
2.4 2.4 0.0 4.9 
Candidate promised a change 4.1 26.8 0.8 31.7 
Candidate's experience 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.4 
Candidate's personality 1.6 0.0 1.6 3.3 
Candidate's ethnicity/region 
of origin  
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other reason  21.1 2.4 0.0 23.6 
Total candidate share 30.9 61.8 7.3 100.0 
Cramér‘s V:   0.592;  χ2= 86.180, p=0.000;  N=123 voters 
Again, these findings generally were consistent with results obtained through 
the shanty compound interviews.  For instance, a 22-year-old Nyanja-speaking 
housewife in Chaisa compound supported Sata because of his policies: ―Sata has good 
policies on living and working conditions.  If they were implemented, they would 
improve the conditions of Zambia.  Under Mwanawasa, working conditions were bad 
and a few people were enriching themselves.‖   In Kalikiliki, a 44 year-old, 
uneducated Chewa-speaking man who works as a gardener at a lodge, claimed that his 
decision to support the PF in 2008 was ―Because of his [Sata‘s] promise to improve 
working conditions for informal workers and to have salaries start from 500,000 
kwacha a month.‖  In Misisi, a 70 year-old Tumbuka-speaking woman who brews and 
sells beer within the compound voted for Sata because she liked the PF‘s policies and 
added, ―I thought Sata would provide roads, better houses, and would legalize Misisi.‖  
However, explanations for why shanty residents voted for Banda are less 
consistent and tended to fall into three categories.  The first was proxy voting.  For 
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instance, a 59 year-old Tonga-speaking woman in Chaisa who sells fish in front of her 
home and a 24 year-old Bemba woman in Kalikiliki who vends vegetables by the side 
of the road both admitted voting for Banda simply because they were told to do so by 
a family member or friend.   The second explanation was that Banda was believed to 
be more likely to foster political stability than Sata.  A 42 year-old Nyanja woman in 
Chaisa who sells groceries in the compound market represented an extreme example 
of this view, claiming that she had a dream that civil war would occur if Sata became 
president.  Third, people wanted continuity with previous MMD policies.  According 
to a 44 yr-old, Tumbuka, man in Misisi who works as a security guard, ―He [Banda] 
promised to give fertilizer in rural areas.‖  Only two shanty compound residents 
supported Hichilema in 2008, one noting that she had no particular reason for voting 
for him while another claimed that she approved of his views on education and 
agriculture.   
Sata‘s policy message therefore played a critical role in the PF‘s ability to 
attract large segments of the urban poor while other candidate‘s appealed to voters 
according to much more ambiguous criteria.  However, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, part of Sata‘s rhetoric included xenophobic overtones, especially towards the 
Chinese community.  While this died down between elections, most of his 2008 
supporters were also faithful PF voters in 2006.  As such, it is conceivable that market 
workers, many of whom have lost stalls to foreigners and who compete to sell their 
goods at the lowest price, may be particularly supportive of Sata because of his 
previously controversial anti-Chinese stance.  To explore this possibility, respondents 
were asked their opinions of the Chinese influence on the Zambian economy and 
whether their presence was uniformly beneficial, harmful, or brought advantages and 
disadvantages.   As seen in Table 4.13, out of the total number of voters, a majority 
believed that the increasing Chinese presence brought both benefits and disadvantages.  
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Many criticized what they viewed as exploitative labor practices by Chinese 
companies and the import of cheap products, but they also praised the Chinese for 
providing communal water taps and construction jobs.  Twenty-seven percent of those 
who adhered to this mixed category also voted for Sata while 20 percent of those who 
saw the Chinese as uniformly harmful supported ―King Cobra.‖ In any case, the 
bivariate relationship between candidate support and Chinese influence is weak and 
not significant.  As such, Sata‘s previously outspoken opinions on this topic cannot 
plausibly be the driving factor for voting behavior amongst this constituency.  
 
Table 4.13:  Relationship between Opinion of Chinese Involvement and 
Candidate Support in 2008  
Opinion of Chinese 
Influence in Economy  
Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)  Total  
(% of All 
Voters)   
Rupiah Banda 
(MMD) 
Michael Sata 
(PF)  
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UPND)  
Beneficial 11.3 14.8 0.9 27.0 
Mixed  13.0 27.8 4.3 45.2 
Harmful 6.1 20.0 1.7 27.8 
Total candidate share 30.4 62.6 7.0 100.0 
Cramér‘s V:   0.1332;  χ2= 4.078, p=0.395;  N=115 voters due to the fact that 8 voters had no opinion 
on this topic.  
   
Further Analysis of Opposition Party Alternatives   
The logit regressions show a correlation between lack of services and negative 
opinions of the MMD‘s delivery record on the one hand, and support for Sata on the 
other.  Yet, these regressions are largely an assessment of why a respondent chose 
Sata over the incumbent, rather than vis-à-vis other opposition parties.  Since only 
nine respondents voted for Hichilema, it is not possible to isolate through regression 
why Sata was chosen over the UPND leader.  The information in Table 4.14 is 
therefore intended to focus explicitly on survey respondents‘ views of the opposition 
parties.  They were asked to identify which opposition party was most interested in 
improving living conditions in Lusaka as a proxy for determining which party they 
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believed was most committed to addressing the city‘s development challenges.  Their 
responses are compared to their opinions on the primary characteristic that 
distinguishes parties in Zambia.   
Table 4.14: Assessment of Opposition Parties 
Main distinction 
amongst parties 
in Zambia 
Opposition Parties interested in Improving Living 
Conditions in Lusaka  (% of All Respondents) 
Total 
(% of All 
Respondents) PF UPND HP  UNIP FDD None 
Personality of 
party leaders 
22.95 8.20 0.55 0 0.55 1.64 33.88 
Positions on 
social and 
economic issues 
32.79 11.48 0 0 0 3.28 47.54 
Parties' links with 
a region of 
Zambia 
2.73 0.55 0 0 0 0.55 3.83 
No difference 2.73 1.09 0 0.55 0 7.65 12.02 
Other 0.55 0 0 0 0 0 0.55 
Don't know 1.09 0.55 0 0 0 0.55 2.19 
Total share for 
party 
62.84 21.86 0.55 0.55 0.55 13.66 100 
Cramér's V =   0.2719 ; χ2=  67.6221   p = 0.000, N=183 due to the fact that the remaining respondents 
could not decide among one particular opposition party. 
 
A key observation from this table is that a majority of respondents, 
approximately 48 percent, identified ―positions on social and economic issues‖ as the 
main distinction among Zambian parties, followed by the ―personality of party 
leaders,‖ and then ―no difference.‖  Overall, the PF was by far the opposition party 
believed to be most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka, obtaining this 
distinction from 63 percent of respondents.  The same merit was accorded to the 
UPND by only 22 percent of respondents.  Likewise, a majority of those who 
identified the PF as the most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka also 
claimed that social and economic issues distinguished parties, reflecting Sata‘s 
outspoken message on jobs and services.  Due to Sata‘s charisma, it is not particularly 
surprising that 23 percent of respondents who supported the PF identified the 
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personality of party leaders as the defining quality.  Indeed, this table suggests that by 
using a populist strategy that combined charisma with a message that exhibited 
congruence with the lives of the urban poor, the PF provided greater differentiation 
from its counterparts.  Furthermore, these results reinforce that parties such as 
Heritage, UNIP, and FDD, which were credible competitors in the 2001 elections, are 
no longer viable for the urban poor.   
Finally, respondents were asked what the term ―party manifesto‖ meant to 
them.  The aim of this question was to uncover whether the urban poor were aware of 
basic tools of political campaigning that are used by a party to express their policy 
messages. Of those who claimed they knew, common responses by the market 
workers were:  ―It's the plans of a particular party which they intend to do for the 
people,‖ ―Things that the party promises to do, such as building schools, lowering 
prices for basic needs,‖ and ―Programs on how a party will work, attract investors, 
manage the economic and living conditions of the people.‖ Otherwise, the individual 
admitted that s/he did not know.  Approximately 70 percent of those who were Sata 
supporters offered a definition of a party manifesto that closely corresponds with its 
actual meaning while 37 percent was the equivalent rate for Banda supporters.  Since 
the regression analyses revealed that education did not significantly influence party 
choice, these findings suggest that how parties campaign and target their messages 
may play an important role in helping people in young democracies recognize what 
constitutes a manifesto.  This indeed offers some support for Nelson‘s (1979) claim 
that sustained competition for the votes of the urban poor may ultimately educate the 
latter about their political options and help them to draw links between complex 
policies and their own long-term interests. 
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Dakar:  The Opposition that Fails to Resonate   
While Sata's populist strategy mobilized Lusaka's urban poor, Senegal's 
lackluster opposition parties convinced many of Dakar's lower-class residents to 
remain loyal to an under-performing incumbent.  The failure of the opposition to 
capitalize on the PDS‘ mistakes, to campaign on issues relevant to the urban poor, and 
even to enter many deprived neighborhoods during the campaign convinced poor 
Dakarois to stake their fortunes on the better-known incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade.  
This becomes clear by examining the opinions and voting rationale that motivated 
Dakar‘s urban poor in the 2007 presidential elections. At the same time, this section 
again tests the four alternative hypotheses regarding vote-buying, ethnic voting, 
macro-economic voting, and the importance of associational ties. 
 Unlike in Zambia, the raw census data from Senegal‘s 2002 Population and 
Housing Census was unavailable.  Instead, data from the 2001 Senegalese Household 
Survey (Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des Ménages-ESAM II) was used to provide a 
relative idea of how the small sample of marketeers compares to the broader 
population of informal sector workers in Dakar.  The ESAM-II relied on a multi-stage 
stratified random sampling procedure that included 6624 households and 64,679 
individuals.  The sampling was designed to allow for population estimates for regions 
and according to rural/urban distinctions.
245
  The right-hand column of Table 4.15 
therefore provides characteristics on those Senegalese citizens who are at least 18 
years-old, live in the urban region of Dakar, and classified themselves as 
independently employed or family help and working for an individual or a 
household.
246
  This is how the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy and Finance 
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 For more details on the ESAM-II survey, see the Central Survey Catalog at 
http://www.surveynetwork.org/home. 
246 Specifically, the calculations are based on the individual-level data for observations within the urban 
region of Dakar for those who 18 years and older and are actively working (acthb= 1), independently 
employ or family help (sitprofp=2 or sitprofp=5), and work for an individual or a household 
(sectactp=1). 
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defined members of the informal sector based on findings from the ESAM-II (see DPS 
2004:  40 &94).  
 
Table 4.15:  Overviews of Survey Respondents 
Variable  Sample Percentage  ESAM-II Percentage  
Gender 
       Female                                                      47.8 46 
       Male                                                         52.2 54 
Age 
       18-24 years 21 21 
       25-30 years 20 12.7 
       31-35 years 10.5 13.7 
       36-40 years 16 12.7 
       More than 40 years 32.5 40 
Language Group  
       Jola/Diola 0.5 4 
       Mandinka 2.5 4 
       Pulaar 14.9 18.7 
       Serer 9.0 10.9 
       Soninke 0.5 1.5 
       Wolof 70.7 54.9 
       Other  1.99 6.1 
Education  
      No schooling  43.5 57.1 
      Koranic/Language School 18 --- 
      Primary  23.5 26.7 
      Secondary  13 12.1 
      Post-secondary vocational 2 3.2 
Born in Dakar?  
      Yes 36.8 --- 
       No  63.2 --- 
Belong to Work Association (e.g.UNACOIS, etc.) ? 
     Yes                                                           15.4  --- 
     No 84.6 --- 
 
 As seen by comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.15, the overall background of the 
Senegalese survey sample reveals both key similarities and differences from the 
Zambian sample. First, a much higher share of Dakar‘s marketeers lack any type of 
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education, with about 44 percent of the sample never having attended school.
247
  Since 
a majority of the Senegalese population is Muslim, a share of the survey sample 
attended Koranic or language schools, which are informal modes of education.  
Students may begin Koranic school as young as the age of three, with the aim of 
learning to read and write Koranic verses by rote as well as to internalize the values of 
obedience, respect, and submission (André and Demonsnat 2009).  A majority of those 
who attended language schools did so to learn Arabic.  Since these informal schools 
teach a minimum degree of literacy but no numeracy, they offer less education than a 
formal primary school.  Students sometimes attend Koranic or language schools in 
parallel with their formal education.  If a respondent fell into this latter category, then 
his/her education was coded according to the formal education level.  If, however, s/he 
only attended Koranic or language school, then this was the type of education level 
assigned to the respondent.   Primary school typically includes students who range 
from around age 7 to 13 while secondary school includes those aged 14 to 18.   
Secondly, the marketplace tends to be concentrated among the young and those 
over 40 years of age, reflecting that the markets tend to be predominantly occupied by 
young men vending retail goods and older women selling foodstuffs.  Thirdly, the 
Dakar respondents have a slightly higher rate of participation in work associations 
than their counterparts in Lusaka.  A majority of those involved in work associations 
belonged to UNACOIS, an organization whose history and objectives were discussed 
in Chapter Three. Yet, as in Lusaka, most respondents claimed they were not involved 
in work associations but rather community-based, rotating micro-credit groups, known 
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 There are two possible explanations for the comparatively low levels of education in Senegal. André 
and Demonsat (2009) argue that the widespread availability of informal Koranic schooling deters 
parents from sending their children to more formal venues.  Another explanation was discussed in 
Chapter Three in reference to Scheld‘s (2002) claim that the success of the moodu-moodu deters parents 
from viewing Western education as the key to social mobility.  Yet, the Senegalese government has 
engaged in education reforms in recent years, waiving primary school fees in 2001 (ILAB 2006: 436) 
and expanding the supply of schools as well as providing free lunches in some establishments (World 
Bank 2006) .  As such, education outcomes may improve in the near future.   
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as tontines, or belonged to micro-finance organizations such as PAMECAS or Credit 
Mutuel.  
 Only about a third of the sample was born in Dakar.  Similar to Lusaka‘s 
marketeers, a majority of these migrants arrived in the city over ten years ago.  Table 
4.16 highlights that Diourbel, Kaolack, Kolda, and Thiès are the main regions of 
origin for these migrants.  Seventy-two percent of these migrants claimed that lack of 
employment in their home regions motivated their decision to come to Dakar.   
 
Table 4.16: Number of Migrants to Dakar by Region and Years of 
Residence  
Region 
where born  
Number of Years Ago Respondent Moved to Dakar 
One year 
or less  
Between 
 1 & 5 years   
Between  
5 & 10 years  
More than 10 
years   
Total from 
Region 
Casamance 0 1 1 2 4 
Diourbel  1 3 7 19 30 
Fatick 0 1 4 4 9 
Kaolack 1 5 5 15 26 
Kolda 1 1 0 1 3 
Louga 0 2 2 18 22 
Matam 2 3 0 2 7 
St. Louis 0 0 2 2 4 
Thiès 0 2 9 10 21 
Other
a
 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 5 18 31 73 127  
Notes: 
a ―Other‖ refers to those who were born outside of Senegal but have since become citizens. 
Another similarity between the two survey samples is the predominance of 
negative assessments of economic conditions at the time the survey was conducted.  
Ninety-three percent of respondents believed that the country‘s economic conditions 
had deteriorated in the year prior to the survey and, as in Zambia, more than half of all 
respondents blamed the government‘s policies for such changes rather than other 
potential factors.   
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Table 4.17:  Assessment of Economic Conditions over the previous 12 months 
(% of All Respondents) 
Factor 
responsible for 
this change in 
economic 
conditions  
How would you compare economic conditions in Senegal 
today to those of the same time last year?  
 
Better No change Worse Total 
Policies of the 
Senegalese 
government  
1.5 0 50.8  52.4 
Global economy  1 0 29.4 30.4 
Weather 1 0 2 3 
Other reason 1.5 0 2 3.5 
More than one 
of the above 
reasons 
0 0 6 6 
Don‘t know 0 0 3 3 
Not applicable  0 2 0 2 
Total  5 2 93 100 
            Cramér's V = 0.764; χ2= 234.796; p = 0.000; N=200  
 
The calculations indicate the survey sample of marketeers is relatively 
representative of Dakar‘s informal sector.  However, there was an oversampling of a 
particular ethno-linguistic group, the Wolof.  Even though the Wolof are the majority 
in both Dakar and in Senegal overall, they may have been over-sampled to the 
detriment of other ethno-linguistic groups.  Again, a language weight is used to 
compensate for this in the regressions presented later in this chapter.    
 
Voting Patterns 
Contrary to the protests of many opposition parties, who claimed that the 
election results must have been manipulated, the voting patterns of these respondents 
largely emphasize that the urban poor were indeed enthusiastic supporters of Wade.  
In fact, an overwhelming 78 percent of respondents claim to have turned up at the 
polls.  This even exceeds the 72 percent turnout rate for Dakar reported by the official 
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election data.  However, though the problem was not as severe as in Zambia, the 
young were less likely to vote.  Procedural issues again proved to be the most cited 
reason for abstaining from the polls with 36 percent of respondents claiming that they 
did not have the necessary documentation.  Importantly, while only 1.3 percent of 
respondents in Zambia noted that they were deterred by the lack of appealing 
candidates, the equivalent figure in Senegal is almost 14 percent. 
 
Table 4.18:  Voting Behavior in the 2007 Elections 
Did you vote in the presidential elections?  
Percentage of all 
respondents  
Yes 78.1 
No  21.9 
Primary reason for not voting  
 
Percentage of non-
voters  
No appealing candidates  13.6 
Lack of time 15.9 
Elections wouldn't be fair 0 
Favorite candidate wouldn't win 2.3 
No matter who wins, nothing will change  4.6 
Lacked identity piece, voter‘s card, or both  36.4 
Too young  9.1 
 Other
a
 18.2 
Party supported
b
 Percentage of those 
who voted
c
  
Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS)  79.9 
Rewmi  11.4 
Alliance des Forces des Progrès  (AFP)  4 
Parti Socialiste (PS)  2.7 
And-Jëf-Parti Africaine pour la Démocratie et la 
Socialisme (AJ-PADS) 0.7 
Front pour la Socialisme et la Démocratie (FSD) 0.7 
War Wi  0.7 
Ligue Démocratique Mouvement pour le Parti du 
Travail (LD-MPT)  0 
  Notes:   
a ―Other‖ usually referred to those who were sick or not interested in politics  
                        b
 Fifteen parties competed in the 2007 presidential elections.  For purposes of  
    saving space, only those major parties and those selected by respondents are  
    provided here.  
  
c  
Eight respondents claimed they voted but refused to admit who they supported. As  
                           
such, they are excluded from these calculations.  
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For those who did vote, almost 80 percent were PDS supporters, exceeding the 
55 percent who voted for Gorgui in Dakar as a whole (see Chapter Three).  This 
indicates that Wade was particularly popular amongst this low-income group, and his 
shares at the city level may have been dampened by the preference of more affluent 
Dakarois for opposition candidates.  Idrissa Seck‘s Rewmi was the second-most 
popular choice among the market workers, largely reflecting the broader order of party 
preferences in both Dakar and the rest of Senegal.  Other ―heavy contender‖ parties, 
such as the AFP and the PS, fared less well.  Parties belonging to the pôle de gauche, 
such as Landing Savané‘s AJ-PADS and Abdoulaye Bathily‘s LD-MPT, received 
negligible support, once again confirming that their leftist discourse holds little appeal 
for sub-altern groups.  These findings were largely mirrored in the slums where 21 out 
of 30 interviewees admitted voting and all but one of them supported Wade.
248
    
Surprisingly though, Figure 4.4 indicates that most people could not identify 
why exactly Wade had won in 2007, and this corresponds with elites‘ confusion over 
the PDS victory.  Twenty-six percent of respondents thought that the PDS‘ success at 
the national level could be attributed to its policy initiatives.  Specifically, many 
assumed that Wade‘s high-profile construction and road projects indicated a nascent 
commitment to improving living conditions for the broader populace. At the same 
time, however, only 12 percent of respondents believed that the election was not fair 
while only around six percent thought that vote-buying was responsible. Critically, 
Figure 4.4 also indicates that a higher share of survey participants in Dakar than in 
Lusaka believed that the lack of a competitive opposition contributed to incumbent 
victory.    
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 One resident in the slum of HLM-Montagne claimed to have voted for Louis Jacques Senghor of the 
Mouvement pour la Liberation du Peuple Sénégalais (MPLS).     
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Figure 4.4:  Primary Reason for PDS Victory in 2007
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  A more thorough investigation into respondents‘ personal motivations for 
supporting a particular candidate further confirms the degree to which the opposition 
failed to mobilize the urban poor.  A significant indication of this is that a majority 
preferred Wade because he promised a change (see Table 4.19).  This is unusual since, 
as an incumbent, Wade represented the least likely of all candidates to want to alter his 
own policies.  Apparently however, the incumbent who had done little for the urban 
poor represented a more credible agent of change than any of the opposition parties.  
Instead, most opposition parties obtained their votes because supporters simply 
recognized the name of a particular party from campaign materials.  Seck in particular 
was well-known given that his ouster from the PDS had been highly publicized in the 
media in the months preceding the elections.  In stark contrast to Lusaka where almost 
28 percent of Sata‘s supporters identified his party manifesto as their main reason for 
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 ―Other‖ often referred to respondents‘ claims that incumbents always win, people just like Wade, or 
that it had been the ―will of God.‖ 
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supporting him, almost no respondents in Dakar claimed to have picked an opposition 
candidate based on the candidate‘s platform.   
 
Table 4.19: Primary Reason for Supporting Candidate in 2007 Elections  
Primary Reason 
for Supporting a 
Candidate 
Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)  Total  
(% of 
All 
Voters)   
Abdoulaye 
Wade 
(PDS) 
Idrissa 
Seck  
(Rewmi) 
Ousmane 
Tanor 
Dieng 
(PS) 
Moustapha 
Niasse 
(AFP) 
Other 
Party 
Candidate‘s 
platform  
3.4 0.7 0 0.7 0 4.7 
Recognized 
candidate‘s name  
16.1 4 0.7 1.3 0.7 22.8 
Personal change in 
living conditions  
4 0 0.7 0 0 4.7 
Candidate 
promised a change 
46.3 3.4 0 1.3 0.7 51.7 
Candidate's 
experience 
0.7 0 0 0 0 0.7 
Candidate's 
personality 
0 1.3 0.7 0.7 0 2.7 
Candidate's 
ethnicity/region of 
origin  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Influenced by 
family 
member/friend 
5.4 0 0.7 0 0.7 6.7 
Other reason  4 2 0 0 0 6 
Total candidate 
share 
79.9 11.4 2.7 4 2 100 
Cramér‘s V:   0.279;  χ2= 46.218, p=0.017;  N=149 voters because 6 people who voted refused to admit 
the candidate he/she supported.  
 A selection of more detailed views from opposition supporters in the survey 
further reveals the rationale driving their voting decisions.  Seck supporters elaborated 
that the Rewmi leader ―did not talk too much‖ and ―seemed competent‖ while a third 
supporter claimed that he just wanted a change in regime.  A male store vendor in 
Grand Yoff market noted that he supported Ousmane Tanor Dieng because he was 
―serious‖ while a women selling in the streets of Guele Tapée claimed that her life was 
better under the PS.  The lone Landing Savané supporter admitted that she voted for 
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him because that was what her husband had done, not because of his leftist orientation.  
In general then, opposition supporters attributed their voting behavior to candidates‘ 
personal characteristics or other idiosyncratic factors rather than candidates‘ positions 
on policy issues.   
  
Table 4.20:  Support for Candidate in 2007 Presidential Elections by 
Primary Language Group 
Primary 
Language 
Group   
Candidate Supported, (% of those in Language 
Group)  
Total % of 
those in 
Language 
Group  
(Frequency)  
Abdoulaye 
Wade 
(PDS) 
Idrissa 
Seck  
(Rewmi) 
Ousmane 
Tanor 
Dieng 
(PS) 
Moustapha 
Niasse 
(AFP) 
Other 
Party  
 Jola/Diola 100 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
(1) 
 Mandinka 100 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
(4) 
 Pulaar 76.2 
 
9.5 
 
9.5 
 
4.8 
 
0 
 
100 
(21) 
 Serer 81.8 
 
9.1 
 
9.1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
(11) 
 Soninke 0 
 
100 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
(1) 
 Wolof 80.6 
 
11.1 
 
0.9 
 
4.6 
 
2.8 
 
100 
(108) 
 Other  66.7 
 
33.3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
(3) 
Total 
candidate 
share 
79.9 11.4 2.7 4 2 100 
     Cramér‘s V:   0.178;  χ2= 18.900, p=0.757; N= 149 voters   
 
Similar to Zambia, no respondent indicated that a candidate‘s ethnicity or 
region of origin influenced his/her voting decision.  Table 4.20 lends even greater 
credibility to the low salience of ethnicity than it did in Zambia.  For instance, Wade 
received support across all language groups, including the Serer, which is Dieng‘s 
primary ethno-linguistic group.  At the same time, the Wolof supported other 
candidates besides Wade.  Moreover, the bivariate relationship between primary 
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ethno-linguistic group and the candidate supported is not significant at conventional 
levels.
250
  The degree of ethnic voting, or the lack thereof, distinguishes Senegal from 
Zambia. 
 
Further Assessment of Opposition Alternatives 
The opposition clearly did not attract many supporters, and those it did were 
not particularly interested in the opposition‘s policy positions.  The low appeal of the 
opposition stems from a lack of differentiation among parties as well as the minimal 
degree of congruence between party platforms and the priorities of the urban poor.  
Indeed, Table 4.21 examines whether respondents, including both voters and non-
voters, felt that any opposition parties were interested in improving living conditions 
in Dakar and what they believed constituted the main mode of differentiation among 
existing opposition parties.  Approximately 53 percent of respondents claimed that 
they perceived no difference among parties while around 33 stated that the personality 
of party leaders represented the main mode of distinction.  Only two percent of 
respondents claimed that positions on social and economic issues distinguished 
parties.  This presents a stark contrast with those surveyed in Lusaka where most 
claimed that positions on social and economic issues represented the key axis of 
differentiation.   
Moreover, almost 66 percent of respondents believed that no party was 
genuinely interested in improving living conditions within Dakar.  Again, this is a 
dramatic difference from Lusaka where only about 14 percent of those surveyed stated 
that no party was interested in addressing that city‘s problems.  Of those who did 
identify a party, Rewmi stood out the most while neither of the other ―heavy 
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 Religious identities are also important in Senegal, and Chapter Five will explore in more detail the 
dynamics between different Muslim brotherhoods and support for particular candidates.   
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contenders‖ nor the leftist LD-MPT was perceived as especially dedicated to 
improving conditions for Dakarois.  As indicated by the chi-2, the bivariate 
relationship between perspectives of opposition parties and their main mode of 
differentiation is significant at less than one percent.   
Table 4.21: Assessment of Opposition Parties 
Main 
distinction 
amongst 
parties in 
Senegal  
Opposition Parties interested in Improving Living 
Conditions in Dakar  (% of All Respondents) 
Total 
(% of All 
Respondents) Rewmi PS AFP LD-
MPT 
Other 
Party 
None 
Personality of 
party leaders 
12.1 1.5 3.5 0.5 5.1 10.1 32.8 
Positions on 
social and 
economic 
issues 
1 0 0 0 0 0.5 1.5 
Parties' links 
with a region of 
Senegal  
1.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 2 
No difference 2 1 0.5 0 1.5 48 53 
Other 1.5 1 0 0 0 1.5 4 
Don't know 1.5 0 0 0 0 5.1 6.6 
Total share  19.7 3.5 4 0.5 6.6 65.7 100 
Cramér's V = 0.311   ; χ2= 95.598; p = 0.000; N=198 due to the exclusion of two respondents who 
couldn‘t identify just one party as interested in improving living conditions in Dakar.  
 
 The detailed comments of the marketeers further illustrate their 
disillusionment.  In Kermel, a male artisan over 40 years of age emphatically stated, 
―They [party leaders] are all liars.‖  A female vendor in her late thirties at Guele Tapée 
sighed that ―It‘s always the same thing‖ with the politicians in her country.  Slum 
dwellers in Dakar echoed similar sentiments.  When asked whether any opposition 
parties appealed to them, 21 out of the 30 could not identify any particular opposition 
party.  A 25 year-old, Serer-speaking laundress in HLM-Montagne captured the 
prevailing attitude by responding, ―None.  They are all the same.‖   
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Regression Analysis of Voting Behavior  
 In order to both test alternative hypotheses on voting behavior and to 
emphasize the absence of populist strategies by Senegal‘s opposition parties, a series 
of binomial logit regressions were again conducted on the survey responses collected 
in the markets of Dakar.  To ensure as much comparability with the Lusaka analysis, 
these regression models also aimed to test the respective influence of demographic and 
schooling variables, campaign conduct, and socioeconomic conditions.  Since many 
more voters supported the incumbent than the opposition, the dependent variable 
measured the probability of supporting Abdoulaye Wade.   
 The demographic and education model is again intended to test the influence 
of ethno-linguistic background on the choice of candidate, taking into account 
additional control variables such as gender of respondent, education level, and age.  
Specifically, this model is specified as the following:   
 
(1) Pr (Wade =1| x) = 
F(β0 +βfemi + βyoungi + βmediumi + βkori+ βlangi + βprimaryi+ βsecondaryabovei 
+βwolof i +βpulaari) 
As in Zambia, the age categories were collapsed into three groups, 18-30 year-olds, 
31-40 year-olds, and above 40 years-old.  Again, young= 1 if respondent i belonged to 
the 18-30 group and medium=1 if s/he belonged to the 31-40 category.  Those who are 
older than 40 years-old constituted the excluded category.  Regarding education, the 
model examines the various levels of schooling that a respondent pursued, ranging 
from only Koranic or language schooling to secondary and post-secondary training.
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Those without any type of schooling constitute the excluded category.  To assess the 
effects of ethno-linguistic background, dummy variables are included to capture 
whether a respondent‘s first language was Wolof or Pulaar, which are two most 
widely-spoken languages.   
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 Since only four respondents attended post-secondary school, they were combined with those 
respondents who attended secondary school.  
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Table 4.22:  Binomial Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for  
Abdoulaye Wade 
Independent 
variables  
Demographic 
& Education  
 
 
(1) 
Campaign 
Conduct  
 
 
(2) 
SocioeconomicC
onditions & 
Associational   
     Activities 
(3) 
Full Model 
 
 
(4) 
Weighted 
Full Model  
 
(5)  
Female  0.643 
(0.492) 
--- --- --- --- 
Age:  
18-30 years
a
 
0.928  
(0.609) 
--- --- --- --- 
Age:  
31-40 years 
0.528 
(0.589)  
--- --- --- ---- 
Koranic  
education 
b
 
      -2.254 *** 
(0.816)  
--- ---  -2.847 *** 
 (0.831) 
 -3.351 *** 
  (0.882)   
Language 
education 
 -1.500* 
(0.772) 
--- ---  -1.585 ** 
 (0.751) 
-1.597 ** 
   (0.740)  
Primary  
education  
-1.263* 
(0.656) 
--- ---  -1.356** 
 (0.594) 
  -1.721 *** 
  (0.637)  
Secondary & 
above education 
  -1.448 ** 
(0.673)  
--- --- -1.441** 
 (0.646) 
  -1.806*** 
  (0.681)  
Wolof language 
group 
       -0.111  
(0.663) 
--- --- --- --- 
Pulaar language 
group 
       -0.191  
(0.817)  
--- --- --- --- 
Handouts by  
PDS 
--- -0.255 
 (0.503) 
--- --- --- 
Handouts by 
opposition 
--- -0.178 
 (0.480) 
--- --- --- 
Household access 
to water 
--- ---         -1.041  
(1.073) 
 
--- 
---- 
Spend 3000 CFA 
or less per day
c 
 
--- --- 0.881* 
(0.512) 
  1.311 ** 
   (0.522) 
  1.756*** 
  (0.541)  
Spend between 
3000 and 5000 
CFA per day  
--- --- 0.116 
(0.501) 
--- ---- 
Belong to a work 
association 
--- --- -0.001 
(0.574) 
--- ---- 
Constant       1.681 ** 
(0.757) 
     1.612*** 
(0.353) 
 1.999* 
(1.094) 
  1.913 ***  
   (0.409)  
  1.953*** 
  (0.424) 
Number of 
observations 
148 148 148 148      148 
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.006 0.033 0.133 0.180 
Prob >chi2 0.063  0.664  0.289  0.001 0.000 
Significance levels:  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   
Notes:    
a
Those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the 
age dummy variables.   
   b
 The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had no 
schooling at all. 
c 
The reference category excluded for the spending levels included those who spend above 
5000  CFA a day.  
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 As seen in column 1 of Table 4.22, age did not prove a significant predictor of 
support for President Wade, nor did the respondent‘s gender.  In contrast to Zambia, 
ethno-linguistic affiliation also was not a statistically significant predictor of support 
for Wade.  Those whose primary ethno-linguistic group is Wolof were not more likely 
to support Wade than those of any other ethno-linguistic background, confirming the 
analysis in Table 4.20 above.
252
   
Instead, however, education appears extremely important for determining a 
respondent‘s voting decisions.  Those with just even a little bit of schooling, such as 
Koranic or language training, were significantly less likely to support Wade than those 
with no schooling at all.  The same pattern prevails for those with some formal 
primary, secondary, or post-secondary education.   
The second model on campaign conduct is intended to test the impact of vote-
buying on survey respondents‘ choice of presidential candidate.  The campaign 
conduct model is specified as:  
 
(2) Pr (Wade =1| x) = F(β0 +βpdshandoutsi + βopphandoutsi )  
 
Table 4.23 highlights that as in Zambia, the incumbent party in Senegal was reported 
by respondents to have distributed more handouts prior to elections than the 
opposition parties.  Nevertheless, the campaign conduct model in Column 2 of Table 
4.22 demonstrates that vote-buying through the distribution of money and/or gifts 
during campaign rallies in a respondent‘s neighborhood does not influence a 
respondent‘s decision to support the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, at a statistically 
significant level.  
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 This holds true even when the same model is run with language weights to account for the over-
sampling of Wolof speakers.  
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Table 4.23:  Handouts (Gifts and/or Money) by Senegalese Political Parties 
before 2007 Elections 
Party  Yes No/Don’t Know 
Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency 
PDS handouts? 59.2% 93 40.8% 64 
Opposition (Rewmi, AFP, 
PS, LD-MPT, And-Jëf) 
handouts? 
43.3% 68        56.7% 89 
Notes:  These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2007 elections rather than for the 
entire sample.  For the entire sample, 54% claimed the PDS offered handouts and 42% claimed the 
opposition parties did so.  
   Notably though, far fewer respondents in Dakar than in Lusaka claimed that 
they even received visits from any political party.  For instance, 65 percent of 
respondents noted that the PDS came to their neighborhood in the run-up to the 2007 
elections while only about 50 percent stated that the PS, AFP, or Rewmi arrived and 
only about 44 percent that any of the leftist parties campaigned.  By contrast, the 
MMD was identified by 94 percent of Lusaka‘s marketeers as campaigning in their 
respective neighborhoods while the equivalent figure for the PF was 89 percent.  This 
indicates that the Zambian opposition was much more active than its Senegalese 
counterparts in visiting the neighborhoods of the urban poor, even though vote-buying 
practices did not prove significant there either.  
 The model presented in column 3 aims to test hypotheses regarding economic 
voting, associational ties, and the importance of service delivery.  However, this 
model deviates from the analysis conducted in Zambia in three key respects.  First, 
whether a respondent‘s household possesses electricity could not be included as an 
independent variable because all of those who did have this service voted for Wade.  
Due to a lack of variation on the dependent variable, the regression model therefore 
could not derive estimates for the impact of this independent variable.
253
  Secondly, 
since more respondents admitted to belonging to a work association in Senegal than in 
Zambia, there were adequate observations to include this variable into the model to 
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 According to Long and Freese (2006), maximum likelihood estimation is not possible when a 
dependent variable does not vary within one of the categories of an independent variable. 
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allow for a more thorough investigation of whether associational membership affects 
voting behavior.  Thirdly, respondents‘ opinions on the PDS‘ performance regarding 
service delivery and jobs could not be used as predictors.  In both countries, 
respondents were asked to assess such performance in the twelve months prior to the 
day the survey was conducted.  Due to the timing of the survey, such questions 
captured opinions more than a year after the Senegalese elections, meaning that they 
could not be considered ex-ante influences on voting decisions.
254
   
As such, model 3 incorporates a variable on a respondent‘s daily spending as a 
proxy for socioeconomic status.  Data was gathered on spending rather than earnings 
because the latter proved a particularly sensitive issue, especially since respondents‘ 
friends and colleagues in the market place were within listening distance.  Three 
spending categories were derived:  those who spend 3000 CFA or less, those who 
spend between 3000 and 5000 CFA, and those who spend more than 5000 CFA.  
Based on an exchange rate of 500 CFA per one US dollar, 3000 CFA per day may 
appear relatively high at first.  Yet, when one considers that 88 percent of survey 
respondents live with more than six people, most of whom are children, it quickly 
becomes apparent that 3000 CFA a day, or six dollars, is not much money at all when 
spread out across an entire household.
255
 Appromixately 41 percent of those who 
voted in the 2007 elections fell within this lower spending category.
256
  
With these details in mind, the third model is specified as:  
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 This was not a problem in Zambia since the survey there was conducted only two months after the 
elections.  Table A7.4 in Appendix Seven presents the regression results when these subjective 
performance indicators are included and reveals that none of them are statistically significant predictors 
of whether a respondent voted for Wade for Senegalese president. 
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 We can have greater confidence in these findings since a series of studies on poverty in Dakar by the 
Agence du Fonds de Développement Social (2004) found that in some of the city‘s poorest 
neighborhoods, such as the arrondissement of Yeumbeul Sud in Pikine, household heads spend on 
average 2625 CFA a day.   
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 Approximately 28 percent of those who voted spent between 3000-5000 CFA per day and 14 percent 
of those who voted spend more than 5000 CFA per day. The remaining respondents could not quantify 
how much they spent on a daily basis.   
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(3) Pr (Wade =1| x) = F(β0 +βwateri + βspendlowi + βspendmedi + βwrkassoci ) 
The variable water=1 if the respondent had a water tap within his/her household.  The 
variable spendlow=1 if respondent i spends 3000 CFA or less a day and spendmed=1 
if s/he expends between 3000 and 5000 CFA a day.  Those who spent more than 5000 
CFA per day represented the excluded category.  If a respondent belonged to a work 
association, then wrkassoc=1.  
 The findings from this third model reveal that work associations are not a 
useful predictor of support for Wade.  This again casts doubt on the hypothesis that 
associational participation may shape voting decisions and largely reinforces the 
claims of the UNACOIS Secretary General, Mame Bou Diop, that his own 
organization is apolitical.
257
 In the same manner, whether a respondent‘s household 
possessed water is not a significant predictor, even though the dearth of water is a 
major problem in many low-income neighborhoods of Dakar.  For instance, only two 
of the thirty slum residents reported having access to water within their homes.  More 
than half stated that the main improvement they wanted for their neighborhood was 
robinets, or water taps. This indeed highlights that despite the desire for significant 
improvements in the realm of service delivery, the opposition was not able to 
capitalize on these issues for electoral gain in the same manner that the PF did in 
Zambia.  Moreover, those who spent 3000 CFA a day or less were actually 
significantly more likely to support Wade than those with greater spending capacity.  
Thus, with existing opposition parties failing to espouse policy messages targeted at 
the priorities of the urban poor, those with the lowest spending abilities decided that 
Wade was their best alternative.   
The full model aims to preserve degrees of freedom by incorporating into the 
socioeconomic model all those independent variables that were significant in each 
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 Personal interview with Mame Bou Diop, Dakar, Senegal, on September 17, 2008. 
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prior model.  A likelihood ratio test revealed that excluding from this full model those 
non-significant variables from the previous models would not compromise the 
results.
258
  While the fit of this full model is much better than in any previous model, 
both the direction of the coefficients and the statistical significance remains unchanged 
on the education and spending variables.
259
  Table A7.5 in Appendix Seven also 
reveals that multi-collinearity amongst the independent variables in this full model 
was not problematic.  
The final model tests for robustness by including language weights calculated 
from the ESAM-II to account for the over-sampling of those whose primary language 
was Wolof.  Even though ethno-linguistic affiliation was not a significant variable, 
reducing the weight of those responses from Wolof-language participants and 
increasing those of other language groups reduces any potential bias that this sampling 
error may exert on the other variables.
260
  As seen in column 5, introducing the 
language weights also does not alter the results from the full model while nonetheless 
providing an even better model fit.     
Predicted probabilities again can facilitate interpretation of the coefficients 
from the logit regressions.  For example, Table 4.24 focuses on one of the education 
levels in combination with the low spending level.  A respondent with a secondary or 
post-secondary education who spends more than 3000 CFA per day is only 35 percent 
likely to have voted for Wade in the 2007 presidential elections.  By contrast, someone 
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 In particular, the likelihood ratio test which excluded from the full model gender, age, ethno-
linguistic background, water, medium spending level, and whether a respondent belonged to a work 
association resulted in a probability > chi2 =0.536. Previous iterations revealed that incorporating the 
campaign conduct variables into the full model did not alter their substantive or statistical significance, 
although this did cause a reduction in the degrees of freedom.  
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 The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was p= 0.388, meaning that the number of those who actually voted for 
Wade was not statistically different from those predicted by this model.    
260
In order to derive the language weights, the population share of a language grouping indicated by the 
ESAM-II was divided by the sample share provided in Table 4.15 of this Chapter.   
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with a lower education level who spends 3000 CFA per day or less is 95 percent likely 
to have voted for Gorgui in 2007.   
 
Table 4.24:  Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Wade in 2007 
Selected Variables  Spending Level  
High  
(Above 3000 CFA/day)   
Low  
(Below 3000 CFA/day)  
Below secondary education 0.77 0.95 
Secondary education and above 0.35 0.76 
 
The Importance of Educational Background for Voting Behavior  
 The predicted probabilities and regression results emphasize the importance of 
education in shaping voting behavior among Dakar‘s urban poor. Notwithstanding 
qualms about potential disparities in education quality, those who had some schooling 
generally were less likely to support Wade and more likely to support the opposition 
than those with no schooling.  This echoes survey findings by Vengroff and Mangala 
(2001: 18) who examined voting behavior in the 2000 elections and discovered that 
those Senegalese with higher education demonstrated a greater propensity to support 
the opposition.   
The importance of education in Senegal, but not Zambia, is potentially due to 
two key factors.  First, many more survey respondents in Senegal had no schooling 
compared with their counterparts in Zambia and this is especially true for older 
respondents.  Even based on the population shares from the 2000 Zambian Census and 
the ESAM-II, 13 percent of informal sector workers in Lusaka had no schooling 
compared with 57 percent in Dakar.  Secondly, as the discussion in Chapter Three 
illustrated, the Senegalese opposition de salon is perceived as elitist and 
intellectualistic.  This means that without actively campaigning in low-income 
neighborhoods and the workplaces of the urban poor, the activities of the opposition 
will remain largely unknown by, or unattractive to,  this group.  Indeed, when slum 
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dwellers were asked which newspaper they consulted and how many times a week 
they read it, all but three claimed that they could not read.  As such, the better-
educated will be more exposed to the policy ideas or incendiary statements of the 
opposition in the printed press, which has more outlets for independent expression in 
Senegal than television or radio.  In addition, better-educated citizens may be less 
inclined to believe Wade‘s promises to change after having witnessed his inability to 
deliver on his initial populist claims during his first seven years in office.    
 
Table 4.25:  Awareness of the Assises Nationales by Education Level 
Level of Education  Do you know what the Assises 
Nationales is? (% of Education Level) 
Yes No 
No schooling 7.7 92.3 
Koranic/Language 22.6 77.4 
Primary  27.3 72.7 
Secondary  43.5 56.5 
Post-secondary 100 0 
Total  21.2 78.8 
 Cramér's V = 0.392   ; χ2= 27.482; p = 0.000; N=179  
Education once again proved significant when analyzing whether survey 
respondents were aware of the Assises Nationales which, as noted in Chapter Three, 
represents the opposition‘s grand project for addressing the challenges facing the 
country and for critiquing Wade‘s governance.  From Table 4.25 above, it is clear that 
a majority of respondents did not even know that such a vast opposition initiative was 
taking place.  Moreover, there is a significant relationship between level of education 
and awareness of the Assises Nationales, with only 7 percent of those without 
schooling knowing about this initiative compared with almost 44 percent of those with 
some secondary schooling. Likewise, in the slums, only two people knew about the 
Assises Nationales, and they were the two with the highest levels of education, one 
with a Master's degree and the other with five years of secondary education.  Both 
were the only slum residents who read the newspaper, choosing the independent 
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L'Observateur as their preferred source.  In general, this highlights that the opposition 
either is not properly marketing its activities or that its activities are not viewed by the 
urban poor as the most effective means for improving their immediate living and 
working conditions.   
 
Conclusions  
By probing the views of market workers and residents of slum and squatter 
settlements, this chapter provided an assessment of voting motivations among the 
urban poor of Dakar and Lusaka during each country‘s most recent presidential 
elections. The chapter aimed to accomplish two objectives.  First, the four hypotheses 
introduced in Chapter Two regarding the voting behavior of the urban poor were 
tested.  Vote-buying in the form of money and/or gifts during the election period was 
not found to be a major explanation for disparate voting patterns in either Lusaka or 
Dakar. When asked directly, the urban poor of neither Lusaka nor Dakar believed that 
handouts accounted for the incumbent party‘s overall national victory (see Figures 4.3 
and 4.4). In addition, the logit results demonstrated that whether the incumbent or 
opposition offered handouts to survey respondents did not significantly affect which 
candidate they supported.  This is not to say that parties did not try to engage in vote-
buying; in fact, as shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.23, political parties did distribute gifts 
and/or money in respondents‘ neighborhoods.  Rather, it demonstrates that such 
practices on their own do not shape the voting decisions of the urban poor because if 
almost every party is engaging in this practice, then parties need some additional 
means of distinguishing themselves to the urban poor.  Moreover, in these cities, 
opposition parties in particular have few resources to monitor voting behavior and 
therefore cannot punish voters if they accept handouts but then vote or abstain 
according to their conscience.  This echoes Young‘s (2009a) findings from Kenya and 
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Zambia that African voters who are offered gifts by politicians are not necessarily 
likely to support these politicians at the ballot box.  
 Likewise, the influence of associational ties on voting behavior was not 
confirmed. Very few marketeers actually belonged to work associations, confirming 
that the urban poor, particularly workers in the informal sector, remain unorganized.  
Moreover, in the Senegalese case, where about 15 percent of respondents belonged to 
work associations, the logit analysis demonstrated that this was not a statistically 
significant determinant of support for a presidential candidate.  Associational life is by 
no means absent, especially since many are involved in credit associations.  Yet, 
contrary to the role played by formal trade unions in African history, involvement in 
work associations for marketeers and street vendors appears devoid of any serious 
political implications.  
The existing evidence also questions the impact on support for the opposition 
caused by voters‘ retrospective sociotropic and egotropic perspectives of the economy 
in the past year. This chapter illustrated that from a subjective perspective, both 
Zambians and Senegalese possessed negative sociotropic views of their country‘s 
recent economic conditions.  Nevertheless, the regression analysis for Zambia 
demonstrated that neither negative sociotropic nor egotropic views ultimately 
determined support for Sata.  For those in Senegal, those with lower incomes, as 
measured by spending ability, were actually less likely to vote for an opposition party 
and more likely to support Wade.    
While the other three hypotheses on voting behavior were not supported in the 
results here, the ethnic voting hypothesis did demonstrate some traction. When asked 
directly, respondents in both countries overwhelmingly rejected that a candidate‘s 
ethnic background or region of origin influenced their voting decisions. However, the 
statistical analyses revealed that while ethno-linguistic affiliation proved insignificant 
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in explaining the voting behavior of Dakar‘s urban poor, it was correlated at a 
statistically significant level with higher shares of votes for Sata among Lusaka‘s 
urban poor.  At the same time though, Nyanja-speakers were not significantly less 
likely to vote for Sata, and he attracted support from other ethno-linguistic groups as 
well.  Even after controlling for ethno-linguistic background as well as other 
demographic variables, the importance of services and jobs remained statistically and 
substantively important determinants of a respondent‘s decision to support Sata.   As 
such, voters may be attracted to a candidate for a number of reasons, including that 
s/he is a co-ethnic, but this does not necessarily mean that non-co-ethnics will avoid 
voting for the same candidate.   
The chapter‘s second objective was to uncover some key relationships between 
the type of party strategy and the share of votes a candidate received.  An opposition 
party that employs a populist strategy, such as the PF, appeals most to the urban poor 
by offering both greater congruence and greater differentiation than alternative party 
linkage approaches.  In Lusaka, Sata was the overwhelming favorite among market 
workers, a majority of whom pointed to policy promises on jobs and services as their 
primary motivation for supporting him. In addition, the PF was pinpointed by both 
voters and non-voters as the main opposition party interested in improving living 
conditions in Lusaka, and most PF supporters identified positions on social and 
economic issues as the main distinction among Zambia‘s political parties.  As noted 
earlier, the logit analyses also highlighted that many of the issues Sata emphasized in 
his campaign were significantly associated with his electoral success within Lusaka. 
Specifically, those who were most disillusioned with the MMD‘s performance with 
respect to job creation and ameliorating conditions for the poor, as well as those 
without access to water, were most likely to vote for Sata.  Therefore, by providing a 
message targeted at the urban poor, which was focused on ameliorating inequalities 
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through the creation of jobs and the improvement of basic services, Sata offered 
greater congruence with the policy priorities of this constituency.  This in turn helped 
distinguish him from his other opposition competitors, specifically the UPND and 
Heritage Party, which eschewed the populist strategy in favor of alternative linkage 
approaches.  
The appeal of an opposition party relying on a populist strategy becomes even 
more apparent when compared with perceptions of the Senegalese party scene.  In 
Dakar, the urban poor directly claimed that they voted for Wade not because they 
approved of his past performance in office but more because he promised to change 
his policies.  By relying on either personalistic or programmatic linkages, the 
opposition was unable to capitalize on disillusionment with Wade‘s first seven years 
in office.  Programmatic, leftist parties were the least successful in obtaining any votes 
while those who supported Rewmi, AFP, or PS predominantly did so because of the 
party leader‘s personality. Compared with Zambia, more of the Senegalese 
respondents believed that the incumbent‘s victory could be attributed to the lack of a 
competitive opposition. This was further confirmed by more than half of respondents 
claiming that they could discern little difference among the existing opposition parties 
and almost two-thirds stating that none of the parties was interested in improving 
conditions for Dakarois.  With less than 50 percent of respondents claiming that an 
opposition party even visited his/her neighborhood during the 2007 campaign, these 
parties clearly demonstrated that the urban poor were not their key constituency base 
in the same way that they were for Zambia‘s PF.  Furthermore, widespread ignorance 
among the urban poor of the opposition‘s main forum for critiquing Abdoulaye Wade, 
the Assises Nationales, proved that this initiative was largely divorced from the 
realities of the everyday lives of most Senegalese, and this is especially true for those 
who are the least educated.  
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Beyond illustrating the mechanisms of congruence and differentiation via 
which a populist strategy can win over the urban poor, one of the major contributions 
of this chapter is the introduction of a novel set of primary data.  Surveys on informal 
sector workers in developing countries frequently focus on their economic activities 
and organizational structure (see Maloney 2004) rather than their political views and 
voting behavior.  Moreover, a comparative survey of informal sector workers across 
countries is especially rare in the African context.  Recent work on class voting, such 
as Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010), has tended to rely on disaggregating election data 
by neighborhood.  While useful for gaining a perspective on voting trends, such a 
technique on its own fails to uncover why certain socioeconomic groups favor one 
particular candidate over another.  Public opinion data from Afrobarometer can shed 
more light on these motivational issues, but this database does not focus exclusively 
on the urban poor and thus far has not included questions about actual voting decisions 
but rather prospective ones. 
Through statistical analyses of this novel dataset, a populist strategy was 
revealed as the superior approach for opposition parties to attract the votes of the 
urban poor.  Why then do not more parties in African electoral democracies employ it?  
The next chapter examines this question in greater detail.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Electoral Coalition Building in Urbanized Democracies 
 
Introduction 
 This study thus far has shown that Africa‘s urban poor are most likely to 
support an opposition party when they are mobilized by a populist strategy rather than 
personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone.   The previous chapter 
illustrated that a populist strategy attracts the urban poor by providing greater 
differentiation and greater congruence than alternative party options. Yet, if a populist 
strategy represents an optimal approach for attracting the support of the urban poor, 
then presumably more African political parties would adopt it.  This chapter therefore 
probes two questions that emerge from the previous chapters‘ comparison of party 
strategies and voter responses in Senegal and Zambia. First, why do opposition parties 
in some African countries choose a populist strategy while those in other countries 
decide otherwise?  Secondly, why does one opposition party choose a populist strategy 
while its competitors within the same country do not?   
 In addressing these two questions, the study only focuses on an opposition 
party competing in national elections for president rather than for a local office or for a 
position as MP in a specific constituency.  Indeed, as noted in Chapter One, politicians 
who are interested in a sub-national or legislative office face different constraints and 
opportunities for party strategizing than those competing to win a national presidential 
election. Moreover, the study assumes that a politician actually is interested in 
winning the election rather than simply participating solely to gain legitimacy as a 
representative for certain interest groups or to gain leverage in negotiating for future 
political appointments.
261
  This latter assumption is increasingly realistic since, as in 
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 Some have argued that this type of rationale does often explain why parties participate in elections.  
For instance, van de Walle (2003:  314) observes that ―[African] parties gain respect and power within 
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Senegal and Zambia, many African countries now require candidates to pay large fees 
to enter presidential contests, therefore limiting participation in electoral races to only 
those who are seriously interested in winning office.   
With these qualifications in mind, this chapter argues that not all parties can 
employ a populist strategy to win national presidential elections. Even though such a 
strategy is advantageous for mobilizing the urban poor, it can impose at least two 
costs.  First, it will not help a party win a national election if only a small share of the 
national population lives in urban areas.  As such, a country needs to have a 
sufficiently large urbanized population in order for a presidential candidate to even 
have an incentive to mobilize the urban poor and for a populist message to resonate. In 
countries that remain predominantly rural, politicians may decide that targeting the 
urban poor offers little reward at the ballot box.  Secondly, the policy appeals inherent 
in a populist strategy that is oriented towards the urban poor can alienate other voters, 
such as rural dwellers, whose support is still necessary to obtain national electoral 
majorities in most African countries. Thus, an opposition party will not choose to 
employ a populist strategy with the urban poor if no other options are available by 
which to appeal to rural voters. However, a populist strategy becomes more feasible if 
a share of rural dwellers can be mobilized through clientelistic linkages based on 
appeals to a salient identity cleavage, such as ethnicity, religion, language, or race. 
Given their resource limits, opposition parties ideally would target only enough rural 
voters who, in tandem with the urban poor, would help them win national office 
without requiring extensive campaigning in remote rural areas.   
In such circumstances, a party can forge a minimum winning coalition that 
consists of ―metropolitan‖ elements centered on the urban poor and ―peripheral‖ 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the party system when they can make a credible claim to represent a certain ethnic, regional or 
linguistic segment of the population.‖  However, as noted, parties and their leaders who possess these 
type of motivations alone are not the focus of the present study.   
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constituents represented by a certain segment of rural dwellers.  This framework of 
―metropolitan‖ and ―peripheral‖ coalition members originally was conceptualized by 
Gibson (1997) in his comparative scholarship on Mexico and Argentina.  He argued 
that the ruling parties in both countries were able to implement policy reforms during 
the 1990s that primarily benefited urban constituents, who represented the 
―metropolitan‖ component, but still retained national office by engaging in clientelist 
practices with rural voters, or the ―peripheral‖ component.   
 In the present study, the opposition PF in Zambia was able to orient its populist 
strategy around the policy priorities of the urban poor while mobilizing a certain level 
of rural support to win national office.  Since the potentially salient identity cleavage 
in Zambia is ethno-linguistic group, the PF‘s Michael Sata combined his populist 
strategy towards the urban poor with clientelistic linkages with his co-ethnic Bembas 
in the rural provinces of Northern and Luapula.  Yet, a similar strategy remained 
unavailable for his main opposition competitor, Hakainde Hichilema, who belongs to 
the numerically inferior Tonga ethno-linguistic group.  In Senegal, the potentially 
salient identity cleavage is Sufi brotherhood.   With Abdoulaye Wade co-opting 
leaders of the Mouride brotherhood and one sect of the Tidiane brotherhood, 
opposition parties lacked the ability to use religious appeals for significant rural votes.  
As a consequence, the AFP, PS, and Rewmi were forced to rely on personalistic 
linkages with the urban poor so as to avoid losing any potential supporters in the rural 
areas. Smaller parties reliant on programmatic linkages, such as the LD-MPT, 
primarily concentrated their campaigns in Dakar and therefore forfeited the chance to 
obtain rural votes.  
 The rest of the chapter further elaborates on the circumstances that reduce the 
costs of employing a populist strategy geared towards the urban poor.  The following 
section discusses why an urbanized populace represents an essential scope condition 
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for a populist strategy.  However, even under such conditions, a populist strategy can 
still prove alienating.  As such, the chapter subsequently details how an opposition 
party interested in using a populist strategy with the urban poor needs to 
simultaneously mobilize a segment of rural voters through clientelist linkages oriented 
around identity appeals.  Assumptions about electoral institutions and politician 
motivations that undergird this argument are also discussed.  Then, existing research 
on politically relevant cleavages in Senegal and Zambia is combined with available 
census data to determine politically salient identities in both countries. By drawing on 
elite interviews, local newspapers, and campaign data, the chapter proceeds to 
illustrate whether and how parties mobilized such identities in rural areas.  Finally, 
nationally-disaggregated election data reveals the success of the PF in creating 
―metropolitan‖ and ―peripheral‖ coalitions in 2008 as well as emphasizes the 
Senegalese opposition‘s inability to do the same in the 2007 elections.   
 
An Urbanized Populace as a Scope Condition 
 Key demographic and socioeconomic circumstances are required for a political 
party to recognize the benefits of mobilizing the urban poor.   Specifically, a country 
needs to be sufficiently urbanized for a party to possess an incentive to target this 
constituency.
262
  In other areas of the world, such as Latin America, populism has been 
a predominantly urban phenomenon (Conniff 1982; Weyland 2001). Moreover, as 
seen in Table 5.1, those countries which are more urbanized demonstrate a higher 
share of the urban poor accounting for a country‘s total share of poor citizens.  While 
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 The level of urbanization is examined here rather than potential alternative measures, such as the age 
of the city, for at least two reasons.  First, it is much harder to determine exactly the age of a city given 
that urban centers may have been important for pre-colonial African kingdoms long before they were 
officially ―settled‖ by colonialists.  Secondly, the share of the population that is urbanized is an 
indicator that is available on a comparable basis across most countries, therefore facilitating the testing 
of this study‘s arguments beyond the case studies of Senegal and Zambia.    
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no definitive threshold exists for determining when a country is sufficiently urbanized 
to ensure that parties direct their attention to the urban poor, it is reasonable to assume 
that an opposition party in Burkina Faso or Malawi would be less likely to stake an 
election outcome on a populist strategy than one in Nigeria or Kenya.   
 
Table 5.1:  Urbanization and Urban Poverty in Selected Electoral Democracies 
Country  Urban Population as 
Share of Total 
Population (%)
a
 
Urban Poverty as Share 
of Total Poverty (%)
b
   
Benin 44.5 35.3 
Burkina Faso 17.6 7.4 
Ghana 37.1 21.8 
Kenya 36.3 33.5 
Madagascar 31.4 23.2 
Malawi 15.9 13.1 
Nigeria 46.6 41.3 
Senegal  49.6 38.2 
Tanzania 35.4 28.4 
Zambia  40.3 31.1 
     Source:  Kessides (2006).   
                    Notes:  
a
These are 2003 figures. 
         
b
These figures are based on the most recent survey year for the corresponding  
        country.  
 When the urban poor comprise a larger share of the total poor population, a 
greater share of the urban population generally is poor and in turn, intra-urban 
inequality often increases. Kaufmann and Stallings (1991) believe that there is 
probably a link between inequality and populist policies since inequality creates 
circumstances that are conducive to generating redistributive demands by citizens.  
While inequality does not automatically result in populist parties, it does certainly 
increase the appeal of the anti-elitist discourse that is inherent to the populist strategy.   
Both Senegal and Zambia have national income Gini coefficients that exceed 0.4, 
which is the level that UN-HABITAT (2009) classified as the ―international alert line- 
inequality threshold,‖ beyond which conditions are ripe for potential social and 
political strife.   Moreover, within Dakar, the Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.46 
(Latreille 2005) while calculations from Zambia‘s 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring 
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Survey (LCMS) reveal that urban Lusaka‘s Gini coefficient is 0.48.  As Larmer and 
Fraser (2007: 618) observe, ―Popular resentment regarding liberalization has been 
strengthened by visible signs of rising inequality…Liberalization‘s winners 
ostentatiously display their wealth in Lusaka‘s new shopping centres, their car parks 
full of luxury vehicles.‖ 
 Thus, having a sizeable share of the population living in a country‘s major 
urban centers is a prerequisite for a party to use a populist strategy to capture the votes 
of the urban poor.  African countries with higher shares of their populations residing in 
urban centers tend to have more individuals living in deprived urban conditions, 
creating more of a gap between the rich and the poor that is conducive to a discourse 
aimed at rectifying the exclusion of sub-altern groups.  Both Senegal and Zambia fit 
these conditions and yet only one opposition party in Zambia took advantage of them 
for electoral gain.  To understand why, it‘s necessary to unpack the nature of populist 
strategies and the need for parties to establish a minimum winning coalition. 
 
The Nature of Populist Strategies and Political Campaigns  
 Even in countries with relatively large urban populations, a populist strategy 
can prove risky. Middle- and upper-class voters, who are often needed to finance the 
campaigns of resource-deprived opposition parties, may fear that populist promises to 
ameliorate living conditions for the urban poor could result in excessive taxation or 
other redistributive measures.  Rural voters may find a focus on urban priorities 
superfluous or even antithetical to their own needs.  Moreover, in order to be a 
credible representative of the urban poor, an opposition party reliant on a populist 
strategy will by necessity campaign less in rural areas and therefore will be less well-
known there than parties that adopt an alternative approach.  At the same time, parties 
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in most African countries still cannot win national elections without at least some rural 
support.    
A populist strategy can therefore create huge trade-offs.  On the one hand, it 
may provide a party with the best chances of mobilizing an increasingly growing 
constituency, i.e. the urban poor.  On the other hand, it may result in the loss of critical 
financing or rural votes, which are essential if a party wants to create a base beyond 
the city.  As Nelson (1979: 323) observes, this dilemma becomes more pronounced as 
a party becomes more established:   
 
Political leaders must also weigh the risks of alienating established supporters by 
overzealous attempts to mobilize the urban poor.  Parties or movements likely to turn 
to the urban poor probably have earlier established bases of support among the lower 
middle class, organized labor, or more rarely peasants.  While the interests of these 
groups may coincide with those of the urban poor on certain issues, particularly 
inflation and to some extent housing and related services, they are often antagonistic 
to the urban poor in other respects.   
In order to reconcile these trade-offs, a party can first consider the 
requirements for achieving a minimum winning coalition.  The concept, as introduced 
by Riker (1962), refers to the inclination of participants in an n-person, zero-sum 
game to create coalitions that are just large enough to ensure winning but no larger.  In 
his view, this is rational given that a party needs to offer a side-payment to entice each 
additional coalition member to join.  Parties will naturally want to conserve on 
resources while still desiring victory and thus, they will only form the smallest 
coalition possible that contributes to this goal.   
 How many groups are required for a minimum winning coalition will depend 
on the type of electoral institutions that are required to elect a country‘s national 
executive.  In first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections, politicians can win with a smaller 
share of the votes than in two-round systems (TRS), which typically require a 
candidate to win 50 percent of the vote in the first round to avoid the second round.  
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As such, from a theoretical standpoint, candidates in FPTP systems could form smaller 
minimum coalitions than those in TRS and still obtain national office.  Levy 
Mwanawasa‘s ascendancy to the presidency in 2001 with only 29 percent of Zambia‘s 
national vote represents a good example of this possibility.  
 Practically, however, politicians in FPTP do not know ex-ante how many votes 
that either they or their competitors will obtain and therefore they do not know how 
many votes will constitute the winning plurality. This is especially true as the number 
of parties competing for national office changes with each election. In other words, 
even if there are instances where the minimum winning coalition turns out to be quite 
small, candidates will not know that this will be the outcome when they are 
campaigning.  As such, even though a candidate in a FPTP system can win with less 
than 50 percent of the vote, s/he is assured of victory if s/he gains 50 percent or more 
of the vote, and knowing this fact ex-ante will shape his/her campaign strategy.  This 
means that the size of the minimum winning coalition that a candidate will try to 
create in an FPTP system will not dramatically vary from that in a TRS.
263
     
 In the African context, an opposition party participating in an election for 
national office can employ a populist strategy with the urban poor as long as it can 
find an alternative means of gaining the minimum number of rural votes necessary to 
achieve a national majority.  Yet, there are some challenges for opposition parties 
attempting to lure rural voters.  Most significantly, rural voters in Africa 
overwhelmingly tend to support the incumbent in elections (e.g. Bawumia 1998; 
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 Proportional representation (PR) elections in parliamentary systems stipulate a much lower threshold 
of votes that parties must obtain in order to be represented in the national government.  However, if a 
party wants its leader to be elected as the country‘s executive, this usually requires having a larger share 
of the votes and representation than any of the other parties.  While a 50 percent goal may not be 
targeted, depending on the number of other competitors, the party will try to form a larger winning 
coalition than that required for it to obtain only a few seats within the government.  In fact, Chapter Six 
details how in a PR, parliamentary system such as South Africa, a populist strategy with the urban poor 
and clientelist linkages with a particular ethnic group in rural areas helped the African National 
Congress (ANC) and its leader, Jacob Zuma, to win the April 2009 elections.  
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Conroy-Krutz n.d;  Villalón 1994). The reasons for this are numerous.  As noted in 
Chapter Two, resources tend to be scarcer for opposition parties and therefore they 
cannot make significant inroads in remote and less densely populated rural areas.  
When compared with the resource advantage enjoyed by incumbents, more rural 
dwellers will be familiar with the incumbent candidate than those of the opposition.  
For the opposition, this disadvantage is compounded by fewer independent media 
outlets in rural areas and lower literacy levels, both of which will diminish the ability 
to create a presence among rural voters outside of campaign periods.  Moreover, 
having committed in 2003 to spend ten percent of their budgets on the agricultural 
sector as part of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program 
(CAADP), most ruling governments currently are involved in investment, input 
subsidy, and/or social safety net programs in rural areas (The Economist 2009).
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Rural dwellers may fear that a change in government could threaten the continuation 
of these programs, and the opposition lacks the credibility to ensure voters that these 
programs will proceed unhindered.  As noted by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the 
inability of an opposition figure to guarantee potential supporters that they will benefit 
directly from his/her tenure in office represents a significant advantage for the 
incumbent leader.  
Clientelist Linkages Based on Ascriptive Identities  
Given these circumstances, how can opposition parties make inroads with the 
rural populace while still employing a populist strategy with the urban poor?  By 
mobilizing a politically salient identity among a certain segment of the rural 
population, an opposition party can gain the necessary leverage to obtain a minimum 
winning coalition.  This study follows Chandra and Metz (2002: 10) in referring to 
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 For instance, fertilizer subsidy and voucher programs currently exist in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia (see Dorward 2009 and Minot and Benson 
2009).    
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identity as an ascriptive feature that is inherited by birth (e.g. religion, ethnicity, first 
language, race, gender) rather than acquired over an individual‘s lifetime (e.g. 
occupation, subsequent languages, place of residence).
265
 Appeals to ascriptive 
identity ties represents a sub-type of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters 
(Kitschelt 2000;  Roniger 1994).  As discussed in Chapter Two, clientelist linkages 
involve the selective distribution of benefits and promises in exchange for votes, and 
they are typically targeted towards the poor.  An ascriptive identity, such as ethnicity 
or religion, can be one means of further disagreggating to whom such selective 
benefits should be distributed (e.g. Hardin 1995).  For opposition parties, which 
possess fewer resources and less leverage to guarantee benefits than incumbents, such 
clientelistic linkages to specific ethnic, religious, linguistic, or racial groups are based 
on future promises to that particular group during campaigns. At the same time, voters 
will choose a candidate with a similar ascriptive identity in the belief that they and 
their community will receive selective benefits if that party enters office (Chandra 
2004; Posner 2005).  
Posner (2005) further argues that mobilizing constituents according to a salient 
identity allows a party to obtain a sufficient number of votes to win elections while 
simultaneously reducing the number of benefits that the party needs to distribute ex-
post.  Instead, I argue that clientelistic linkages based on identity help parties 
maximize the investment of campaign resources in rural areas ex-ante, which is 
especially important for the opposition.  Unlike in cities, certain identities are 
geographically-concentrated in rural areas, and therefore campaigns based on identity 
do not require extensive travel throughout a country to garner sufficient support.  By 
conserving resources, an opposition candidate can spend more time in a small number 
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 In the remainder of this chapter, the term ―identity‖ only refers to ascriptive identities.  
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of rural areas and thereby convince residents that they stand to benefit more if s/he 
enters office than if a competitor does.   
The identity appeals on which this type of clientelist linkage is based can be 
either exclusive or inclusive.  In other words, parties can specifically espouse a 
discourse of exclusion that aims to prevent other groups in society from enjoying 
certain benefits if that party comes into office.  The use of the discourse of Ivoirité by 
Henri Bédié in Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s approximates this first approach 
because it actively advocated excluding those with Muslim or Northern backgrounds 
from the political and economic spheres (see Crook 1997).  This approach can be quite 
alienating and difficult to combine with a populist strategy with the urban poor who 
may be offended by the identity-specific claims a politician is making in rural areas. 
Alternatively, parties can imply that their tenure in office will coincide with 
selective benefits to those of similar backgrounds without actually claiming that other 
groups will not receive other advantages.  The second approach is more amenable to 
the use of other modes of mobilization with diverse societal groups.  For instance, 
Madrid (2008:  481) argues that parties that successfully combine ethnic and populist 
appeals, which he labels "ethnopopulist," are precisely able to do so because they rely 
on an inclusive discourse:   
 
…ethnopopulist parties, like traditional ethnic parties, make ethnic appeals. They 
often portray themselves as the legitimate representative of a particular ethnic group, 
they frequently prioritize the demands of that group, and they typically use cultural 
and political symbols associated with it. However, unlike ethnic parties, ethnopopulist 
parties are inclusive. Whereas ethnic parties use exclusionary rhetoric and platforms 
to mobilize members of a single ethnic group, ethnopopulist parties have sought to 
appeal to a variety of different ethnic groups. 
Overall then, an opposition party can only rely on a populist strategy to capture 
the votes of the urban poor if a politically salient identity is available by which to 
mobilize a segment of the rural population that is sizeable enough to contribute to 
259 
 
electoral majorities.  In other words, the collective contribution of votes from the 
urban poor and the segment of the rural population should prove adequate for national 
victory but not so vast as to require extensive campaigning. Moreover, the use of 
clientelist linkages to mobilize certain rural groups according to identity must involve 
an inclusive rather than exclusive discourse.  Without being able to combine these two 
appeals, candidates will be forced to utilize alternative forms of mobilization, such as 
personalistic linkages, to gain the votes of the urban poor without alienating other 
potential supporters.  Such parties, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, often espouse 
vague proposals to improve both urban and rural areas and fail to gain the level of 
differentiation and congruence necessary to win votes from the urban poor.  
 
 “Metropolitan” and “Peripheral” Coalitions 
Candidates that use populist strategies to mobilize the urban poor often rely on 
multiple coalitions to reconcile seemingly contradictory goals.  Low-income, city 
residents constitute the ―metropolitan‖ component of this coalition because 
rectification of their economic exclusion constitutes the main policy goal of the party.  
A portion of the rural populace represents the ―peripheral‖ coalition, which is 
necessary for electoral victory.   
This segmentation of party approaches between urban and rural areas is not 
atypical and has been observed in other regions of the world.  Indeed, Gibson (1997) 
popularized the notion of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions in his study of 
Mexico‘s Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) and Argentina‘s Peronists.  He 
argues that both parties historically represented sub-coalitions of urban labor unions 
and the working classes, who were central to upholding policies of state-led 
development, and rural peasants and rural elites who were co-opted through 
clientelistic practices to deliver the electoral majorities that kept both parties in office.  
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When both the PRI and the Personists embarked on free-market policies in the mid-
1990s, they retained their traditional peripheral coalition while creating a new 
metropolitan one that consisted of wealthy business entrepreneurs, the urban poor, and 
the self-employed.  Though consisting of different urban constituents than their 
historical antecedents, the use of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions allowed both 
parties to pursue the twin goals of economic policy reform and re-election.  
This framework has been slightly altered in other scholarship to highlight how 
parties can combine policy objectives targeted to urban areas with identity appeals to 
rural dwellers.  For instance, Moore (1997) used Gibson‘s framework to understand 
the ability of Sri Lanka‘s People‘s Alliance (PA) to engage in economic reforms 
during the 1990s. The main party within the PA, known as the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP), was able to appeal to a peripheral coalition consisting of rural Sinhalese, 
Buddhists who belonged to the high-ranking Goigama caste, which account for a third 
of the national population.  At the same time, other parties within the PA consisted of 
non-Goigama Sinhalese, urban technocrats who were able to steer the country towards 
greater economic liberalization. For Gisselquist (2005) and Madrid (2008), Bolivia‘s 
economic crisis in the 1980s led to a discrediting of traditional leftist parties, thereby 
leaving new urban migrants and the urban poor voiceless.  Consequently, Evo 
Morales‘ Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party filled an important gap by appealing 
to voters with both pro-poor policy goals and a rhetoric that empowered indigenous 
communities, which comprise approximately half of the population.  In the country‘s 
2009 elections, these dual coalitions allowed the populist leader to achieve a high 
share of the votes in the capital of La Paz along with substantial majorities in rural 
areas of the Western portion of the country.
266
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 See the Corte Nacional Electoral at  http://www.cne.org.bo/ (accessed December 15, 2009).  
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Similarly, the present study also draws on Gibson's (1997) framework.  
However, instead of the ―metropolitan‖ coalition consisting of a diverse range of 
socio-economic actors, it predominantly consists of the urban poor.  Likewise, the 
"peripheral" coalition includes only a segment of the rural population who are 
mobilized by clientelist linkages that specifically rely on appeals to ascriptive identity 
cleavages.  Moreover, the present study examines the advantage of metropolitian and 
peripheral coalitions only for the purposes of winning national elections rather than for 
the dual goals of implementing economic reforms and being re-elected.   
 Importantly, this coalition can exist not because rural voters are ignorant of a 
party‘s message to the urban poor or because the urban poor are unaware of identity 
appeals to specific rural communities.  Instead, it is feasible precisely because the 
identity appeals are not explicitly exclusive and therefore poor urbanites who are not 
members of a particular cultural community will not necessarily be offended by such 
overtures to specific rural groups. Moreover, as noted in Chapter Two, one key 
element of a populist strategy with the urban poor is the concentration of campaign 
efforts within poor urban communities.  As such, the urban poor will also recognize 
that most of a populist party‘s campaigns are targeted at them.  At the same time, rural 
residents may recognize that a message aimed at improving conditions for the urban 
poor is not necessarily antithetical to a party‘s espoused commitment to a particular 
cultural community.   All of this confirms Hagopian‘s (2007) assertion that parties and 
individual candidates can mix their strategies in order to mobilize different 
constituents.   
Determining Politically Salient Identities  
In heterogeneous countries, which identities are most politically salient and can 
therefore be seized upon by parties interested in forming a peripheral coalition? 
Individuals of course adhere to multiple, non-exclusive identities spanning race, 
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ethnicity, language, and religion.  Unfortunately, finding a uniform and easily 
applicable approach for uncovering potentially salient identity cleavages has thus far 
eluded scholars on identity politics.  Determining whether an identity is ―salient‖ 
depends on context (Abdelal et al. 2006).  This fact compounds the challenge for a 
politician searching for the identity that will not only have the greatest mobilizing 
power but also secure an electoral advantage.  Torcal and Mainwaring‘s (2003) 
research on Chile as well as Chhibber and Torcal‘s work (1997) on Spain provide one 
method for uncovering politically salient cleavages.  In both studies, econometric 
analysis unveils which variable, such as class or religious background, played the most 
significant role in an individual‘s decision to support a party.  However, this approach 
is predominantly ex-post in that it explains which cleavages influenced voting 
behavior but not necessarily if those were the ones that politicians purposely 
mobilized during a campaign.
267
  Based on his work on India, Wilkinson (2000) has 
sampled media sources to record all those identities that appear important within a 
particular community but which may not necessarily be captured in standard census 
data.  While this method provides a better ex-ante analysis of the potential menu of 
cleavages a politician can choose, it still does not explain why a politician may choose 
one identity for electoral purposes over another.  
Instead of these other approaches, this study draws on the rationale underlying 
Posner‘s (2005) identity matrices, combined with existing scholarship on cleavages  in 
Senegal and Zambia.  Based on the logic of numbers and the assumption that certain 
identities are geographically concentrated, Posner‘s approach offers a uniform method 
that can be applied across multiple countries.  This approach involves creating a 
round-robin of identity dyads, such as religion and language, with each category 
                                                          
267
 As Chandra (2009: 253) explains, those identities that motivate voters and those that drive party 
strategy should in principle be similar but the concepts are analytically distinct and can sometimes 
diverge. 
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constituting 100 percent of the population.
268
  Those individuals who belong to the 
largest group of each dyad category constitute what Posner labels as the ―pivot,‖ 
meaning that they will belong to the winning coalition regardless of which category of 
the dyad, e.g. religion or language, is chosen for mobilization.  Out of the two options, 
the pivot members choose to adhere to the one which encompasses the smaller share 
of the population.  
This in turn ensures that they are placed in the minimum winning coalition and 
can therefore share economic and political benefits among a smaller group.  The 
politically salient cleavage therefore depends on which of the two identities the pivot 
group chooses. For example, if the linguistic group has a smaller population share than 
the religious group, then politics will revolve around mobilizing voters according to 
their language rather than their religion.  
The present study applies the logic of this approach to understand which 
identity a politician will choose as a salient cleavage. Specifically, a politician will 
determine whether it is instrumental to mobilize rural constituents along a politically 
salient cleavage if that provides him/her with a minimum winning coalition that also 
encompasses the urban poor.   Full identity matrices cannot be constructed here 
because they require raw census data in order to calculate cross-tabulations of the 
various identity dyads.
269
  Instead, based on the idea of minimum winning coalitions 
that encompass ―metropolitan‖ and ―peripheral‖ components, I first examine the share 
of the rural population in Senegal and Zambia across three ascriptive categories, which 
are ethnicity, language group, and religion. Based on the size of the urban population, 
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 One of Posner‘s (2005) main insights was that an individual‘s salient identity can vary according to 
institutional constraints, differing in one-party, constituency elections compared with multi-party 
national elections.  Since multi-party, presidential elections are the focus in the present study, the 
populations of both Senegal and Zambia can be explored under the assumption that they face the same 
basic institutional constraints, and social cleavages are examined at the national level rather than at the 
district or constituency level.    
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 The raw census data is available for Zambia but not for Senegal.   
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an opposition politician will presumably choose to mobilize rural dwellers along a 
cleavage that results in constituencies which can deliver an electoral majority but 
whose size and geographical dispersion does not require extensive campaigning 
throughout the entire country.  If a candidate cannot mobilize rural voters via an 
identity cleavage, then s/he must choose an alternative mode of capturing the votes of 
the urban poor and rural dwellers, such as through personalistic linkages.   
 Since this approach is predicated on numbers, it is dynamic and amenable to 
demographic shifts.  For instance, as the share of the urban population increases, an 
opposition candidate can still achieve a minimum winning coalition with a smaller 
share of the rural population, meaning that smaller ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
groups become viable targets to construct peripheral coalitions.  At the same time, 
however, whether an opposition candidate can mobilize voters with a particular 
identity requires the candidate to share that identity with them.  Candidates from a 
minority group that cannot deliver electoral majorities on its own will certainly require 
a different form of mobilization that encompasses a diverse share of rural constituents.  
In addition, whether an opposition candidate can capture the support of a certain 
segment of rural voters depends on the incumbent‘s actions, which may involve 
longstanding clientelistic relations with certain communities. 
 
Uncovering Politically Salient Identity Cleavages in Rural Senegal and Zambia  
The population of Zambia‘s major urban centers, which are Lusaka and the 
two major cities on the Copperbelt, Kitwe and Ndola, collectively constituted 21.6 
percent of the total population in 2000 when the last census was conducted.
270
  Since 
not everyone within that 21.6 will be poor, the number of votes from the urban poor 
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 Presumably, all three cities have grown in the interim and their share in Zambia‘s total population 
will be even higher.  However, the 2010 census results for these cities were not published at the time 
this study was written.  
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that a politician can obtain will realistically be less than this.  Nevertheless, 
recognizing that the poor are the majority of the urban population, and without 
knowing exactly how many urbanites are objectively poor or how many believe they 
have been excluded from the benefits of economic growth, a candidate will consider 
this 21.6 percent as the maximum potential share of votes that s/he could gain in 
Zambia's key urban areas.  By extension then, any cleavage that includes at least 28 
percent (50 - 21.6) of the rural population can be mobilized into a minimum winning 
coalition.
271
 As mentioned earlier, in a FPTP system such as Zambia‘s, a 50 percent 
threshold is not required to win.  Yet, without knowing how many votes other 
candidates will win ex-ante and therefore how much of a plurality is needed, a 
politician benefits by campaigning with the goal of obtaining this 50 percent threshold.  
 Table 5.2 below illustrates only two groups that meet this threshold, which are 
Christians and those belonging to the Bemba language group.
272
  However, with 87 
percent of the rural population claiming allegiance to Christianity, religion is not 
necessarily a cleavage that politicians can mobilize while still consolidating campaign 
resources.  By contrast, a candidate could target a much smaller segment of the 
population, namely those within the Bemba language group and, combined with votes 
in major metropolitan centers, would be able to win a national majority.  As such, 
ethno-linguistic affinity represents a cleavage for political competition.  If one 
candidate targets Bemba-speakers, another could form a multi-lingual coalition to try 
and defeat his/her competitor.     
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 If the share of the poor in the urban population declines, then the cleavage needs to encompass an 
even larger share of the rural population. 
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 The language groups encompass a number of different dialects.  However, these dialects are 
mutually intelligible among ethnic groups within each language group.  For example, the Chewa, 
Ngoni, and Nsenga tribes all speak a language that falls within the broader Nyanja language group.  
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Table 5.2:  Distribution of Ascriptive Identities in Rural Zambia 
First Language Share of Rural Population (%) 
Bemba 31.7 
Tonga 18.9 
Nyanja 17.4 
NW 10.1 
Barotse 8.6 
Tumbuka 4.4 
Ethnicity (Tribe) Share of Rural Population (%) 
Tonga 15.5 
Bemba 13.1 
Chewa 7.7 
Lozi 5.7 
Nsenga 4.8 
Tumbuka 3.8 
Religious Affiliation Share of Rural Population (%) 
Christian  87.0 
Other 6.56 
None 6.11 
Muslim  0.26 
Hindu  0.01 
Sources:  Calculated from the 2000 Zambian Census.  
Ethno-linguistic identity has long played an important role in Zambian politics.    
Posner (2005) illustrates in great detail that in multi-party national elections, the 
salient political cleavage in Zambia is ethno-linguistic identity among the four main 
language groups:  Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi.  As seen in Table 5.3, these 
language groups tend to be geographically concentrated in most rural provinces.  For 
instance, the Bemba-speaking groups are predominantly located in Luapula and 
Northern Provinces.  Under Chiluba, the MMD became perceived as a Bemba party, 
which only fuelled the desire of Tongas and Lozis for greater political representation 
in the central government (Burnell 2001).
273
 According to Burnell (2005: 122), 
―Zambia‘s politicians continue to factor ethnic and provincial considerations into their 
strategies for mobilizing support at local levels.‖   
 
                                                          
273
 Under British colonial rule, the proximity of Bemba-speaking groups to the Copperbelt meant that 
they supplied much of the labor to the copper-mining operations, which placed them in a more 
advantageous position vis-à-vis other groups at the time of independence (Taylor 2006). 
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Table 5.3:  Distribution of Zambian Ethno-Linguistic Groups by Province 
Province Predominant First 
Language Group 
Share of Provincial 
Population Speaking 
Language (%) 
Central  Bemba 47.7 
Copperbelt  Bemba 79.5 
Eastern Nyanja 67.9 
Luapula Bemba 88.5 
Lusaka  Nyanja 55.9 
Northern Bemba 64.2 
Northwestern  Northwestern 81.9 
Southern Tonga 72.8 
Western  Barotse/Lozi 70.0 
          Source:  Calculations based on the 2000 Zambian Census 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Map of Zambia’s Provinces 
Importantly though, overt ethnic appeals are rare (Posner 2005: 181) and there 
are no ethnic parties in the manner defined by Chandra (2004: 3) ―as a champion of 
the cause of one particular ethnic category or a set of categories to the exclusion of 
others‖ [emphasis added].  Rather, ethnic appeals follow a pattern of implicit 
mobilization, meaning that they are coded in a manner that targets specific 
constituents without necessarily naming a particular ethnic identity (Chandra 2009).  
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Based on interviews conducted in 2000, Scarritt (2006) found most politicians 
admitting that ethnopolitical mobilization occurred during campaigns but not in an 
exclusionary manner that threatened national unity. 
In Senegal, approximately 25 percent of the national population resides in 
Dakar (ANSD 2007a).  As such, a candidate needs at least 25 percent of the vote in 
rural areas if s/he is to win at the national level.  Again, this is based on the 
assumption that all Dakarois are poor and all will vote, which realistically is not the 
case.  However, without knowing exactly how many are poor at the time of elections 
and how many Dakarois will show up at the polls, the 25 percent represents a 
politician‘s best estimate of how many potential votes s/he can obtain from the urban 
poor.   
Moreover, based on Senegal‘s two-round system (TRS), a candidate 
technically can win without obtaining more than 50 percent of the vote if s/he can be 
among the top two finalists in the first round of elections and forges a coalition with 
enough opposition parties in the second round.  Again though, ex-ante, a candidate 
does not know who will be among the top two parties and whether a coalition will be 
formed in the aftermath.  Yet, if a candidate gains more than 50 percent of the vote in 
the first round, s/he can avoid competing in the second round, which is what 
Abdoulaye Wade achieved in 2007.  As such, while a candidate plausibly can win 
without mobilizing at least half of the population, the chances of guaranteed victory 
increase if s/he does attempt to do this.   
Given these conditions, Table 5.4 illustrates that a politician would not pursue 
a religious cleavage along Muslim/Christian lines since the rural population is 
overwhelmingly Muslim.  Ethnicity or linguistic background theoretically could be 
mobilized for political gain.  However, Sufi brotherhood affiliation represents the most 
plausible identity cleavage that a politician could target, not only because ties with 
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either the Mouride or the Tidiane would ensure a minimum winning coalition but also 
because extensive scholarship on Senegal has revealed that neither ethnic nor 
linguistic background plays a substantial role in politics. 
 
Table 5.4:  Distribution of Ascriptive Identities in Rural Senegal 
First Language  Share of Rural Population (%) 
Wolof 44.6 
Pulaar 24.7 
Serer 14.1 
Mandike 5.6 
Dioula 5.3 
Soninke 2.0 
Ethnicity (Tribe)  Share of Rural Population (%) 
Wolof 40.7 
Pulaar 25.6 
Serer 15.5 
Dioula 5.3 
Mandinke 5.0 
Others 7.9 
Religious Affiliation  Share of Rural Population (%) 
Muslim 94.9 
Christian 3.8 
Other 1.3 
Muslim Brotherhood Share of Rural Population (%) 
Tidiane 48.9 
Mouride 33.6 
Khadriya 12.8 
Layène 0.7 
Sources:  Division de la Prévision et de la Statistique. 1993. Recensement Général de 
la Population et de l’Habitat de 1988. Dakar, Sénégal :  Ministère de l‘Economie, des 
Finances et du Plan.  
Indeed, there are a number of indicators attesting to the low salience of 
ethnicity in Senegal.  For example, Posner (2004b) constructed a Politically Relevant 
Ethnic Group (PREG) index which aims not to account for how many ethnic groups 
exist in a particular country but rather to determine how many actually have been 
engaged in political competition.
274
   According to the PREG index, Senegal received 
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 More specifically, Posner (2004b) draws on an exhaustive review of secondary literature.  Where the 
literature discussed voting patterns, party-building, or electoral campaigns, he determined which and 
how many ethnic groups were involved.  Then, with this knowledge, he amended the traditional 
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a score of only 0.14 out of a possible 1, indicating that ethnicity plays a negligible 
factor in competition over policy in the country.   This supports Maktar Diouf‘s (1994: 
44-45) claim that ethnic cleavages have never been a part of the Senegalese landscape. 
In fact, the former president, Abdou Diouf, who belongs to the Wolof ethnic group, 
received some of the highest votes from the Pulaar-speaking Toucouleur while his 
predecessor from the Serer ethnic group, Leopold Senghor, obtained high levels of 
support in regions containing non-Serers (Beck 2008).  Moreover, based on the Round 
4 of the Afrobarometer survey, most Senegalese in rural areas do not view themselves 
in ethnic terms while almost 62 percent of their counterparts in Zambia attach equal 
importance to their ethnicity and nationality (see Table 5.5).  
One reason for the low salience of ethnic identity is because, like other West 
African societies, many ethnic groups in Senegal are structured by caste.  For 
example, the Wolof, Serer, and the Pulaar-speaking Toucouleur are all caste societies 
(Diop 1964; Markovitz 1970).
275
 Members of the same caste across different ethnic 
groups may have more in common than they do with their co-ethnics.  Traditionally, 
marriage practices encouraged endogamy within castes rather than within ethnic 
groups (Ross 2008).   In addition, Wolof is almost equivalent to a lingua franca in that 
approximately 70 to 80 percent of Senegalese speak it as either their first or second 
language (Ross 2008).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which is calculated using a Herfindahl index  and is based 
on data compiled by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s.  
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 Historically, for instance, the Wolof caste structure included the nobility, commoners (Badolo), 
artisans and griots (Gnegno) and slaves (Markovitz 1970).  Within each caste stratum, there were even 
further sub-divisions.  
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     Table 5.5:  Comparison of Importance of Ethnicity in Rural Senegal and 
Zambia  
Opinion  Senegalese 
Rural  
Population (%)  
Zambian Rural 
Population (%)  
I feel only [ethnic group] 5.8 6.6 
I feel more [ethnic group] than 
Senegalese/ Zambian 
16 7.7 
I feel equally Senegalese/Zambian and 
[ethnic group] 
23.8 61.2 
I feel more Senegalese/ Zambian than 
[ethnic group] 
9.6 4.4 
I feel only Senegalese/ Zambian  43.4 18.1 
Don‘t know  0.4 0.3 
Total
a
 99 100 
Source:  Round 4 Afrobarometer.  The exact question was ―Let us suppose that you had to 
choose between being a Senegalese/Zambian and being a member of [respondent‘s ethnic 
group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?‖  
Notes:  
a
The total for Senegal does not exactly equal 100 due to rounding and missing data.  
By contrast, Senegal‘s brotherhoods (confrèries, tariqa) represent a much 
stronger marker of identity, playing a central role in the lives of most of this country‘s 
Muslims.
276
  All of the brotherhoods are hierarchically structured with authority 
filtering downwards from the Khalifa Général, or leader of the brotherhood, to 
multiple religious leaders known as marabouts, to talibés, or disciples (O‘Brien 1971). 
In the Tidiane brotherhood, which originated in Morocco, disciples view their 
marabouts as religious guides with mystical powers.  However, in the Mouride 
brotherhood, which was established in Senegal during the early 1900s by Cheikh 
Amadou Bamba, the marabout’s intercession on behalf of his talibé is necessary for 
the latter‘s redemption (Beck 2008).  The Mouridiyya is very centralized, recognizes 
only one Khalifa Général, and is centered on the town of Touba in the region of 
Diourbel.  Due to internal rivalries and family disputes, the Tijaniyya are more 
fragmented.  The Malikiyya branch established by Al-Hajj Malik Sy is located in 
Tivaouane in the region of Thiès while the Niassène sect, which was founded by Al-
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 In fact, 95 percent of Senegalese reported that religion was very important to them in the Round 4 
Afrobarometer survey. 
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Hajj Abdoulaye Niass, is headquartered in the region of Kaolack (Ross 2008; 
Loimeier 2007).
277
   
 
Table 5.6:  Distribution of Senegalese Sufi Brotherhoods by Region 
Region  Predominant Sufi 
Brotherhood 
Share of Region’s Population 
Adhering to Brotherhood (%) 
Dakar Tidiane  47.7 
Diourbel  Mouride 84.4 
Fatick Tidiane  36.4 
Kaolack Tidiane  64.3 
Kolda Tidiane  49.2 
Louga Mouride  45.7 
St. Louis  Tidiane  79.2 
Tambacounda Tidiane  52 
Thiès  Mouride  42.2 
Ziguinchor
a
 Khadriya  24.1 
Sources: Calculations based on Division de la Prévision et de la Statistique. 1993. 
Recensement  Général de la Population et de l’Habitat de 1988. Dakar, Sénégal :  Ministère de 
l‘Economie, des Finances et du Plan. 
Notes : 
a
Zinguinchor is predominantly Catholic, which is why the share of Sufi affiliation is so 
low.  
 
As Table 5.6 above illustrates, one brotherhood is more predominant than 
another in some rural regions while in others, such as Thiès, Louga, and Fatick, they 
have relatively equal followings.  Figure 5.2 highlights where these different regions 
are located.  
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 The Qadiriyya (Khadriya) order emerged in Baghdad and attracts many of Senegal‘s minority ethnic 
groups, such as Mauritanians living in the country, migrant Bambara from Mali, and the Mandika of 
Casamance.  The Layène was established in a suburb of Dakar and its membership is generally limited 
to the Cap Vert peninsula (Ross 2008).      
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Figure 5.2: Map of Senegalese Regions 
 
 The prominence of the brotherhoods in the political sphere is well-
documented.  The Mourides in particular have motivated a broad range of scholarship 
examining their role as what Beck (2008) terms ―influential brokers‖ who encourage 
their disciples to support specific candidates depending on the economic benefits they 
receive from the ruling regime (e.g. Coulon 1981; O‘Brien 1971).  Their ability to 
bestow politicians with legitimacy remains strong in rural areas, prompting Boone 
(2003: 91) to observe the following:   
 
So it is that even after the groundnut era the regime has continued to invest in 
sustaining the material bases of the Mouride order, and thus to provide the economic 
linkages by which religious prestige and legitimacy were transformed into worldly 
political clout.  Senegal‘s opposition politicians in the 1990s courted the marabouts 
almost as assiduously as Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor did in the 1950s. 
Yet, Loimeier (2007) argues that the Mourides were forced to engage in explicit 
demands for political concessions precisely because most government offices 
traditionally have been held by Tidjanis.  By contrast, the Mourides were 
conspicuously missing from the upper echelons of politics:  ―Murids have thus had to 
ask for ‗their goods‘ rather ‗loudly‘…Tijanis were not forced to resort to ‗Murid‘ 
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strategies as long as they were ‗in power‘ or close to it‖ (Loimeier 2007: 71). 
Declining patronage resources due to structural adjustment certainly contributed to the 
Mouride marabouts‘ decision not to issue a ndïgel instructing disciples to vote for the 
Tidiane candidate, Abdou Diouf, in the 2000 elections (Diop et al. 2002). Yet, their 
support for a Mouride candidate instead, Abdoulaye Wade, also reflected a sense of 
disappointment with their longstanding exclusion from the structures of state 
bureaucracy and authority (Loimeier 2007).  By contrast, one of the heads of the 
Tidiane brotherhood in Tivaoune, Chiekh Tidiane Sy, publicly instructed his followers 
to support Diouf in the same elections (Villalón 2004).  Jostling between brotherhoods 
for influence therefore remains a defining feature of the Senegalese political 
landscape.
278
              
 Therefore, in Zambia, opposition politicians can forge a metropolitan coalition 
with the urban poor if they can simultaneously mobilize a segment of rural residents 
according to a specific ethno-linguistic identity (or identities), which collectively 
provides a majority of votes.  Likewise, in Senegal, an opposition politician can 
employ a populist strategy with the urban poor if s/he can simultaneously appeal to a 
certain share of rural residents based on Sufi brotherhood affiliation.  If, however, 
these strategies are not available in rural areas, either due to the politician‘s own 
identity or the actions of the incumbent, then an alternative means of mobilization is 
required.  For instance, a candidate could simply rely on personalistic linkages with 
both the urban poor and rural dwellers, which invoke vague messages oriented around 
both constituencies‘ concerns but provide very little differentiation from other parties.  
Alternatively, a candidate could explicitly focus on programmatic linkages oriented 
around agricultural and rural development policies, but this will exhibit very little 
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 Koter (2009) also argues that the lack of ethnic voting in Senegal, as well as Mali, is due to the role 
of hierarchically-structured religious orders whose leaders act as intermediaries between voters and the 
state.  
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congruence with the priorities of the urban poor.  In both of the latter cases, the 
candidate will forfeit a populist strategy with the urban poor in order to avoid 
alienating rural voters.   
 
Sata’s Peripheral Coalition in the Bemba Heartland   
 In the 2008 presidential campaign, Zambia‘s opposition parties were first and 
foremost limited by the clientelistic linkages forged with rural voters by the ruling 
MMD. In addition to the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP), which distributed 
subsidized fertilizer to rural dwellers just prior to the elections, the MMD also relied 
on the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to mobilize supporters.  The FRA aims to 
facilitate markets, manage storage facilities, and ensure the country has a strategic 
reserve of food by buying smallholder maize and cassava and therefore guaranteeing 
farmers a market for their output.
279
   Right before the inception of the campaign, the 
government announced that the FRA would increase the cost it paid farmers for their 
maize from 45,000 Kwacha to 55,000 Kwacha.  In response, the PF unsuccessfully 
filed for a court injunction to force the FRA either to wait until after the elections 
before paying the new price or to compensate farmers who had already sold their 
maize at the cheaper price (Times of Zambia 2008d).  
 By virtue of already being in power, the MMD also possessed two other 
advantages.  First, the MMD naturally had greater campaign resources to reach most 
areas of the country. According to the BBC correspondent in Zambia, ―What tends to 
happen, the ruling party, MMD, they tend to use state money, government public 
funds; that is indisputable. They use that, they use public money, they use Zambia air 
force planes to cover and get to every part of the country.  They use government cars, 
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 See http://www.fra.org.zm/about_the_fra.php, accessed October 16, 2009.  
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they have free access to the media, they don‘t pay for their adverts.‖280   The PF‘s 
vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, concurs that this is a major challenge for his party:  ―I 
think the PF is disadvantaged in the rural areas because A, only the government has 
got the resources to actually campaign in the rural areas in a country that is as sparse 
and is as poorly provided with telecommunications and so on and so forth as this 
one.‖281   
 Secondly, the MMD claimed that by virtue of already occupying office, it 
could more credibly implement projects and fulfill campaign promises than any of the 
opposition candidates.  This was the common message during Rupiah Banda‘s 
campaign tour across the country‘s nine provinces.  For example, in Southern 
Province, he promised to continue promoting agricultural growth through the Fertilizer 
Support Program and warned residents ―against being hoodwinked by other 
presidential candidates whom he [Banda] said could not deliver on their promises 
because they were out of the system while he was in Government‖ (Moonga 2008: 1). 
In Eastern Province, Banda emphasized that only he possessed enough members in 
Parliament to form a strong Government (Ntanda and Lungu 2008: 1).  
Given these advantages for the MMD in rural areas, Michael Sata relied on 
ethno-linguistic appeals in order to build a peripheral coalition with a segment of rural 
voters, namely those belonging to the Bemba linguistic group.  In 2001, Sata's bid for 
president occurred shortly after the PF was formed and as noted in Chapter Three, 
relied on personalistic linkages and was almost entirely targeted in urban areas due to 
limited resources.   Five years later, Sata had not only switched to using a populist 
strategy with Zambia's urban poor but also began more actively campaigning in rural 
areas, with a specific focus on Bemba-speaking areas.  As a result, between the 2001 
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 Personal interview with Musonda Chibamba, BBC, Lusaka, January 28, 2009. 
281
 Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, PF, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.  
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and 2006 elections, Sata increased his share of the presidential vote from 3 to 61 
percent in Luapula Province and from 8 to 43 percent in Northern Provinces.
282
  The 
same strategy was repeated again in 2008, with even greater vigor.  As Zambian 
political analyst Dr.Neo Simutanyi explains, 
 
You know, Sata‘s political strategy has been very simple. It‘s based on 
demographics... the strategy has been that if the Bemba group is consolidated and it 
votes as a bloc and then gets sympathy, in other words gets support from non-Bembas 
who are in the group of the working class and the poor and so forth, then it should be 
possible for this bloc vote to help him win the presidency.
283
  
  The clearest evidence of this strategy emerges by observing where Sata spent 
most of his time campaigning in 2008.  Table 5.7 illustrates the share of rallies that 
each candidate held within provinces outside of Lusaka.  These figures were derived 
from counting the number of separate rallies held by each presidential candidate and 
reported in the newspaper Times of Zambia during the official campaign period, which 
started on September 26 and ended on October 29, 2008.
284
  Admittedly, this approach 
can be problematic for at least two reasons.  First, the number of rallies will inevitably 
be under-reported since newspaper space cannot be solely devoted to reports on 
candidates‘ campaign activities. Godfrey Miyanda in particular argued that the lack of 
media coverage of his rallies conveyed to the public that he did not engage in much 
campaigning in rural areas (Times of Zambia Reporter 2008e).  However, this bias is 
more likely to exclude smaller rallies and therefore will only serve to further 
emphasize which constituencies a candidate accorded the most attention.   Secondly, 
rallies which were held by parties, but not attended by the actual presidential 
candidate, are excluded. Yet, one would assume that those constituencies which are 
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 During the same period, the number of MPs elected in Luapula increased from zero to 9 out of a 
total of 14 constituencies.  In Northern Province, the number of MPs elected between 2001 and  2006  
increased from zero to 9 out of a total of 21 constituencies.  
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 Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009. 
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 September 26, 2008 marked the day when presidential candidates needed to submit their official 
nomination forms to the Zambian High Court.  
278 
 
deemed most important by the party are those most likely to receive a visit from the 
actual presidential contender.  Notwithstanding these caveats, newspaper reports offer 
a useful approximation of candidates‘ geographic focus given that more extensive data 
regarding political campaigns remains unavailable.    
 
Table 5.7: Share of Campaign Rallies by Province 
Province Candidate 
Rupiah Banda 
(MMD) 
Michael Sata 
(PF) 
Hakainde 
Hichilema 
(UPND)  
Godfrey 
Miyanda 
(Heritage 
Party) 
Central  4.9 14.8 0.0 50.0 
Copperbelt 12.2 7.4 5.0 0.0 
Eastern 14.6 0.0 30.0 0.0 
Luapula 12.2 14.8 10.0 0.0 
Northern 14.6 44.4 10.0 25.0 
Northwestern 9.8 3.7 10.0 25.0 
Southern 14.6 3.7 30.0 0.0 
Western 17.1 11.1 5.0 0.0 
Total 100 (N=41) 100(N=27) 100 (N=20) 100 (N=4) 
Source:  Calculated from news reports in The Times of Zambia newspaper between the 2008 
presidential campaign period of Sept. 26-Oct.29.   
 
Due to the MMD‘s access to campaign resources, Banda conducted more 
rallies than any of the other candidates.  Notably, Banda distributed his rallies 
relatively evenly amongst the provinces, spending marginally more time in Western 
Province which, as will be discussed later in this section, was designed to deprive Lozi 
votes from the UPND.  By contrast, Sata concentrated 44 percent of his 27 total, non-
Lusaka campaign rallies in the Bemba-speaking Northern Province alone.  Luapula 
and Central Provinces, which are also Bemba-speaking, followed with each 
accounting for approximately 15 percent of Sata‘s rallies.  Eastern Province, which is 
Banda‘s stronghold, received no visits from Sata who presumably felt that it was a 
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waste of resources to campaign in the incumbent‘s main area of influence.285  Both the 
Tonga-speaking Southern Province and those in Northwestern Province also obtained 
minimal attention from Sata.   
Sata mobilized fellow Bemba speakers through implicit, rather than explicit, 
appeals which were centered on their shared identity.  In other words, he did not 
present the PF as an exclusionary party only interested in representing Bemba 
speakers. Thus, during one of his visits to the Lozi-speaking Western Province, he 
stated in a radio interview that the PF was a national party and not just for Bembas 
(Times of Zambia 2008f). Rather, he implied that other groups have, and would 
continue to, exclude the Bemba from political influence.  For instance, the late 
President Mwanawasa‘s deliberate actions to reduce the dominance of Bemba 
representation among government appointments encouraged Sata to claim, in turn, that 
the MMD was purposely marginalizing the Bemba.
286
  In the same vein, the Tonga-
speaking UPND leader, Hakainde Hichilema, believes Sata purposely discouraged 
Bemba-speakers from supporting him because of his ethno-linguistic background:  ―I 
went to campaign in Luapula Province. And Sata told the people there not to vote for 
me because I was Tonga and they are Bemba. How can you campaign like that? I 
never go to Southern Province and say, ‗Don‘t vote for Sata because he‘s Bemba.‘ 
No.‖287 
  Language provided the key means of implicit mobilization. The PF‘s slogan of 
Pabwato, which is Bemba, was never translated into any other indigenous languages 
in campaign materials.  This presumably reinforced for rural voters, who were less 
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 Banda‘s popularity in Eastern Province can be traced to at least two factors.  First, his father was 
Chewa and his mother was Ngoni, both of which are members of the Nyanja language group that is 
dominant in Eastern Province.  Secondly, Banda formerly was a key figure in UNIP which, due to 
Kenneth Kaunda‘s background, retained support in Eastern Province even after the MMD came to 
power in 1991.  
286
 Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009. 
287
 Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, UPND President, Lusaka, February 17, 2009. 
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likely to relate to a message of ―Lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your 
pockets,‖ that Sata was a Bemba candidate.  Moreover, King Cobra relied on Bemba 
to address his rallies in Northern and Luapula provinces.  Rallies from these provinces 
were nationally broadcast on independent radio stations, such as QFM Radio and Hot 
FM Radio (see Times of Zambia 2008g; Times of Zambia 2008h), which again may 
have given the impression more widely among Zambians that he was a Bemba 
politician.  Even during his closing rally in Lusaka, where he exhorted supporters not 
to engage in violence if the election outcome did not favor the PF, he resorted to 
Bemba, stating ―Kabiyeni, mwilalwa kabili mwila tukana‖ [―Go, but do not fight and 
insult.‖] (Times of Zambia 2008i).      
 
Figure 5.3:  Map of 2008 Zambian Presidential Results
288
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 Map adapted by author from data provided by the Electoral Commission of Zambia.  
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  Figure 5.3 illustrates how Sata‘s campaign strategy affected voting outcomes.  
Specifically, the PF‘s base of support, highlighted in black dots, centers on Zambia‘s 
most urban and cosmopolitan areas in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, as well as the 
Bemba-speaking Luapula and Northern Provinces.   In these two provinces, Sata 
obtained 66 and 65 percent of the vote in 2008, respectively.  By contrast, the UPND‘s 
support base is shaded with the cross-hatch and predominantly concentrated in the 
Tonga-speaking Southern Province.  The MMD‘s results emphasize that this ruling 
party, which originally emerged in urban areas, has now become predominantly rural.    
The success of Sata in Bembaphone provinces is difficult to attribute to other 
factors besides ethno-linguistic appeals.  Due to his focus on his metropolitan coalition 
of the urban poor, he had not spoken much about agriculture during the campaign.  
Indeed, one disgruntled Zambian wrote that "His [Sata's] political vision is in town 
alone, talking about making flyover bridges, sweeping the markets, etc. Coming to 
issues that affect the rural multitudes, he has nothing to offer or talk about. Ask him 
about agricultural policies and you will get nothing from him" (Daka 2008: 5).   In 
fact, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010:  23&24) point out that some of Sata's promises 
to the urban poor, such as reducing food prices, were directly antithetical to the 
interests of rural producers.  They further observe that Sata insulted rural producers 
during the 2008 campaign by claiming that their farm practices were from the "stone 
age."   Research by Govereh et al. (2009) also shows that Northern and Luapula 
provinces were disproportionately favored by fertilizer distribution through the FSP, 
as well as by crop purchases through the FRA.
289
 As such, support for Sata in these 
provinces could not necessarily be traced to farmers' disappointment with the MMD's 
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These provinces specialize in cassava production, and the Govereh et al. (2009) study shows that they 
were favored by the FSP and the FRA over other cassava producing regions, such as Northwestern and 
Western provinces. 
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agricultural policies. Notably, within Northern Province, the MMD only won in non-
Bemba speaking areas (Simutanyi 2009).   
Interestingly, Sata‘s campaign strategy is also reflected in the other party 
representatives who have been elected to office on the PF ticket. In urban centers, PF 
MPs are more likely to be non-Bembas.  This is true for Dr. Guy Scott (MP for Lusaka 
Central), Given Lubinda (MP for Kabwata constituency), and Wilbur Simuusa (MP 
for Chingola constituency in the Copperbelt).  However, in the Northern and Luapula 
provinces, the PF's MPs tend to be predominantly Bemba.  
 Sata‘s dualistic mode of coalition-building probably explains why such 
disparate views exist over how best to characterize the PF.  Not surprisingly, other 
parties attempt to portray the PF as a distinctly Bemba party.  The MMD‘s campaign 
manager in 2008, Dr. Mbita Chitala, claims, ―He [Sata] is basically a very tribal 
gentleman, if you look at his party, the whole leadership is Bemba, the Northern 
people, the Bemba.‖290  Likewise, the research director for the UPND, Dr. Choolwe 
Beyani believes that ―There are ethnic considerations to voting patterns.  There is what 
you may call a Bemba voting bloc that has voted PF, which has been seen as a Bemba 
party… You see, if there‘s any party that is ethnically associated, it‘s PF.‖291  Yet, for 
PF members, the accusations of tribal affiliation appear unfounded.  The PF‘s director 
of research, Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, states, ―In cities which are metropolitan, where 
you have mixed populations, people from different parts of the country living side by 
side, we have a lot of support.‖292  He echoes the PF spokesman and MP for Lusaka‘s 
Kabwata constituency, Given Lubinda, who observes, ―Now, we have been criticized 
as a tribal party but you will see that the areas where we win votes are the most 
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 Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, MMD, Lusaka, January 29, 2009. 
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 Personal interview with Dr. Choolwe Beyani, UPND, Lusaka, February 24, 2009. 
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 Personal interview with Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, PF, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.  
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cosmopolitan.‖293 Other independent observers point to the PF‘s victories in a multi-
lingual city such as Lusaka as a counter to the party‘s categorization as a Bemba 
entity.
294
  Scholars of the Zambian political scene, such as Gould (2007: 8) and 
Larmer and Fraser (2007: 632), also dismiss the PF as an ethnic party precisely 
because of its populist appeal in key cities. These conflicting perspectives most likely 
reflect Sata‘s success in using mixed strategies to create a minimum winning coalition 
that consisted of the urban poor as well as rural dwellers in Bemba-speaking 
provinces.   
 
Hichilema’s Dilemma 
Sata‘s ability to use a populist strategy with the urban poor by capturing the 
votes of Bemba-speaking groups in rural areas is only reinforced by Hichilema's 
inability to follow a similar strategy.  Since both Hichilema and his predecessor, the 
late Andrew Mazoka, are from the Tonga ethno-linguistic group, the UPND is largely 
perceived as a ―Tonga party.‖  Yet, as shown in Table 5.2, first-language Tonga 
speakers are only approximately 19 percent of the rural population.  Moreover, Table 
5.3 highlighted that they are only the majority group in Southern Province which, 
according to the Central Statistical Office (2003b), only contains 12 percent of the 
national population.  As such, Hichilema would not have been able to forge a 
minimum winning coalition between Tonga-speakers in Southern Province and the 
urban poor.   
In the past, the UPND has been able to create multi-ethnic coalitions, 
particularly with the Lozis of Western Province.  In fact, in 2001, Mazoka obtained 49 
percent of the vote there, compared with Mwanawasa‘s 27 percent.  However, in the 
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 Personal interview with Given Lubinda, PF, Lusaka, January 22, 2009. 
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 Personal interviews with Sheikh Chifuwe, The Post Newspaper, Lusaka, January 29, 2009 and 
Musonda Chibamba, BBC, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.  
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aftermath of the succession struggle within the UPND after Mazoka‘s death, described 
briefly in Chapter Three, the party‘s vice-president at the time, Sakwiba Sikota, left 
after Hichilema was chosen as party leader.  A Lozi-speaker, Sikota threw his weight 
behind the MMD in 2008 and campaigned vigorously with Banda across the country, 
including Western Province. In any case, Lozi speakers only comprise 8 percent of the 
rural population (see Table 5.3) and residents in Western Province are only 8 percent 
of the national population.  As such, even if a Lozi-Tonga coalition could be formed in 
tandem with the urban poor, this combination would still not be adequate to provide 
the UPND with a national majority.    
Given these circumstances, Hichilema attempted to portray the UPND as a 
national rather than Tonga party in order to obtain votes from other rural voters in 
2008.  This was apparent in two key respects.  First, in contrast to the PF, the UPND‘s 
slogan was printed on the party‘s campaign materials in seven indigenous languages, 
including Nyanja, Bemba, Tonga, Lozi, and a language of the Northwestern linguistic 
group (see UPND 2008).  During campaign rallies, Hichilema also attempted to speak 
local languages, rather than English, when addressing the audience.  For instance, at 
his rally in Chipata, the capital of Eastern Province, he spoke entirely in Nyanja 
(Times of Zambia 2008j).  He also affirmed the role of traditional chiefs from all 
ethno-linguistic groups, pledging on the campaign trail to renovate chiefs‘ palaces, 
provide them with better allowances, and offer them new cars if he were elected 
president (Lungu 2008).  Overall, Hichilema spent more time campaigning in Eastern 
Province and the PF‘s strongholds than Sata spent in the UPND‘s strongholds or 
Eastern Province (see Table 5.8).  This indicates that Hichilema recognized a 
peripheral coalition could not be secured by focusing on Southern Province alone in 
the same manner that Sata could concentrate on Bemba-speaking provinces.    
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Secondly, outside of Tonga-speaking areas, Hichilema engaged in a concerted 
effort to appeal to rural voters by addressing agricultural concerns.  For example, at 
his October 7, 2008 rally in Katete, Eastern Province, Hichilema stressed the 
importance of revitalizing the agricultural sector and pledged to provide farmers with 
free inputs during the first three years of his tenure (Times of Zambia 2008j).  In the 
town of Isoka, Northern Province, Hichilema promised that as president, he would 
cancel the Presidential Emoluments Bill and the Constitutional Office Holders‘ Bill, 
both of which aimed to increase salaries for the president, vice-president, speaker of 
Parliament, ministers and deputy ministers.  Instead, the money for such salary 
increases would be re-allocated to buy fertilizers and other agricultural inputs that 
would be distributed to farmers free of charge (Mulowa 2008).  However, such 
promises were not necessarily different from what the MMD was already offering 
through the FSP and FRA and unfortunately, as seen in Figure 5.3, Hichilema did not 
obtain substantial electoral majorities outside of Southern Province.   
Thus, Hichilema could not adopt a populist strategy with the urban poor 
because a peripheral coalition with rural Tonga-speakers alone would not provide him 
with a national majority. Instead, he needed to mobilize a larger segment of rural 
voters beyond Southern Province.  A populist strategy with the urban poor, which 
inherently focuses on urban priorities, would have failed in capturing the broader rural 
constituency base that he needed to win the presidency.  Consequently, Hichilema 
relied on personalistic linkages with the urban poor, which focused on his youth, 
education, charisma, and vague messages of both urban and rural development, in 
order to avoid alienating any voters.  
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Opposition and Religion in the Senegalese Countryside 
The pattern of mobilization employed by Sata in 2008 was likewise used by 
Abdoulaye Wade during his days as an opposition leader.  Previous to the 2000 
elections, Wade consistently gained most of his support in urban areas.  Yet, as Beck 
(2001) points out, he would have never won national office without receiving both 
urban and rural support.  Wade appeared to realize this in the years preceding the 2000 
elections, when he began to emphasize his religious background.  According to the 
Tidiane religious leader Serigne Moustapha Sy, ―In 1993, no one knew that Wade was 
a Mouride. We [Tidiane marabouts] helped him and protected him‖ (cited in Diouf 
2007). Yet, by 2000, Wade seized upon the Mouride leadership‘s disappointment with 
Diouf‘s policies and reinforced the notion that he would be ―their‖ president (Loimeier 
2007: 72). Such promises gained even greater credibility when Wade immediately 
traveled to Touba on the day he won in 2000 to be photographed kneeling before the 
Mouride Khalifa Général (Villalón 2004). Hundreds of copies of the photograph 
subsequently were distributed widely throughout the country (Villalón 2004). Thus, 
while Wade invoked a populist strategy in Dakar to capture the disgruntled masses in 
2000, he chose to mobilize a segment of rural supporters through public overtures 
demonstrating his religious devotion.    
By the 2007 presidential elections though, Senegal‘s opposition parties 
competed in circumstances akin to those experienced by Hichilema.  Theoretically, 
they could have followed Wade‘s example by forming a minimum winning coalition 
with poor Dakarois and a segment of rural voters by appealing to one of the two major 
Sufi brotherhoods, either the Tidianes or the Mourides.   Although most urban 
dwellers are devout Muslims, a number of observers have emphasized that religious 
brotherhoods take on different manifestations in rural than in urban areas (e.g. Dahou 
and Foucher 2004).  In urban areas, the marabouts tend to play a prominent role in 
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facilitating social and business networks (Beck 2001: 605).
295
  Yet, they have less 
influence over secular matters, such as politics (Gellar 2005: 111).  Notably, a well-
known urban marabout, Cheikh Modou Kara, was booed during a rally in Dakar in 
2000 when he announced to an audience filled with disgruntled youth that they should 
vote for the then-incumbent Parti Socialiste (PS) in the forthcoming elections  
(Audrain 2004: 100).  In rural areas, however, loyalty to religious leaders historically 
has been much higher than in urban centers (Beck 2008).  Moreover, Senegal‘s 
relatively high level of administrative decentralization accords religious leaders, 
particularly in regions where the seat of the brotherhoods are based, a substantial level 
of authority over local development and therefore makes them important 
intermediaries for the central government (see Beck 2001). Recognizing that local 
development depends on a community leader‘s assessment of continued government 
beneficence can play a powerful role for voting-age residents: 
  
When you go into rural areas, if you have in your party the leader of the village who 
serves the community, etc. you are sure to win there because he dominates the region 
economically, etc.  When the leader says ―vote‖ for something, then it‘s of course 
necessary for the people to vote for that person…But, in large cities, the people can 
position themselves more as they personally wish; they are less conditioned 
psychologically by the marabouts.
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Engaging in appeals to local religious leaders in rural areas and the Khalifa of the 
brotherhoods therefore could have assisted opposition leaders in gaining the following 
of co-religionists.   
 Practically, however, this was not possible in the 2007 elections for a variety of 
reasons.  First, as briefly detailed in Chapter Three, Abdoulaye Wade was already 
crafting clientelistic relationships with the Mouride leadership through ―implicit 
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 For instance, diaras, or religious solidarity associations, first emerged in urban areas to assist 
migrants financially with their adjustment to city life, and they often are controlled by a particular 
marabout (Beck 2001; Guèye 2001). 
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 Personal interview with Alioune Badara Diop, political scientist at the University of Gaston-Berger, 
St. Louis, December 1, 2008. 
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patronage promises and overt gestures‖ (Galvan 2009: 4). In addition to building a 
new road from the holy city of Touba to the Khalifa’s residence at Mbacké (Le Vine 
2004), he promised to build an airport there to facilitate religious pilgrimages 
(Gervasoni and Guèye 2005). Unlike previous presidents who have possessed a retreat 
in a beach community south of Dakar, Wade decided to build his own vacation home 
at Touba (Vengroff and Magala 2001:150). Shockingly, he also claimed during his 
first term that he would not engage in any project within the country without first 
consulting with his personal marabout, who happens to be the Khalifa Général of the 
Mourides (Gervasoni and Guèye 2005: 633).  Such actions provoked a great deal of 
tension among the brotherhoods and created especially difficult relations between the 
Tidjani branch at Tivaoune and Wade‘s government during his first term in office 
(Villalón 2004).   
Nevertheless, Wade remained committed to his Mouride co-religionists. When 
he launched his 2007 presidential campaign in Mbacké, Wade announced to the 
assembled crowd, ―I have constructed mosques and churches.  I have helped all 
religions. But, I will say clearly that I am a Muslim and a Mouride‖ (cited in Faye 
2007a: 4).  According to the journalist who accompanied Wade on the campaign trail, 
the President gave out 50 million CFA and a 4 X 4 car to all of the most important 
families within the Mouride brotherhood (Faye 2007b).  Such efforts ultimately 
proved fruitful for Wade since the Khalifa Général of the Mourides, Cheikh Saliou 
Mbacké, issued a declaration for his disciples to support Wade and appeared on 
television to lobby on behalf of the incumbent on the eve of the elections (Mbow 
2008). For Aiwa Wade, the representative for the LD-MPT, these clientelistic relations 
were a critical factor in explaining the PDS‘ support in rural areas:   ―The PDS is 
supported by the marabout bourgeoisie, who are compradors, and you know that in 
Senegal, there are the marabouts who say to their supporters ‗vote for this person‘ and 
289 
 
then their supporters will vote for that person.‖297 Indeed, interviews conducted with 
Mouride followers in the region of Diourbel revealed that though many preferred 
Idrissa Seck of Rewmi, they supported Wade because they did not want to disobey 
Cheikh Mbacké (see Faye 2007b).  Wade also forged close ties with another 
influential Mouride marabout, Cheikh Bethio Thioune, whose disciples violently 
attacked members of Idrissa Seck‘s campaign team (Mane 2007b).     
Secondly, Wade also attempted to co-opt portions of the Tidiane leadership.  
This was particularly problematic for the main opposition parties.  Indeed, given 
Abdou Diouf‘s Tidiane background, the PS remains associated with the Tidiane 
brotherhood.  According to the former Minister of Planning for the PS, Ibrahima Sall, 
the PS‘ main constituency is ―The middle-class, the Tidiane, and the Lébous‖ 
[emphasis added].
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Specifically, Wade tried to split the Tidianes by favoring one segment of the 
brotherhood, the Niassène branch at Kaolack, over the traditionally more influential 
one, which is the Malikiyya branch headquartered in Tivaoune (Mbow 2008). Wade 
did so by inviting a high-ranking Niassène marabout, Serigne Mamoune Niasse, to the 
Presidential Palace in the months immediately preceding the 2007 campaign and 
offered him 1.5 million Euros in cash in exchange for his support (Diop 2007).   In 
November 2006, Wade also promoted Serigne Niasse, who is illiterate in French, to 
the position of Minister of State without Portfolio and appointed him as a national 
senator not long after the elections.  In addition, Wade appointed Ahmed Khalifa 
Niasse, who is one of the sons of the Niassène Khalifa Général, as his Minister in 
Charge of a New Capital, which is a newly created ministry intended to oversee the 
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 Personal interview with Ibrahima Sall, PS, Dakar, November 11, 2008.   The Lébou are a subgroup 
of the Wolof people and are predominantly concentrated in the Cape Vert Peninsula where Dakar is 
located (Ross 2008). 
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construction of a new Senegalese capital between Dakar and St.Louis (Kane and Anne 
2007).  Such actions were strategic in thwarting the opposition candidate Moustapha 
Niasse.  Not only was Serigne Mamoune Niasse formerly was an organizer for the 
AFP in the regions of Kaolack, Fatick, and Diourbel, but also Moustapha Niasse 
belongs to the Niassène branch of the Tidiane brotherhood, and Kaolack is his home 
region and historically an important AFP stronghold.    
Beyond reducing candidate Niasse‘s prospects, Wade‘s actions continued to 
provoke anger among the Tivaoune branch of the Tidiane co-fraternity.  A sub-sect of 
this branch, known as the Moustarchidine, threw their support behind Idrissa Seck, 
who is both a Moustarchidine adherent and mayor of Thiès, which is the département 
in which the sub-sect is based.
299
  Although the Mouride leader encouraged Seck not 
to compete against Wade in the 2007 elections, Cheikh Tidiane Sy of the 
Moustarchidine suggested otherwise and affirmed his close ties with the Rewmi leader 
by stating that he had baptized Seck when the latter was an infant (Sow 2006).  
Ultimately, the influential son of Cheikh Sy, named Cheikh Moustapha Sy, issued a 
ndïgel for all Moustarchidine adherents to vote for Seck in the 2007 elections (Mbaye 
2007).
300
  In the immediate aftermath of the elections, Cheikh Moustapha Sy gave a 
speech that denounced Wade‘s division of the brotherhoods and the President‘s 
involvement in various financial scandals (Thurston 2007).  
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 According to Villalón (1999), the Moustarchidine is a movement that was founded in 1980 and was 
actually spurred by a succession crisis within the Tivaouane Tijaniyya order.  When Cheikh Ababacar 
Sy died in 1957, his successor as caliphate was fought over by his son, Cheikh Tidiane Sy and his 
brother, Cheikh Abdoul Aziz.  The latter ultimately obtained a majority of family support and Tidiane 
Sy established the Moustarchidine as a parallel power base.  The movement stresses the importance of 
genealogy as the source of legitimacy for its leadership, and has been active in hosting political 
activities aimed at targeting disillusioned youth.  In the early 1990s, the Moustarchidine gave support to 
the opposition and publicly broke with the PS and then-president Abdou Diouf.     
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 Mbaye (2007) speculates that this ndïgel created the impression among Mourides that Seck was a 
distinctly Tidiane candidate and therefore, it actually spurred more Mourides to vote for Wade.   
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Broad Campaigning for the Opposition  
Due to Wade's maneuvering as well as overlapping religious affinities among 
some of the main opposition candidates, no opposition leader could rely on targeting a 
minimum number of rural residents with religious appeals.  Rather, they needed to 
campaign more broadly in the countryside.  To demonstrate this, campaign data was 
collected from the newspaper Sud Quotidien between the official presidential 
campaign period of February 4-23, 2007. This newspaper is one of the most important 
independent newspapers in Senegal, and it dedicated a specific section of the paper to 
following the campaign trail for every day of the campaign period. 
   Importantly, the mode of campaigning is different in Senegal than in Zambia.  
Perhaps influenced by Wade's once-novel marches blues (see Chapter Three), 
candidates tend to travel through towns and stop occasionally to visit religious leaders 
or tour a neighborhood.  The most obvious illustration of this was Seck‘s orange 
caravan, which consisted of Seck traveling in a Hummer that was escorted by ten other 
4 x 4 cars, motorcycles, scooters, and the music of Youssou N‘dour (Mane 2007a). 
While rallies do occur, especially at the launch and ending of a campaign, they are not 
the overriding method of campaigning in the same manner as they are in Zambia.   As 
such, the number of villages and towns visited by each of the main candidates were 
recorded.  Then, the village names were matched with the 2002 census, which 
indicates the administrative region where each locality can be found.  Subsequently, 
the share of places visited within each region was calculated as the share of total 
places visited.  
Table 5.8 reveals that like Zambia, the incumbent was the only candidate to 
have visited all regions outside of Dakar, and this included the most remote regions, 
such as Matam.   In St. Louis, where President Wade concentrated many of his visits, 
these mostly occurred in the remote département of Podor, along the northern border 
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with Mauritania.  The region is mostly Pulaar and Tidiane and none of the main 
presidential candidates were from there so, Wade may have viewed it as an important 
swing region. Given the LD-MPT‘s more programmatic orientation around socialist 
goals, Bathily overwhelmingly concentrated his campaign activities in Dakar, where a 
more educated populace was more likely to understand his message.  In rural areas, he 
was most active in Tambacounda, which is the region of his birth. Dieng and Seck 
likewise spent most of their time in Dakar.  Yet, unlike the PF in Zambia, these 
opposition politicians spread out their rural campaign activities more broadly.  In 
contrast to Sata‘s concentration in those rural areas with large numbers of co-ethnics, 
Niasse allocated only 13 percent of his time in Kaolack, which is where he has the 
greatest affinity with the populace along religious lines.  He concentrated rather more 
of his visits in Louga, which has a Mouride majority, and in Thiès, where the other 
Tidiane sect is located.     
 
 Table 5.8: Share of Locales Visited in each Région  
Région Selected Candidates (Party) 
Wade 
(PDS) 
Seck 
(Rewmi) 
Niasse 
(AFP) 
Dieng  
(PS)  
Bathily 
(LD-
MPT) 
Sagna 
(DS) 
Dakar 9.5 29.3 6.5 25.0 40.7 14.3 
Diourbel  4.8 7.3 3.2 12.5 0.0 0.0 
Fatick 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 
Kaolack 4.8 9.8 12.9 8.3 7.4 0.0 
Kolda 2.4 7.3 3.2 4.2 3.7 28.6 
Louga 4.8 7.3 16.1 8.3 7.4 0.0 
Matam 7.1 2.4 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 
St. Louis 31.0 12.2 9.7 4.2 3.7 0.0 
Tamba-
counda 
4.8 4.9 9.7 12.5 14.8 14.3 
Thies 9.5 14.6 25.8 16.7 11.1 28.6 
Ziguinchor  11.9 4.9 12.9 4.2 7.4 14.3 
Total  100 
(N=42) 
100 
 (N=41) 
100 
 (N=31) 
100 
 (N=24) 
100 
 (N=27) 
100 
 (N=7) 
Source:  Calculated from news reports in Sud Quotidien newspaper between February 4-23, 2007. 
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Interestingly, regardless of where the opposition candidates campaigned, they 
all received their greatest electoral support in their home regions, as seen by the 
boldfaced numbers in Table 5.9.  Wade‘s most formidable challenge came in the 
region of Thiès where Seck was certainly assisted by both his mayoral position there 
and his support from the Moustarchidine.  Dieng, who was born in the département of 
Mbour within Thiès, also obtained the highest share of his votes in this region. Sagna, 
who was the only Christian candidate in the race, was the favorite opposition 
candidate in the predominantly Catholic region of Ziguinchor.  Bathily received very 
few votes across all regions but his highest share of votes came from Tambacounda.   
 
Table 5.9:  Regional Distribution of Voting Shares in 2007 Senegalese  
Presidential Elections 
Région Selected Candidates  
Wade 
(PDS) 
Seck 
(Rewmi) 
Niasse 
(AFP) 
Dieng  
(PS)  
Bathily 
(LD-MPT) 
Sagna 
(DS) 
Dakar  55.9 19.1 4.0 14.0 1.4 1.3 
Diourbel  73.5 10.4 2.2 8.3 1.0 0.5 
Fatick 55.9 6.5 9.9 16.9 3.6 1.0 
Kaolack 44.8 6.6 23.1 18.0 2.2 0.9 
Kolda 68.1 4.4 4.5 5.6 3.2 5.8 
Louga 59.1 14.2 2.8 15.4 2.5 0.8 
Matam 67.1 3.7 11.4 5.2 5.9 1.6 
St. Louis 59.5 12.2 3.4 17.1 2.5 0.5 
Tambacounda 60.0 7.0 4.3 10.6 6.8 5.4 
Thies 38.6 32.9 2.6 19.9 1.2 0.8 
Ziguinchor  55.9 4.9 2.4 2.2 2.1 26.3 
Total  55.9 14.9 5.9 13.6 2.2 2.6 
Source:  ―Résultats Provisoires de la Commision Nationale de Récensement des Votes,‖ Sud Quotidien, 
March 2, 2007, p.3.   
For Niasse, Kaolack was by far the region in which he was most popular.  
However, Wade‘s ties to the Niassène marabouts there surely dampened some of 
Niasse‘s support.  Indeed, in the first round of the 2000 presidential elections, Niasse 
received 32 percent of the votes in the region of Kaolack while Wade received only 14 
percent.
 301
   The tables were turned by 2007 when Niasse received only 23 percent of 
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 Data was provided by Macoumba Coumé at the Ministry of the Interior in Dakar on Oct. 2, 2008. 
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the vote compared with Wade‘s 45 percent. As such, Wade‘s actions in the interim 
must have encouraged the Niassène leadership, and its disciples, that the incumbent 
was a better choice than their co-religionist. With respect to Wade, even though he did 
not spend much physical time in Diourbel during the two-week campaign period, the 
explicit support of the Mouride Khalifa Général helped Gorgui achieve his highest 
victories in that overwhelmingly Mouride region.   
 This pattern of election results illustrates that without being able to appeal to a 
religious brotherhood, the opposition candidates could not obtain sufficient rural 
support beyond their home regions. This was even true for Seck, who gained the 
support of the Moustarchidine and came very close to obtaining the majority of votes 
in the region of Thiès.
302
 The Moustarchidine are just one sub-sect of the wider 
Tidiane brotherhood and they are concentrated in Thiès, which is the second most 
populous region but still only contains 13 percent of the national population (ANSD 
2004).  Like Hichilema in Zambia, Seck and other Senegalese opposition candidates 
failed to mobilize a sizeable enough following in the countryside that would have, in 
concert with support from Dakar‘s urban poor, provided a minimum winning 
coalition.  As such, a populist strategy with the urban poor was untenable for members 
of the opposition who could not be assured of enough support from rural voters to 
gamble on a campaign message that explicitly focused on rectifying exclusion and 
improving services and jobs for deprived Dakarois.     
 
Conclusion  
This chapter argued that even though a populist strategy is optimal for 
attaining differentiation and congruence among the urban poor, it also poses some 
costs.  First, such a strategy will not help a party win a national election if only a small 
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share of the national population lives in urban areas.  As such, a party is more likely to 
employ a populist strategy with the urban poor in a country which is sufficiently 
urbanized.  Without a sizeable, low-income, urban constituency whose experiences 
will resonate with a discourse oriented around the rectification of inequalities, a 
populist strategy is not optimal.  Both Zambia and Senegal meet this necessary 
condition.   
A second challenge for populist strategies is that they can prove alienating to 
other constituents.  This is particularly problematic given that opposition parties must 
ensure that they also receive enough support from rural voters in order to obtain 
national majorities.  With fewer resources than the incumbent, an opposition party 
keen to employ a populist strategy therefore needs to form a minimum winning 
coalition that ensures the most votes with the expenditure of the fewest resources.  
Such a coalition is possible if a segment of rural voters can be appealed to via 
clientelistic linkages based on an ascriptive identity that applies to a population group 
sizeable enough to offer a national victory when combined with support from the 
urban poor.  As in Gibson‘s (1997) work, such a coalition depends on a metropolitan 
constituency around whom a policy discourse is directed and a peripheral element that 
provides a party with sufficient votes.   
In Zambia‘s 2008 elections, Sata was capable of meeting this sufficient 
condition while other parties were not.  He could use a populist strategy with the urban 
poor because he appealed to Bemba-speaking rural dwellers who were concentrated in 
Northern and Luapula provinces and who could provide a sufficient number of votes.  
His clientelistic linkages in Bemba-speaking areas were not based on a discourse of 
excluding other ethno-linguistic groups if he came to office.  Rather, he implied that 
other leaders, such as Hichilema, would exclude Bemba-speakers if they came to 
office.  Moreover, while he often used Bemba slogans, even in urban areas, to 
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communicate with voters, these slogans conveyed inclusive messages.  Indeed, 
pleading that voters should "get on the boat" (Pabwato) with the PF to escape 
economic hardships was an appealing prospect even for those who were not co-
ethnics.  As such, he was able to appeal to "peripheral" interests in Bembaphone rural 
provinces without necessarily offending non-co-ethnics in urban areas.  Ultimately, 
Sata did not win the presidency, but he only lost by two percentage points to Banda.  If 
many young, urban voters had not been disenfranchised by the ECZ‘s refusal to re-
open the electoral register, then Sata‘s dual coalition would more than likely have 
proved victorious, especially since the findings in Chapter Four illustrated that this 
constituency was especially likely to support Sata.
303
   
  By contrast, Figure 5.4 shows that Hichilema could not rely on appealing to 
solely Tonga-speakers for a majority, and his need to campaign more widely in rural 
Zambia implied that he could not use a potentially alienating populist strategy with the 
urban poor.  Likewise, support from the Moustarchidines in Thiès did not offer Seck a 
sizeable rural coalition.  Due to the presence of religious candidates and Wade‘s co-
optation of Mouride and Niassène Tidiane marabouts, Niasse and Dieng also were 
forced to campaign more broadly in rural areas and therefore could not risk a populist 
strategy with poor Dakarois. A Christian candidate such as Robert Sagna could never 
hope to use religious appeals alone in a majority Muslim country if his goal was the 
national presidency.  Consequently, these conditions in the countryside forced most of 
the Senegalese opposition, as well as Zambia‘s Hichilema, to resort to personalistic 
linkages with the urban poor. 
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Figure 5.4:   Conditions Conducive to a Populist Strategy with the Urban Poor by 
Opposition Party 
 
Given other research on politics and cleavage structures in Africa and beyond, 
these findings are significant for at least three related reasons.  First, in Zambia in 
particular, rural-urban and class cleavages have been dismissed as less salient than 
ethno-linguistic ones (see Posner 2005: 86-88), and parties often are portrayed as 
predominantly interested in coalitions that allow them to exploit ethno-regional 
affinities for electoral gain (see Scarritt 2006). Instead, this chapter argues that parties 
Can the opposition candidate   No  The candidate needs to obtain broad support 
appeal to rural voters via an                   in rural areas;  Cannot use populist strategy with 
ascriptive identity cleavage?       the urban poor  (E.g. Sagna, 2007) 
 
         
                  
                 Yes  
 
 
 
Is the incumbent already   Yes   The candidate needs to obtain broad support 
appealing to this segment of          in rural areas;  Cannot use populist strategy             
rural voters via an ascriptive       with the urban poor  
identity cleavage?                                                          (E.g. Niasse, Dieng, 2007)    
                                                                                      
 
       No    
      
       
 
 
Is this segment of rural      The candidate needs to obtain broad support 
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coalition when combined with                 (E.g. Hichilema,2006 & 2008; Seck, 2007) 
the urban poor?  
 
 
     Yes 
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(E.g.  Sata, 2006 & 2008;  Wade, 2001) 
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conceivably can exploit multiple cleavages during the same electoral cycle and form 
unlikely coalitions. Ultimately, different segments of society may support the same 
candidate for different reasons. This in turn may lead to multiple, potentially 
conflicting, public expectations about performance when and if the candidate becomes 
president.  Secondly, based on his analysis of opposition politics in Côte d'Ivoire 
during the 1990s, Crook (1997) observes that ruling parties can more credibly claim 
that they represent "the nation" rather than localized interests.  By contrast, he argues 
that opposition parties face the challenge of trying to mobilize their ethnic or 
communal social bases without becoming limited by them and simply synonymous 
with regional strongholds. By combining a populist strategy with the urban poor and 
clientelist linkages with a segment of rural voters, the PF was able to confront this 
challenge and craft a more inclusive coalition than if it had relied on either 
constituency alone.  Lastly, as illustrated by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and 
Chhibber and Torcal (1997), parties often play a pivotal role in exacerbating or 
mitigating certain cleavage structures according to prevailing circumstances. In the 
case of Senegal and Zambia, the direction in which a party leader ultimately decided 
to embark to capture rural votes depended on demographics, the choices of other 
parties, and a candidate‘s own identity.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Africa‘s Urban Poor:  Agents of Political Change?  
 
As the colonial era ended, African urban poverty was changing.  The traditional poor 
were still there.  Blind beggars still felt their way through the streets.  Market-women 
still jostled for tiny profits…But now new categories of poor joined them in the 
swollen towns.  Unemployed youths sat on the kerbs awaiting the chance to unload a 
lorry…Policemen with street urchins and old women with nothing sat in the shade 
awaiting the arrival of the social worker.  Poverty in Africa has been a cumulative 
phenomenon.  
(Iliffe 1987: 192).  
 
Iliffe‘s observations about the intersection between demographic and 
socioeconomic trends in Africa continue to resonate today and, as this dissertation has 
shown, can impact party strategizing and voting behavior within the region.  Although 
Nelson (1979) argued more than 30 years ago that few African political parties 
accorded attention to the urban poor because the electorate was predominantly rural, 
Africa is now on the precipice of an urban ―tipping point.‖  Not only is Africa the 
fastest urbanizing region of the world, but also one where urbanization has resulted in 
a higher share of the region‘s poor living in urban areas (Ravallion et al. 2007).  At the 
same time, opportunities for political parties to mobilize the urban poor are more 
numerous given that multi-party elections now represent the norm rather than the 
exception in Africa.  In fact, while only about eight percent of presidential elections in 
the 1960s involved an incumbent competing against an actual opposition party, the 
equivalent figure by 2005 was 98 percent (Posner and Young 2007: 130).   
   Based on these underlying changes in the region, this study addressed two 
main questions by comparing political parties within the same country, across 
countries, and over different time periods.  First, why and when do the urban poor in 
African democracies support opposition parties? Chapter Two argued that the 
campaign strategies used by political parties to mobilize the urban poor were more 
likely explanations for this constituency‘s voting behavior than other potential 
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explanations, such as vote-buying by political parties, the poor‘s retrospective 
perceptions of the macro-economy, ethnic voting, and associational ties.  Populist 
strategies in particular were believed to be more likely to mobilize the urban poor than 
personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone. Populist strategies were 
characterized by an anti-elitist discourse, a policy message of social inclusion focused 
on jobs, housing, and services, charismatic leadership, and sometimes the distribution 
of selective benefits.  Populist strategies therefore fuse together the different modes of 
mobilization inherent in the three types of citizen-voter linkages.  At same time, 
populist strategies target the same constituents as clientelistic linkages, i.e. the poor, 
and foster unmediated ties between leaders and voters in the same manner as 
personalistic linkages.   
The main mechanisms facilitating the appeal of populist strategies are 
differentiation and congruence.  Differentiation refers to the ability of a voter to 
determine distinctions among parties that extend beyond just the personality of the 
party leader.  Congruence refers to the distance between the policies advocated by a 
party on the one hand and those desired by a constituency on the other hand.  Since 
most African parties rely on personalistic linkages, a populist strategy provides greater 
differentiation.  Simultaneously, purely programmatic linkages along a left-right 
policy spectrum may fail to provide adequate congruence.   
 Chapter Three relied on interviews with political elites and other local 
observers to illustrate the different manner in which parties interact with the urban 
poor in Senegal and Zambia.  In Zambia, the PF‘s Michael Sata employed a populist 
strategy in both the 2006 and 2008 presidential elections.  This consisted of a 
campaign focused on improving urban services, reducing taxes, creating jobs, and 
ending harassment of marketeers and shanty compound residents.  Along with 
controversial antics designed to attract attention, Sata targeted his urban campaigns in 
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low-income areas of Lusaka.  Furthermore, he created unmediated ties with the urban 
poor by using simplistic language that resonated with their plight and having an ―open 
door‖ policy to make him more available to constituents.  At the same time, this 
populism manifested through a highly autocratic management of the PF, which 
involved ostracizing errant party members who disobeyed Sata‘s dictates.  By contrast, 
both Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND and Godfrey Miyanda of the Heritage Party 
depended on more personalistic linkages with the urban poor.  The inability of either 
of these candidates to garner a high number of votes in the capital city, and the fact 
that they obtained even fewer votes than the incumbent MMD, indicates that poor 
Lusakans are not just pro-opposition but specifically pro-Sata.  
While Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS relied on a populist strategy with the urban 
poor to win Senegal‘s 2000 presidential elections, his first term in office resulted in 
few tangible benefits for this constituency.  In Dakar, a majority of his attention was 
diverted towards large-scale construction projects that primarily benefitted the urban 
elite. Nevertheless, no opposition party could obtain sufficient vote majorities from the 
urban poor during the 2007 elections.  Parties such as the PS, AFP, and Rewmi 
primarily forged personalistic linkages with the urban poor that were devoid of a clear 
policy message and mostly focused on the personalities of the party leaders.  Leftist 
parties relied more on programmatic linkages but their central messages were divorced 
from the everyday realities of the urban poor.        
Chapter Four utilized surveys with informal market workers and slum dwellers 
to analyze the mechanisms of differentiation and congruence. The chapter revealed 
that the populist PF overwhelmingly was viewed by respondents as the party most 
concerned about improving living conditions in Lusaka, and a majority of respondents 
believed that the main distinction among Zambia‘s political parties were their 
positions on social and economic conditions.  By contrast, most respondents in 
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Senegal did not perceive any difference among their country‘s political parties and 
believed that no opposition party was concerned with improving living conditions in 
Dakar.  The econometric results confirmed that, among other factors, those 
respondents who were most concerned with, and or disappointed by, service delivery 
and job creation under the incumbent MMD were significantly more likely to support 
the opposition PF in Zambia.  However, in Senegal, those who were least educated 
and objectively poorer still supported the incumbent, despite Wade‘s well-known lack 
of attention to the needs of the urban poor during his first term.    
The relative success of Sata‘s populist strategy in Zambia as compared to the 
opposition challengers in Senegal motivates the second question probed during this 
study:  when is it feasible for an opposition party to employ a populist strategy?  
Chapter Five argued that this depended on two factors.  First, a country needs to be 
sufficiently urbanized in order for a party to possess an incentive to appeal to the 
urban poor and in order for socioeconomic conditions to permit a populist discourse to 
resonate with voters.  Even when a country meets such conditions, a second condition 
is also required.  An opposition party needs to be able to form a minimum winning 
coalition that consists of the urban poor and a large enough segment of rural voters to 
deliver electoral majorities but not so large as to require extensive campaigning.  In 
such instances, the urban poor represent what Gibson (1997) terms the ―metropolitan‖ 
component of the coalition, towards whom policies are directed, while the segment of 
rural voters constitutes the coalition‘s ―peripheral‖ element.  For the reasons discussed 
in Chapter Five, ascriptive identity cleavages offer one of the few means of mobilizing 
an adequate share of rural voters without undermining an opposition party‘s credibility 
with the urban poor.  Through the use of census data, it was argued that ethno-
linguistic identity and Sufi brotherhood represent the politically salient cleavages in 
Zambia and Senegal, respectively.   
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By using data on campaign rallies, the study revealed that Zambia‘s populist 
candidate, Sata, concentrated his 2008 rural campaigning in Bemba-speaking 
provinces, and these were also the only rural provinces that he won during that 
election.  His ability to create a metropolitan and peripheral coalition explains why the 
PF is alternately viewed as a populist party and a tribal one.  By contrast, the 
Senegalese opposition could not engage in the same coalition-building with a 
combination of Dakar‘s poor and a segment of rural voters.  The incumbent, Wade, 
had already co-opted the leaders of the Mouride brotherhood as well as those from the 
Niassène sect of the Tidiane brotherhood.  While Seck obtained support from a sect of 
the Tidiane brotherhood known as the Moustarchidines, this sect‘s following was not 
sizeable enough to provide the Rewmi leader with a minimum winning coalition.  
Unable to mobilize rural voters along identity cleavages, most of Senegal‘s opposition 
needed to espouse broad messages of rural development and these messages would not 
resonate with rural dwellers if they had been coupled with a targeted discourse focused 
on rectifying urban inequalities and living conditions.  
Overall then, the study emphasized how and why populist strategies are 
optimal for mobilizing the urban poor, as well as why parties do not always employ 
them.  This chapter first examines how the study informed existing theories of voting 
behavior.  Then, the study‘s two central arguments are applied to explain the voting 
behavior of the urban poor in other highly urbanized African electoral democracies, 
such as Kenya, Botswana, and South Africa.  Thereafter, four contributions of the 
research are discussed with respect to democratic contestation and consolidation, party 
linkages, cross-regional manifestations of populism, and Africanist scholarship on 
elections, parties, and voting.  The chapter concludes by discussing areas for further 
research.        
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Informing Theories on Voting Behavior  
This study originally noted that the voting literature suggested four potential 
influences on the urban poor's decision about whether to support an opposition party:  
vote-buying, ethnic ties, retrospective perceptions of the macro-economy, and 
associational membership. Based on the study‘s findings, two variables can be 
discounted in the African context while two require modifications.   
Associational membership had no influence on the urban poor's voting 
behavior.  Though some were involved in credit associations, often administered by 
NGOs, few respondents in either country were involved in any type of work 
associations.  They either did not know that such organizations existed for marketeers 
and vendors, or they felt that there was little benefit to their participation in them.  
Even UNACOIS in Senegal, which was politically active in the 1990s, is 
predominantly for informal sector workers who engage in export-import enterprises 
than for those who are small-scale street hawkers.  Potentially, associational 
membership among the urban poor can at some point shape political affiliations or 
facilitate corporatist ties in the same way that formal trade unions have done in both 
other regions and at certain points in Africa‘s history.  However, the existing results 
largely confirm the prevailing view (e.g. Amis 2004; Croucher 2007; Dietz 1998; 
Huntington and Nelson 1976; Nelson  1970, 1979; Thornton 2000) that the diverse 
activities, time constraints, and heterogeneous backgrounds of the urban poor simply 
precludes their ability and desire to organize effectively and thereby create the critical 
mass necessary for political influence.  
Likewise, vote-buying alone, which is a sub-type of clientelism, displayed no 
perceivable influence on the voting behavior of the urban poor in either Senegal or 
Zambia. Unlike in rural areas, where fewer opposition parties can extensively 
campaign, multiple parties may be engaged in vote-buying in urban centers. This was 
305 
 
clear in both case study countries where survey respondents reported that the 
incumbent party and most of the opposition parties offered gifts and sometimes even 
money to their communities during campaign periods.  
A voter may certainly be more likely to vote for any candidate who provides 
certain goods and services over one who does not.  Indeed, Zambia's opposition 
candidate, Godfrey Miyanda, was known for abstaining from vote-buying practices 
and he received no support from the respondents surveyed in Lusaka.  However, in a 
context where multiple parties are engaged in vote-buying, this cannot be the main 
means of mobilizing the urban poor.  Ultimately, the urban poor need to distinguish 
parties according to other criteria and can still vote according to their conscience even 
if they accept gifts from every party.
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  This explains why, despite the high level of 
vote-buying in both countries, this variable did not demonstrate a statistically 
significant effect in shaping respondents' support for Sata or Wade.    
Retrospective views of the macro-economy also did not exhibit an influence on 
voting behavior in the traditional sense.  However, the findings here suggest an 
alteration to the usual conceptualization and measurement of variables associated with 
this school of thought.  Specifically, Chapter Two illustrated that based on traditional 
measures used in this literature, such as GDP and inflation, poor macroeconomic 
conditions did not necessarily explain when the urban poor supported the incumbent 
or the opposition.  In fact, in Senegal, macroeconomic growth was negative before the 
2007 elections and the PDS‘ incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, nevertheless won a great 
deal of support among the urban poor.  By contrast, growth was positive in Zambia 
before the 2006 elections but the MMD incumbent at the time, Levy Mwanawasa, 
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similar point:  ―"We do like vote buying.  It is essential.  That is the only way we have to see anything 
good coming from the politicians. Anyway, I can vote for whoever I want."  
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gained few votes from the urban poor.  Chapter Three further elaborated on the 
economic climate in these two countries preceding key presidential elections.  For 
example, Sata's popularity coincided with a period of strong economic growth under 
Mwanawasa. Chapter Four further illustrated that negative sociotropic and egotropic 
views of the macro-economy did not play a statistically significant role in determining 
whether a survey respondent supported the opposition or incumbent in each country's 
most recent presidential elections.   
Yet, macroeconomic growth does not necessarily always filter down to the 
poor in developing countries (e.g. Lewis 2008; Thurlow and Wobst 2006) and can 
therefore fail to address the urban poor's main concerns over jobs, housing, services, 
and food prices.  Not surprisingly, disappointment with incumbent performance with 
job creation and service provision proved a major impetus for supporting the 
opposition in Zambia, particularly since the populist PF specifically targeted these 
issues during its campaigns.  As such, this voting model could be amended in ways 
that account for issues that are more relevant in developing countries than in OECD 
ones, where this school of thought originally emerged.   Accurate and comparable 
indicators on unemployment, inequality, access to services, and treatment of informal 
sector workers are difficult to find but would nevertheless go a long way towards 
making this voting model more finely attuned to the everyday worries of the poor in 
developing countries.  
Of the four voting models originally discussed, ethnicity played the strongest 
role in Zambia, where ethno-linguistic affinity has long been a factor in politics, but 
not in Senegal, where ethnicity rarely has represented the main salient cleavage.  In 
particular, Bemba speakers among Lusaka's poor tended to vote for a co-ethnic leader, 
Sata.   Yet, a majority of the survey respondents who were non-Bemba also voted for 
him.  Moreover, even after Bemba ethno-linguistic identity was controlled for in the 
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statistical analyses included in Chapter Four, indicators capturing satisfaction with 
jobs and service delivery were also statistically significant predictors of a respondent's 
support for Sata.   
King Cobra‘s populist strategy purposely targeted class concerns and 
represented the main reason for his success.  Indeed, given that Lusaka is Zambia's 
most diverse city and dominated more by Nyanja than Bemba speakers, Sata's 
overwhelming successes there cannot simply be due to ethnic factors alone. Yet, his 
background as a Bemba and his use of ethnic mobilization in the countryside may 
have even further increased his appeal among poor, urban co-ethnics.   In any case, 
national election results reveal that ethno-linguistic identity played a much stronger 
role in the rural areas since Sata only won in those rural provinces that are a majority 
Bemba-speaking, despite the PF's lack of an agricultural message and the MMD's 
agricultural subsidies to these regions.  Chapter Five emphasized a similar trend in 
Senegal where adherence to a specific Sufi brotherhood was less relevant in Dakar 
than in rural areas.   
These findings therefore question extreme views regarding the political 
influence of ethnic and other ascriptive identities among city dwellers. Urbanization 
does not overwhelmingly exacerbate ethnic differences, as Bates (1983) or Melson 
and Wolpe (1970) once speculated, nor does it entirely eradicate their salience, as 
Allport (1954) postulated.  Instead, it allows the urban poor to adapt multiple 
identities, e.g. ascriptive, occupational, socioeconomic, demographic, etc., that can at 
times be mutually reinforcing.    
 
The Populist Strategy in Other African Democracies  
 The study‘s central arguments can be used to explain the success of parties in 
other African democracies.  Chapter One identified 15 countries that are considered 
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electoral democracies and categorized them according to their level of urbanization 
and whether an opposition or incumbent party obtained the majority of votes in that 
country‘s largest city during the most recent national elections for executive office 
(see Table 1.1). Based on that classification, three additional countries which were 
considered electoral democracies and which fell within the highly urbanized category 
are examined here.  This latter characteristic is important given this study‘s claim that 
a highly urbanized populace represents a scope condition for the presence of a populist 
strategy with the urban poor.     
These three shadow cases include Kenya, Botswana, and South Africa, which 
have varied on the dependent variable of opposition success in urban areas. Kenya is 
similar to Zambia in that it represents a case where an opposition party obtained a 
majority of urban votes during the last elections in 2007.  Botswana is a country where 
the opposition was dominant in the capital of Gaborone for more than a decade but 
where the incumbent party gained a majority of votes in the city during the 2009 
elections.  As such, the case offers the opportunity to examine how changes in parties‘ 
electoral fortunes are reflective of the presence or absence of a populist strategy.  
Despite internal squabbles and the emergence of a new opposition party, South 
Africa‘s incumbent party retained its dominance in major urban areas, such as 
Johannesburg, during the 2009 presidential elections.   
Collectively, the cases emphasize three points about a populist strategy.  First 
and foremost, it is a winning strategy for mobilizing the urban poor.  Secondly, it is 
almost always predicated on a dual coalition that consists of the urban poor and a 
segment of rural voters who are mobilized according to an identity cleavage.  Thirdly, 
a populist strategy is also available to incumbent parties, whose leaders may use this 
strategy to reinvigorate their party‘s support among the urban poor.   
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Agwambo’s Populist Strategy with Kenya’s Urban Poor   
 Kenya officially transitioned to a multi-party system in December 1991.  
However, the long-ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was not ousted 
until Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 presidential elections. Kibaki was leader of the 
Democratic Party (DP) as well as a broader opposition coalition known as the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC).  According to Kenya‘s Electoral Commission, Kibaki 
obtained approximately 76 percent of the votes in Nairobi during the 2002 elections.   
Similar to Mwanawasa‘s first term in office, Kibaki‘s first five years as 
president were characterized by good stewardship of the macro-economy.  By 
privatizing failing state enterprises, enforcing tax regulations, and improving Kenya‘s 
business environment, the budget deficit declined substantially and tax revenue 
doubled (Chege 2008).  Between 2003 and 2007, economic growth increased from 3.4 
to 7 percent (Chege 2008: 128).   
Yet, urban poverty and inequality actually increased during roughly the same 
period. Over the last decade, Kenya has experienced rapid urbanization, growing at 
4.4 percent in recent years (UN-Habitat 2003), and it is expected that the capital city 
of Nairobi will have 3.3 million residents by 2010 (Otiso and Owusu 2008).  Between 
1997 and 2006, two poverty studies conducted under the auspices of the Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget Survey Bureau revealed that the share of the urban 
population considered ―food poor‖ increased from 38 to 41 percent (Oxfam 2009).  
Moreover, while the rural Gini coefficient decreased from 0.42 to 0.38, its urban 
equivalent increased from 0.43 to 0.45 (Oxfam 2009). In Nairobi province, the poverty 
incidence is 44 percent, and it is estimated that the richest decile of the city‘s 
population accrues approximately 20 times more income than the poorest decile 
(World Bank 2009b: 50).  Youth unemployment in Nairobi alone stands at 42 percent 
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(World Bank 2009b: 50), and an estimated 60 percent of the city‘s population lives in 
slums that occupy only five percent of the capital‘s land area (UN-Habitat 2008: 10).  
Moreover, the Kibaki regime‘s treatment of the urban poor was not particularly 
benevolent. For instance, in February 2004, the government threatened to evict 
300,000 people from Kibera, which is considered Africa‘s largest slum, because 
houses had been built by railway tracks, under electricity pylons, or in areas marked 
for road construction.  Though nothing ultimately happened, government authorities 
bulldozed and set fire to hundreds of homes in dozens of Nairobi‘s other informal 
settlements between 2004 and 2006 (COHRE 2006: 21-23).  Even more 
controversially, gang violence within the slums resulted in heavy-handed police 
intervention that was resented by residents.  A raid on gangs in Mathare slum in mid-
2007, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 people, left the urban poor particularly 
incensed over Kibaki‘s inability to control the police (Kagwanja 2009: 371).  
 Raila Odinga was well-placed to capitalize on the urban poor‘s 
disenchantment. Nicknamed Agwambo, or ―the myseterious one,‖ Odinga is a well-
established Kenyan politician.  During the early 1990s, Odinga belonged to a party 
known as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD).
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  When that party 
split into two, he became leader of the FORD-Kenya faction.  After losing internal 
elections to lead this faction, he left to form the National Democratic Party (NDP), 
from which he contested the 1997 presidential elections.  Subsequently, he became a 
member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which in turn joined Kibaki‘s NARC 
coalition in the 2002 elections.  Odinga was appointed the Minister of Roads under 
Kibaki‘s government.  Yet, in 2005, in the aftermath of Kibaki‘s failed referendum on 
strengthening presidential powers, a number of cabinet ministers, including Odinga, 
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 Raila Odinga‘s father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, had been vice-president to Jomo Kenyatta during 
the 1960s and a stalwart of KANU until he left the party and founded FORD.   
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were purged.  Odinga subsequently formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
and Kibaki changed the name of his own party to the Party of National Unity 
(PNU).
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Despite traversing so many parties, Odinga‘s constituency base is undoubtedly 
tied to the urban poor.  Since 1992, he has been consistently re-elected as the MP for 
Nairobi‘s Langata constituency, which contains the large slum of Kibera, estimated to 
house from 750,000 to one million of Nairobi‘s population.  Residents have cited 
unemployment, poor housing, insufficient water and sanitation facilities, and 
insecurity as some of their main concerns (The Nation 2007). The ODM also has an 
unofficial office located in a part of the slum known as Gatwikira (De Smedt 2009), 
and Odinga spent the day before the 2007 elections holding a series of rallies in 
Langata constituency (Barasa 2007).  
 Like Sata, Odinga is highly charismatic and politically ambitious.  A rich 
businessman who formerly subscribed to socialism, he is well-known for his 
flamboyant outfits and for driving around Nairobi in his expensive Hummer car.  
During the 2007 campaign, he would improvise riddles and alter song lyrics in order 
to highlight the Kibaki government‘s failings, and he notably once emerged from his 
car‘s sunroof to exclaim, ―This government needs a hammer…it needs to be 
hammered out‖ (cited in Bosire 2007). Such tactics attract large crowds to his urban 
rallies.  In fact, his motorcade was mobbed with adoring supporters during his opening 
rally in Nairobi‘s Uhuru Park where the crowd forced people onto trees and rooftops 
to find space to hear his message (Odula 2007).  As Lynch (2006:  255) observes, ―Raila 
is a man who stirs up the strongest of emotions – be it ‗Railamania‘ or ‗Railaphobia‘.‖ 
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symbol of those who opposed greater executive powers and a banana was the symbol for those who did 
not.   
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 A discourse firmly targeted at ameliorating inequalities and catering to the 
needs of the urban poor proved central to Odinga‘s 2007 campaign.  The interests of 
slum dwellers in particular have long represented one of his interests.  Back in 2001, 
Odinga had appealed to the then-president, Daniel Arap Moi, to lower the rents in 
Kibera (De Smedt 2009).  In 2005, when speculators were trying to obtain private 
ownership of land in Nairobi‘s Kiambiu slum, Odinga gave a speech on behalf of 
protecting the slum residents‘ interests and argued that the Kibaki government should 
more actively upgrade slums in both the capital and elsewhere in the country (The 
East African 2005).  When accepting the presidential nomination by the ODM in 
September 2007, Odinga promised to end Kenya‘s ―economic apartheid‖ and ensured 
his young supporters jobs, free schooling, and cash for the poor (Chege 2008). In a 
subsequent rally, Odinga announced, ―Kibaki says that the economy is better, but the 
situation on the ground shows that inflation has grown high.  Sixty percent of Nairobi 
residents live in informal settlements because of government mismanagement. We 
want to improve the economic power of the people. We want a social movement" 
(cited in Odula 2007). While Kibaki focused on emphasizing his government‘s 
economic achievements, Odinga placed job creation as the first priority in his party 
manifesto and countered that growth under Kibaki only resulted in widening income 
gaps.  As such, Odinga promised the following:   
 
I give you a cast-iron guarantee that I will be a champion of social justice and social 
emancipation – a champion of the poor, the dispossessed and the disadvantaged in our 
nation. I will redress the imbalance between the powerful and the weak, between the 
rich and the poor, between the satisfied and the hungry (Odinga 2007: 7).  
Odinga also launched attacks on government corruption, which only strengthened his 
focus on inequality since Kibaki himself was one of the world‘s highest paid heads of 
state at the time (see Bosire and Peytermann 2007). 
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 Such a campaign helped Odinga forge unmediated ties with the urban poor.  
Chege (2008: 135) observes that the ODM‘s lively and colorful campaign oriented 
around exclusion proved much more entertaining than the PNU‘s bland and 
businesslike one, which tried to appeal to voters on the basis of dry statistics.  Lynch 
(2006) also claims that, despite being 60 years-old at the time, Odinga portrayed 
himself as a modern and youthful leader, which undoubtedly aimed to endear him to 
Nairobi‘s restless and relatively young population. The fact that the ODM‘s orange 
campaign T-shirts espoused that Odinga was the ―People‘s President‖ (see Odula 
2007) provided yet another example of the candidate‘s attempt to convey that he was a 
man-of-the-people rather than a wealthy politician.  Rumors that Odinga has, for 
years, paid the rent for some Kibera tenants (De Smedt 2009: 595) also suggests that 
he has at times engaged in the distribution of selective benefits to his constituents.   
 By contrast, he was not particularly well-liked by the country‘s business 
community.  The PNU‘s economic record appealed to the business class, and when 
share prices on the Nairobi Stock Exchange fell in early 2007, the ruling party argued 
that this was the consequence of international fears over an Odinga win (Chege 2008).  
Privately, financial actors admitted to preferring Kibaki to Odinga because the former 
offered continuity (Bosire and Peytermann 2007). Beyond economic stability, some 
Kenyans feared that Odinga conveyed a ―street-brawling image,‖ which was only 
reinforced by his support from young and unemployed ―street thugs‖ in the slums 
(Clayton 2007).    
 As seen in Table 6.1 below, Odinga‘s populist strategy certainly proved 
successful in most of Nairobi‘s constituencies, which are known as ―divisions.‖ 
Parliamentary results are presented here because they are more credible than the 
presidential ones, which outside observers claimed were rigged.  Indeed, the fact that 
so many PNU MPs were voted out of office in the parliamentary elections fuelled 
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suspicions that the presidential results had been rigged in favor of Kibaki (Gettleman 
2007).  Moreover, an exit poll conducted during the elections and funded by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) found that 46.2 percent 
of voters had selected Odinga for president compared with 40.2 for Kibaki (USAID 
2008).
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 The more credible parliamentary results reveal that ODM candidates 
received the majority of votes in five of these divisions, and Odinga did exceptionally 
well in Langata, where he ran again as MP.   
 
Table 6.1:  Poverty and Votes in Kenya’s 2007 Parliamentary Elections 
Divisions Number of Poor 
People 
Share of ODM 
Votes (%) 
Share of PNU 
Votes (%) 
Nairobi District  881,265 41.9 28.8 
             Central  91, 559 42.2 40.9 
             Dagoretti 106,177 38.1 47.7 
             Embakasi 170,165 32.9 26.4 
             Kasarani 152, 825 48.5 20.8 
             Langata 110,504 69.7 28.1 
             Makadara 108,100 32.5 33.9 
             Westlands 60,705 45.3 31.1 
Sources:  Poverty data calculated by Ndeng‘e et al. (2003). Election data from the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, www.eck.ke, (accessed March 13, 2008).  
Notes:  The poverty data is based on an urban-specific poverty line, pegged at 2648 Kenyan shillings 
per adult per month for an urban household.  This was equivalent to about 35 dollars in 2003 prices, 
which was when the survey was conducted.  Official results in the eighth division, Kamukunji, were 
contested and went to court.  The results were never declared but a PNU MP was appointed in August 
2008.  
Yet, the urban poor were not Odinga‘s only constituency base.  Similar to Sata, 
he forged a coalition with a segment of rural voters who were his Luo co-ethnics or 
belonged to other minority groups.  Of all potential cleavages, ethnicity certainly has 
proved the most salient in Kenya‘s political history (see Barkan & Chege 1989; 
Hulterström 2004; Miguel 2004; Oyugi 1997).  According to Posner‘s (2004: 856) 
PREG index, Kenya possesses a relatively high rating of 0.57. Perceived political 
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the poll, and a copy of the final report, can be found at http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-
center/news/iri-statement-kenya-election-day-poll (accessed April 5, 2010).  
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domination and wealth accumulation by the Kikuyu has been a key concern among 
other ethnic groups.  The Luo largely were excluded from power during both the 
Kenyatta and Moi regimes, and groups such as the Luhya and Kamba often felt that 
their political representation was not commensurate with their share of the voting 
population (Branch and Cheeseman 2008). Although the victory of the multi-ethnic 
NARC in 2002 hinted of ethnicity‘s potentially declining salience, the constitutional 
reform in 2005 reinvigorated it as opposing camps largely divided along ethnic lines 
(Lynch 2006).   
Although Nairobi is a very diverse city, some of Kenya‘s rural provinces 
demonstrate a greater degree of concentration by certain ethnic groups.
308
  For 
instance, Table 6.2 reveals that Central Province is almost entirely comprised of 
Kikuyu while the Luo represent almost 58 percent of the population in Nyanza.   
 
Table 6.2:  Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Kenya 
Province Dominant Ethnic Group Share of Province in 
Kenya’s Population 
(%) 
Name Share of Province’s 
Population (%) 
Central Kikuyu 93.8 11.2 
Coast Mijikenda 54.4 8.8 
Eastern Kamba 53.9 15.5 
Nairobi Kikuyu 32.4 8.7 
North-eastern Ogaden 36.0 4.0 
Nyanza Luo 57.9 14.5 
Rift Valley Kalenjin 46.4 24.9 
Western Luhya 86.2 12.4 
Source:  1989 Kenyan Census;  Population Projections from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(see http://www.knbs.or.ke/, accessed January 19, 2010).  
Odinga did not portray the ODM as solely an ethnic party oriented around the 
Luo.  Instead, the ODM constructed a ―pentagon‖ alliance with leaders representing 
the Luhya, the Kalenjin, the Embu, and the Coast peoples (EIU 2007d: 3).  
Furthermore, his rhetoric was often couched in class terms with ethnic implications, 
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 While the Kikuyu are the ethnic group with the largest representation in Nairobi, they comprise only 
32 percent of the city‘s population, followed by the Luo at 18 percent and the Luhya at 16 percent 
(Butler 2002). 
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blaming the President and his ―Mount Kenya mafia‖ for creating massive disparities 
between Kikuyu dominated areas and the rest of Kenya.
309
  The ODM‘s campaign 
focused on Kikuyu domination in banking, government, commercial farming, and 
education (Chege 2008) as well as their influx into the Rift Valley, which historically 
was the home of the Kalenjin and Maasai (Kagwanja 2009:374). This storyline was 
reinforced by the ODM‘s campaign symbol, which was an orange divided into equal 
eight pieces.  According to Odinga‘s manifesto, this symbolism represented that 
Kenya‘s eight provinces would receive equal resources under his administration 
(Odinga 2007: 4).  The implication was that under Kibaki, inter-provincial disparities 
prevailed.  
This strategy proved conducive to mobilizing ethnic groups beyond Odinga‘s 
Luo base, which was necessary for Odinga to create a minimum winning coalition.  
Indeed, as seen in Table 6.2 above, the Luo alone in combination with the population 
of the urban poor would not provide the ODM with a national majority.   Nyanza, 
where the Luo are concentrated, represents only 14 percent of the national population.  
As such, attempts were made to mobilize other key groups, such as the Kalenjin and 
the Luhya.  In fact, Odinga often claims that he is the descendant of a famous Luhya 
leader, named Nabongo Mumia (The Nation 2007).  Based on an analysis of campaign 
rallies in 2007, Horowitz (2009) finds that Odinga concentrated most of his rallies in 
the Rift Valley and Western Provinces.  He only visited the Kikuyu-dominated Central 
Province once and never visited Eastern Province, from where the Kamba leader of 
the ODM-Kenya party, Kalonzo Musyoka, hailed.
310
  Likewise, Horowitz (2009) 
discovers that neither Kibaki nor Musyoka spent any time in the Luo-dominated 
province of Nyanza.   
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 Mount Kenya clan refers to those politicians in Kibaki‘s inner circle and who hail from 
predominantly Kikuyu areas in Central and Eastern Province (Africa Confidential 2003: 2).  
310
The ODM-Kenya party broke off from the ODM shortly before the 2007 elections.  
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Table 6.3 below highlights the results of the candidate‘s campaign strategies. 
Parliamentary results are used to ensure consistency with those that were presented in 
Table 6.1 and because, once again, they are considered more accurate than their 
presidential equivalents.  The results show that Musyoka‘s party only achieved a 
majority of seats in Eastern Province while the PNU was most successful in Central 
Province.  Similarly, the ODM‘s biggest wins occurred in Nyanza, Rift Valley, and 
Western Provinces.  In total, the ODM obtained 99 out of a total number of 207 
Parliamentary seats while the PNU received only 43 and the ODM-Kenya won 15.    
 
Table 6.3: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats Won by Party in  
2007 Kenyan Elections 
Province Dominant Ethnic 
Group 
Number of Seats Total 
ODM PNU ODM-K Other 
Central Kikuyu 0 18 0 11 29 
Coast Mijikenda 12 3 1 5 21 
Eastern Kamba 2 7 13 14 36 
Nairobi Kikuyu 5 2 0 0 7 
North-
eastern 
Ogaden 5 0 0 5 10 
Nyanza Luo 25 0 0 7 32 
Rift 
Valley 
Kalenjin 32 11 1 4 48 
Western Luhya 18 2 0 4 24 
Total  99 43 15 50 207 
  Source:  ―Office of Government Spokesperson:  Election Results 2007‖    
  http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/province.asp (accessed January 19, 2010)  
  Notes:  The results for one seat in Nairobi were contested and the results were never publicized.  As  
               such,  the results for only seven, rather than eight, seats are indicated here.   
By creating a peripheral coalition oriented around Luo co-ethnics and other 
minority ethnic groups, Odinga could mobilize a metropolitan coalition comprised of 
most of Nairobi‘s poor by employing a populist strategy.  When well-documented 
vote-rigging caused Odinga to lose his presidential bid, despite the ODM‘s 
parliamentary victory, violence not only erupted among ethnic groups in rural 
provinces but also spilled out of the city‘s slums, where disappointed Odinga 
supporters threatened ―No Raila! No Peace!‖ for weeks thereafter (De Smedt 2009).  
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The violence represented an unfortunate testament to the emotional resonance of a 
campaign discourse that consistently focused on rectifying various manifestations of 
inequality.   
 
A Populist Opposition in a Dominant Party State 
 With approximately 57 percent of its population living in urban areas (World 
Bank 2009b), Botswana has an even higher urbanization rate than Kenya.  Well-
managed diamonds have ensured high economic growth rates over the last few 
decades, but little of the diamond wealth translated into significant poverty reduction.  
In the capital of Gaborone, 47 percent of the population lives below the poverty line 
(UNFPA 2007). Official unemployment currently is estimated at around 24 percent 
(OECD 2006), and inequality in Botswana‘s cities is considered some of the highest in 
Africa (UN-Habitat 2009).   
These circumstances, combined with Botswana‘s long history of democracy, 
help explain why the country represents one of the earlier examples of an opposition 
party relying on a populist strategy to win votes from the urban poor.  Botswana‘s 
political system is often classified as one-party dominant (e.g. Bogaards 2000; 
Doorenspleet 2003) because the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) never has 
been ousted from the presidency.  Established by cattle elites, the BDP possesses 
strong roots in rural areas and has long adhered to a free-market orientation (Good and 
Taylor 2008).  Yet, between 1994 and 2009, the opposition Botswana National Front 
(BNF) won substantial support among the urban poor in the capital city of Gaborone, 
and its bastion of support centered in the city‘s slum of Old Naledi.  
Founded in 1965, the BNF‘s leader was Dr. Kenneth Koma, an intellectual 
trained in the former Soviet Union who inherited considerable wealth from his father 
(Makgala 2005).  Like Senegal‘s pôle de gauche opposition, Koma long espoused a 
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programmatic message centered on socialism that held little appeal to the urban poor 
(van Bingsbergen 1994). The BDP often used this against the BNF, generating fear 
among rural peasants that the BNF would nationalize their land and enforce communal 
ownership of cattle (Molomo 2000).  
Yet, the BNF long posed little threat to the BDP until 1994.  With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the party shifted to a less avowedly socialist and more populist 
message.  In the first elections after switching its orientation, the party obtained 40 
percent of the national vote, which was its highest ever (Lemon 2007).  During these 
elections, the BNF achieved massive majorities in three of Gaborone‘s four 
constituencies, Gaborone North, South, and West, while also beating the BDP in the 
secondary towns of Lobatse, Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe, and Mogoditshane (Tsie 
1996).  
In analyses of these elections, two features proved instrumental to the BNF‘s 
successes.  First, Dr. Koma was viewed as a modern ―Moses‖ by Gaborone‘s poor, 
and his appearance in crumpled clothes and use of colloquial Setswana helped him 
forge unmediated ties with this constituency (see Motlogelwa 2009). Secondly, the 
discourse of the BNF provided congruence with the priorities of the urban poor. 
According to Wiseman (1998), the sense of relative deprivation in urban areas among 
recently-arrived rural migrants who failed to find jobs certainly explains the rise of the 
BNF and the attendant decline of the BDP during this period.  Grievances included the 
shortage of accommodation in the city and the high prices for consumer goods (see 
Garekwe and Moloi 1994).  As Tsie (1996: 31) explains:  
 
A substantial section of the electorate supports it [the BNF] because its political 
message seems to be relevant to the socio-economic conditions of contemporary 
Botswana. The issues which it has stressed in its campaigns such as affordable 
housing, employment creation, better working conditions and the revamping of the 
education system resonate with more conviction amongst urban and peri-urban 
dwellers than amongst the peasantry. 
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Likewise, Molomo (2000: 72) observes that the BNF‘s message assisted the party in 
differentiating it from both the BDP and other opposition competitors:  ―It was a 
message focused on defining a niche for themselves [and which emphasized] 
defending the interests of the unemployed and the poor, largely those who stand on the 
losing side of rapid economic development.‖ Among other claims, Dr. Koma argued 
that foreign investors should not be allowed to exploit Botswana‘s resources if 
Batswana were not receiving any profits in return (Molomo 2000), and he advocated 
for tax exemptions for people living below the subsistence level (Aguilar and Pacek 
2000).  
 Since younger people were more likely to support the BNF than the BDP, the 
opposition party benefited in subsequent elections from a 1997 referendum lowering 
the voting age from 21 to 18 (Molomo 2000).  For instance, in the 1999 elections, the 
BNF retained its dominance in Gaborone where the young are concentrated while still 
failing to mobilize older or rural voters (see Garekwe and Moloi 1994).  Observers 
noted that the win reflected ―a potentially dangerous polarization between the urban 
poor who benefit little from the country‘s diamond wealth, the Batswana elite, and the 
rural people whose cash incomes are somewhat appeased by a sense of community 
and government handouts‖ (Africa Confidential 1999:  4). 
Party support, however, also derives from ethno-linguistic affinities in rural 
areas.  Though Botswana frequently is deemed an ethnically homogeneous country, 
communal tensions are not rare (see Solway 2002).  While the BDP benefits from 
rural support from the two largest Setswana-speaking groups, the Bangwato and the 
Bakwena, the BNF has long held appeal for the Setswana-speaking Bangwaketse tribe 
who live in the country‘s Southeast District.  The chief of the latter tribe joined the 
BNF early on in 1969 because he believed the BDP-led government had neglected his 
region (Lemon 2007). The BNF is also popular among the Batlokwa tribe (Africa 
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Confidential 2004).  Beyond disaffected tribes of the Tswana-speaking population, the 
BNF attracted the Bayei in the Okavango area (Rule 2000), as well as the Kalanga-
speaking group who reside in the country‘s Northeast District and who have long 
resented the country‘s Tswana- and English-only language policies (Du Toit 1996).  
The BNF further sought to draw the attention of urbanites to the plight of the country‘s 
poorest minority group, the Basarwa (Wilmsen 1996), who are concentrated in areas 
such as Ghanzi and Kgalagadi.  As Solway (2002: 726) explains, the BNF was not an 
ethnic party but its support of minority goals helped extend its base into rural areas.   
As is typical of populist leaders, Dr. Koma inspired a personality cult around 
him.  His authoritarian tendencies meant that he would not tolerant dissension within 
the BNF (Molomo 2000) or inter-party debate (Makgala 2005).  He repeatedly refused 
to have the BNF overshadowed by participating in a larger opposition coalition, 
known as the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) (Africa Confidential 1999). The 
BNF was viewed as having very little institutionalization beyond Koma, and the party 
effectively was synonymous with him (Somolekae 2005). This may explain why with 
the retirement of Dr. Koma and the ascendance of a new leader, Otsweletse Moupo, 
the party has experienced a high level of in-fighting and subsequent splintering. For 
example, ten new parties have emerged that are led by previous members of the BNF 
(Molefhe 2009).   
Internal problems, coupled with recent attempts by the BDP to re-brand its 
image, have caused the BNF to lose its appeal among the urban poor. In particular, the 
BDP decided to start echoing the BNF‘s rhetoric and adopting its own populist stance.  
When Ian Khama took over as leader of the BDP in April 2008, he began a series of 
fireside chats and surprise town tours intended to demonstrate an understanding and 
affinity with the challenges faced by the urban electorate (see Molefhe 2009). Right 
before the 2009 general elections, Khama rode a bicycle into the slum of Old Naledi to 
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address a rally, prompting Mooketsi (2009) to observe that he had a common touch 
with the ―grassroots.‖ Ultimately, the BDP grabbed the BNF‘s constituency seats in 
Gaborone for the first time in over a decade and captured the majority of votes in Old 
Naledi. For the sake of symbolism, Khama decided to return to the slum to hold his 
party‘s victory rally (Motlogelwa 2009).   
 As in Kenya and Zambia, the Botswana case illustrates that a populist strategy 
attracts the urban poor and that it is often predicated on a coalition of rural voters who 
are mobilized by different issues than their urban compatriots.  In the Botswana case, 
the higher rate of urbanization meant that the opposition could focus on smaller 
demographic groups for support.  Moreover, the BNF‘s apparent downfall in the urban 
areas highlights that an incumbent party can just as easily adapt a populist strategy as 
an opposition party to win over new constituents.  This latter point becomes even 
clearer by examining briefly the case of South Africa and the African National 
Congress (ANC).  
 
A Populist Faction within a Dominant Ruling Party  
 South Africa represents one of Africa‘s most urbanized democracies, with 
almost 60 percent of its population living in urban areas as of 2005 (World Bank 
2009b). The country‘s largest city, Johannesburg, currently has around 3.4 million 
residents (De Wet et al. 2008).  Gauteng Province, in which both Johannesburg and 
Pretoria are located, is estimated to have approximately 14 million residents by 2015 
(De Wet et al. 2008). Yet, the legacy of apartheid has still left massive inequalities 
both between rural and urban areas as well as within cities.  For instance, based on 
surveys from 2005, there is a Gini coefficient of 0.75 in Johannesburg, 0.67 in Cape 
Town, and 0.72 in both Durban and Pretoria (UN-Habitat 2009). Racial disparities 
also still persist since approximately 25 percent of the country‘s black population is 
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unemployed, compared with only 4 percent of the white population (Statistics South 
Africa 2009a).  Declines in the manufacturing sector and low demand for both 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor has not only contributed to this unemployment but 
also depressed wages for those with a job (see Beall et al. 2000). Moreover, a quarter 
of the population still lives in shacks rather than safe and durable housing (Blair 
2009).  
 Under Thabo Mbeki, the country‘s second democratically-elected president 
from the ANC, South Africa‘s economy experienced substantial macroeconomic 
growth but few improvements for the poor. For example, between 2002 and 2008, the 
average annual GDP growth was 4.6 percent (Statistics South Africa 2009b).  
However, Mbeki‘s neoliberal policy orientation prompted growing rifts within the 
ruling tripartite alliance of the ANC, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP).   In the mid-1990s, the 
alliance partners developed the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), 
which focused on growth through redistribution.  The RDP called for a strategic role 
for the public sector, land reform, better training and a living wage for workers, and 
the provision of houses, electricity, and water to poor communities (Lodge 2002).  
Yet, without substantial foreign investment, the growth needed for these policies never 
emerged, prompting the ANC to shift to a more free-market plan known as Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) (Saunders 2005).  Both COSATU and 
SACP opposed the ANC‘s abandonment of its dirigiste principles in favor of a plan 
that, among other things, emphasized privatization, tariff reductions, and productivity-
linked wage rates (Lodge 2002; Saunders, 2005).   
 At the same time, these policies prompted widespread discontent among the 
poor. While a small number of extraordinarily wealthy black business tycoons 
benefitted from the ANC‘s Black Economic Empowerment initiative (BEE) (Gumede 
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2008), most of the poor were still grappling with insufficient service delivery. In fact, 
between 2004 and 2006, the number of protests over substandard services in poor 
townships and informal urban settlements increased from 5800 to over 10,000 
(Gumede 2008).  While water and electricity infrastructure were extended to millions 
of customers after the end of apartheid, the policies of cost-recovery, which required 
customers to pay the full cost of these services, meant that hundreds of thousands of 
residents effectively could not afford them (see Khunou 2002; Pape and McDonald 
2002). Illegal reconnections of electricity subsequently became the source of violent 
conflict between the police and members of poor communities (Bassett and Clarke 
2008).  Moreover, while the ANC increased the number of people living in proper 
housing, the rate of progress disappointed many slum and squatter dwellers.  
Movements such as Abahali baseMjondolo (―shack dwellers‖) in Durban organized 
marches under the  banner of ―No Land, No House, No Vote‖ (Pithouse 2006 ) while 
shack dwellers outside Johannesburg admitted losing faith in the ANC (Georgy 2007).  
During 2008, tensions over insufficient jobs erupted into xenophobic riots within 
Johannesburg‘s townships.   
Jacob Zuma, who had been vice-president until 2005 when he was forced to 
resign because of his involvement in a fraud case, blamed the government‘s failures 
on Mbeki‘s style of leadership rather than on the ANC.  In December 2007, when the 
ANC held its first internal party elections since 1958, Zuma benefitted from both 
popular disillusionment as well as inter-alliance squabbling.  With the help of leftist 
allies, Zuma unseated Mbeki as president of the ANC, and therefore as president of 
South Africa, by obtaining 2329 delegate votes to Mbeki‘s 1505 (Foster 2009).  The 
vice-president, Kgalema Motlanthe, took over as interim president of the country until 
the next general elections could be held in April 2009.  Furthermore, all of Mbeki‘s 
supporters were removed from the National Executive Committee, which is the party‘s 
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main decision-making body (Bassett and Clarke 2008).  Mbeki‘s followers eventually 
split from the ANC and left to form a more economically conservative and business-
friendly opposition party, named the Congress of the People (COPE).  
Zuma‘s internal support, particularly from COSATU and SACP, derived from 
his espoused pro-poor orientation.  During the campaign period before the 2009 
general elections, Zuma wandered around urban townships, promising greater public 
spending to create jobs and to improve services and welfare for the poor.   In a study 
of voters‘ intentions in the country‘s largest township of Soweto, Ceruti (2008) found 
that those who supported Zuma were more likely to be poorer in both objective and 
subjective terms.  Having grown up as a goat-herder with no formal education, he was 
able to endear himself to the poor, who viewed him as much more approachable than 
Mbeki. Indeed, Hart (2007: 97&98) observes that Zuma held widespread appeal to the 
poor by simultaneously portraying himself as a liberation hero, a leftist, a 
traditionalist, and as an anti-elitist:  ―His [Zuma‘s] regular reference to himself as ‗not 
educated‘ – but, by implication, extremely smart – is a direct attack on the 
technocratic elite surrounding Mbeki, often portrayed by Zuma supporters as arrogant 
and self-serving, and as not having served in the trenches of the revolutionary 
struggle.‖  Ceruti (2008: 322) likewise finds a widespread perception that Soweto 
supporters viewed Zuma as someone ―like them.‖ 
In addition to his ―man of the people‖ persona, Zuma both generates 
controversy and exudes charisma.  He was not only implicated in the corruption case 
that cost him the vice-presidency, but also went on trial for rape in 2006.  During his 
trial, masses of supporters gathered outside the Supreme Court each day to sing 
Zuma‘s signature song from his days in the liberation movement, ―Bring Me My 
Machine Gun,‖ as well as other songs that symbolized the marginalization of the poor 
and the distance of the ruling elite (Gunner 2008). Zuma‘s campaign rallies also 
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attracted massive crowds where the politician often danced on stage, thereby affirming 
the legitimacy of his clan name of Msholozi, which means dancer. According to Foster 
(2009: 78), poor voters who attended these rallies saw the 67-year-old politician as a 
type of messiah who could revolutionize their lives. Meanwhile, the business 
community and foreign investors proved less enthusiastic about Zuma, fearing that his 
promises to intervene on behalf of the poor and the trade unions would involve 
compromising the country‘s macroeconomic fundamentals.  In early 2009, when 
Zuma‘s prospects of becoming the next president appeared inevitable, the Rand 
depreciated considerably and the value of shares fell on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (Gunnion 2009).  
In addition to Zuma‘s reputation as a champion of the poor, he also appealed to 
rural voters with his unabashed promotion of his Zulu ethnic identity.  Importantly, 
Zuma did not portray the ANC as an exclusionary party.  In fact, unlike his 
predecessor, Zuma actively courted white Afrikaners during the campaign, a 
community which had at one time included some of the most ardent supporters of 
apartheid policies (Business Day 2009). Yet, as a polygamist who readily dons animal 
skins to participate in Zulu ceremonies, Zuma showed that he was comfortable with 
his heritage.  While Mbeki rarely mentioned his Xhosa background, Zuma explained 
in an interview that he was ―A South African who grew up here in KZN [Kwa-Zulu 
Natal province], who is a Zulu with Zulu traditions and Zulu values pushed into 
myself‖ (cited in Foster 2009: 75).  This of course resonated with the Zulu 
community, which long felt excluded from political power because Mandela, Mbeki, 
and Motlanthe were all presidents from the Xhosa community (Johnson 2008). In 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, which is not only where the largest concentration of Zulus is found 
but also one of South Africa‘s most rural provinces (Kersting 2009), such Xhosa 
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dominance in the ANC explained why many residents historically had instead aligned 
with the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).   
Yet, in the 2009 election campaign, Zuma was able to attract such voters to the 
ANC.  Before the campaign officially even began, Zuma supporters began wearing T-
shirts with the politician‘s face and which stated ―100 percent Zulu boy.‖ He often 
threw Zulu phrases into his speeches, and his final campaign rally in Johannesburg 
was labeled the Siyanqoba rally, meaning ―to conquer‖ in the Zulu language. In a 
country with eleven official languages, the use of Zulu for national rallies reinforced 
the impression that Zuma was not simply an ANC candidate but also a Zulu one.  The 
tactic certainly succeeded in wresting away voters from the IFP.  In 1999, the ANC 
only obtained 39 percent of the vote in Kwa-Zulu Natal province compared with 42 
percent for the IFP.  In the 2009 elections, the ANC obtained 64 percent of the vote in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, more than triple the IFP‘s 20.5 percent.311    
 At the national level, the ANC was never at risk of losing the 2009 elections.  
However, at a time when many South Africans were disappointed with the ANC‘s 
performance, the emergence of COPE and the growing success of the opposition 
Democratic Alliance (DA) did threaten to reduce the party‘s sizeable parliamentary 
majority. Zuma‘s ability to reinvigorate the party‘s image by fusing a populist strategy 
towards the poor with appeals along identity lines demonstrates that this tactic of 
building dual coalitions is not only available to Africa‘s opposition parties but also to 
incumbents.  
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 Election results from South Africa‘s Independent Electoral Commission.  
See:http://www.elections.org.za/ 
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Implications and Contributions   
Democratic Contestation and Consolidation  
The contributions of this research span at least four different domains. First 
and foremost, the study speaks to the broader literature on democracy and political 
parties. According to Dahl (1971), the two underlying dimensions of political 
democracy are public contestation and inclusiveness.  However, the nature of 
opposition parties in Africa‘s young democracies rarely allows for genuine 
contestation in a manner that reflects a clear articulation of citizens‘ preferences.  In 
fact, few have heeded Stepan‘s (1990:  44) advice that opposition parties can only 
defeat ruling regimes by providing a ―credible democratic alternative.‖ 
In turn, the lack of credible opposition alternatives has significant 
consequences for participation and inclusiveness. Indeed, if parties are irrelevant for 
voters, then parties‘ survival is threatened (Crisp 2000) and disillusionment with the 
democratic process could ensue.  Hagopian (2005) further argues that if parties do not 
provide credible alternatives, this can lead to a diminished interest in politics and a 
decline in citizen participation. Likewise, according to Huntington and Nelson (1976: 
158), "Standard theory argues that people must view politics as relevant and their own 
participation as potentially effective, as a prerequisite to political participation."  
By targeting the preferences of the urban poor, parties that employ populist 
strategies present a viable alternative to the status quo for this particular constituency, 
thereby ensuring that their economic marginalization does not result in political 
exclusion. The policies espoused in such strategies do not correspond to a typical 
programmatic orientation along a left-right ideological spectrum, which tends to 
advocate greater or less government intervention in economic and social institutions. 
As noted in Chapter Two, such programmatic policies are rare in the African context, 
which lack the historical experiences that shaped these ideologies in North America 
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and Western Europe, possess small private sectors, and must often adhere to the policy 
dictates of foreign donors.  The examples of the pôle de gauche in Senegal and even 
the early days of Botswana‘s BNF highlight the inability of programmatic orientations 
aligned along traditional left-right ideological spectrums to attract the urban poor.  
However, populist strategies do nonetheless incorporate a policy discourse as one 
means of mobilizing the urban poor, and these policies tend to exhibit greater 
congruence to their contemporary working and living conditions than a traditional 
programmatic stance could.   
Both contestation and meaningful participation are in turn essential for 
achieving democratic consolidation, as measured by Huntington's (1991) two 
turnovers of political leadership following a democratic transition.
312
  During the 
1990s, urbanites in general facilitated the move to multi-party democracy in Africa.  
Since then, many scholars have lamented how the party which was victorious during 
the transition rarely has been ousted (Bratton 1998; Doorenspleet 2003; Nohlen et al. 
1999; van de Walle 2003).  Yet, as noted in Chapters Three and Four, official turnout 
rates were higher in urban Senegal and urban Zambia than they were for either country 
as a whole, implying that urban voters turn up at the polls more often than rural ones.  
Furthermore, turnout rates among survey respondents, who exclusively consisted of 
the urban poor, were even higher than the official rates for urban areas, suggesting that 
the urban poor in particular are more likely to vote than other constituents.  As such, 
the urban poor can be particularly instrumental in achieving the critical second 
turnover in most African electoral democracies, and this study has argued that such 
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 Huntington's (1991) two turnover test has been criticized because of its narrow focus on elections.  A 
number of other scholars have described consolidation as a broader process that involves deep, 
attitudinal changes on behalf of citizens (Linz and Stepan 1996;  Schmitter 1992) and an acceptance of 
democratic institutions as "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991: 23).   While not disputing these 
alternative conceptualizations of consolidation, Huntington's narrower indicator is referred to here 
because of the dissertation's central concern with voting behavior and election outcomes.   
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turnovers are most likely to happen when they are mobilized by an opposition party 
employing a populist strategy.   
 
Party Linkages  
A second contribution of this study is to provide a comparative analysis of 
party linkages and to emphasize the feasibility of combining different linkages.  
Kitschelt (2000:  855&856) laments the lack of comparative research on the rise and 
decline of different linkage strategies, noting that existing scholarship either focuses 
on linkages in one particular case study or engages in comparative analyses of parties 
and elections without examining linkages. This study aims to fill that gap by 
representing the only known attempt to detail how disparate political parties in Africa, 
both ruling and opposition, mobilize various constituents across countries and over 
time.  It does not just focus on these linkages from the party perspective but also 
surveyed the political behavior of African informal sector workers to examine how 
well these modes of mobilization actually capture the sentiments and preferences of 
the urban poor.   As such, it begins to address Hagopian‘s (2007:  599) qualm that too 
little is known about the ―demand side‖ of the party-voter relationship.  
Moreover, as detailed throughout the study, a populist strategy represents an 
amalgam of programmatic, personalistic, and clientelistic linkages.  Specifically, the 
programmatic element emerges through the advocacy of policies of social inclusion.  
Personalistic linkages manifest through a politician‘s charisma and the existence of 
vertical ties between a leader and his/her followers. The distribution of selective 
benefits and a constituency base oriented around sub-altern groups are both key 
elements of clientelist linkages.
313
  However, based on his observations of parties in 
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 While a sub-type of clientelism, vote-buying, was shown not to influence voting behavior on its 
own, this does not contradict the fact that clientelistic linkages are a component of a populist strategy.   
 
331 
 
Western Europe, Kitschelt (2000: 855) claims that these three linkages cannot be 
combined:  ―At low dosages, all linkage mechanisms may be compatible. As 
politicians intensify their cultivation of a particular type of linkage, however, they 
reach a production possibility frontier at which further intensifications of one linkage 
mechanism can occur only at the expense of toning down other linkage mechanisms." 
In his view, charisma is incompatible with programmatic linkages because the 
routinization of authority requires the abandonment of theatrical antics. Similarly, 
clientelistic linkages require the distribution of selective benefits that undercuts the 
credibility of a traditional programmatic message.   
 Because the populist strategies presented here rely on mobilization through 
policies that are not purely programmatic in the traditional sense, the three types of 
politician-citizen linkages are compatible.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine the PF‘s 
appeal being just as robust without either Sata‘s charisma or his very pro-poor policy 
pronouncements.  Likewise, Abdoulaye Wade‘s 2000 campaign would have proved 
less remarkable without the combination of theatrical antics, represented most clearly 
by his marches bleues, and his targeted appeals to Dakar‘s youth and informal sector 
workers.   
 Furthermore, Kitschelt (2000) only examines the linkages forged by politicians 
with the general citizenry, rather than with different segments of the citizenry.  The 
present study, however, emphasizes that parties and politicians can employ different 
linkages with the urban poor than they may with rural constituents.  For example, Sata 
used a sub-type of clientelistic linkages with rural Bemba-speakers that relied on 
ethno-linguistic appeals, even as charisma and targeted policy promises proved 
essential for mobilizing the urban poor.  In other words, the various linkages can be 
compatible when a party derives its credibility and support from different groups of 
constituents.      
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Cross-Regional Contrasts and Comparisons of Populism  
 A third contribution of the work lies in highlighting how citizens‘ preferences 
and parties‘ strategies in Africa compare and contrast with other regions of the world.  
Demographic and socioeconomic dynamics have long represented the impetus for 
shifts in voters‘ behavior and their relationships with political parties. For instance, in 
Europe, the decline in farming and manufacturing that began in the 1970s led to the 
rise of service sector workers whose differing priorities altered the nature of class-
based voting (Mair, Muller, and Plasser 2004; Clark and Lipset 2001).  Growing 
unemployment and informalization of the workforce during the same period created a 
class of ―outsiders‖ whose preferences largely were ignored by Western Europe‘s 
traditional leftist parties (Rueda 2005).  Similarly, Dietz‘ (1998: 33) observation about 
Latin America‘s earlier experience with urbanization holds relevance for 
contemporary Africa:   
 
Following the end of World War II, most Latin American and Third World cities 
found themselves the targets of large-scale cityward migration, a phenomenon that not 
only produced rapid population growth but an exploding demand for services such as 
jobs, housing, transportation, and physical infrastructure. Such services might not be 
essential in rural areas, but in an urban setting, low-income inhabitants-migrants or 
otherwise-came to expect such services and to react in politically sensitive ways if 
they were not delivered.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, these processes of urbanization and 
informalization in Latin America even further eroded organizational ties between 
laborers and parties, thereby generating greater fluidity in cleavage structures and 
higher electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999).  Importantly, this volatility 
offered the political space for populist leaders to emerge in certain countries, such as 
Peru and Venezuela (Roberts 1995; Roberts 2003). Volatility has long been a notable 
feature of Africa‘s party systems (e.g. Bogaards 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; 
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Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).
314
  As the cases presented in this study highlight, this 
volatility and lack of party institutionalization likewise has created a window of 
opportunity for the emergence of parties reliant on populist strategies and aimed at 
targeting the priorities of sub-altern groups.  
 Other important similarities and differences exist between Africa‘s populist 
leaders and those of other regions.  For instance, in order to reconcile the diverse 
policy orientations espoused by neo-populist leaders in Latin America, scholars such 
as Weyland (2001) have argued that the defining feature of populism is the 
plebiscitarian relationship and unmediated ties it fosters between a leader and his/her 
followers.  Instead, this study has illustrated that in the African context, populism 
cannot be divorced from its programmatic content, which is defined by the goal of 
social inclusion for economically marginalized groups.   
  Moreover, in the cases presented in this study, African party leaders who 
employed populist strategies alternately were well-educated or possessed little formal 
schooling, came from humble backgrounds or inherited wealth and prestige.  Yet, in 
every case, they portrayed themselves as ―men of the people‖ who were just as 
comfortable wading into slums, townships, and squatter compounds as they were 
attending high-level political meetings.  Unlike their contemporary Latin American 
counterparts, who gained credibility from their status as political outsiders (e.g. 
Madrid 2008; Roberts 1995, 2007), Africa‘s populists were all insiders in their 
country‘s political scene for decades and often collaborated with those they ultimately 
came to oppose.  Nevertheless, they succeeded in creating the image of outsiders who 
loathed the existing political establishment for its alleged perpetuation of vast 
socioeconomic inequalities.  They combined class appeals in urban areas with 
                                                          
314
 In the European context, Dalton (2000) also found that younger people were less likely to have 
partisan attachments than older voters.  This is especially relevant for Africa given that the population 
pyramid for most of the region‘s countries is highly skewed towards the young.  
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overtures to ascriptive identities in rural areas, mobilizing both groups with either a 
real or imagined story of exclusion from political and economic power structures.   
 The impact of these dynamics over time on African party systems remains to 
be seen.  One possibility is that ultimately, political parties within the region may be 
encouraged to focus more on programmatic appeals and less on purely personalistic or 
clientelistic ones, creating greater alignment with the policy preferences of low-
income citizens and reducing electoral volatility.  These appeals do not need to be 
programmatic in the typical North American or Western European sense, which 
typically involves parties espousing a certain degree of state intervention in society 
and markets.  As shown in this study, such appeals can have little congruence with the 
priorities of low-income and poorly-educated citizens and are limited by the 
interference of international donors in African political economies. Instead, 
programmatic appeals in the African context might involve practical proposals for 
improving the living conditions of the poor that involve an eclectic set of policy levers 
which collectively defy neat classification along a left-right continuum.  
 
African Elections and Parties  
A final contribution of this study is its focus on the interactive relationship 
between political parties and citizens in Africa, as well as the study‘s differentiation of 
opposition parties.  Thus far, much of the Africanist scholarship on elections falls into 
at least three categories.  Detailed public opinion data and innovative field 
experiments have motivated micro-level studies of voting behavior (e.g. Bratton and 
Kimenyi 2008; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Wantchekon 2003; Young 2009b).  
These studies reveal key influences on individual voting decisions. At the more 
macro-level, scholars have engaged in various classifications of party systems, such as 
multi-party, two-party, and dominant-party regimes (e.g. Bogaards 2000; 
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Doorenspleet 2003; Giliomee 1998; Manning 2005). Such work often helps to inform 
even larger themes within this literature regarding whether countries are experiencing 
democratic transitions, consolidation, or reversals (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; 
Fomunyoh 2001; Joseph 1998; Lindberg 2006a; Randall and Svasand 2002; Von 
Doepp and Villalón 2005).   
 Each of these studies is valuable on its own, and many of the insights from this 
scholarship have been drawn on in the present study.  This dissertation, however, 
combines these micro and macro perspectives by illustrating how African parties 
mobilize different types of constituents, and how voters react to such strategies.  The 
case studies emphasize the dynamic nature of this relationship, highlighting that the 
preferences of the urban poor can inform the policy messages of a party using a 
populist strategy, which in turn enables that particular party to obtain more votes from 
this sector of society.   
 In addition, notwithstanding recent scholarship on opposition parties (e.g. 
Lindberg 2006b;  Rakner and van de Walle 2009), there is a tendency in the literature 
to discuss African opposition parties in monolithic terms, thereby portraying multi-
party competition as simply a struggle between "the" opposition and the incumbent.  
By contrast, the present study actually distinguishes opposition parties according to 
the way in which they mobilize various constituents, such as the urban poor and rural 
dwellers.  This is valuable for illustrating under what conditions an opposition party 
will be able to not just defeat an incumbent party but also why one opposition party 
proved more appealing than alternative competitors.   
 
Areas for Further Research  
 The above contributions of the present study provide a useful starting point for 
considering at least three areas of further research on populism, the urban poor, and 
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voting behavior in Africa.  First, populist strategies proved the most effective means 
for mobilizing the urban poor in those African democracies with a highly urbanized 
populace.  However, do the urban poor ultimately benefit from having a party which 
used a populist strategy during electoral campaigns enter national office?   
 On the one hand, the urban poor may benefit from having their policy priorities 
squarely brought into the political arena and from becoming increasingly targeted by 
elites for votes. Indeed, the urban poor‘s growing importance as an electoral 
constituency may increasingly reduce the amount of harassment they face by state 
authorities who are hesitant to alienate this constituency base.  On the other hand, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, populist parties tend to view their constituents as a source 
of votes rather than as agents of social reform (Mouzelis 1985). Moreover, populism is 
a particularly short-lived mode of mobilization, and once in office, a former 
opposition party must respond to national issues, manage the macro-economy, attract 
investors, and in the African case, often court donors.  As Weyland (2001: 14) notes, 
―Political success therefore transforms populism into a different type of rule that rests 
on nonpopulist strategies.  Populist leadership therefore tends to be transitory.  It either 
fails or, if successful, transcends itself.‖ Similarly, Collier (2001: 11815) observes that  
populist ―politicians find fertile ground in the actual or threatened grievances and 
social dislocation resulting from new economic models, but once in office often adopt 
marketizing policies.‖  Furthermore, coalitions built on populist strategies cannot be 
sustained for indefinite periods if the urban poor fail to see any tangible improvements 
in their lives or experience policies that are directly antithetical to their own interests.   
The existing evidence is not particularly positive for the urban poor.  Wade‘s 
commitments to the urban poor remained unfilled seven years after his first term as 
president began.  Shortly after Raila Odinga became Kenya‘s prime minister in 2008, 
he abandoned his position as protector of the poor and told Kibera residents that those 
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who were illegally squatting in the slums would face legal action by the government 
(De Smedt 596-597).  Three months after Zuma was elected South Africa‘s president, 
riots over poor service delivery and lack of jobs flared up throughout the country‘s 
townships where residents felt the ANC failed to deliver promptly enough on its 
populist campaign messages (see Lindow 2009).  
This is not to suggest that democratic, African governments are completely 
disinterested in improving living conditions for their citizens.  As noted earlier, many 
African governments have made concerted investments in the agricultural sector under 
the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) to improve 
agricultural growth and alleviate rural poverty.  Moreover, research by  
Stasavage (2005) covering 44 African countries has illustrated that where multi-party 
democracy exists, governments spend more on education, particularly primary 
education.
315
   Yet, whether parties that rely on populist strategies to win the votes of 
the urban poor actually improve outcomes for this particular constituency when they 
enter national office remains an open question and one that will naturally depend on 
country-specific circumstances.    
Future research could examine how natural resource endowments and 
macroeconomic conditions intersect with the ability to deliver on populist promises.  
For instance, Hugo Chávez‘s sustained commitment thus far to Venezuela‘s urban 
poor largely has depended on oil revenues.  Research in this area would benefit from 
greater data collection at the city level on the distribution and quality of water, refuse 
collection, sanitation facilities, electricity availability and affordability, and formal job 
creation.   
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 Since primary education is the main form of schooling for rural populations, Stasavage (2005: 344) 
further argues that democratization particularly improves expenditures for rural constituents.  
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     Secondly, how does the use of a populist strategy in one election condition the 
urban poor‘s expectations in future elections? Once voters become accustomed to a 
populist strategy, they may actually demand that the opposition adheres to this strategy 
in subsequent elections in order to gain their attention and support.  This effect may 
have played an important role in the Senegalese case where the populist campaigning 
of Wade as an opposition leader created an expectation about how the opposition 
should subsequently act in the 2007 elections. When the opposition failed to follow 
Wade‘s example, the urban poor chose to continue supporting the candidate who had 
won them over in 2000.    
Thirdly, what does urbanization imply for the voting behavior of Africa‘s rural 
poor?  The rural poor were not the primary focus of the present analysis and thus 
assumed to possess relatively static preferences.  Yet, there is greater scope for 
analyzing whether rural voting behavior is influenced by how urban compatriots 
respond to opposition candidates and whether rural voting preferences are changing 
over time.  In Zambia, Larmer and Fraser (2007) suggest that urbanites exhibit little 
influence over the voting behavior of their rural cousins largely because of the 
former‘s diminished ability to send back remittances and declining interest to retire in 
rural areas.  As such, rural-urban linkages regarding voting behavior may vary 
according to the nature of a country‘s urbanization processes. In countries where rural-
to-urban migration still drives urbanization, there may be greater latitude for feedback 
from urban residents to rural kin than in those countries where urbanization largely 
depends on natural population growth within the cities.  Surveys focused on the 
rationale for rural voting decisions across countries encountering these disparate 
urbanization processes may help illuminate these issues.  
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Conclusion  
  Historically, the urban poor have been sidelined by governments in Africa. 
During colonial times, authorities viewed the poor urban masses as dangerous and 
violent (Cooper 1987), and they aimed to discourage African settlement in urban areas 
(Njoh 2003). The urban bias literature of the 1970s and 1980s stressed rural-urban 
cleavages while obscuring intra-urban disparities. Consequently, urban poverty was 
overlooked by both national governments and international donors as attention shifted 
to rural development.  To ease population pressures, African governments have also at 
times encouraged the urban poor to return to the countryside (Pieterse 2010) or have 
built new capital cities instead of addressing chronic problems in the old ones.  
Abdoulaye Wade‘s dream of creating a new capital for Senegal, rather than 
ameliorating living conditions in Dakar, represents only the most recent example of 
this phenomenon.   
Yet, rapid urbanization will continue to proceed apace in the years to come, 
particularly in those countries which are still predominantly rural. Given the high 
concentration of young people in the region's urban areas, concern with 
unemployment and under-employment will persist as more and more students leave 
school. Crises in the provision of electricity and water, garbage collection, housing 
availability, and affordable food will likewise test the managerial capacities and 
priority-setting abilities of African governments. How well political parties respond to 
such challenges and effectively tap into popular discontent will certainly influence 
their fortunes at the ballot box, thereby ensuring that the urban poor will continue to 
represent a powerful force in African politics for the foreseeable future.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
Share of Vote (%) by Largest City in Most Recent National Elections
316
 
 
Country (Sub-national unit containing largest city)  Election Type (Year)  
Benin (Littoral Département
317
)  Presidential (2006) 
Adrien Houngbédji (PRD) 32.7 
Boni Yayi (Independent) 28.3 
Léhady Soglo (RB) 14.0 
Botswana (Gaborone Constituency)  Parliamentary (2009) 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 41.2 
Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 36.8 
Botswana National Front (BNF) 19.6 
Ghana (Accra Metropolis District) Presidential (2008) 
John Atta Mills (NDC) 54.0 
Nana A D Akufo-Addo (NPP) 46.0 
Papa Kwesi Nduom (CPP)   1.2 
Kenya (Nairobi Province) Parliamentary (2007) 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 41.9 
Party of National Unity (PNU) 28.8 
Lesotho (Maseru Constituency) Parliamentary (2007) 
All Basotho Convention (ABC)  46.9 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)  39.0 
Malawi (Blantyre District)  Presidential (2009) 
Dr. B wa Mutharika (UDF) 74.8 
John Tembo (MCP) 23.5 
Walter Chibambo (PETRA)    0.5 
Mali (Bamako District)  Presidential (2007) 
Amadou Toumani Touré (ADEMA-PASJ)
 318
 54.0 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keїta (RPM)  38.5 
Tiébilé Dramé (PARENA)    2.4  
Mozambique (City of Maputo)  Presidential (2009) 
Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO) 80.7 
Davíz Simango (MDM)  14.9 
Alfonso Marceta Dhlakama (RENAMO)    4.4 
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 The results of presidential elections are provided here for those countries with presidential systems.  
Parliamentary results are provided for the following four countries that are not purely presidential:  
Botswana (executive presidency linked to parliament), Ethiopia (parliamentary republic), Lesotho 
(parliamentary, constitutional monarchy), and South Africa (executive presidency linked to parliament).  
The one exception to this rule is Kenya, which is a presidential system but given the controversy over 
the most recent elections, parliamentary results are provided here.  
317
 For those countries with a two-round majority run-off system (TRS), the results of the first-round are 
presented here.  Except for elections in Benin, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, a second round was 
unnecessary for most TRS countries because one candidate was able to attain more than 50 percent of 
the votes in the first round.        
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 Touré ran as an independent but was supported by ADEMA-PAJ.   
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Namibia (Khomas Province)  Presidential (2009)  
Hifikepunye Pohamba (SWAPO)  64.2 
Hidipo Hamtenya (Rally for Democracy & Progress)  21.1 
Katuutire Kaura (DTA)   2.6  
Nigeria (Lagos State)  Presidential (2007) 
Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (AC)  50.3 
Alhaji Umar Yar‘Adua (PDP)  32.2 
Muhammadu Buhari (ANPP)    5.6  
Sénégal (Dakar Region)  Presidential (2007) 
Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)  55.9 
Idrissa Seck (Independent) 19.1 
Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS)  14.0 
Sierra Leone (Western Area Urban District)  Presidential (2007) 
Ernest Bai Koroma (APC) 60.5 
Solomon Berewa (SLPP)  32.0 
Charles Francis Margai (PMDC)   5.5 
South Africa (City of Johannesburg)  Parliamentary (2009)  
African National Congress (ANC) 63.2 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 20.8 
Congress of the People (COPE)   9.5  
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam Region)  Presidential (2005) 
Jakaya Kikwete (CCM)  70.6 
Prof. Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba (CUF) 22.8 
Freeman Aikaeli Mbowe (CHADEMA)    5.6 
Zambia (Lusaka District) Presidential (2008) 
Michael Sata (PF) 60.7 
Rupiah Banda (MMD) 25.6 
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)  13.2 
Own calculations based on the following sources:   
Benin: Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA), cited in Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) April  2006 Country Report.   
Botswana :  Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), http://www.iec.gov.bw/ 
Ghana:  Ghana Electoral Commission, found at 
 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/elections.results.runoff.php  
Kenya:  Kenya Electoral Commission, http://www.eck.or.ke 
Lesotho:  Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission, http://www.iec.org.ls/about/default.php 
Malawi: Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), http://www.mec.org.mw/ 
Mali:  La Cour Constitutionelle du Mali  
Mozambique: Center for Public Integrity (Centro de Integridade Publica), 
http://www.elections2009.cip.org.mz  
Namibia: Electoral Commission of Namibia, http://www.ecn.na/ 
Nigeria: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC),  
 http://www.nigeriannews.com/elections/2007/national/presidency/lagos_results.htm 
Senegal: http://www.sénélections.org 
Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone National Election Commission,  
         http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/7_elect/7_1elections.htm 
South Africa: Independent Electoral Commission, http://www.elections.org.za 
Tanzania:  The National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, http://www.nec.go.tz/ 
Zambia:  Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Description of Data Sources for Table 1.2  
 
 
 This appendix discusses the data sources and notes that accompany Table 1.2 
of Chapter One.   Table 1.2 attempts to provide a more disaggregated view of voting 
behavior within the largest city of selected countries by analyzing the share of votes 
accruing to both the ruling party and the main opposition party in constituencies 
within the largest city that are known to contain a high level of poverty.  Below, the 
sources and notes for how this table was constructed are discussed for each country 
displayed within the table: 
 
Botswana 
 
The election data for Gaborone South is based on the 2009 presidential elections and 
available from Botswana‘s Independent Electoral Commission at www.iec.gov.bw/.  
Old Naledi is Gaborone‘s largest slum, and the poorest area of the city (see Mazonde, 
1996;  Gaotlhobogwe, 2009).   
 
Ghana 
  
The election data for Odododioo is based on the 2008 presidential elections and 
available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/.  Although 
there was a two-round vote for those elections, the results presented in the table are 
based on the second-round that occurred on December 28, 2008.  However, the NDC 
still had the majority within that constituency after the first-round polls.  Old Fadama 
contains about 30,000 people and is considered Accra‘s, and possibly Ghana‘s, largest 
squatter settlement (see ―Settlement Story:  Old Fadama‖ available at 
http://www.homeless-international.org/ and  ―People‘s Dialogue on Human 
Settlements (PD)& The Ghana Homeless People‘s Federation (GHPF)‖ at 
http://www.sdinet.org/documents/doc1.htm).  
 
Kenya 
 
The election data for Langata is based on Kenya‘s December 27, 2007 presidential 
elections and available from the Electoral Commission of Kenya at 
http://www.eck.or.ke/index.php/Election-Results-Database/.   Langata Division is 
within Nairobi district and sometimes alternatively referred to as Kibera Division.  
Kibera is widely recognized as Africa‘s largest slum with about 56 percent of its 
population living below the poverty line (see Ndeng‘e et al. 2003).   
 
Namibia 
 
The election data for Katutura were calculated by combining the election results for 
both Katutura East and Katutura Central constituencies in the Khomas region where 
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Windhoek is located.  The vote shares are the proportion of total valid votes.  This 
data is from the 2009 presidential elections and available from the Electoral 
Commission of Namibia at http://www.ecn.gov.na/.  Information on deprivation in 
Windhoek was primarily derived from Frayne (2007).   
 
South Africa 
 
The election data is for Ward 3 of Region G in the municipality of Johannesburg in 
Gauteng Province.  The data is for the April 22, 2009 national elections, and can be 
accessed at South Africa‘s Independent Electoral Commission at 
www.elections.org.za.   According to a multiple deprivation index that captures 
peoples‘ unmet needs with respect to food, housing, household facilities, fuel, 
education, health, and work, Orange Farm is considered the most deprived ward in 
Johannesburg and the 22
nd
 most deprived ward out of the total 420 wards within 
Gauteng Province (De Wet et al. 2008).  Many informal settlers from Soweto re-
located to Orange Farm in the early 1990s and today, the area is considered to be 
South Africa‘s largest informal settlement.  The broader Region G has Johannesburg‘s 
highest rates of unemployment and lacks adequate housing and infrastructure (Visser 
2007).  
 
Tanzania 
 
Election data for Temeke constituency is for the 2005 presidential elections and 
available from Tanzania‘s National Electoral Commission at http://www.nec.go.tz/.  
Temeke was identified as Dar es Salaam‘s poorest area from a World Bank study by 
Muzzini and Lindeboom (2008).   
 
Zambia  
 
The 2008 presidential election data for Mandevu constituency was obtained from the 
Zambian Electoral Commission and available at http://www.elections.org.zm/.  Simler 
(2007) combined census data with poverty data from Zambia‘s 2002-03 Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) in order to determine that within Lusaka 
district, Chaisa is the poorest ward with approximately 68 percent of its population 
living below the poverty line.     
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APPENDIX THREE 
Interview Respondents  
 
Interviews conducted with political elites, journalists, development experts, 
academics, and civil society representatives are presented in this appendix.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, the interviews were recorded.   
 
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  
 
No. Last Name,  
First Name(s) 
Title Affiliation Date 
Interviewed  
1 Bazin, Benoist  
 
Social and Governance 
Sector 
European 
Commission 
Delegation to the 
Republic of Zambia 
March 17, 
2009 
2 Beyani , Dr. Choolwe  
 
Director of Policy and 
Research and Deputy 
Chairman for 
International Relations; 
Professor of History  
United Party for 
National 
Development;  
University of 
Zambia  
February 24, 
2009 
3 Chibamba, Musonda News Correspondent  British 
Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) 
January 28, 
2009  
4 Chibwe, Winstone* Deputy Secretary 
General  
United Party for 
National 
Development  
February 17, 
2009  
5 Chifuwe, Sheikh Journalist, General 
Secretary of the Press 
Freedom Committee 
The Post 
newspaper  
January 29, 
2009 
6 Chitala, Dr. Mbita Executive Campaign 
Manager; Former 
Ambassador to Libya  
Movement for 
Multi-party 
Democracy 
January 29, 
2009 
7 Chisenga, Edward* Publicity Director Street Vendors 
Association 
March 3, 
2009  
8 Chiwama, Sally  Journalist Zambia Media 
Women‘s 
Association  
January 21, 
2009  
9 Henriot, Father Peter Director Jesuit Center for 
Theological 
Reflection  
January 30, 
2009  
10 Hichilema, Hakainde President United Party for 
National 
Development 
February 17, 
2009  
11 Kabimba , Wynter* Chairman for local 
government;  Former 
Lusaka Town Clerk 
Patriotic Front  February 5, 
2009 
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12 Kalumba, Dr. Katele National Secretary;  
Minister of Parliament 
for Chiengi 
Constituency;  former 
Deputy Minister of 
Health, Minister of 
Health, Minister of 
Finance, Minister of 
Tourism, Minister of 
Home Affairs, and 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
Movement for 
Multi-party 
Democracy  
March 5, 
2009  
13 Lubinda, Given Minister of Parliament 
for Kabwata 
constituency, Party 
spokesperson  
Patriotic Front  January 22, 
2009 
14 Malido, Webster*  Former editor and 
journalist  
The Post 
newspaper  
February 5, 
2009 
15 Matawe, Bornwell Deputy Director of 
Housing and Social 
Services 
Lusaka City 
Council  
April 8, 2009  
16 Mulenga, Dr. 
Chileshe  
Director of Research 
and Deputy Secretary 
General 
Patriotic Front  February 24, 
2009  
17 Mumbwatasai, 
Morgan* 
Governance Advisor UK Department for 
International 
Development  
March 11, 
2009 
18 Nchito, Wilma* Professor of 
Geography, Research 
on markets 
University of 
Zambia  
January 22, 
2009  
19 Ncube, Nelson Director  People‘s Process on 
Housing and 
Poverty in Zambia 
February 17, 
2009 
20 Palale, Patricia Public Sector 
Management Specialist   
World Bank February 25, 
2009 
21 Phiri, Rose Director of Housing 
and Social Services 
Lusaka City 
Council 
April 8, 2009 
22 Phiri, Victor National Coordinator 
& Organizer for 
Lusaka District 
Workers Education 
Alliance of Zambia 
February 25, 
2009 
23 Phiri, Wazziah Spokesman  Heritage Party February 28, 
2009 
24 Rubvuta, Elijah Executive Director  Forum for 
Democratic Process 
(FODEP) 
February 11, 
2009 
25 Sata, Michael President  Patriotic Front  January 28, 
2009  
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26 Scott, Dr. Guy Vice President and 
Member of Parliament 
for the constituency of 
Lusaka Central 
Patriotic Front  January 21, 
2009  
27 Sikota, Sakwiba President, MP for 
Livingstone 
Constituency 
United Liberal 
Party   
March 31, 
2009  
28 Simutanyi, Dr. Neo Executive Director  Centre for Policy 
Dialogue  
February 3, 
2009  
29 Simuusa, Wilber Member of Parliament 
for Nchanga 
constituency 
Patriotic Front  January 21, 
2009  
30 Soko, Michael Assistant Resident 
Representative/Govern
ance Advisor 
United Nations 
Development 
Program  
March 10, 
2009 
31 Zulu, Brenda Journalist  Zambia Media 
Women‘s 
Association 
January 21, 
2009  
Notes:  *Indicates that notes for interview were handwritten.  
 
 
 
DAKAR, SENEGAL  
 
No. Last Name,  
First Name(s)  
Title Affiliation Date 
Interviewed 
1 Abdoul, Dr. 
Mohammadou 
Urban Development 
Researcher 
Endapol of ENDA-
Tiers Monde  
October 3, 
2008  
2 Bâ, Abdoul Wahab Team leader of 
Governance Unit  
United Nations 
Development 
Program 
November 
18, 2008  
3 Balde, Demba Social Development 
Specialist 
World Bank November 
14, 2008 
4 Coulibaly,  
Abdou Latif  
Political Analyst & 
Journalist  
Sud Quotidien 
newspaper  
October 10, 
2008  
5 Coumé, Macoumba* Director de la 
Formation et de la 
Communication in the 
Direction Generale des 
Elections 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
October 2, 
2008  
6 Diop, Mame Bou Secretary General  Union Nationale des 
Commercants et 
Industriels du 
Sénégal, (UNACOIS) 
September 
17, 2008  
7 Diop, Dr. Alioune 
Badara 
Political Scientist  University of Gaston-
Berger of St. Louis, 
Department of 
Juridical and Political 
December 1, 
2008  
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Science 
8 Diop, Dr. Momar 
Coumba* 
Sociologist and 
Researcher 
University of Cheikh 
Anta Diop/ West 
African Research 
Center  
October 9, 
2008  
9 Fall, Dr. Abdou 
Salam 
Sociologist and 
Researcher, Laboratory 
for the study of poverty 
and social 
transformation  
University of Cheikh 
Anta Diop and 
Institut Fondamental 
d’Afrique Noire 
(IFAN)  
August 28, 
2008 
10 Fall, Waly In charge of 
communication for 
Rewmi and Mayor of 
Dieuppeul-Derklé 
Rewmi November 
25, 2008  
11 Faye, Ibrahima* Journalist Sud Quotidien August 29, 
2008  
12 Gaye, Babacar Spokesperson for the 
PDS, Director of the 
Political Affairs 
Cabinet 
Parti Démocratique 
Sénégalais (PDS)  
September 
30, 2008  
13 Guèye, Cheikh Geographical 
Researcher  
ENDA Tiers Monde November 
19, 2008  
14 Martin, Nicolas Governance team 
member 
United Nations 
Development 
Program  
November 
18, 2008  
15 Mboup, Khalifa Secretary General Association of 
Senegalese Mayors 
December 2, 
2008  
16 Sall, Aissata Tall  In charge of 
communication for the 
PS  
Parti Socialiste (PS)  September 
15, 2008  
17 Sall, Ebrima  Senior Program 
Officer, Head 
Department of 
Research  
CODESRIA September 
9, 2008  
18 Sall, Ibrahima Former Minister of 
Planning under Abdou 
Diouf 
Parti Socialiste (PS) November 
11, 2008 
19 Sall ,Seydou Sy  Former Minister of 
Urbanization  
Ligue-
Démocratique-
Mouvement pour le 
Parti du Travail 
(LD-MPT) 
September 
23, 2008  
20 Sarr, Omar Spokesperson Rewmi November 
11, 2008  
21 Sène, Ibrahima In charge of economic 
and social affairs for 
PIT  
Parti de 
l’Indépendance et 
du Travail (PIT)  
September 
25, 2008  
22 Sow, Malick* Director Malick Sow & October 8, 
348 
 
Associates 2008  
23 Tall, 
Dr. Serigne Mansour  
Program Manager  UN-HABITAT for 
Senegal 
October 29, 
2008  
24 Thior, Mamadou Chief News Editor Radio Television 
Senegal-RTS 
November 
6, 2008  
25 Thioub,  
Dr. Ibrahima  
Historian University of Cheikh 
Anta Diop  
September 
10, 2008  
26 Tine, Helène  Spokesperson Alliance des Forces 
du Progrès (AFP) 
September 
16, 2008  
27 Vasseur, Mathieu In charge of Urban 
Development and 
Decentralization  
Agence France de 
Développement 
November 
6, 2008  
28 Vilane, Abdoulaye  Spokesperson  Parti Socialiste (PS) September 
11, 2008  
29  Wade, Aiwa Spokesperson Ligue-
Démocratique-
Mouvement pour le 
Parti du Travail 
(LD-MPT) 
September 
21, 2008  
Notes:  * Indicates that notes for interview were handwritten.  
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Campaign Photos and Satirical Cartoons 
 
Figure A4.1:  Rupiah Banda (MMD) Distributing Sugar in Eastern Province in  
2008 Presidential Campaign 
 
Source:  Nsama, Thomas. 2008. "MMD presidential candidate Rupiah Banda becomes a ‗sugar 
daddy‘.‖ The Post, September 14: 1. 
 
Figure A4.2:  Michael Sata amid Supporters at the Zambian High Court 
 
Source:  http://www.michaelsata.co.zm/ (accessed Oct. 28, 2009).  Sata is the man in the middle with 
his arm outstretched.  
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Figure A4.3:  Cartoon Deriding Abdoulaye Wade’s Très Grands Projets 
 
Source:  Le Quotidien. 22-23 Novembre 2008, p.1. 
Notes :  The title of the picture translates as ―To be led in a boat or in a horse-drawn carriage: the youth 
of the [Dakar] suburbs has a choice.‖ A caricature of Wade is presented in the middle, hoping to 
convince the prospective emigrant to stay and benefit from Wade‘s TGP.  Wade says, ―With my TGP, I 
will take you to a Senegal of dreams.‖  Unconvinced, the departing emigrant replies, ―Our only hope is 
everything except Wade.‖   
 
Figure A4.4: 2007 PDS Campaign Poster in Dakar 
 
Source:  Photo by C. Berger, displayed in Magrin,Géraud. 2007. "Sopi or not sopi?: A propos des 
élections présidentielles de février 2007 au Sénégal." EchoGéo, Juillet-Septembre (3). 
Notes : The slogan ―Le meilleur reste à venir‖ means ―The best is yet to come.‖ Notably, even those the 
poster is hanging in Dakar, the pictures in the poster focus on modernizing the agricultural sector.   
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APPENDIX FIVE: 
Survey Questionnaires for the Markets  
 
 
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  
 
I.  Details concerning the interview  
 
A.  Respondent Number: 
 
B.  Date of interview:   
 
C.  Time at which interview began:   
 
D.  Market: 
 
II.  Details concerning the respondent  
 
A.  Gender  
   
1.  ______Female    2.  ______Male  
 
B.  What is your first language?  (The language you first learned as a child)  
 
1. _____Bemba  8.____Lamba   15._____Namwanga 
2. _____Bisa   9.____Lenje   16._____Ngoni 
3. _____Chewa  10.____Lozi   17._____Nsenga 
4. _____English  11.____Lunda   18._____Nyanja 
5. _____Ila   12.____Lungu   19._____Senga 
6. _____Kaonde  13.____Luvale   20._____Tonga 
7. _____Lala   14.____Mambwe   21._____Tumbuka  
22. _____Other 
  
 C. How old are you ?   
 
1. _____18-24 years    5. _____More than 40 years  
2. _____25-30 years    6. _____Don‘t know 
3. _____31-35 years    7. _____ Refuse to respond  
4. _____36-40 years 
 
D.  What is the highest level of education you have attained ?   
 
1.  _____No schooling     8. _____ Don‘t know 
2.  _____Primary, uncompleted     
3.  _____Primary, completed         
4.  _____Secondary, uncompleted    
5.______Secondary, completed      
6.______Post-secondary, uncompleted    
7.______Post-secondary, completed   
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E.  Do you currently live in Lusaka?   
 
 1._______Yes       2._______No 
 
F.  If so, in which constituency do you reside?   
 
1.  _______Chawama   5.  _______Mandevu   
2. ________Kabwata   6.  _______Matero  
3. ________Kanyama    7.  _______Munali  
4. ________Lusaka Central   8.  _______Other    
  
 
G.  If so, in which ward do you reside?  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H.  In your opinion, what are the poorest wards in Lusaka?  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I.  Were you born in Lusaka province?   
 
1. _____Yes    2. _____No  
 
J.  If you were not born in the province of Lusaka but currently reside here, in which 
province were you born?   
 
      1.  _____Central      6.  _____Northwest  
      2.  _____Copperbelt    7.  _____Southern    
      3.  _____Eastern    8.  _____Western  
      4.  _____Luapula    9.Other__________ 
      5. ______Northern  
 
K.  If you were not born in the province of Lusaka, when did you move there?   
 
      1.  _____One year ago or less  
      2.  _____More than 1 year ago but no more than 5 years 
      3.  _____More than 5 years ago but no more than 10 years  
      4.  _____More than 10 years ago  
       
L.  If you were not born in the province of Lusaka, what was the main reason for why 
you decided to move here ?   
 
      1.  _____A part of your family already lived here  
      2.  _____A lack of employment in the province where you were born  
      3.  _____To study  
      4. ______Marriage  
      5.______Work transfer  
      6. _____Husband or family members had a work transfer  
      7.______Brought by parents as a child  
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      8.  Other reason ________________________ 
 
M.  What is your main occupation?   
 
1.  ______Street hawker    10._______Store/restaurant owner
  
2.  ______Artisan     11.______Student 
3.  ______Sell merchandise in permanent stall  12.______Unemployed 
4.  ______Sell merchandise in temporary structure 13.______Professor/Teacher  
5.  ______Sell merchandise in the street   14. ______Beggar  
6.  ______Maid      15._______Other services (i.e.  
7    _____Taxi driver                  hairdresser, shoe-shiner, etc.) 
8.  ______Professional, private sector    16. _______Other non-services (i.e. 
9.  ______Professional, public sector            tailor, etc.)  
        17. ______ Trader     
     
 
N.  Approximately how much money do you spend per day?   
 
        1.  ______Less than 10,000 ZMK 
        2.  ______Between 10,000 and 30,000 ZMK  
        3.  ______Between 30,000 ZMK and 50,000 ZMK  
        4.  ______ More than 50,000 ZMK  
        5.  ______ Refused to respond  
        6.  ______ Don‘t know     
 
III.  Living Conditions  
 
A.  In general, how would you describe the economic conditions in Zambia today 
compared with this same time last year ?   
 
 1.  ______Conditions are much better  
 2.  ______Conditions are a little better  
 3.  ______No change  
 4.  ______Conditions are worse  
 
B.  If you believe that conditions became better or worse, what is the principal reason for 
this change?   
 
 1.  ______Policies of the Zambian government  
 2.  ______The global economy   
 3.  ______The weather  
 4. Other ___________________________________  
 5.  ______Don‘t know   
  
C.  In general, how would you describe your own economic conditions today compared 
with this same time last year ?   
 
 1.  ______Conditions are much better  
 2.  ______Conditions are a little better  
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 3.  ______No change  
 4.  ______Conditions are worse  
 
D.  If you believe that conditions become better or worse, what is the principal reason for 
this change?  
 
 1.  ______Policies of the Zambian government  
 2.  ______The global economy  
 3.  ______The weather  
 4.  ______Your family situation  
 5.  Other reason___________________________________ 
 6.______ Don‘t know  
 
E.  Do you have a water tap within your household?   
 
 1.  _____Yes    2.  _____No  
 
F.  Do you have electricity within your household?  
 
 1.  _____Yes     2.  _____No   
 
G. How many people live in your home ?    
 
1.   _____2 or less     3.  ______Between 5 and 6 
2.   _____Between 3 and 4   4.  ______More than 6  
 
H.  How many rooms are in your home ?   
 
 1.  ______1 room 
 2.  ______2 rooms 
 3.  ______3 rooms 
 4.  ______ 4 or more rooms   
5.  ______ Don‘t know  
 
I.  In your opinion, who should be responsible for the delivery of public services, such as 
water and electricity, in your neighborhood ?   
 
 1.  ______The national government  
 2.  ______The Lusaka City Council   
 3.  ______Ward authorities 
 4.  ______National utility companies   
 5. ______Don‘t know  
 6.  Other ________________________________________ 
 
J.  In general, how would you describe the housing conditions in your neighborhood 
during the period in which you have lived there ?   
 
1.  ______Conditions are much better  
 2.  ______Conditions are a little better  
 3.  ______No change  
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 4.  ______Conditions are worse  
 
K.  Within the last five years (or within the period that you have lived there, if less than 
five years), has your house or any houses in your neighborhood ever been demolished 
without warning by government authorities?   
 
1.  ________Yes    2. _______No        
 3._______Refused to respond       4.  _______Don‘t know  
 
 
IV.  Working Conditions & Associational Membership 
 
A.  Are you satisfied with your working conditions?  
 
1.  ______Yes, very much so    
2.  ______No, not at all   
3._______Sometimes/ A little bit  
 
B.  If you work in one of Lusaka’s markets, have you or someone that you know ever 
been harassed by the government authorities?  
 
1. _______Yes   
2.  _______No               
3.  _______Refused to respond    
 
 C.  If so, which of the following have the government authorities done to you or someone 
that you know (check all that apply):   
 
1.  _______Destroyed stall(s) or merchandise 
2. ________Forced you to work in a different place  
3. ________Forced you to pay certain taxes or other fees 
4. ________Arrested you 
5. Other _______________________________________________________________ 
6. ________Refuse to respond 
 
D.  If so, which level of government do you believe is responsible for such harassment?   
 
1.  _______The national government  
2. _______The Lusaka City Council 
3. _______Constituency-level authorities 
4. _______Ward-level authorities  
5.  _______Market chairperson  
6. _______Doesn‘t know  
 
 
E.  If so, how often does such harassment occur?  
 
1.  _______At least once every 6 months  
2.  _______At least once a year  
3.  _______At least once every 2 years  
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4.  _______Very infrequently 
   
 
F.  Are you a member of any work organizations?    
 
1. ______Yes    2._______No 
 
G.  If so, which one (s)?  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H.  If yes, why did you decide to become a member of this organization?  
 
1. ______It has a good record of protecting the rights of workers 
2. ______It has a close relationship with the local authorities  
3. ______A friend convinced you to become a member 
4. ______A member of your family convinced you to become a member  
5. Other reason _____________________________________________ 
 
I.  If not, why have you decided not to join any work organizations ?  
 
1. _____The benefits of membership are not clear 
2. _____Membership fees are too high  
3. _____The existing work organizations are too closely tied to the ruling party  
4. _____The existing work organizations are too autocratic  
5. _____You didn‘t know that any work organizations existed  
6. Other reason_____________________________________ 
7. _____Don‘t know  
 
J.   Recently, the role of the Chinese in the Zambian economy has been controversial.  
What is your opinion of the growing Chinese presence in Zambia?   
 
1. _______Beneficial:   They bring skills and resources that improve Zambia‘s  
                                    development 
2. _______Harmful:       They are taking away opportunities from Zambians 
3. _______Mixed:          They bring both benefits and disadvantages  
4. _______No opinion   
 
 
V.  Presidential Elections  
 
A.  Did you vote in the 2006 presidential election?   
 
1. _______Yes   2. _______No  
 
B. If not, why not ?   
 
1.  ______ None of the candidates appealed to you   
2.  ______You did not have enough time to vote   
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3.  ______You thought that the elections would not be fair and transparent   
4.  ______You thought that your favorite candidate would not win  
5.  ______You did not know the manifestoes of the candidates  
6.  ______You thought that, no matter who wins, nothing will change 
7.  ______ You didn‘t have necessary documents (NRC, voter‘s card, or both)  
8.  ______You were too young to vote 
9.  ______You cannot vote for religious reasons (e.g. Jehovah‘s Witness) 
10. ______Other  
 
C.  If yes, who did you support during the 2006 presidential election?   
 
1.  ______Levy Mwanawasa (MMD)  
2.  ______Michael Sata (PF)  
3.  ______Hakainde Hichilema (UDA)  
4.  ______Godfrey K. Miyanda (HP)   
5.  ______Winright K. Ngondo (APC)   
6.  Other candidate__________________________ 
7.  ______Don‘t know  
 8.  ______Refused to respond  
 
D.  What was the main reason why you supported this candidate in the 2006 presidential 
election?   
 
1.  ______You recognized his name  
2.  ______You preferred the manifesto of this candidate 
3.  ______You had experienced a change in your own economic conditions  
4.  ______The candidate‘s ethnicity   
5.  ______The candidate‘s party campaigned in your neighborhood  
6.  ______The candidate promised a change  
7.  ______A member of your family voted for him  
8._______A neighbor/friend/acquaintance voted for him  
9._______This candidate had a lot of experience 
10. ______You preferred the personality/characteristics of this candidate 
11. Other reason _____________________________ 
12.______Don‘t know  
 
E.  Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?   
 
1. _______Yes   2. _______No  
 
F. If not, why not?   
 
1.  ______ None of the candidates appealed to you   
2.  ______You did not have enough time to vote   
3.  ______You thought that the elections would not be fair and transparent   
4.  ______You thought that your favorite candidate would not win  
5.  ______You did not know the manifestoes of the candidates  
6.  ______You thought that, no matter who wins, nothing will change 
7.  ______ You didn‘t have necessary documents (NRC, voter‘s card, or both)  
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8.  ______You were too young to vote 
9.  ______You cannot vote for religious reasons (e.g. Jehovah‘s Witness) 
10. ______Other  
 
G.  If yes, who did you support during the 2008 presidential election?   
 
1.  ______Rupiah Banda (MMD)  
2.  ______Michael Sata (PF)  
3.  ______Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)  
4.  ______Godfrey K. Miyanda (HP)   
5.  Other candidate__________________________ 
6.  ______Don‘t know  
 7.  ______Refused to respond  
 
H.  What was the main reason why you supported this candidate in the 2008 presidential 
elections?   
 
1.  ______You recognized his name  
2.  ______You preferred the manifesto of this candidate 
3.  ______You had experienced a change in your own economic conditions  
4.  ______The candidate‘s ethnicity   
5.  ______The candidate‘s party campaigned in your neighborhood  
6.  ______The candidate promised a change  
7.  ______A member of your family voted for him  
8._______A neighbor/friend/acquaintance voted for him  
9._______This candidate had a lot of experience 
10. ______You preferred the personality/characteristics of this candidate 
11. Other reason _____________________________ 
12.______Don‘t know  
 
   
VI.  Perspectives on the ruling party (MMD)  
 
A.  Did the MMD campaign in your neighborhood during the 2008 presidential 
elections ? 
    
 1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
   
B.  If yes, did the MMD give a speech in your neighborhood ?   
 
 1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
C.  If yes, did the MMD hang up signs in your neighborhood ?   
 
 1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
 
D.  If yes, did the MMD give out gifts, such as T-shirts, hats, etc. in your neighborhood?   
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 1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
E.  If yes, did the MMD give out money in your neighborhood? 
 
 1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
F.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
  «The MMD has improved the availability of electricity in Lusaka »  
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
G.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
  «The MMD has improved the cost of electricity in Lusaka » 
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
   
H.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
 «The MMD has improved the availability of water in Lusaka » 
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
I.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
 «The MMD has improved the cost of water in Lusaka » 
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
J.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
 «The MMD has improved the cost of transport in Lusaka » 
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
K.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
«The MMD has done a lot to improve the conditions of the poor in Lusaka »  
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
L.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:   
«Thanks to the MMD, unemployment has declined »  
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3. ______Don‘t know   
 
M.  Why did the MMD win the 2008 presidential elections?  
 
1. _____The MMD has had good policies for improving the living conditions of many 
                Zambians  
2.  _____The opposition parties were not competitive enough  
3.  _____The election was not fair   
4.  _____The MMD gave money and/or other goods to certain voters in order to obtain their  
    support  
5.  _____Sympathy for the loss of Levy Mwanawasa  
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6.  Other reason ________________________________________ 
7. _____Don‘t know  
 
VII.  Perspectives of the opposition parties  
 
A.  Which opposition parties campaigned in your neighborhood during the 2008 
presidential elections ?  
  
1._______Patriotic Front (PF)  
2. _______United Party for National Development 
3. _______Heritage Party  
4. Other party _______________________________________________________ 
5.  _______None  
6. _______ Don‘t know  
 
B.  Did any of these opposition parties give a speech in your neighborhood ?   
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3.  ______Don‘t know   
 
C.  Did any of these opposition parties hang up signs in your neighborhood?   
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3.  ______Don‘t know   
 
D.  Did any of these opposition parties give out gifts, such as T-shirts and hats, in your 
neighborhood ?  
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3.  ______Don‘t know   
 
E.  Did any of these opposition parties give out money in your neighborhood ?  
 
1.  ______Yes  2.  ______No  3.  ______Don‘t know    
 
F.  Which opposition parties do you think are the most interested in improving the living 
conditions of those living in the province of Lusaka ?  (check all that apply)  
 
1.  _______Patriotic Front (PF)  
2.  _______United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
3. ________United Party for National Development (UPND) 
4. ________Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) 
5.  _______Heritage Party (HP) 
6. Other party ________________________________________________________  
7. _______None  
 
G.  In your opinion, what is the major difference between Zambia’s political parties ?  
 
1.  ______The personalities of the party leaders  
2.  ______The parties‘ positions on important social and economic issues 
3.  ______The parties‘ links with a particular region of Zambia 
4.  ______There is no difference  
5.  Other factor _______________________________________________________ 
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6.  ______ Don‘t know  
   
 
H.  If elections took place tomorrow, would you support the MMD?  
 
1. ______Yes                     
2. ______No      
3. ______Don‘t know             
4._______Refused to respond   
5._______Not Applicable  (e.g. Jehovah‘s Witness, etc.)   
 
I.  How would you define what a “political party platform/manifesto” is?   
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Time that interview ended:   
 
 
DAKAR, SENEGAL 
 
I.  Détailles concernant l’entrevue  
 
A.  Numéro du Répondant: 
 
B.  Date d‘entrevue:   
 
C.  Heure à laquelle l‘entrevue a commencé:   
 
D.  Marché : 
 
II.  Détailles concernant le répondant  
 
A.  Le genre du répondant 
   
1.  ______Femme                           2.  ______Homme   
 
B.  Quelle est votre première langue ?   
 
1.  ______French    5.  ______Serer   
2.  ______ Jola     6.  ______Soninke 
3. _______Mandinka    7.  ______Wolof 
4._______ Pulaar    8.  Autre ___________________ 
  
 C. Quel âge avez-vous ?   
 
1. _____18-24   5. _____Plus de 40 ans 
2. _____25-30   6. _____Vous ne savez pas 
3. _____31-35               7. _____Vous ne voulez pas répondre  
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4. _____36-40  
 
D.  Quel est le plus haut niveau d’éducation que vous avez atteint ?   
 
 1.  _____ Vous n‘êtes pas allé(e) à l‘école 
 2. _____  Coran  
 3. _____  Langue (Arabe/Pulaar) 
 4.  _____Ecole primaire 
 5.  _____Ecole sécondaire 
 6.  _____Post-sécondaire  
 7.  _____Ne sais pas   
 
E.  Est-ce que vous êtes né(e) dans la région de Dakar ?  
 
1. _____Oui                                              2. _____Non  
 
 
F.  Sinon, quand est-ce que vous êtes venu(e) à Dakar?  
 
      1.  _____Il y a un an ou moins  
      2.  _____Il y a plus d‘un an mais pas plus de cinq ans  
      3.  _____Il y a plus de cinq ans mais pas plus de dix ans  
      4.  _____Il y a plus de dix ans  
 
G.  Si vous n’êtes pas originaire de Dakar, vous venez de quelle région ?  
 
      1.  _____Diourbel      7.  _____Saint Louis 
      2.  _____Fatick      8.  _____Tambacounda  
      3.  _____Kaolack     9.  _____Thiès  
      4.  _____Kolda      10._____Casamance  
      5. _____ Louga      11.Autre _________________________ 
      6.  _____Matam   
       
H.  Si vous n’êtes pas originaire de Dakar, quelle était la raison principale de venir ici ?  
 
      1.  _____Une partie de la famille déjà habitait ici  
      2.  _____Une manque d‘emploi dans la région d‘origine  
      3.  _____Etudier  
      4.  Autre raison________________________ 
 
I.  Quelle est votre profession principale ?  
 
1.  ____ Commerçant(e) ambulant(e)               9. ____ Propriétaire d‘un magasin 
2.  ____Artisan                10._____Étudiant(e) 
3.  ____Vendre les marchandises dans              11. ____Pêcheur   
               un magasin                12. ____Chômeur/Chômeuse 
4.  ____Vendre les marchandises dans la rue     13. ____ Professeur ou Enseignant (e) 
5.  ____Domestique                14.  ____Mendiant (e )  
6.  _____Chauffeur de taxi               15.______Autre -services   
7.  _____Travail dans le secteur privé             16. _____ Autre-non services  
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8.  _____Travail dans le secteur publique    
 
J.  Approximativement, vous dépensez combien d’argent par jour ?   
 
 1.  ______ 1000 CFA ou moins  
 2.  ______Plus de 1000 mais pas plus de 3000 CFA  
 3.  ______Plus de 3000 mais pas plus de 5000 CFA  
 4.  ______Plus de 5000 CFA  
 5.  ______ Vous refusez de répondre  
 6.  ______ Vous ne savez pas    
 
III.  Les Conditions de la Vie 
   
A.  Dans quel département habitez-vous ?   
 
1.  ______Dakar     
2.  ______Pikine  
3.  ______Guediawaye 
4.  ______Rufisque 
5.  Autre  ___________________________ 
 
B.  Dans quelle commune habitez-vous ?   
 
 ___________________________________ 
 
C.  Dans quel quartier habitez-vous ?   
 
 ___________________________________ 
 
 
D.  A votre avis, quels sont des quartiers plus défavorisés dans Dakar ? 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
E.  En général, comment décririez-vous les conditions économiques au Sénégal 
aujourd’hui par rapport à la même époque l’année dernière ?   
 
 1.  ______Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures  
 2.  ______Les conditions sont un peu meilleures  
 3.  ______Il n‘y a pas de changement  
 4.  ______Les conditions sont pires  
 
F.  Si vous croyez qu’elles sont devenues meilleures ou pires, quelle raison est 
responsable pour le changement?  
 
 1.  ______Les politiques du gouvernement sénégalais 
 2.  ______L‘économie mondiale  
 3.  ______La météo 
 4. Autre raison___________________________________  
 5.  ______Au moins deux choix ci-dessus sont responsables 
364 
 
 6. ______Ne sais pas   
  
G.  En général, comment décririez-vous vos propres conditions économiques aujourd’hui 
par rapport à la même époque l’année dernière ?   
 
 1.  ______Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures  
 2.  ______Les conditions sont un peu meilleures  
 3.  ______Il n‘y a pas de changement  
 4.  ______Les conditions sont pires  
 
H.  Si vous croyez qu’elles sont devenues meilleures ou pires, quelle raison est 
responsable pour le changement?  
 
 1.  ______Les politiques du gouvernement sénégalais 
 2.  ______L‘économie mondiale  
 3.  ______La météo 
 4.  ______Votre situation familiale 
 5.  Autre raison___________________________________ 
 6.  ______ Au moins deux choix ci-dessus sont responsables 
 7.  ______ Ne sais pas  
 
I.  Est-ce que vous avez des robinets dans votre maison ?  
 
 1.  _____Oui    2.  _____Non  
 
J.  Est-ce que vous avez l’électricité dans votre maison?   
 
 1.  _____Oui    2.  _____Non   
 
K. Combien de gens y-a-t-il dans votre maison ?    
 
1.   _____2 ou moins  
2.   _____Entre 3 ou 4 
3.   _____Entre 5 ou 6 
4.   _____Plus de 6  
 
L.  Combien de chambres y-a-t-il dans votre maison ?   
 
 1.  ______Un  
 2.  ______Deux 
 3.  ______Trois  
 4.  ______ Quatre ou plus  
5.  ______ Ne sais pas  
 
M.  En général, comment décririez-vous les conditions de logement dans votre quartier 
pendant la période que vous avez habité ici ?  
 
  1.  ______Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures  
 2.  ______Les conditions sont un peu meilleures  
 3.  ______Il n‘y a pas de changement  
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 4.  ______Les conditions sont pires 
 
N.  A votre avis, qui doit être plus responsable pour la prestation des services publics, 
comme l’eau et l’électricité, dans votre quartier?  
 
 1.  ______Le gouvernement national  
 2.  ______Le gouvernement municipal  
 3.  ______Le gouvernement de commune d‘arrondissement  
 4.  ______SENELEC/SDE/Les compagnies d‘utilité 
 5. ______Vous ne savez pas 
 6.  Autre ________________________________________ 
 7.  _____ Au moins deux acteurs ci-dessus sont responsables 
 
IV.  Les conditions de travail  
 
A.  Est-ce que vous êtes satisfait avec vos conditions de travail ?  
 
1.  ______Oui, beaucoup   
2.  ______Non, pas du tout   
3._______Parfois/ un peu  
 
B.  Est-ce que vous êtes membre de l’UNACOIS ?  
 
1.  ______Oui     2.  ______Non 
 
C.  Si oui, pourquoi avez-vous choisi d’être membre de l’UNACOIS ?  
 
 1.  _____Parce que l‘UNACOIS a une bonne réputation 
 2.  _____Parce que l‘UNACOIS a des liens proches avec le parti au pouvoir 
 3.  _____Un(e) ami(e) vous a convaincu d‘être membre  
 4.  _____Un membre de votre famille vous a convaincu d‘être membre 
 5.  Autre _____________________________________ 
 
D.  Sinon, pourquoi pas ?  
 
 1.  ______Les honoraires sont trop hauts   
 2.  ______Les bénéfices d‘être membre ne sont pas clair 
 3.  ______L‘UNACOIS a des liens trop proches avec le parti au pouvoir  
 4. ______ L‘UNACOIS est trop autocratique 
 5. ______Vous n‘avez pas connu que l‘UNACOIS existe  
 6. Autre_______________________________________ 
 7.  _____Vous ne savez pas  
 
E.  Est-ce que vous êtes membre d’une autre association de travail ?  
 
1.  ______Oui     2. _______Non 
 
F. Si oui, laquelle ?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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V.  Les élections présidentielles de 2007  
 
A.  Avez-vous voté pendant la dernière élection présidentielle ? 
 
 1. _______Oui   2. _______Non  
 
B. Sinon, pourquoi pas ?   
 
 1. ______ Aucun des candidats n‘a fait appel à vous  
 2.  ______Vous n‘avez pas eu assez de temps à voter  
 3.  ______Vous avez pensé que les élections ne seraient pas justes 
 4.  ______Vous avez pensé que votre candidat favori ne gagnerait pas 
 5.  ______Vous n‘avez pas connu les plat-formes des candidats 
  6.  ______Vous avez pensé que, quoi qu‘il gagne, rien ne changerait 
 7.  ______Vous n‘aviez pas votre pièce d‘identité/carte électorale 
 8.  ______Vous étiez trop jeune à voter  
 9.  Autre raison _________________________________ 
   
C.  Si oui, qui est-ce que vous avez soutenu pendant la dernière élection présidentielle ?   
 
 1.  ______Abdoulaye Wade, (PDS) 
 2.  ______Ousamane Tanor Dieng (PS) 
 3.  ______Moustapha Niasse (AFP) 
 4.  ______Idrissa Seck (Rewmi)  
 5.  ______Robert Sagna (Démocratie-Solidarité)  
 6.  ______Talla Sylla (APJ-JJ)  
 7.  ______Abdoulaye Bathily (LD-MPT)  
 8.  ______Vous ne voulez pas répondre  
 9.  Autre parti__________________________ 
 10.  _____Vous ne savez pas  
 
D.  Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez soutenu ce candidat ?   
 
 1.  ______Vous avez reconnu son nom  
 2.  ______Vous avez préféré la plate-forme du parti du candidat 
 3.  ______Vous avez éprouvé un changement des vos propres  
                               conditions économiques 
 4.  ______L‘ethnicité du candidat  
 5.  ______Le candidat a fait campagne dans votre quartier 
 6.  ______Le candidat a promis un changement  
 7.  ______ Les raisons religieuses  
 8.  ______Un membre de votre famille a voté pour lui  
 9.  ______Vos connaissances/voisins ont voté pour lui  
 10.______Le candidat avait beaucoup d‘expérience 
 11. ______Vous avez préféré la personnalité de ce candidat  
 12. _____Autre raison _____________________________ 
 13.______Vous ne savez pas  
 
VI.  Perspectives sur le parti au pouvoir (le PDS)  
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A.  Est-ce que le PDS a fait campagne dans votre quartier pendant les élections 
présidentielles de 2007 ? 
    
1.  ______Oui   2.  ______Non   3. ______Ne sais pas  
   
B.  Si oui, est-ce le PDS a prononcé un discours dans votre quartier ? 
 
1.  ______Oui   2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas 
  
C.  Si oui, est-ce le PDS a accroché des affiches dans votre quartier ? 
 
1.  ______Oui   2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
 
D.  Si oui, est-ce le PDS a donné des cadeaux (comme T-shirts, chapeau, etc.) dans votre 
quartier ? 
 
1.  ______Oui   2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
 
E.  Si oui, est-ce le PDS a donné l’argent dans votre quartier ? 
 
1.  ______Oui   2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
  
F.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :  
  «Le PDS a amélioré la disponibilité de l’électricité dans Dakar »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord  2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas  
 
G.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :  
  «Le PDS a amélioré le coût de l’électricité dans Dakar »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord          3. ______Ne sais pas    
 
H.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
 «Le PDS a amélioré la disponibilité de l’eau dans Dakar »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas  
 
I.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
 «Le PDS a amélioré le coût de l’eau dans Dakar »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord        3. ______Ne sais pas            
 
J.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
 «Le PDS a amélioré le transport dans Dakar »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord        3. ______Ne sais pas            
 
 
K.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
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«Le PDS a  fait beaucoup de choses pour améliorer les conditions de vie pour les 
populations plus défavorisées dans Dakar »   
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas  
 
L.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
«Grace au PDS, le taux de chômage a diminué »  
 
1. _____D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas     
 
 
M.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
« Le PDS s’est seulement engagé dans les projets qui bénéficient les riches»  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas  
 
N.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :  
 « Le PDS devient plus répressif vers la presse »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord              3. ______Ne sais pas     
 
O.  Etes-vous d’accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :   
«  Le changement du mandat présidentiel de 5 à 7 ans c’est bon pour la démocratie 
sénégalaise »  
 
1. ____ D‘accord 2. ______ Pas d‘accord   3. ______Ne sais pas  
 
 
P.  A votre avis, pourquoi est-ce que le PDS a gagné les élections présidentielles de 2007 ?  
 
1. _____Le PDS a eu des bonnes politiques pour améliorer les conditions de vie des  
   Sénégalais   
2.  _____Les partis d‘opposition n‘étaient pas assez compétitifs  
3.  _____L‘élection n‘était pas juste  
4.  _____Le PDS a donné l‘argent à quelques communautés importantes pour qu‘elles le  
    soutiennent  
5.  Autre raison ________________________________________ 
6. _____Vous ne savez pas  
7. _____Le candidat de PDS a promis un changement  
 
Q.  L’année dernière, le gouvernement a essayé de déguerpir des commerçants 
ambulants.   Que pensez-vous de cette tentative du gouvernement ? 
 
1.______C‘était une bonne idée ;  Les commerçants ambulants sont un problème dans Dakar 
2. ______C‘était une mauvaise idée ;  Le gouvernement doit laisser les commerçants  
     ambulants  tranquille  
3. ______ Le gouvernement doit trouver une espace permanent pour les commerçants 
                  ambulants  
4. ______Aucune opinion  
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VII.  Perspectives sur les partis d’opposition  
 
A.  Quels partis d’opposition ont fait campagne dans votre quartier pendant des 
élections présidentielles de 2007 ?   
  
 1.  _______Parti Socialiste (PS)  
 2.  _______Alliance des forces de progrès (AFP) 
 3.  _______Rewmi 
 4.  _______Alliance pour le progrès et la justice –Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ) 
 5.  _______Ligue démocratique – Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD-MPT)  
 6.  _______Démocratie-Solidarité 
 7.  _______Aucuns  
 8.  Autre parti____________________________ 
 9. _______ Ne sais pas  
 
B.  Est-ce que ces partis d’opposition ont prononcé un discours ? 
 
 1.  ______Oui  2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
 
C.  Est-ce que ces partis d’opposition ont accroché des affiches ? 
 
 1.  ______Oui  2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
 
 
D.  Est-ce que ces partis d’opposition ont donné des cadeaux (comme T-shirts, chapeau, 
etc.) ? 
 
 1.  ______Oui  2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
 
E.  Est-ce que ces partis d’opposition ont donné l’argent? 
 
 
 1.  ______Oui  2.  ______Non   3.  ______Ne sais pas  
  
F.  Quel partis d’opposition pensez-vous sont les plus intéressé à une amélioration des 
conditions de vie dans la région de Dakar? (Vous pouvez choisir plus d’un parti)  
 
 1.  ______Parti Socialiste (PS)  
 2.  ______Alliance des forces de progrès (AFP) 
 3.  ______Rewmi 
 4.  ______Alliance pour le progrès et la justice –Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ) 
 5.  ______Ligue démocratique – Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD-MPT)  
 6.  ______Démocratie-Solidarité 
 7.  ______Aucun des partis politiques  
 8.  Autre parti _________________________________________ 
  
 
G.  Selon vous, quel est le facteur clé qui distingue des partis politiques sénégalais ?   
 
 1.  ______Les personnalités des chefs des partis  
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 2.  ______Leur position politique sur des sujets sociaux et économiques importants  
 3.  ______Leur liens proches avec une région particulière du Sénégal 
 4.  ______Il n‘y a pas de différence parmi des partis  
 5.  ______ Autre 
 6.  ______ Ne sais pas 
   
H.  Si les élections auraient lieu demain, est-ce que vous soutiendrez le PDS ?  
 
1. ______Oui                   3. ______Ne sais pas   
2. ______Non    4.  ______Vous ne pouvez pas voter  
                                                                      (e.g. à cause de la réligion, etc.)  
 
K.  A votre avis, qu’est-ce que c’est une plate-forme d’un parti politique ? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
L. Est-ce que vous connaissez l’Assise Nationale ? 
 
1. ______Oui                              2. ______Non    
 
M.  Si oui, qu’est-ce que vous pensez de cette initiative ? 
 
1._____C‘est une bonne idée et ça va changer la scène politique sénégalaise 
2._____C‘est une bonne idée mais rien ne changera  
3._____Ce n‘est pas nécessaire  
4._____Aucune opinion   
5.Autre 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Heure à laquelle l’entrevue a terminé : 
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APPENDIX SIX: 
Detailed Description of Selected Markets and Survey Procedures  
 
A6.1: Description of Selected Markets  
 
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  
 
Chelstone Market -  Located in the Northeastern corner of the city, Chelstone Market 
is relatively small compared with many of the cities other markets.  Established stores, 
intermixed with welders, mechanics, and hairdressers provide a rectangular perimeter 
of the market while vegetable vendors are located in the market‘s center.  Temporary 
shacks where vendors sell second-hand clothes, shoes, and DVDs, are set up along the 
market‘s periphery.  Many of the marketers with whom we spoke noted that the 
current market was only temporary and they were waiting to move into a larger and 
more permanent market that has been under construction for a number of years.  Some 
expressed worry that moving into the new structure will require them to pay higher 
market fees.  All of the workers in this market came from the immediate area, 
particularly from Munali Constituency.    
 
Kaunda Square – This market is similar in structure to Chelstone, except that is 
much bigger.  As in Chelstone, the center of the market consists of vegetable sellers 
with surrounding stalls containing vendors of clothes and household appliances as well 
as tailors.  The market streams out into the dirt street with many street vendors selling 
groundnuts, vegetables, fruits, and popcorn.  Many of the vendors on the street at this 
market noted that they had been harassed by the city council and told to move inside 
the market. However, there is not enough space for them in the already over-crowded 
market stalls.  Most residents are from Munali constituency, with a few from 
Mandevu.   
 
Mandevu Market -  This market is overwhelmingly dominated by salaula, or second-
hand clothes and shoes, vendors.  Within the market, the stalls consist of precariously-
built, wooden structures covered by a plastic roof.  The market spreads out over a few 
polluted brooks of water, over which hand-made log bridges have been constructed.  
Some carpenters line the outer periphery of one side of the market while those selling 
clothes in the street or hot food are stationed on the other side.  When it rains, the 
marketers have little cover since the plastic roofs often have holes and those in the 
street have to completely halt their business activities in such weather.  Most of the 
marketers are from the surrounding constituency of Mandevu, with a few also from 
Matero.        
 
Matero Market -  Matero market, located in the Northwestern outskirts of the city, 
has a different structure than some of the other markets.  Specifically, the market does 
not appear to have any center but rather contains a labyrinth of little stores selling 
hardware, candy, basic foodstuffs, and some second-hand clothes and shoes.  
Interspersed amongst these stores are tailors and hairdressers.  Amongst the permanent 
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stalls and temporary/hand-built ones are some rondavels that also serve as stores.  
Towards the back of the market are some live chicken vendors and a large covered 
concrete area where women sell vegetables and bread.  On the edge of the market are 
charcoal vendors.  As with most of the markets in Lusaka, Matero market is very 
closely intertwined with the housing townships that border it.  Most of the marketers 
are from the constituency of Matero.     
 
Chilenje Market – The Chilenje market is located in the Southeastern part of Lusaka 
in Kabwata constituency on the edge of the Merzaf flat project initiated by Sata during 
his time as the Minister of Local Government and Housing.  This market has a number 
of layers to it.  Vegetable vendors selling in the street mix with minibus drivers and 
bar owners at the entrance of the market, followed by vendors of second-hand clothes, 
hardware supplies, and staple goods.  At the center are brand-new stalls surrounding a 
clean courtyard, the corner of which is located a modern office for the market 
chairman.  However, immediately behind this modern market area, vegetable vendors 
and other vendors continue selling under temporary stands, interspersed with tailors, 
hairdressers, and welders.   
 
Kabwata Market –  Kabwata market is located in the Southern part of Lusaka in 
Kabwata constituency, not very far from most of the government offices and bordering 
the relatively affluent Woodlands neighborhood.  When Sata was the National 
Secretary for the MMD, he was also the MP for Kabwata constituency.  The market 
was formerly a cooperative but now is under control of the Lusaka City Council.  
Along the front of the market are temporary stalls with vendors of second-hand clothes 
as well as trailers where vendors sell maize and other food staples.  Right beyond the 
entrance to the market are vegetable, kapenta, groundnut, and fritter vendors while the 
inner portion of the market consists of the usual array of vendors, tailors, and 
hairdressers.  Although the chairwoman of the market mentioned that there had 
previously been violence in the market because of peoples‘ different political views, 
this did not come through during our interviews.  Unlike many markets that grow out 
of compounds, the vendors in this market come from a variety of constituencies 
around the city, including Chawama, Kabwata, Kanyama, Lusaka Central, and 
Munali.  The customers at this market also tend to span a variety of different social 
classes.   
 
Chipata Market –   Chipata market is an outgrowth of Chipata compound on the 
Northern edge of the city.  This is one of the city‘s poorest compounds and the area‘s 
name comes from the fact that the original settlers in this area came from Eastern 
Province, the capital of which is Chipata.  The market actually consists of two 
markets, centered along the main thoroughfare.  Charcoal and firewood sellers and 
vendors of alcohol and food staples jostle with minibuses along this route.  The 
entrance of both markets is found behind established bars and stores and paved with 
predominantly woman vendors of peanuts, roasted maize, and kapenta.  The inside of 
one of the markets consists almost entirely of foodstuffs while the other includes 
tailors, hairdressers, and vendors of various hardware, mechanical, and electrical 
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supplies.  The market is a cooperative rather than under control of the Lusaka City 
Council.   
 
Chawama Market – Located in the Southwest of the city in the constituency of 
Chawama, the Chawama market is incredibly sprawling.  It is a co-operative market, 
though the chairman implied that there was contention with the Lusaka City Council 
over its status.  Directly across the street from the entrance to the market, the LCC 
built a Spar supermarket, which resulted in evicting vendors that were selling on the 
plot of land allocated to Spar.  The entrance to the market is crowded by vendors 
selling vegetables, kapenta, peanuts, and worms from makeshift wooden tables or the 
ground.  The market then turns into a labyrinth of permanent and temporary stalls, 
filled with vendors, butchers, carpenters, tailors, and hairdressers.  Towards the 
eastern side of the market there are rows and rows of temporary structures with 
vendors selling second-hand clothes.  The market is directly adjacent to the new and 
old Chawama compounds, which is where most of the vendors live.   
 
Kanyama Market -  As another one of Lusaka‘s poorest constituencies, located south 
of Cairo Road, Kanyama has a number of markets.  However, we visited the main 
Kanyama market, known as Sekhelela Market.  This market directly serves the 
immediate community, with all of its vendors coming from one of the incredibly poor 
surrounding compounds.  Indeed, in the surveys, Kanyama compound was considered 
by most respondents as being amongst Lusaka‘s poorest neighborhoods. Unlike many 
of the other markets, this one is unique for having a majority of its vendors selling 
along the streets, often selling in muddy conditions and near open sewerage streams, 
rather than within the established market.  As usual, the wares along the street include 
secondhand clothes, food staples, and mobile phones.  The interior of the market is 
relatively empty, with a number of closed shops.  Nevertheless, a scattering of tailors, 
vegetable sellers, and shop-owners could be found within.   
 
Old Soweto Market – In the city center, only a few blocks from Cairo Road, lays the 
New City Market and the New Soweto Market.  The Old Soweto Market, which 
predominantly specializes in saluala is wedged between these two modern markets.  
Along the main road behind the New City Market, the street is completely covered 
with hawkers, including those who showcase their wares in a perambulatory fashion 
and others who remain stationary.  Then, the outer edges of the market are dominated 
by temporary structures piled high with second-hand clothes and vendors standing on 
tables, shouting the price of their goods.  On the back side of this market, facing the 
New Soweto Market, is a field of litter and polluted puddles of muddy water lying 
under electricity pylons. Inside the market are hairdressers and small restaurants and 
some selling computer supplies.  Unlike most of the other markets surveyed for this 
study, Old Soweto Market attracts vendors from all over Lusaka because it is near the 
center of the city rather than adjacent to a compound.  Probably for the same reasons, 
harassment of marketeers is particularly intense here.  Many of those surveyed 
indicated that when the New City Market was initially built, they were pushed away.  
More recently, authorities have been harassing them to move into the New Soweto 
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Market.  However, there are only few stalls available there and the fees are too high 
for most vendors to afford.  Apparently, when the New Soweto Market opens, the Old 
Soweto Market is supposed to be demolished.   
 
 
DAKAR, SENEGAL 
 
Ouakam -  Ouakam is a relatively small market that caters to those living within the 
immediate Ouakam neighborhood and whose workers all come from that area.  The 
market contains a wide range of goods, and there are a number of craftspeople 
engaged in carpentry, metalwork, jewelry-making, and tailoring who are mixed 
amongst the merchants selling clothes and food.   
 
Grand Yoff -  This market is very much a large-scale version of the Ouakam market 
in terms of the variety of goods that are sold.  However, most workers here are 
engaged in commerce rather than producing their own goods.  Besides coming from 
the Grand Yoff area, most workers are from the suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye.     
  
HLM -  HLM is well-known as a fabric market, and while a vast range of goods can 
be found here, fabrics, jewelry, shoes, and other clothes are the main focus.  A number 
of street hawkers also concentrate in front of the market stalls.  Very few workers are 
actually from the immediate area but rather come from the suburbs, Grand Yoff, 
Parcelles, Medina, and Grand Dakar.   
 
Sandaga -  Sandaga is Dakar‘s central market, located in the middle of the downtown 
Plateau area.  Anything one would want can be found here.  The stores range from 
well-constructed, air-conditioned stores in the Sandaga commercial center, to 
ramshackle stands buried in the thick of the overcrowded market, to wooden carts set 
up on the side of Avenue Pompidou.  Moreover, Sandaga is the center of hawking 
activity and was where the PDS-led government controversially attempted to clear the 
streets of hawkers in November 2007 in preparation for its stint hosting the 
International Islamic Conference.  Given its proximity to the city center, this market 
attracts more foreigners than any of the others. Most workers here live in the suburbs, 
Parcelles, Medina, Grand Dakar, and Yoff.   
    
Kermel -  Nicknamed “marché toubab,” Kermel is predominantly an artisan‘s market 
that caters to tourists.  Jewelry, paintings, and handcrafted goods are the focus here.  
Prices are often a bit higher than elsewhere and workers speak more French and even 
some English than in some of the other markets in order to improve their chance of 
selling to the tourists.  However, food sellers are also scattered amongst the artisans 
and the merchants.  Most workers here live in the suburbs, Medina, Grand Dakar, 
Grand Yoff, and SICAP.    
  
Syndicat -  This market is much less formally organized than those in the center of the 
city.  The market basically extends outside of residents‘ living area and flows into the 
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surrounding streets. A majority of workers either sell their goods from self-constructed 
stands or simply display their wares on the ground.  Fresh fruit and nuts are the main 
specialty here, although there are also quite a few individuals who earn a living by 
selling hot meals to other workers during lunch.  Almost all the merchants are from 
the immediate neighborhood or nearby regions of the interior, such as Thiès.  
 
Marché Zinc -  Very close to Syndicat and much more formally organized, the 
merchants in Marché Zinc specialize in selling live chickens, fabric, and jewelry.   
    
Thiaroye –  Located in one of the poorest communes of the Greater Dakar region, 
known as Thiaroye, this market is Dakar‘s largest in terms of surface area, surpassing 
the size of Sandaga.  Like Syndicat, the market is very disorganized, with merchants 
streaming out into the dusty streets and spanning the Thiaroye railroad to sell their 
goods. Some use the underbelly of disused trucks as shade for selling their goods. 
Most of the workers are from the surrounding neighborhoods, such as the very poor 
Guinaw Rail, or commute daily from Thiès.  Vendors specialize in selling fruit, fish, 
vegetables, salt, and hardware.   
 
Tilène –  Located in the Medina commune of the city off of Avenue Blaise Diagne, 
Tilène is best known for being a food market that, along with exotic fruits and 
vegetables, specializes in fish, spices, gold and silver, and marabout trinkets.  The 
exterior of the market is lined with shops selling second-hand merchandise and the 
interior contains numerous hawkers who try to convince the passer-by to purchase a T-
shirt, sunglasses, or watch from him.  Due to its location, it caters to a mixture of local 
residents and tourists.  Most of the sellers live in Medina, although some also come in 
from the suburbs of Pikine.   
 
Gueule Tapée - This market is located in the Cambérène commune of the Parcelles 
Assainies arrondissement, an area that was originally created to house those who were 
removed from slums in the city center under the PS regime.  It is located on the 
outskirts of the Dakar city center before reaching the suburbs of Pikine and 
Guédiawaye.  The exterior of the market is dominated by fruit and vegetable vendors 
while the interior is filled with tailors and fabric shops.  The back of the market 
contains numerous shops constructed out of corrugated iron and wood where vendors 
specialize in selling meat and poultry.  Most of the workers in this market come from 
the immediate neighborhoods of Parcelles and Cambérène or from the suburb of 
Guédiawaye.   
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A6.2: Detailed Description of Survey Procedures  
 
 Chapter Four provided an overview of when and how the ten markets in each 
city were selected for the surveys.  This section offers a few more details on the actual 
surveying process, including specific challenges that one encounters when surveying 
in the markets as opposed to a household survey.   
 In Senegal, I worked with a research assistant from the University of Cheikh 
Anta Diop who was recommended by the center with which I was affiliated, the West 
African Research Center.  She and I pre-tested the questionnaire three times, 
discovering issues that were too sensitive to discuss or language that was prone to 
misinterpretation.  When the questionnaire was finalized, we could begin the 
surveying in earnest.  I accompanied her on each and every survey interview, ensuring 
that questions were asked in a similar manner across respondents and asking follow-up 
questions whenever the respondent appeared to contradict him- or herself.  Before 
each interview, potential respondents received a paper summarizing my research 
project, highlighting that I was a student and not affiliated with any government 
organization, and providing email and phone details in case the respondent ever need 
to contact the Cornell Institutional Review Board.  When the respondent agreed to 
participate, s/he would sign the consent form or, if illiterate, would have a nearby 
witness sign for her/him.  All respondents received a small bag of sugar as 
compensation for their participation.   
 In Zambia, I worked with a research assistant from the University of Zambia 
who was recommended by a professor there who focuses on urbanization and markets 
in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.  She and I only needed to pre-test the questionnaire 
once since most of the same questions from the Senegal survey were asked in Zambia.  
Again, I accompanied her on every survey interview.  While the same exact procedure 
was used to obtain consent from respondents, the Lusakan case was somewhat 
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different in that the markets tend to be much more politicized than in Dakar.  As such, 
we requested permission from the market chairperson in each market before beginning 
our survey work.  No chairperson denied our request, though one claimed that we 
should be careful not to generate political tensions within her market.  Since an ethics 
review board at the University of Zambia further approved my survey materials, I was 
able to provide respondents with a local contact number at the University in case they 
had any questions about their participation after our departure.  As in Dakar, we 
distributed small bags of sugar as a token of appreciation for respondents‘ 
participation.      
 In both cities, a few challenges occurred when conducting the surveys. In 
addition to noise and the lack of places to sit and discuss in privacy, a main problem is 
that marketeers can be extremely busy trying to court customers.  In order to ensure 
their participation, the survey questionnaires were kept relatively short, around twenty 
minutes long, and respondents were told to give priority to vending if a customer came 
along. Secondly, many individuals work in close proximity in the markets, increasing 
the possibility that potential respondents may hear survey questions and answers in 
advance.  In order to avoid this bias, respondents were chosen from different segments 
of the market such that the samples included those both at the entrance to the markets 
as well as those who plied their trade at a deeper location therein.  In Lusaka, an 
additional difficulty was that a majority of the surveys were conducted in February 
and March, which are the height of the rainy season.  Since most of the markets have 
no drainage and people work out of temporary stalls with little cover, it was quite 
difficult navigating through these markets to talk to people, although certainly 
revealing of the abysmal work conditions they must endure for part of the year.   
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APPENDIX SEVEN 
Robustness Tests   
 
Table A7.1:  Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for Rupiah Banda in 2008 
Independent variables  Demo-
graphic & 
Education  
(1) 
Campaign 
Conduct     
 
(2) 
Economy 
& Service 
Delivery 
(3) 
Full Model 
 
 
(4) 
Weighted 
Full Model  
 
(5) 
Female  0.508  
( 0.441) 
--- --- --- --- 
Age:  18-30 years
a
 -1.202** 
(0.580) 
--- --- -1.886*** 
(  0.670) 
-1.159 
(0.799) 
Age: 31-40 years -0.548 
(.498) 
--- --- --- ---- 
Low education
b
  0.449  
(0.669) 
--- --- --- ---- 
Medium education -0.514 
(0.513) 
--- --- ---  
Bemba language  group -0.844 
(.518) 
--- --- -1.036* 
( 0.544) 
-0.639 
(0.745) 
Nyanja language group  -0.058 
( 0.515) 
--- --- --- --- 
Handouts by MMD --- -0.055 
( 0.680) 
--- --- --- 
Handouts by opposition --- -0.829  
(0.528) 
--- --- ---- 
Household access to water --- ---    1.493 ** 
( 0.603) 
1.535** 
( 0.670) 
2.804*** 
( 0.756) 
Household access to 
electricity 
--- --- -1.841*** 
( 0.599) 
-1.734*** 
(0.646) 
-2.817*** 
(0.734) 
Poor performance by MMD 
in creating jobs 
--- --- -0.984  
(0.957) 
-1.803* 
( 1.081) 
-2.453 
( 1.624) 
Poor performance by MMD 
in improving conditions for 
the poor 
--- --- -1.619*** 
(0.567) 
-1.757*** 
( 0.626) 
-2.822*** 
( 0.797) 
Poor performance by MMD 
in improving transport 
--- --- -0.705 
( 0.500) 
  -1.067* 
(0.547) 
-1.124  
(0.923) 
Worsened economic 
conditions over previous 12 
months  
--- --- -0.603 
(0.623) 
-0.395 
(0.672)  
  1.105 
( 1.107) 
Worsened personal 
economic conditions over 
previous 12 months  
--- --- 0.138 
( 0.490) 
-0.349 
(0.549)  
 
-0.045  
( 0.657) 
Constant  0.051   -0.122 2.560  4.541   3.913 
Number of obs.  123 123 123 123 123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.084  0.023  0.211 0.288       0.462 
Prob >chi2 0.080  0.180  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Significance levels:   ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   
Notes:  
a
Those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the 
age dummy   variables.   
b
 The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had 12 or more 
years of education.  
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Table A7.2:  Multi-collinearity Diagnostics on Independent Variables for Zambia 
 
Variable VIF Sqrt VIF Tolerance R-squared 
Age:  18-30 1.13 1.06 0.888 0.112 
Bemba language group 1.02 1.01 0.978 0.022 
Household access to water 1.24 1.11 0.805 0.195 
Household access to 
electricity  
1.23 1.11 0.813 0.187 
Poor performance by MMD 
in creating jobs 
1.20 1.10 0.831 0.169 
Poor performance by MMD 
in improving conditions for 
the poor 
1.24 1.11 0.807 0.193 
Poor performance by MMD 
in improving transport 
1.08 1.04 0.926  0.075 
Worsened econ conditions 
over previous 12 months 
1.15 1.07 0.870 0.130 
Worsened personal econ 
conditions over previous 12 
months 
1.25 1.12   0.800 0.200 
Mean VIF = 1.17   
 
 
Table A7.3:  Internal Consistency of Subjective Performance Variables in Zambia  
 
 
Variables Average inter-
item 
covariance 
Scale 
reliability 
coefficient  
Poor performance by MMD in 
creating jobs 
0.0299121 0.4877 
Poor performance by MMD in 
improving conditions for the 
poor 
Poor performance by MMD in 
improving transport 
Worsened econ conditions over 
previous 12 months 
Worsened personal econ 
conditions over previous 12 
months 
Notes: This table uses Chronbach‘s Alpha to test internal consistency of the subjective performance 
variables included in the binomial logit regressions.  When the scale reliability coefficient is less than 
0.70, this indicates that the variables are not all measuring the same underlying variable dimension  
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Table A7.4:  Alternative Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for  
Abdoulaye Wade in 2007 
 
Independent variables  Demographic 
& Education 
(1) 
Campaign 
Conduct    
(2) 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions  
(3) 
Full Model 
 
(4) 
Female  0.670 
 (0.495) 
--- --- --- 
Age: 18-30 years
a
 0.949 
(0.610) 
--- --- --- 
Age: 31-40 years 0.549 
(0.589) 
--- --- --- 
Koranic education
b
 -2.225*** 
(0.819) 
--- --- -2.450*** 
(0.795) 
Language education -1.469* 
(0.773) 
--- --- -1.609** 
(0.761) 
Primary education  -1.241* 
(0.656) 
---  -1.076* 
(0.582) 
Secondary education and 
above  
-1.424** 
(0.673) 
--- --- -1.674** 
(0.686) 
Wolof language group -0.126 
(0.663) 
--- --- --- 
Pulaar language group  -0.195 
(0.816) 
   
Handouts by PDS  --- -0.261 
(0.502) 
--- --- 
Handouts by opposition --- -0.196 
(0.479) 
--- --- 
Household access to water    -1.273 
(1.076) 
-1.106 
(1.156) 
Poor performance by PDS 
in creating jobs 
--- ---  -0.339 
(0.961) 
-0.443 
(1.107) 
Poor performance by PDS 
in improving conditions for 
the poor 
--- --- -0.346  
(0.567) 
-0.396 
(0.618) 
Poor performance by PDS 
in improving transport 
--- ---  -0.187 
(0.618) 
-0.546 
(0.680) 
Worsened econ conditions 
over previous 12 months 
--- --- 1.243  
(1.119) 
1.400 
(1.253) 
Worsened personal econ 
conditions over previous 12 
months 
  -0.797 
(0.671) 
-1.078 
(0.699) 
Constant  1.643** 
(0.758) 
1.614*** 
(0.353) 
2.753* 
(1.472) 
4.054** 
(1.600) 
Number of observations 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.006 0.032 0.127 
Prob >chi2 0.064 0.636 0.576 0.042 
Significance levels:  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  Standard errors are in the parentheses.   
Notes:    
a
Those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the 
 age dummy variables.   
                   b
 The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had no    
 schooling at all.  
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Table A7.5:  Multi-collinearity Diagnostics on Independent Variables for Senegal 
 
 
Variable VIF Sqrt VIF Tolerance R-squared 
Koranic education  1.11 1.05 0.905 0.095 
Language education  1.10 1.05 0.910 0.090  
Primary education  1.20 1.09 0.835  0.165 
Secondary education and 
above   
1.15  1.07 0.870  0.130  
Spend 3000 CFA or less per 
day 
1.04 1.02 0.965 0.035 
Mean VIF = 1.12 
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